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ADDENDUM A TO BRIEF OF PETITIONER/APPELLANT 
RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE 
MOTOR VEHICLE ENFORCEMENT ACT 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 41-3-1, et seq. 
§ 41-3-101. Short title, UT ST§ 41-3-101 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 41. Motor Vehicles 
Chapter 3. Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act 
Part 1. Administration (Refs & Annos) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-101 
§ 41-3-101. Short title 
Currentness 
This chapter is known as the Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act. 
Credits 
Laws 1992, c. 234, § 12. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-101, UT ST§ 41-3-101 
Current through 2015 First Special Session 
End of Document ·0 :?016 Thomson Rcurcrs. No cl:1im to original U.S. Government Works. 
----------------·--·-· --·-··-- -
§ 41-3-102. Definitions, UT ST§ 41-3-102 
------ -•~•~---------H ~•-•-•-•--•••-••-• ----•-••••H•-•----
KeyCitc Yellow Flag- Negative Treatment 
Proposed Legislation 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 41. Motor Vehicles 
Chapter 3. Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act 
Part 1. Administration (Refs & Annos) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-102 
§ 41-3-102. Definitions 
Currentness 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Administrator" means the motor vehicle enforcement administrator. 
(2) "Agent" means a person other than a ho lder of any dealer's or salesperson's license issued under this chapter, who for salary, 
commission, or compensation of any kind, negotiates in any way for the sale, purchase, order, or exchange of three or more 
motor vehicles for any other person in any 12-month period. 
(3) "Auction" means a dealer engaged in the business of auctioning motor vehicles, either owned or consigned, to the general 
public. 
( 4) "Board" means the advisory board created in Section 4 1-3-106. 
(5) "Body shop" means a business engaged in rebuilding, restoring, repairing, or painting primarily the body of motor vehicles 
damaged by collision or natural disaster. 
(6) "Commission" means the State Tax Commission. 
(7) "Crusher" means a person who crushes or shreds motor vehicles subject lo registration under Title 41, Chapter la, Motor 
Vehicle Act, to reduce the useable materials and metals to a more compact size for recyc ling. 
(S)(a) "Dealer" means a person: 
(i) whose business in whole or in part involves selling new, used, or new and used motor vehicles or off-highway vehicles; 
and 
'-iVestla..vNexr c: 20 16 Th0rns:)n Fi -2uters. Ne c1ai,,, to :xigi'lai U S. Governmer.t Works. 
§ 41 -3-102. Definitions, UT ST§ 41 -3-102 
(ii) who sells, displays for sale, or offers for sale or exchange three or more new or used motor vehicles or off-highway 
vehicles in any 12-month period. 
(b) "Dealer" includes a representative or consignee of any dealer. 
(9)(a) "Dismantler" means a person engaged in the business of dismantling motor vehicles subject to registration under Title 
41, Chapter l a, Motor Vehicle Act, for the resale of parts or for salvage. 
(b) "Dismantler" includes a person who dismantles three or more motor vehicles in any 12-n1onth period. 
(10) "Distributor" means a person who has a franchise from a manufacturer of motor vehicles to distribute motor vehicles 
within this state and who in whole or in part sells or distributes new motor vehicles to dealers or who maintains distributor 
representatives. 
(11) "Distributor branch" means a branch o ffice similarly maintained by a distributor for the same purposes a factory branch 
is maintained. 
(12) "Distributor representative" means a person and each officer and employee of the person engaged as a representative of 
a distributor or distributor branch of motor vehicles to make or promote the sale of the distributor or the distributor branch's 
motor vehicles, or for supervising or contacting dealers or prospective dealers of tl1e distributor or the distributor branch. 
(13) "Division" means the Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division created in Section 4 1-3-1 04. 
(14) "Factory branch" means a branch o ffice maintained by a person who manufactures or assembles motor vehicles for sale 
to distributors, motor vehicle dealers, or who directs or supervises the factory branch's representatives. 
(15) "Factory representative" means a person and each officer and employee of the person engaged as a representative of a 
manufacturer of motor vehicles or by a factory branch to make or promote the sale of the manufacturer's or factory branch's 
motor vehicles, or for supervising or contacting the dealers or prospective dealers of the manufacturer or the factory branch. 
(16) "Franchise" means a contract or agreement betw.een a dealer and a manufacturer of new motor vehicles or its distributor 
or factory branch by which the dealer is authorized to sell any specified make or makes of new motor vehicles. 
(17) "Manufacturer" means a person engaged in the business of constructing or assembling new motor vehicles, ownership of 
which is customarily trans ferred by a manufacturer's statement or certificate of origin, or a person who constructs three or more 
new motor vehicles in any l2-mont11 period. 
( 18) "Motorcycle" has the same meaning as defined in Section 4 1- 1 a- I 02. 
') ,_ 
§ 41-3-102. Definitions, UT ST§ 41-3-102 
--------------·---- ----·--·-----------·--
(I 9)(a) "Motor vehicle" means a vehicle that is: 
(i) self-propelled; 
(ii) a trailer, travel trailer, or semitrailer; or 
(iii) an off-highway vehicle or small trai ler. 
(b) "Motor vehicle" does not include: 
( i) mobile homes as defined in Section 41-la- l 02; 
(ii) trailers of750 pounds or less unladen weight; 
(iii) farm tractors and other machines and tools used in the production, harvesting, and care of farm products; and 
(iv) park model recreational vehicles as defined in Section 41-1a-102. 
(20) "New motor vehicle" means a motor vehicle that has never been titled or registered and has been driven less than 7,500 
miles, unless the motor vehicle is an off-highway vehicle, small trailer, trailer, travel trai ler, or semitrailer, in which case the 
mileage limit does not apply. 
(21) "Off-highway vehicle" has the same meaning as provided in Section 41-22-2. 
(22) "Pawnbroker" means a person whose business is to lend money on security of personal property deposited with him. 
(23) "Principal place of business" means a site or location in this state: 
(a) devoted exclusively to the business for which the dealer, manufacturer, remanufacturer, transporter, dismantler, crusher, 
or body shop is licensed, and businesses incidental to them; 
(b) sufficiently bounded by fence, chain, posts, or otherwise marked to definitely indicate the boundary and to admit a definite 
description with space adequate to permit the display of three or more new, or new and used, or used motor vehicles and 
sufficient parking for the public; and 
(c) that includes a permanent enclosed building or structure large enough to accommodate the office of the establi·slunent 
and to provide a safe place to keep the books and other records of the business, at which the principal portion of the business 
is conducted and the books and records kept and maintained. 
'.//;,stl,➔•:1Ne:<t· © 20'15 fhc"7lsor; K8' ;tes. rfo ,·laim ;c orlg1nai U.S. Gc-vernment \/vorks ') _, 
§ 41-3-102. Definitions, UT ST§ 41-3-102 
---- ----- --- ----·--------------------·-------·------·--
(24) "Remanufacturer" means a person who reconstructs used motor vehicles subject to registration under Title 41, Chapter 
1 a, Motor Vehicle Act, to change the body style and appearance of the motor vehicle or who constructs or assembles motor 
vehicles from used or new and used motor vehicle parts, or who reconstructs, constructs, or assembles three or more motor 
vehicles in any 12-month period. 
(25) "Salesperson" means an individual who for a salary, commission, or compensation of any kind, is employed either directly, 
indirectly, regularly, or occasionally by any new motor vehicle dealer or used motor veh.icle dealer to sell, purchase, or exchange 
or to negotiate for the sale, purchase, or exchange of motor vehicles. 
(26) "Semitrailer" has the same meaning as defined in Section 41-la-102. 
(27) "Small trailer" means a trailer that has an unladen weight of more than 750 pounds, but less than 2,000 pounds. 
(28) "Special equipment" includes a truck mounted crane, cherry picker, material lift, post hole digger, and a util ity or service 
body. 
(29) "Special equipment dealer" means a new or new and used motor vehicle dealer engaged in the business of buying new 
incomplete motor vehicles with a gross vehicle weight of 12,000 or- more pounds and install ing specia l equipment on the 
incomplete motor vehicle. 
(30) "Trailer" has the same meaning as defined, in Section 41-1a-102. 
(31) "Transporter" means a person engaged in the business of transporting motor vehicles as described in Section 41-3-202. 
(32) "Trave l trailer" has the same meaning as provided in Section 41-la-102. 
(33) "Used motor vehicle" means a vehicle that .has been titled and registered to a purchaser other than a dealer or has been 
driven 7,500 or more miles, unless the vehicle is a trailer, or semitrailer, in which case the mileage limit does not apply. 
(34) "Wholesale motor vehicle auction" means a dealer primarily engaged in the business of auctioning consigned motor 
vehicles to dealers or dismantlers who are licensed by this or any other jurisdiction. 
Credits 
Laws 1949, c. 67, § 2; Laws 1961, c. 80, § 6; Laws 1965, c. 81, § l ; Laws 1965, c. 82, § 2; Laws 1981, c. 182, § 4; Laws 
1987, c. 171 , § 2; Laws 1990, c. 192, § l ; Laws 1991, c. 153, § 2; Laws 1992, c. I,§ 179; Laws 1992, c. 234, § 13; Laws 
1995, c. 7, § I, eff. May l , 1995 ; Laws 1998, c. 165, § I , eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 1998, c . 339, § 5, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 
2003, c. 157, § 1, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2008, c. 388, § 2, eff. July 1, 2008; Laws 20 10, c. 393, § I, eff. May 11, 20 10; Laws 
201 4, c. 237, § 10, eff. Jan. I , 2015. 
Codifications C. I 943, Supp. , § 57-6-12; C. 1953, § 41 -3-7. 
'-t/2~,t l<1wNe:<t ,,;.1201G Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S Government Work.s. ,i 
• 
§ 41-3-102. Definitions, UT ST§ 41-3-102 
-------------- -------·· ------ --. 
Notes of Decisions (I) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-102, UT ST§ 41-3-102 
Current through 20 15 First Special Session 
End of Dor um,·nl J;, 20 I G Thomson l<cutcr~ No daim lo origm:ii U S Gov~rnmcm Works. 
'-Nestla·:vNexr c~:) 20 l 6 Thorns:)'1 Reuters. No ciairn to o ;·iqin3i 1J S Government '/·/orks s 
§ 41-3-201. Licenses required--Restitution--Education, UT ST § 41-3-201 
... ,"1,1 
r . KcyCitc Yellow flag - Negative Treatment 
Proposed Legislation 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 41. Motor Vehicles 
Chapter 3. Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act 
Part 2 . Licensing 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-201 
§ 41-3-201. Licenses required--Restitution--Education 
Currentness 
( 1) As used in this section, " new applicant" means a person who is applying for a license that the person has not been issued 
during the previous licensing year. 
(2) A person may not act as any of the fo llowing without having procured a license issued by the administrator: 
(a) a dealer; 
(b) salvage vehicle buyer; 
(c) salesperson; 
( d) manufacturer; 
( e) transporter; 
(f) clismantler; 
(g) distributor; 
(h) facto1y branch and representative; 
(i) distributor branch and representative; 
U) crusher; 
'Nestla•.vNext '{::, 20 i 0 l"h,1msc;-, Reuiers. No cla1tr: tc or;£linc;i U S C:iov1?tnment Wows. 
§ 41-3-201. Licenses required--Restitution--Education, UT ST§ 41 -3-201 
(k) remanufacturer; or 
(I) body shop. 
(3)(a) Except as provided in Subsection (3)(c), a person may not bid on or purchase a vehicle with a nonrepairable or salvage 
certificate as defined in Section 4 1-1a-100 I at or through a motor vehicle auction unless the person is a licensed salvage vehicle 
buyer. 
(b) Except as provided in Subsection (3)(c), a person may not offer for sale, sell, or exchange a vehicle with a nonrepairable 
or salvage certificate as defined in Section 41- la-1001 at or through a motor vehicle auction except_to a licensed salvage 
vehicle buyer. 
(c) A person may offer for sale, sel l, or exchange a vehicle with a nonrepairable or salvage certificate as defined in Section 
4 1-1 a-100 l at or through a motor vehicle auction: 
(i) to an out-of-state or out-of-country purchaser not licensed under this section, but that is authorized to do business in 
the domestic or foreign jurisdiction in which the person is domiciled or registered to do business; 
(ii) subject to the restrictions in Subsection (3)(d), to an in-state purchaser not licensed under this section that: 
(A) has a valid business license in Utah; and 
(B) has a Utah sales tax license; and 
(iii) to a crusher. 
(d)(i) An operator ofa motor vehicle auction shall verify that an in-state purchaser not licensed under this section has the 
licenses required in Subsection (3)(c)(ii). 
(ii) An operator of a motor vehicle auction may only offer for sale, sell, or exchange five vehicles with a salvage certificate 
as defined in Section 41-1a-100 I at or through a motor vehicle auction in any 12 month period to an in-state purchaser 
that does not have a salvage vehicle buyer license issued in accordance with Subsection 41-3-202(15). 
(iii) The five vehicle limitation under this Subsection (3)(d) applies to each Utah sales tax license and not to each person 
with the authority to use a sales tax license. 
(iv) An operator of a motor vehicle auction may not sell a vehicle wi th a nonrepairable certificate as defined in Section 
41- 1a-100 I to a purchaser otherwise a llowed to purchase a vehicle under Subsection (3)(c)(ii). 
'h'estlav,Ne:<t ,{;; 20 ' 13 Tr:crr,scn ReJters. No cla\m to or:ginai U.S. Government VVork.s. 2 
§ 41-3-201. Licenses required--Restitution--Education, UT ST§ 41-3-201 
(e) For a vehicle with a salvage certificate purchased under Subsection (3)(c)(ii), an operator of a motor vehicle auction shall: 
(i)(A) until Subsection (3)(e)(i)(B) applies, make application for a salvage certificate of title on behalf of the Utah purchaser 
within seven days of the purchase if the purchaser does not have a salvage vehicle buyer license, dealer license, body shop 
license, or dismantler license issued in accordance with Section 4 1-3-202; or 
(B) beginning on or after the date that the Motor Vehicle Division has implemented the Motor Vehicle Division's 
GenTax system, make application electronically, in a form and time period approved by the Motor Vehicle Division, 
for a salvage certificate of title to be issued in the name of the purchaser; 
(ii) g ive to the purchaser a disclosure printed on a separate piece of paper that states: 
"THIS DISCLOSURE STATEMENT MUST BE GIVEN BY THE SELLER TO THE BUYER EVERY TIME THJS 
VEHICLE rs RESOLD WITH A SALVAGE CERTIFICATE 
Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) 
Year: Make: Model: 
SALVAGE VEHICLE--NOT FOR RESALE WITHOUT DISCLOSURE 
WARNING: THIS SALVAGE VEHICLE MAY NOT BE SAFE FOR OPERATION UNLESS PROPERLY REPAJRED. 
SOME ST ATES MAY REQUIRE AN INSPECTION BEFORE THIS VEHICLE MAY BE REGISTERED. THE ST A TE 
OF UTAH MAY REQUIRE THIS VEHICLE TO BE PERMANENTLY BRANDED AS A REBUILT SALVAGE 
VEHICLE. OTHER ST ATES MAY ALSO PERMANENTLY BRAND THE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE. 
Signature of Purchaser 
(iii) if applicable, provide evidence to the Motor Vehicle Division of: 
(A) payment of sales taxes on taxable sales in accordance with Section 4 l- l a-5 1 0; 
(B) the identification number inspection required under Section 41-1 a-5 l l; and 
(C) the odometer disclosure statement required under Section 41-1 a-902. 
Date"; 
and 
(f) The Motor Vehicle Division shall include a link to the disclosure statement described in Subsection (3)( e)(ii) on its website. 
'./..'2stla•NNext ,t, 2J lG Thornsor: Reuters. No ciaim to ~;riginai U.S. Governn;enl iNGrks. 
§ 41-3-201 . Licenses required--Restitution--Education, UT ST § 41 -3-201 
(g) The commission may impose an administrative entrance fee established in accordance with the procedures and 
requirements of Section 631-1-504 not to exceed $10 on a person not holding a license described in Subsection (3)(e)(i) 
that enters the physical premises of a motor vehicle auction for the purpose of viewing available salvage vehicles prior to 
an auction. 
(h) A vehicle sold at or through a motor vehicle auction to an out-of-state purchaser with a nonrepairable or salvage certificate 
may not be certificated in Utah until the vehicle has been certificated out-of-state. 
(4)(a) An operator of a motor vehicle auction shall keep .a record of the sale of each salvage vehicle. 
(b) A record described under Subsection (4)(a) shall contain: 
(i) the purchaser's name and address; and 
(ii) the year, make, and vehicle identification number for each salvage vehicle sold. 
(c) An operator ofa motor vehicle auction shall: 
(i)_provide the record described in Subsection ( 4)(a) electronically in a method approved by the division to the division 
within two business days of the completion of the motor vehicle auction; 
(ii) retain the record described in this Subsection ( 4) for five years from the date of sale; and 
(iii) make a record described in this Subsection ( 4) available for inspection by the division at the location of the motor 
vehicle auction during normal business hours. 
(5)(a) If applicable, an operator of a motor vehicle auction shall comply with the reporting requirements of the Nation'al Motor 
Vehicle Title Information System overseen by the United States Department of Justice if the person sells a vehicle with a salvage 
certificate to an in-state purchaser under Subsection (3)(c)(ii). 
(b) The Motor Vehicle Division shall include a link to the National Motor Vehicle Title Information System on its website. 
(6)(a) An operator of a motor vehicle auction that sells a salvage vehicle to a person that is an out-of-country buyer shall: 
(i) stamp on the face of the title so as not to obscure the name, date, or mileage statement the words " FOR EXPORT 
ONLY" in all capital, black lette rs; and 
(ii) stamp in each unused reassignment space on the back of the title the words "FOR EXPORT ONLY." 
'·Nestl~wNexr li;) ;,o·,G T!~cr'l's0r f'.;e~;ters. No c:;airr: to o:-iginai U.S Government Works. 4 
§ 41 -3-201. Licenses required--Restitution--Education,. UT ST § 41-3-201 
(b) The words "FOR EXPORT ONLY" shall be: 
(i) at least two inches wide; and 
(ii) c learly legible. 
(7) A supplemental license shall be secured by a dealer, manufacturer, remanu~acturer, transporter, dismantler, crusher, or body 
shop for each additional place of business maintained by the licensee. 
(8)(a) A person who has been convicted of any law re lating to motor vehicle commerce or motor vehicle fraud may not be issued 
a license or purchase a vehicle with a salvage or nonrepairable certificate unless full restitution regarding those convictions 
has been made. 
(b) An operator of a motor vehicle auction, a dealer, or a consignor may not sell a vehicle with a nonrepairable or salvage 
certificate to a buyer described in Subsection (8)(a) if the division has informed the operator of the motor vehicle auction, 
the dealer, or the consignor in writing that the buyer is prohibited from purchasing a vehicle with a nonrepairable or salvage 
certificate under Subsection (8)(a). 
(9)(a) The division may not issue a license to a new applicant for a new or used motor vehicle dealer license, a new or used 
motorcycle dealer license, or a small trailer dealer license unless the new applicant completes an eight-hour orientation class 
approved by the division that includes education on motor vehicle laws and rules. 
(b) The approved costs of the orientation class shall be paid by the new applicant. 
(c) The class shall be completed by the new applicant and the applicant's partners, corporate officers, bond indemnitors, and 
managers. 
(d)(i) The division s_hall approve: 
(A) providers of the orientation class; and 
(B) costs of the orientation class. 
(ii) A provider of an orientation class shall submit the orientation c lass curriculum to the division for approval prior to 
teaching the orientation c lass. 
( iii) A provider of an orientation class sha ll include in the orientation materials: 
'·Nestl.=;•.vNext C:.' ?01'3 TiYimson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government \ivc;rks. ,. c• 
• 
§ 41-3-201. Licenses required--Restitution--Education, UT ST§ 41-3-201 
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(A) ethics training; 
(B) motor vehicle title and registration processes; 
(C) provisions of Title 13, Chapter 5, Unfair Practices Act, re lating to motor vehicles; 
(D) Department ofinsurance requirements relating to motor vehicles; 
(E) Department of Public Safety requirements relating to motor vehicles; 
(F) federal requirements related to motor vehicles as determined by the division; and 
(G) any required disclosure compliance forms as determined by the division. 
(10) A person or purchaser described in Subsection (3)(c)(ii): 
(a) may not purchase more than five salvage vehicles with a nonrepairable or salvage certificate as defi!led in Section 
41-la-1001 in any 12-month period; 
(b) may not, without first complying with Section 41-l a-705, offer for sale, sell, or exchange more than two vehicles with a 
salvage certificate as defined in Section 41-la-1001 in any 12-month period to a person not licensed under this section; and 
(c) may not, without first complying with Section 41-la-705, offer for sale, sell , or exchange a vehicle with a nonrepairable 
certificate as defined in Section 41-la-1001 to a person not licensed under this section. 
(1 1) An operator of a motor vehicle auction, a dealer, or a consignor may not sell a vehicle with a nonrepairable or salvage 
certificate to a buyer des_cribed in Subsection (lO)(a) if the division has informed the operator of the motor vehicle auction, 
the dealer, or the consignor in writing that the buyer is prohibited from purchasing a vehicle with a nonrepairable or salvage 
certificate under Subsection (1 0)(a). 
Credits 
Laws 1949, c. 67, § I; Laws I 961, c. 80, § 5; Laws I 965, c . 81, § I; Laws 1981, c. 182, § 3; Laws 1991, c. 153, § I; Laws 199 l, 
c. 241, § 65; Laws l 992, c. 234, § 23; Laws 1999, c. 239, § 1, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2000, c. 311, § I, eff. July I, 2000; Laws 
2008, c . 388, § 3, eff. July I, 2008; Laws 2009, c. 234, § 1, eff. May 12, 2009; Laws 20 I 0, c. 393, § 4, eff. May 11 , 201 0; Laws 
2012, c. 390, § 4, eff. Oct. I, 2012; Laws 2013, c. 463, § 5, eff. May 14, 2013. 
Codifications C. 1943, Supp. , § 57-6-1 1; C. 1953, § 4 1-3-6. 
'/Vestla>.vNe:ct· © 20 i G Thorn son f~euters. No c:airn to origin a: U S. Governrnent V\Jorks . 6 
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Notes of Decisions (I) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-201, UT ST§ 41-3-201 
Current through 2015 First Special Session 
End ol'Documcnt ,<' 2016 Th<>ms, ,11 R~utcr, No cluim to original U.S. Govcrnm~nf Works 
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§ 41-3-201.5. Brokering of a new motor vehicle without a ... , UT ST§ 41-3-201.5 
-------------------
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 41. Motor Vehicles 
Chapter 3. Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act 
Part 2 . Licensing 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-201.5 
-----------------·--------------
§ 41-3-201.5. Brokering of a new motor vehicle without a license prohibited 
Currentness 
(l)(a) A person may not, for a fee, commission, or other form of compensation, arrange, offer to arrange, or broker a transaction 
involving the sale or lease of more than two: 
(i) new or used motor vehicles 111 any 12 consecutive month period, unless the person is licensed under Subsection 
41 -3-202(1); or 
(ii) used motor vehicles in any I 2 consecutive month period, unless the person is licensed under Subsection 41-3-202(2). 
(b) Each transaction a person arranges, offers to arrange, or brokers involving the sale or lease of a motor vehicle for a fee, 
commission, or other form of compensation is a separate violation under this section if: 
(i) the person has for a fee, commission, or other form of compensation, arranged, offered to arrange, or brokered the sale 
or lease of more than two new or used motor vehicles within the previous 12 consecutive month period; and 
(ii) the person is not licensed under Subsection 41-3-202(1). 
(2) A person who violates this section is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
Credits 
Laws 1997, c. 187, § I , eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 2007, c. 105, § I , eff. April 30, 2007; Laws 2010, c. 393, § 5, eff. May 11, 2010. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 41. Motor Vehicles 
Chapter 3. Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act 
Part 2. Licensing 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-201.7 
§ 41-3-201.7. Supplemental license for additional place of business restrictions--Exception 
Currentness 
(l)(a) Subject to the requirements of Subsection (2), a supplemental license for an additional place of business issued pursuant 
to Subsection 4 1-3-20 l(7) may only be issued to a dealer if the dealer is: 
(i) licensed in accordance with Section 4 1-3-202; 
(ii) bonded in accordance with Section 41-3-205; and 
(iii) in compliance with existing rules promulgated by the administrator of the division under Section 41-3- l 05. 
(b) A supplemental license for a permanent additional place of business may only be issued to a used motor vehicle dealer if: 
(i) the dealer independently satisfies the bond requirements under Section 4 1-3-205 for the permanent additional place 
of business; 
(ii) the dealer is in compliance with existing rules promulgated by the administrator of the division under Section 41-3-105; 
and 
(iii) the permanent additional place of business meets all the requirements for a principal place of business. 
(2)(a) Except as provided in Subsections (2)(c) and (3), a supplemental license for an additional place ofbusiness issued pursuant 
to Subsection 4 1-3-20 1(7) for a new motor vehicle dealer may not be issued for an additional place of business that is beyond 
the geographic specifications outlined as the area of responsibility in the dealer's franchise agreement. 
(b) A new motor vehicle dealer shall provide the administrator with a copy of the portion of the new motor vehicle dealer's 
franchise agreement identifying the dealer's area ofresponsibility before being issued a supplemental license for an additional 
place of business. 
(c) The restrictions under Subsections (2)(a) and (b) do not apply to a new motor vehicle dealer if the license for an additional 
place of business is being issued for the sale of used motor vehicles. 
---------------------------·--·---- --- -------------
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(3) The provisions of Subsection (2) do not apply if the additional place of business is a trade show or exhibition if: 
(a) there are five or more dealers participating in the trade show or exhibition; and 
(b) the trade show or exhibition takes place at a location other than the principal place of business of one of the dealers 
participating in the trade show or exhibition. 
(4) A supplemental license for a temporary additional place of business issued to a used motor vehicle dealer may not be for 
longer than 10 consecutive days. 
C r edits 
Laws 2007, c. 70, § 1, eff. April 30, 2007; Laws 2009, c. 234, § 2, eff. May 12, 2009; Laws 2010, c. 393, § 6, eff. May 11, 
201 0; Laws 20 12, c. 390, § 5, eff. Oct. I, 20 I 2. 
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Proposed Legislation 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 41. Motor Vehicles 
Chapter 3. Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act 
Part 2. Licensing 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-202 
§ 41-3-202. Licenses--Classes and scope 
Currentness 
(I) A new motor vehicle dealer's license permits the licensee to: 
(a) offer for sale, sell, or exchange new motor vehicles if the licensee possesses a franchise from the manufacturer of the 
motor vehicle offered for sale, sold, or exchanged by the licensee; 
(b) offer for sale, sell, or exchange used motor vehicles; 
(c) operate as a body shop; and 
(d) dismantle motor vehicles. 
(2) A used motor vehicle dealer's license permits the licensee to: 
(a) offer for sale, sell, or exchange used motor vehicles; 
(b) operate as a body shop; and 
(c) dismantle motor vehicles. 
(3) A new motorcycle, off-highway vehicle, and small trailer dealer's license permits the licensee to: 
(a) offer for sale, sell, or exchange new motorcycles, off-highway vehicles, or small trailers if the licensee possesses a 
franchise from the manufacturer of the motorcycle, off-highway vehicle, or small trailer offered for sale, sold, or exchanged· 
by the licensee; 
(b) offer for sale, sell, or exchange used motorcycles, off-highway vehicles, or small trailers; and 
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(c) dismantle motorcycles, off-highway vehicles, or small trailers. 
(4) A used motorcycle, off-highway vehicle, and small trailer dealer's license permits the licensee to: 
(a) offer for sale, sell, or exchange used motorcycles, off-highway vehicles, and small trailers; and 
(b) dismantle motorcycles, off-highway vehicles, or small trailers. 
(5)(~) Except as provided in Subsection (5)(b), a salesperson's license permits the licensee to act as a motor vehicle salesperson 
and is valid for employment with only one dealer at a time. 
(b) A licensee that has been issued a salesperson's license and that is employed by a dealer that operates as a wholesale motor 
vehicle auction may be employed by more than one dealer that operates as a wholesale motor vehicle auction at a time. 
(6)(a) A manufacturer's license permits the licensee to construct or assemble motor vehicles subject to registration under Title 
41, Chapter I a, Motor Vehicle Act, at an established place of business and to remanufacture motor vehicles. 
(b) Under rules made by the administrator, the licensee may issue and install vehicle identification numbers on manufactured 
· motor vehicles. 
(c) The licensee may franchise and appoint dealers to sell manufactured motor vehicles by notifying the division of the 
franchise or appointment. 
(7) A transporter's license permits the licensee to transport or deliver motor vehicles subject to registration under Title 41, 
Chapter I a, Motor Vehicle Act, from a manufacturing, assembling, or distributing point or from a dealer, to dealers, distributors, 
or sales agents of a manufacturer or remanufacturer, to or from detail or repair shops, and to financial institutions or places of 
storage from points of repossession. 
(8) A dismantler's license permits the licensee to dismantle motor vehicles subject to registration under Title 41 , Chapter I a, 
Motor Vehicle Act, for the purpose of reselling parts or for salvage, or selling dismantled or salvage vehicles to a crusher or 
other dismantler. 
(9) A distributor or factory branch and distributor branch's license permits the licensee to sell and distribute new motor vehicles, 
parts, and accessories to their franchised dealers. 
(10) A representative's license, for factory representatives or distributor representatives permits the licensee to contact the 
licensee's authorized dealers for the purpose of making or promoting the sale of motor vehicles, parts, and accessories. 
'./,est[,l'.vNexr C 20 i6 Thor.1son Reuters No daim to o;-iginal U.S C0vemn;ent ,fvcri<s. 2 
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(11 )(a)(i) A remanufacturer's license permits the licensee to construct, reconstruct, assemble, or reassemble motor vehicles 
subject to registration under Title 41, Chapter I a, Motor Vehicle Act, from used or new motor vehicles or parts. 
(ii) Evidence of ownership of parts and motor vehicles used in remanufacture shall be available to the division upon 
demand. 
(b) Under rules made by the administrator, the licensee may issue and install vehicle identification numbers on 
remanufactured motor vehicles. 
(12) A crusher's license permits the licensee to engage in the business of crushing or shredding motor vehicles subject to 
registration under Title 41, Chapter la, Motor Vehicle Act, for the purpose of reducing the useable materials and metals to a 
more compact size for recycling. 
(13) A body shop's license permits the licensee to rebuild, restore, repair, or paint primarily the body of motor vel1icles damaged 
by collision or natural disaster, and to dismantle motor vehicles. 
(14) A special equipment dealer's license permits the licensee to: 
(a) buy incomplete new motor vehicles with a gross vehicle weight of 12,000 or more pounds from a new motor vehicle 
dealer and sell the new vehicle with the special equipment installed without a franchise from the manufacturer; 
(b) offer for sale, sell, or exchange used motor vehicles; 
(c) operate as a body shop; and 
(d) dismantle motor vehicles. 
(I 5)(a) A salvage vehicle buyer license permits the licensee to bid on or purchase a vehicle with a salvage certificate as defined 
in Section 41-1a-100 I at any motor vehicle auction. 
(b) A salvage vehicle buyer license may only be issued to a motor vehicle dea ler, dismantler, or body shop who quali fies 
under rules made by the division and is licensed in any state as a motor vehicle dealer, dismantler, or body shop. 
(c) The division may not issue more than two salvage veh icle buyer licenses to any one dealer, dismantler, or body shop. 
(d) In accordance with Title 630, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, the administrator shall make rules 
establishing qualifications ofan applicant for a salvage vehic le buyer license. The criteria shall include: 
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(i) business histo1y; 
( ii) salvage vehicle qual ifications; 
(ii i) abi lity to properly handle and dispose of environmental hazardous materials associated with salvage vehicles; and 
(iv) record in demonstrating compliance with the provisions of this chapter. 
Credits 
Laws 1949, c. 67, § 6; Laws 196 1, c. 80, § 9; Laws 1965, c. 81 , § l ; Laws 1965, c. 82, § 3; Laws 1981, c. 182, § 7; Laws 
1987, c. 171, § 5; Laws 1991, c. 153, § 4; Laws 1992, c. 234, § 24; Laws 1998, c. 165, § 2, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 2000, 
c. 311, § 2, eff. July 1, 2000; Laws 2003, c. 157, § 2, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2008, c. 382, § 558, eff. May 5, 2008; Laws 
2009, c. 78, § I, eff. May 12, 2009. 
Codifications C. 1943, Supp.,§ 57-6-16; C. 1953, § 41-3-1 2. 
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KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Treatment 
Proposed Legislation 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 41. Motor Vehicles 
Chapter 3. Motor·vehicle Business Regulation Act 
Part 2. Licensing 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-203 
§ 41-3-203. Licenses--Form--Seal--Custody of salesperson's license--
Display of salesperson and dealer licenses--Licensee's pocket card 
Currentness 
( I )(a) The administrator shall prescribe the fom1 of each license and the seal of his office shall be imprinted on each license. 
(b) The license of each salesperson shall be delivered or mailed to the dealer employing the salesperson and it shall be kept 
in the custody and control of the dealer and conspicuously displayed in the dealer's place of business. 
(c) Each licensee shall display conspicuous ly his own license in his place of business. 
(2)(a).The administrator shall prepare and deliver a pocket card, certifying that the person whose name is on the card is licensed 
under this chapter. 
(b) Each salesperson's card shall also contain the name and address of the dealer employing him. 
(c) Each salesperson shall on request display his pocket card. 
Credits 
Laws 1949, c. 67, § 11; Laws 1961 , c. 80, § 12; Laws 1981, c. 182, § 11; Laws 1991, c. 153, § 8; Laws 1992, c. 234, § 25. 
Codifications C. 1943, Supp.,§ 57-6-2 1; C. 1953, § 41-3-19. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-203, UT ST§ 4 1-3-203 
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Proposed Legislation 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 41. Motor Vehicles 
Chapter 3. Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act 
Part 2. Licensing 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-204 
§ 41-3-204. Licenses--Principal place of business as prerequisite--
Change of location--Relinquishment on loss of principal place of business 
Currentness 
( ! )(a) The following licensees must maintain a principal place of business: 
(i) dealers; 






(viii) body shops; and 
(ix) distributors who: 
(A) are located within the state; or 
(B) have a branch office within the state. 
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(b) The administrator may not issue a license under Subsection (!)(a) to an applicant who does not have a principal place 
of business. 
(c) If a licensee changes the location of his principal place of business, he shall immediately notify the administrator and a 
new license shall be granted for the unexpired portion of the term of the original license at no additional fee. 
(2)(a) If a licensee loses possession of a principal place of business, the license is automatically suspended and he shall 
immediately notify the administrator and upon demand by the administrator deliver the license, pocket cards, special plates, 
and temporary permits to the administrator. 
(b) The administrator shall hold the licenses, cards, plates, and permits until the licensee obtains a principal place of business. 
C redits 
Laws 1949, c. 67, § 12(A); Laws 1961, c. 80, § 13; Laws 1981, c. 182, § 12; Laws 1987, c. 171, § 9; Laws 199 1, c. 153, § 9; 
Laws 1992, c. 234, § 26; Laws 1998, c. 165, § 3, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 2008, c. 388, § 4, eff. July 1, 2008. 
Codifications C. 1943, Supp.,§ 57-6-22(A); C. 1953, § 41 -3-20. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-204, UT ST§ 41-3-204 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 41. Motor Vehicles 
Chapter 3. Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act 
Part 2. Licensing 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-205 
§ 41-3-205. Licenses--Bonds required--Maximum liabilily--Action against surely--Loss of bond 
Currentness 
(l)(a) Before a dealer's, special equipment dealer's, crusher's, or body shop's license is issued, the applicant shall file with the 
administrator a corporate surety bond in the amount of: 
(i) $50,000 until June 30, 2006, and $75,000 on or after July I, 2006, for a motor vehicle dealer's license; 
(ii) $20,000 until June 30, 2006, and $75,000 on or after July 1, 2006, for a special equipment dealer's license; 
(iii) $10,000 for a motorcycle, off-highway vehicle, or small trailer dealer's or crusher's license; or 
(iv) $20,000 for a body shop's license. 
(b) The corporate surety shall be licensed to do business wiU1in the state and have a rating of at least B+ by the A.M. Best 
Company. 
(c) The form of the bond: 
(i) shall be approved by the attorney general; 
(ii) shall be conditioned upon the applicant's conducting business as a dealer without: 
(A) fraud; 
(B) fraudulent representation; 
(C) violating Subsection 41-3-30 I ( 1) which requires a dealer to submit or deliver a certi ficate of title or manufacturer's 
certificate of origin; or 
(D) violating Subsection 41-3-402(1) which requi res payoff of liens on motor vehicles traded in ; and 
'-Nestl;iw Nexr © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to otig;nal U.S. Government No;~"-
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(iii) may be continuous in form. 
( d) The total aggregate liability on the bond to al I persons making claims, regardless of the number of claimants or the number 
of years a bond remains in force, may not exceed the amount of the bond. 
(2)(a) A cause of action under Subsection(!) may not be maintained against a surety unless: 
(i) a claim is filed in writing with the administrator within one year after the cause of action arose; and 
(ii) the action is commenced within two years after the cla im was filed with the administrator. 
(b) The surety or principal shall notify the administrator ifa claim on the bond is successfully prosecuted or settled against 
the surety or principal. 
(3)(a) A surety or principal may not make a payment on a surety bond to any claimant until s ix months have expired from the 
date when the first claim on the bond was filed with the surety ·or pri!lcip,al in writing. 
(b) After six months have expired following the filing of the first bond claim, the surety or principal shall: 
(i) assess the validity of all claims on the bond; and 
(ii) submit a distribution assessment determined in accordance with Subsection (3)(c) regarding the bond proceeds to the 
claimants of valid claims for approval. 
(c)(i) If the total verifiable claims on the bond are less than the bond amount, then each bond claimant shall be entitled to 
the full amount of a valid claim. 
( ii) If the total verifiable claims exceed the bond amount, then the proceeds shall be distributed pro rata to the bond 
claimants of valid claims. 
(d) If the distribution assessment under Subsection (3)(b) is not unanimously approved by the claimants of all val id claims 
on the bond, the principal or surety shall file an interpleader actioi1 in the state district court where the defaulting dealer 
was licensed. 
(4)(a) A person making a claim on the bond shall be awarded attorney fees in cases successfully prosecuted or settled against 
the surety or principal if the bond has not been depleted. 
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(b) A surety or principal may not be awarded attorney fees that exceed $2,500 for an interpleader action filed under Subsection 
(3)(d). 
(5)(a)(i) If a dealer, body shop, or crusher loses possession of the bond required by this chapter, the dealer, body shop, or crusher 
license is automatically suspended. 
(ii) All licenses, pocket cards, temporary permits, and special plates issued to the licensee shall be immediate ly returned 
to the administrator. 
(b) A dealer, body shop, or crusher may not continue to use or permit to be used licenses, pocket cards, temporary permits, 
or special plates until the required bond is on file w ith the administrator and the license has been reinstated. 
(6) A representative or consignee of a dealer is not required to fi le a bond if the dealer for whom the representative or consignee 
acts fully complies with the provisions of this chapter. 
C redits 
Laws 1949, c. 67, § 8; Laws 1961, c. 80, § 11; Laws 1977, c. 175, § l ; Laws 1981, c. 182, § 9; Laws 1983, c. 188, § I; Laws 
1987, c. 171, § 7; Laws 1991, c. 27, § I ; Laws 1991, c. 153, § 6; Laws 1992, c. 234, § 27; Laws 1998, c. 165, § 4, eff. May 4, 
1998; Laws 1999, c. 239, § 2, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2003, c. 157, § 3, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2005, c. 90, § 1, eff. July 1, 
2005; Laws 2007, c. 267, § I , eff. April 30, 2007; Laws 2010, c. 342, § 5, eff. May 11, 2010. 
Codifications C. 1943, Supp.,§ 57-6-1 8; C. 1953, § 4 1-3-16. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 41. Motor Vehicles 
Chapter 3. Motor Vehicle Bus iness Regulation Act 
Part 2 . Licensing 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-205.5 
§ 41-3-205.5. Licenses--Criminal background check required on salesperson's licen~es--Payment of cost 
Currentness 
(l)(a) Every applicant for a salesperson's license shall submit fingerprints with a completed application to the division. 
(b) A person required to renew a salesperson license on or before June 30, 2010, shall submit fingerprints to the division 
on or before November 30, 2010. 
(2) The division shall submit fingerprints for each applicant described in Subsection (1) to the Bureau of Criminal Identification 
established in Section 53-10-201. 
(3) The Bureau of Criminal Identification shall: 
(a) check the information submitted by the division for an applicant under Subsection (2) against the applicable state and 
regional criminal records databases; and 
(b) release to the division all information obtained under Subsection (3)(a) relating to the applicant. 
( 4)(a) The Bureau of Criminal Identification shall maintain a separate file of fingerprints submitted under Subsection (2) and 
notify the division when a new entry is made in the applicable state and regional database against a person whose fingerprints 
are held in the fi le regarding any matt~r involving an arrest under state law involving: 
( i) motor vehicles; 
(ii) controlled substances; 
(iii) fraud; or 
( iv) a registerable sex offense under Section 77-41-106. 
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(b) Upon request by the divis ion, the Bureau of Crimina l Identification shall inform the division whether a person whose 
arrest was reported to the division under Subsection (4)(a) was subsequently convicted of the charge for which the person 
was arrested. 
(5) In addition to any fees imposed under this chapter, the division shall: 
(a) impose on individuals submitting fingerprints in accordance with this section the fees that the Bureau of Criminal 
Identification is authorized to collect for the services the Bureau of Criminal Identification provides under Subsections (3) 
and (4); and 
(b) remit the fees collected under Subsection (5)(a) to the Bureau of Criminal Identification. 
(6) The division shall use information received from the Bureau of Criminal Identification under this section to determine 
whether a license should be denied, suspended, or revoked under Section 4 l -3-209. 
Credits 
Laws 2010, c. 291, § l , eff. July I, 20 10; Laws 2012, c. 145, § I , eff. May 8, 2012. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 41. Motor Vehicles 
--------·- - - .. ·-· -·- . 
Chapter 3. Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act 
Part 2 . Licensing 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-206 
§ 41-3-206. Duration oflicenses--Expiration date--Renewal 
Currentness 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), each license issued und~r this chapter expires on June 30 of each year and may be 
renewed upon application and payment of a fee required under Section 4 1-3-60 I, if the license has not been suspended or 
revoked. 
(2) A motor vehicle salesperson's license expires as provided under Subsection (1) or when the salesperson terminates 
employment with the dealer with whom he is licensed, whichever comes first. 
(3)(a) Beginning July I , 1999, the division may not renew a license for a new or used motor vehicle dealer's license, a new or 
used motorcycle dealer's license, or a small trailer dealer's license w1less the renewal applicant completes a three-hour class 
approved by the division that includes education on new motor vehicle laws and rules. 
(b) The approved costs of the class shall be paid by the renewal applicant. 
(c) The class shall be completed by the renewal applicant or any designated representative of the renewal applicant dealer. 
(d) The division shall approve: 
(i) the class providers; and 
( ii) costs of the c lass. 
Credits 
Laws 1992, c. 234, § 28; Laws 1999, c. 239, § 3, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2008, c. 388, § 5, eff. Ju ly I, 2008. 
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§ 41-3-207. New motor vehicle dealer's license--Change, addition, ... , UT ST§ 41-3-207 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 41. Motor Vehicles 
Chapter 3. Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act 
Part 2. Licensing 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-207 
§ 41-3-207. New motor vehicle dealer's license--Change, addition, or loss 
of franchise--Notification--Relinquishment of license and relicensing as 
used motor vehicle dealer--Continuance in business to dispose of stock 
Currentness 
(1) If a dealer changes to, adds, cancels, or loses a franchise for the sale of new motor vehicles he shall immediately notify 
the administrator. 
(2)(a) If the dealer has cancelled or lost a franchise, the administrator shall determine whether the dealer should be licensed 
as a used motor vehicle dealer. 
(b) If the administrator determines that the dealer should be licensed as a used motor vehicle dealer, he shall issue to the 
dealer a used motor vehicle dealer's license. 
(c) A dealer relicensed as a used motor vehicle dealer may continue to sell new motor vehicles for up to six months from the 
date of the relicensing, to enable the dealer to dispose ofhis _existing stock of new motor vehicles. 
Credits 
Laws 1949, c. 67, § 12(8); Laws 1992, c. 234, § 29. 
Codifications C. 1943, Supp.,§ 57-6-22(8); C. 1953, § 41-3-21. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-207, UT ST§ 41-3-207 
Current through 2015 First Special Session 
En<l of Oornment ,t~ 2016 Thomson Reuters No ria1111 to origin:ti US GOlcmmcnt Works. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 41. Motor Vehicles 
Chapter 3. Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act 
Part 2. Licensing 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-207.5 
§ 41-3-207.5. Liquidation of inventory for suspended used motor vehicle dealers 
Currentness 
(l) A used motor vehicle dealer whose used motor vehicle dealer's license has been suspended may liquidate any remaining 
inventory by selling the remaining used motor vehicles to: 
(a) a licensed auto auction; 
(b) another licensed motor vehicle dealer; or 
(c) to any person, but only after the used motor vehicle has been titled in the name of the owner, partner, or corporate officer 
of the used motor vehicle dealer for at least 12 months. 
(2) A dealer may sell inventory under Subsections ( l )(a) and (b) for up to 90 days from the date the dealer's used motor vehicle 
dealer's license was suspended. 
Credits 
Laws 2008, c. 388, § 6, eff. July 1, 2008. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41 -3-207.5, UT ST§ 41-3-207.5 
Current through 2015 First Special Session 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 41. Motor Vehicles 
Chapter 3. Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act 
Part 2. Licensing 
--·--·----·--· ·- ---------
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-208 
§ 41-3-208. Salesperson's license--Relinquishment upon loss or 
change of employment--Notice to salesperson--New license required 
Currentness 
( 1) If a salesperson is discharged from or leaves his employer, the dealer who last employed the salesperson shall return the 
salesperson's license to the administrator. 
(2) The salesperson shall be notified at his last known place of residence that his license has been returned to the administrator. 
(3) A person may not act as a motor vehicle salesperson until a new license is procured. 
Credits 
Laws 1949, c. 67, § 12(C); Laws 1992, c. 234, § 30. 
Codifications C. 1943, Supp.,§ 57-6-22(C); C. 1953, § 41-3-22. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-208, UT ST § 41-3-208 
Current through 2015 First Special Session 
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; • KcyCitc Yellow Flag• Negative Treatment 
Proposed Legislation 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 41. Motor Vehicles 
Chapter 3. Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act 
Part 2. Licensing 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-209 
§ 41-3-209. Administ rator's findings--Suspension and revocation oflicense 
Currentness 
(1) If the administrator finds that an applicant is not qualified to receive a license, a license may not be granted. 
(2)(a) On December 1, 2010, the administrator shall suspend the license ofa salesperson who fails to submit to the divis_ion 
fingerprints as required under Subsection 41-3-205.5( 1 )(b) on or before November 30, 20 I 0. 
(b) If the administrator finds that there is reasonable cause to deny, suspend, or revoke a license issued under this chapter, 
the administrator shall deny, suspend, or revoke the license. 
( c) Reasonable cause for denia l, suspension, or revocation of a license includes, in rel~tion to the applicant or license holder 
or any of its partners, officers, or directors: 
(i) lack of a principal place of business; 
(ii ) lack of a sales tax license required w1der Title 59, Chapter 12, Sales and Use Tax Act; 
(iii) lack of a bond in effect as required by this chapter; 
(iv) current revocation or suspension of a dealer, dismantler, auction, or salesperson license issued in another state; 
(v) nonpayment of requi red foes; 
(vi) making a fa lse statement on any application for a license under this chapter or for special license plates; 
(vii) a violation of any state or federal law involving motor vehicles; 
(vi ii) a violation of any state or federal law involving controlled substances; 
'.f.iestl, wNexr O 20·1(3 ·Ttio,nson Rt:iuters. No cia:rn to original US Government '/\/ork.s. 
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(ix) charges filed with any county attorney, district attorney, or U.S. attorney in any court of competent jurisdiction for a 
violation of any state or federal law involving motor vehicles; 
(x) a violation of any state or federal law involving fraud; 
(xi) a violation of any state or federal law involving a registerable sex offense under Section 77-4 1-106; or 
(xii) having had a license issued under this chapter revoked within five years from the date of application. 
(d) Any action taken by the administrator under Subsection (2)(c)(ix) shall remain in effect until a final resolution is reached 
by the court involved or the charges are dropped. 
(3) If the administrator finds that an applicant is not quali fied to receive a license under this section, the administrator shall 
provide the applicant written notice of the reason for the denial. 
( 4) If the administrator finds that the license holder has been convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction of violating any of 
the provisions of this chapter or any ru les made by the administrator, or finds other reasonable cause, the administrator may, 
by complying with the emergency procedures of Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative Procedures Act: 
(a) suspend the license on terms and for a period of time the administrator finds reasonable; or 
(b) revoke the license. 
(5)(a) After suspending or revoking a license, the administrator may take reasonable action to: 
(i) notify the public that the licensee is no longer in business; and 
(ii) prevent the former licensee from violating the law by conducting business without a license. 
(b) Action under Subsection (5)(a) may include signs, banners, barriers, locks, bulletins, and notices. 
(c) Any business being conducted incidental to the business for which the former licensee was licensed may continue to 
operate subject to the preventive action taken under this subsection. 
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C red its 
Laws 1949, c. 67, § 16; Laws 1987, c. 161, § 14 1; Laws 1987, c. 171, § 13; Laws 1992, c. 234, § 3 1; Laws 1998, c. 165, § 5, 
eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 2005, c. 144, § I , eff. May 2, 2005; Laws 2008, c. 382, § 559, eff. May 5, 2008; Laws 20 10, c. 29 1, § 
2, eff. July I, 2010; Laws 2010, c. 342, § 6, eff. May 11 , 2010; Laws 2012, c. 145, § 2, eff. May 8, 20 12. 
Codifications C. 1943, Supp.,§ 57-6-26; C. 1953, § 41 -3-26. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 4 1-3-209, UT ST § 41-3-209 
Current through 20 15 First Special Session 
End of Doc 11111 c11t t!) 20 16 Thomson Rcul~rs. No claim to original U.S. Go,·cnuncnt Works 
'·,\lestlawNext' '02016 The:mson Reuters. No claim to originai U.S Governme:-it Works. 
§ 41-3-210. License holders--Prohibitions and requirements, UT ST§ 41-3-210 
-··•·------·------------
r., KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Treatment 
Proposed Legislation 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 41. Motor Vehicles 
Chapter 3. Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act 
Part 2. Licensing 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-210 
---·-·--·--·-··---- ------
§ 41-3-210. License holders--Prohibitions and requirements 
Currentness 
(1) The holder of any license issued under th is chapter may not: 
(a) intentionally publish, display, or circulate any advertising that is misleading or inaccurate in any material fact or that 
misrepresents any of the products sol9, manufactured, remanufactured, handled, or furnished by a licensee; 
(b) intentionally publish, display, or circulate any advertising without identifying the seller as the licensee by including in 
the advertisement the full name under which the licensee is licensed or the licensee's number assigned by the division; 
(c) violate this chapter or the rules made by the administrator; 
( d) violate any law of the state respecting commerce in motor vehicles or any rule respecting commerce in motor vehicles 
made by any licensing or regulating authority of the state; 
(e) engage in business as a new motor vehicle dealer, special equipment dealer, used motor vehicle dealer, motor vehicle 
crusher, or body shop without having in effect a bond as required in this chapter; 
(f) act as a dealer, dismantler, crusher, manufacturer, transporter, remanufacturer, or body shop without maintaining a 
princ ipal place of business; 
(g) engage in a business respecting the se lling or exchanging of new or new and used motor vehicles for which he is not 
licensed, including sell ing or exchanging a new motor vehicle for which the licensee does not have a franchise, but this 
Subsection ( l)(g) does not apply to a special equipment dealer who sells a new special equipment motor vehicle with a gross 
vehicle weight of 12,000 or more pounds after install ing special equipment on the motor vehicle; 
(h) dismantle or transport to a crusher for c rushing or other disposition any motor vehicle without first obtaining a dismantling 
or junk permit under Section 41-la-1009, 4[- la-1010, or 4 1-la-1011; 
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(i) as a new motor vehicle dealer, special equipment dealer, or used motor vehicle dealer fail to give notice of sales or transfers 
as required in Section 41-3-301; 
G) advertise or otherwise represent, or knowingly allow to be advertised or represented on his behalf or at his place of 
business, that no down payment is required in connection with the sale of a motor vehicle when a down payment is required 
and the buyer is advised or induced to finance a down payment by a loan in addition to any other loan financing the remainder 
of the purchase price of the motor vehicle; 
(k) as a crusher, crush or shred a motor vehicle brought to the crusher without obtaining proper evidence of ownership of 
the motor vehicle; proper evidence of ownership is a certificate of title endorsed according to law or a dismantling or junk 
permit issued under Section 41-la-1009, 41- la-1010, or4l-la-lO I I; 
(I) as a manufacturer or remanufacturer assemble a n1otor vehicle that does not comply with construction, safety, or vehicle 
identification number standards fixed by law or rule of any licensing or regulating authority; 
(m) as anyone other than a salesperson licensed under this chapter, be present on a dealer display space and contact prospective 
customers to promote the sale of the dealer's vehicles; 
(n) sell, display for sale, or offer for sale motor vehicles at any location other than the principal place of business or additional 
places of business licensed under this chapter; this provision is construed to prevent dealers, salespersons, or any other 
representative of a dealership from selling, displaying, or offering motor vehicles for sale from their ho1nes or other unlicensed 
locations; 
( o )(i) as a dealer, dismantler, body shop, or manufacturer, maintain a principal place of business or additional place of business 
that shares any common area with a business or activity not directly related to motor vehicle commerce; or 
(ii) maintain any places of business that share any common area with another dealer, dismantler, body shop, or 
manufacturer; 
(p) withhold delivery of license plates obtained by the licensee on behalfofa customer for any reason, including nonpayment 
of any portion of the vehicle purchase price or down payment; 
(q) issue a temporary permit for any vehicle that has not been sold by the licensee; 
(r) alter a temporary permit in any manner; 
(s) operate any principal place of business or additional place of business in a location that does not comply wi_th local 
ordinances, including zoning ordinances; 
(t) sell, display for sale, offer for sale, or exchange any new motor vehicle if the licensee does not: 
'-NestL=w11Ne:,r @2016 Thomson Reuters. No c!airn tc, original US Govemrnent \J\lorks. 2 
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(i) have a new motor vehicle dealer's license under Section 41 -3-202; and 
(ii) possess a franchise from the manufacturer of the new motor vehicle sold, displayed for sale, offered for sale, or 
exchanged by the licensee; or 
(u) as a new motor vehicle dealer or used motor vehicle dealer, encourage or conspire with any person who has not obtained 
a salesperson's license to solicit for prospective purchasers. 
(2)(a) If a new motor vehic le is constructed in more than one stage, such as a motor home, ambulance, or van conversion, the 
licensee shall advertise, represent, sell, and exchange the vehicle as the make designated by the final stage manufacturer, except 
in those specific situations where the licensee possesses a franchise from the initial or first stage manufacturer, presumably the 
manufacturer of the motor vehicle's chassis. 
(b) Sales of multiple stage manufactured motor vehicles shall include the transfer to the purchaser of a val id manufacturer's 
statement or certificate of orig in from each manufac turer under Section 41-3-30 I. 
(3) Each licensee, except salespersons, shall maintain and make available for inspection by peace officers and employees of 
the division: 
(a) a record of every motor vehicle bought, or exchanged by the licensee or received or accepted by the licensee for sale 
or exchange; 
(b) a record of every used part or used accessory bought or otherwise acquired; 
(c) a record of every motor vehicle bought or otherwise acquired and wrecked or dismantled by the licensee; 
(d) all buyers' orders, contracts, odometer statements, temporary permit records, financing records, and all other documents 
related to the purchase, sale, or consignment of motor vehicles; and 
(e) a record of the name and address of the person to whom any motor vehicle or motor vehicle body, chassis, or motor 
vehicle engine is sold or otherwise disposed ofand a description of the motor vehicle by year, make, and vehicle identification 
number. 
(4) Each licensee requ ired by this chapter to keep records shall: 
(a) be kept by the licensee at least for five years; and 
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(b) furnish copies of those records upon request to any peace officer or employee of the division during reasonable business 
hours. 
(5) A manufacturer, distributor, distributor representative, or factory representative may not induce or attempt to induce by 
means of coercion, intimidation, or discrimination any dealer to: 
(a) accept delivery of any motor vehicle, parts, or accessories or any other commodity or commodities, including advertising 
material not ordered by the dealer; 
(b) order or accept delivery of any motor vehicle with special features, appliances, accessories, or equipment not included in 
the list price of the motor vehicle as publicly advertised by the manufacturer; 
(c) order from any person any parts, accessories, equipment, machinery, tools, appliances, or any other commodity; 
(d) enter into an agreement with the manufacturer,'distributor, distributor representative, or factory representative of any of 
them, or to do any other act unfair to the dealer by threatening to cancel any franchise or contractual agreement between the 
manufacturer, distributor, distributor branch, or factory branch and the dealer; 
(e) refuse to deliver to any dealer having a franchise or contractual arrangement for the retail sale of new and unused motor 
vehicles sold or distributed by the manufacturer, distributor, distributor branch or factory branch, any motor vehicle, publicly 
advertised for immediate delivery within 60 days after the dealer's order is received; or 
(f) unfairly, without regard to the equities of the dealer, cancel the franchise of any motor vehicle dealer; the nonrenewal of 
a franchise or selling agreement without cause is a violation of this subs~ction and is an unfair cancellation. 
(6) A dealer may not assist an unlicensed dealer or salesperson in unlawful activity through active or passive participation in 
sales, or by allowing use of his facilities or dealer license number, or by any other means. 
(7)(a) The holder of any new motor vehicle dealer license issued under th.is chapter may not sell any new motor vehicle to: 
(i) another dealer licensed under this chapter who does not hold a valid franchise for the make of new motor vehicles sold, 
unless the selling dealer licenses and titles the new motor vehicle to the purchasing dealer; or 
(ii) any motor vehicle leasing or rental company located within this state, or who has any branch office within this state, 
unless the dealer licenses and titles the new motor vehicle to the purchasing, leasing, or rental company. 
(b) Subsection (7)(a)(i) does not apply to the sale ofa new incomplete motor vehicle with a gross vehicle weight of 12,000 
or more pounds to a special equipment dealer licensed under this chapter. 
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(8) A dealer licensed under this chapter may not take on consignment any new motor vehicle from anyone other than a new 
motor vehicle dealer, factory, or distributor who is licensed and franchised to distribute or sell that make of motor vehicle in 
this or any other state. 
(9) A body shop licensed under this chapter may not assist an unlicensed body shop in unlawful activity through active or 
passive means or by allowing use of its facilities, name, body shop number, or by any other means. 
(10) A used motor vehicle dealer licensed under this chapter may not advertise, offer for sale, or sell a new motor vehicle that 
has been driven less than 7,500 miles by obtaining a title only to the vehicle and representing it as a used motor vehicle. 
(l l )(a) Except as provided in Subsection (1 l)(c), or in cases of undue hardship or emergency as provided by rule by the division, 
a dealer or salesperson licensed under this chapter may not, on consecutive days of Saturday and Sunday, sell, offer for sale, 
lease, or offer for lease a motor vehicle. 
(b) Each day a motor vehicle is sold, offered for sale, leased, or offered for lease in violation of Subsection (l l)(a) and each 
motor vehicle sold, offered for sale, leased, or o ffered for lease in violation of Subsection ( I !)(a) shall constitute a separate 
offense. 
(c) The provisions of Subsection ( 11 )(a) shall not apply to a dealer participating in a trade show or exhibition if: 
(i) there are five or more dealers participating in the trade show or exhibition; and 
(ii) the trade show or exhibition takes place at a location other than the principal place of business of one of the dealers 
participating in the trade show or exhibition. 
( 12) For purposes of imposing the sales and use tax under Title 59, Chapter I 2, Sales and Use Tax Act, a licensee issuing a 
temporary permit under Section 41-3-302 shall separately identi fy the fees required by Title 41 , Chapter I a, Motor Vehicle Act. 
(I 3)(a) A dismantler or dealer engaged in the business of dismantling motor vehic les for the sale of parts or salvage shall identify 
any vehicles or equipment used by the dismantler or dealer for transporting parts or salvage on the highways. 
(b) The identification required under Subsection ( 13)(a) shall: 
( i) include the name, address, and license number of the dismantler or dealer; and 
( ii) be conspicuously disp layed on both sides of the vehicle or equipment in clearly legible letters and numerals not less 
than two inches in height. 
--- ------------· ·---·--· 
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Credits 
Laws 1949, c. 67, § 13; Laws 1961 , c. 80, § 14; Laws 1965, c. 81, § I ; Laws 1965, c. 82, § 6; Laws 1967, c. 87, § I; Laws 1981, 
c. 182, § 13; Laws 1987, c. 171, § 10; Laws 199 1, c. 153, § 10; Laws 1991, c. 158, § I; Laws 1992, c. I,§ 184; Laws 1992, 
c. 234, § 32; Laws 1993, c. 4, § 78; Laws 1995, c. 7, § 2, eff. May I, 1995; Laws 1998, c. 165, § 6, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 
2000, c. 249, § I, eff. May I, 2000; Laws 2007, c. 322, § 6, eff. April 30, 2007. 
Codifications C. 1943, Supp.,§ 57-6-23; C. 1953, § 4 1-3-23. 
Notes of Decisions (2) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-210, UT ST§ 41 -3-210 
Current through 2015 Fi_rst Special Session 
lsn<l of Dornrnent ·r.i 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Ciov~mmcnt W0rks. 
----------- ---- ----------------------
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 41. Motor Vehicles 
Chapter 3. Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act 
Part 2. Licensing 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-211 
§ 41-3-211. Unlawful acts or practices 
Currentness 
(1) A licensee may not knowingly or intentionally engage in any of the following unlawful acts or practices: 
(a) provide a financial institution or person being contacted to provide financing for the purchase of a motor vehicle, a motor 
vehicle contract of sale, document of sale, contract, request for proposal, or other document that does not accurately state: 
(i) the terms of the motor vehicle purchase; or 
(ii) if the vehicle is a rebuilt vehicle; 
(b) sell a motor vehicle to a purchaser that is subject to financing that is not the motor vehicle described in a motor vehicle 
contract of sale, document of sale, contract, request for proposal, or other document as of the time the contract of sale, 
document of sale, contract, request for proposal, or other document provided to the financial institution or person providing 
financing; or 
(c) make payments on any loan or lease on a motor vehicle subject to a loan or lease that is subject to the payoff requirements 
of Subsection 41-3-402(1). 
(2) The provisions of Subsection (I)( c) do not prohibit a dealer from making one or more loan or lease payments for a motor 
vehicle if making the payments is: 
(a) stated in writing in a motor vehicle contract of sale, document of sale, contract, request for proposal, or other document; or 
(b) stated in the notice to the lienholder of the trade-in of the vehicle as required by Subsection 41 -3-402(5). 
(3) A person who violates the provisions of this section is subject to the penalties provided in Section 41-3-701 and Subsection 
41 -3-702(l)(a). 
C1·edits 
Laws 2010, c. 342, § 7, eff. May 11, 2010. 
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Current thrnugh 2015 First Special Session 
End of Document 
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Proposed Legislation 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 41. Motor Vehicles 
----------------------- ··- --~- ------------- ----
Chapter 3. Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act 
Part 2. Licensing 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-201 
§ 41-3-201. Licenses required--Restitution--Education 
Currentness 
(1) As used in this section, "new applicant" means a person who is applying for a license that the person has not been issued 
during the previous licensing year. 
(2) A person may not act as any of the following without having procured a license issued by the administrator: 
(a) a dealer; 
(b)-salvage vehicle buyer; 
(c) salesperson; 
( d) manufacturer; 
( e) transporter; 
(f) dismantler; 
(g) distributor; 
(h) factory branch and representative; 
(i) distributor branch and representative; 
(j) crusher; 
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(k) remanufacturer; or 
(I) body shop. 
(3)(a) Except as provided in Subsection (3)(c), a person may not bid on or purchase a vehicle with a nonrepairable or salvage 
certificate as defined in Section 41-1a-100 I at or through a motor vehicle auction unless the person is a licensed salvage vehicle 
buyer. 
(b) Except as provided in Subsection (3)(c), a person may not offer for sale, sell, or exchange a vehicle with a nonrepairable 
or salvage certificate as defined in Section 41-la-1001 at or through a motor vehicle auction except to a licensed salvage 
vehicle buyer. 
(c) A person may offer for sale, sell, or exchange a vehicle with a nonrepairable or salvage certificate as defined in Section 
41- 1a-100 l at or through a motor vehicle auction: 
(i) to an out-of-state or out-of-country purchaser not licensed under this section, but that is authorized to do business in 
the domestic or foreign jurisdiction in which the person is domiciled or registered to do business; 
( ii) subject to the restrictions in Subsection (3)(d), to an in-state purchaser not licensed under this section that: 
(A) has a valid business license in Utah; and 
(B) has a Utah sales tax license; and 
(iii) to a crusher. 
(d)(i) An operator of a motor vehicle auction shall verify that an in-state purchaser not licensed under this section has the 
licenses required in Subsection (3)(c)(ii). 
( ii) An operator of a motor vehicle auction may only offer for sale, sell, or exchange five vehicles with a salvage certifica te 
as defined in Section 41-la-1001 at or through a motor vehicle auction in any 12 month period to an in-state purchaser 
that docs not have a salvage vehicle buyer license issued in accordance with Subsection 41 -3-202( 15). 
(ii i) The five vehicle limitation under th is Subsection (3)(d) applies to each Utah sales tax license and not to each person 
with the authority to use a sales tax license. 
(iv) An operator of a motor vehicle auction may not sell a vehicle with a nonrepairable certificate as defined in Section 
41-1a-100 I to a purchaser otherwise allowed to purchase a vehicle under Subsection (3)(c)(i i). 
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(e) For a vehicle with a salvage certificate purchased under Subsection (3)(c)(ii), an operator of a motor vehicle auction shall: 
(i)(A) until Subsection (3)(e)(i)(B) applies, make application for a salvage certificate of title on behalf of the Utah purchaser 
within seven days of the purchase if the purchaser does not have a salvage vehicle buyer license, dealer license, body shop 
license, or dismantler license issued in accordance with Section 41-3-202; or 
(B) beginning on or after the date that the Motor Vehicle Division has implemented the Motor Vehicle Division's 
GenTax system, make application electronically, in a fonn and time period approved by the Motor Vehicle Division, 
for a salvage certificate of title to be issued in the name of the purchaser; 
(ii) give to the purchaser a disclosure printed on a separate piece of paper that states: 
"THIS DISCLOSURE STATEMENT MUST BE GIVEN BY THE SELLER TO THE BUYER EVERY TlME THIS 
VEHICLE IS RESOLD WITH A SALVAGE CERTIFICATE 
Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) 
Year: Make: Model: 
SALVAGE VEHICLE--NOT FOR RESALE WITHOUT DISCLOSURE 
WARNING: THIS SALVAGE VEHICLE MAY NOT BE SAFE FOR OPERATION UNLESS PROPERLY REPAIRED. 
SOME ST ATES MAY REQUIRE AN INSPECTION BEFORE THIS VEHICLE MAY BE REGISTERED. THE STATE 
OF UTAH MAY REQUIRE THIS VEHICLE TO BE PERMANENTLY BRANDED AS A REBUILT SALVAGE 
VEHICLE. OTHER STA TES MAY ALSO PERMANENTLY BRAND THE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE. 
Signature of Purchaser · --·· ---···-·------- --
(iii) if applicable, provide evidence to the Motor Vehicle Division of: 
(A) payment of sales taxes on taxable sales in accordance with Section 4 1- la-5 10; 
(B) the identification number inspection required under Section 41-l a-51 1; and 
(C) the odometer disclosure statement required under Section 4 1-1 a-902. 
Date"; 
and 
(f) The Motor Vehicle Division shall include a link lo the disclosure statement described in Subsection (3)(e)(ii) on its website. 
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(g) The comm1ss1011 may impose an administrative entrance fee established in accordance with the procedures and 
requirements of Section 63J-l-504 not to exceed $10 on a person not holding a license described in Subsection (3)(e)(i) 
that enters the physical premises of a motor vehicle auction for the purpose of viewing available salvage vehicles prior to 
an auction. 
(h) A vehicle sold at or through a motor vehicle auction to an out-of-state purchaser with a nonrepairable or salvage certificate 
may not be certificated in Utah until the vehicle has been certificated out-of-state. 
( 4)(a) An operator of a motor vehicle auction shall keep a record of the sale of each salvage vehicle. 
(b) A record described under Subsection (4)(a) shall contain: 
(i) the purchaser's name and address; and 
(ii) the year, make, and vehicle identification number for each salvage vehicle sold. 
(c) An operator ofa motor vehicle auction shall: 
(i) provide-the record described in Subsection (4)(a) electronically in a method approved by the .division to the division 
within two business days of the completion of the motor vehicle auction; 
(ii) retain the record described in this Subsection (4) for five years from the date of sale; and 
(iii) make a record described in this Subsection ( 4) available for inspection by the division at the location of the motor 
vehicle auction during normal business hours. 
(S)(a) If applicable, an operator ofa motor vehicle auction shall comply with the reporting requirements of the National Motor 
Vehicle Title Information System overseen by the United States Department ofJustice if the person sells a,vehicle with a salvage 
certificate to an in-state purchaser under Subsection (3)(c)(ii). 
(b) The Motor Vehicle Division shall include a link to the National Motor Vehicle Title Information System on its website. 
(6)(a) An operator of a motor vehicle auction that sells a salvage vehicle to a person that is an out-of-country buyer shall: 
(i) stamp on the face of the title so as not to obscure the name, date, or mileage statement the words "FOR EXPORT 
ONLY" in all capital, black letters; and 
(ii) stamp in each unused reassignment space on the back of the tille the words "FOR EXPORT ONLY." 
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(b) The words "FOR EXPORT ONLY" shall be: 
(i) at least two inches wide; and 
(ii) clearly legible. 
(7) A supplemental license shall be secured by a dealer, manufacturer, remanufacturer, transporter, dismantler, crusher, or body 
shop for each additional place of business maintained by the licensee. 
(8)(a) A person who has been convicted of any law relating to motor vehicle commerce or motor vehicle fraud may not be issued 
a license or purchase a vehicle with a salvage or nonrepairable certificate unless full restitution regarding those convictions 
has been made. 
(b) An operator of a motor vehicle auction, a dealer, or a consignor may not sell a vehicle with a nonrepairable or salvage 
certificate to a buyer described in Subsection (8)(a) if the division has informed the operator of the motor vehicle auction, 
the dealer, or the consignor in writing that the buyer is prohibited from purchasing a vehicle with a nonrepairable or salvage 
certificate under Subsection (8)(a). 
(9)(a) The division may not issue a license to a new applicant for a new or used motor vehicle dealer license, a new or used 
motorcycle dealer license, or a small trailer dealer license unless the new applicant completes an eight-hour orientation class 
approved by the division that includes education on motor vehicle laws and rules. 
(b) The approved costs of the orientation class shall be paid by the new applicant. 
(c) The class shall be completed by the new applicant and the applicant's partners, corporate officers, bond indemnitors, and 
managers. 
(d)(i) The division shall approve: 
(A) providers of the orientation class; and 
(B) costs of the orientation class. 
(ii) A provider of an orientation class shall submit the orientation class curriculum to the division for approval prior to 
teaching the orientation class. 
(iii) A provider of an orientation c lass shall include in the orientation materials: 
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(A) ethics training; 
(B) motor vehicle title and registration processes; 
(C) provisions of T itle 13, Chapter 5, Unfair Practices Act, re lating to motor vehicles; 
(D) Department of Insurance requirements relating to motor vehicles; 
(E) Department of Public Safety requirements relating to motor vehicles; 
(F) federal requirements related to motor vehicles as determined by the division; and 
(G) any required disclosure compliance forms as determined by the division. 
(10) A person or purchaser described in Subsection (3)(c)(ii): 
(a) may not purchase more than five salvage vehicles with a nonrepairable or salvage certificate as defined in Section 
41- l a-1001 in any 12-month period; 
(b) may not, without first complying with Section 4 l- la-705, offer for sale, sell, or exchange more tl1an two vehicles with a 
salvage certificate as defined in Section 41- la-1001 in any 12-month period to a person not licensed under this section; and 
(c) may not, without first complying with Section 41-1 a-705, offer for sale, sell, or exchange a vehicle with a nonrepairable 
certificate as defined in Section 41 -l a-1 001 to a person not licensed under th is section. 
(11) An operator of a motor vehicle auction, a dealer, or a consignor may not sell a vehicle with a nonrepairable or salvage 
certificate to a buyer described in Subsection (I 0)(a) if the division has informed tl1e operator of the motor vehicle auction, 
the dealer, or the consignor in writing that the buyer is prohibited from purchasing a vehicle with a nonrepairable or salvage 
certificate under Subsection ( 1 0)(a). 
Credits 
Laws 1949, c. 67, § l ; Laws 1961, c. 80, § 5; Laws 1965, c. 81, § I ; Laws 1981, c. 182, § 3; Laws 1991, c. 153, § l ; Laws 1991, 
c. 241 , § 65; Laws 1992, c. 234, § 23; Laws 1999, c. 239, § I , eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2000, c. 311 , § 1, eff. July 1, 2000; Laws 
2008, c. 388, § 3, eff. July 1, 2008; Laws 2009, c. 234, § I , eff. May 12, 2009; Laws 20 I 0, c. 393, § 4, eff. May 11, 2010; Laws 
2012, c. 390, § 4, eff. Oct. I, 2012; Laws 2013, c. 463, § 5, eff. May 14, 2013. 
Codifications C. 1943, Supp., § 57-6-11 ; C. 1953, § 4 1-3-6. 
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Notes of Decisions (I) 
U .C.A. 1953 § 41 -3-20 I, UT ST § 4 1-3-20 I 
Current through 2015 First Special Session 
End of Documc11 r ~ 2016 Tfl()mSil!l !~cuter,. No cl~im w ongina! U.S. Govcrnmtlm \V11rks. 
'•Nestla1.vNexr .-;:;, 2016 1 hc:: .. sc•n f~euters. No claim to or1ginai U.S Govern1y,er.t Works 7 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 41. Motor Vehicles 
Chapter 3. Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act 
Part 2. Licensing 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-201.5 
§ 41-3-201.5. Brokering of a new motor vehicle without a license prohibited 
Currentness 
( l )(a) A person may not, for a fee, commission, or other fo1m of compensation, arrange, offer to arrange, or broker a transaction 
involving the sale or lease of more than two: 
(i) new or used motor vehicles in any 12 consecutive month period, unless the person is licensed under Subsection 
41-3-202(1); or 
(ii) used motor vehicles in any 12 consecutive month period, unless the person is licensed under Subsection 41-3-202(2). 
(b) Each transaction a person arranges, offers to arrange, or brokers involving the sale or lease of a motor vehicle for a fee, 
commission, or other form of compensation is a separate violation under this section if: 
(i) the person has for a fee, commission, or other form of compensation, arranged, offered to arrange, or brokered the sale 
or lease of more than two new or used motor vehicles within the previous 12 consecutive month period; and 
(ii) the person is not licensed under Subsection 41-3-202(1 ). 
(2) A person who violates this section is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
Credits 
Laws 1997, c.187, § 1, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 2007, c. 105, § I, eff. Apri l 30, 2007; Laws 2010, c. 393, § 5, eff. May 11, 2010. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-201.5, UT ST§ 41 -3-201.5 
Current through 2015 First Special Session 
~:nd of Document f; 20!6 Thomson Rc.::utcrs. No claim to original U.S. Govcrmrn:nt \.\forks. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 41. Motor Vehicles 
Chapter 3. Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act 
Part 2 . Licensing 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-201.7 
§ 41-3-201.7. Supplemental license for additional place of business restrictions--Exception 
Currentness 
( l )(a) Subject to the requirements of Subsection (2), a supplemental license for an additional place of business issued pursuant 
to Subsection 41-3-201(7) may only be issued to a dealer if the dealer is: 
(i) licensed in accordance with Section 41-3-202; 
( ii) bonded in accordance with Section 41-3-205 ; and 
(iii) in compliance with existing rules promulgated by the administrator_ofthe division under Section 41-3-105. 
(b) A supplemental license for a permanent additional place of business may only be issued to a used motor vehicle dealer if: 
(i) the dealer independently satisfies the bond requirements under Section 4 1-3-205 for the permanent additional place 
of business; 
(ii) the dealer is in compliance with existing rules promulgated by the administrator of the division under Section 41 -3-105; 
and 
(ii i) the permanent additional place of business meets all the requirements for a principal place of business. 
(2)(a) Except as provided in Subsections (2)(c) and (3), a supplemental license for an additional place of business issued pursuant 
to Subsection 41 -3-201(7) for a new motor vehicle dealer may not be issued for an additional place of business that is beyond 
the geographic specificat ions outlined as the area of responsibility in the dealer's franchise agreement. 
(b) A new motor vehicle dealer shall provide the administrator with a copy of the portion of the new motor vehicle dealer's 
franchise agreement identifying the dealer's area of responsibility before being issued a supplemental license for an additional 
place of business. 
(c) The restrictions under Subsections (2)(a) and (b) do not apply to a new motor vehicle dealer if the license for an additional 
place of business is being issued for the sa le of used motor vehicles. 
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(3) The provisions of Subsection (2) do not apply if the additional place of business is a trade show or exhibition _if: 
(a) there are five or more dealers participating in the trade show or exhibition; and 
(b) the trade show or exhibition takes place at a location other than the principal place of business of one of the dealers 
participating in the trade show or exhibition. 
(4) A supplemental lice nse for a temporary ilddit.ional place of business issued to a used motor vehicle dealer may not be for 
longer than LO consecutive days. 
Credits 
Laws 2007, c. 70, § I, eff. April 30, 2007; Laws 2009, c. 234, § 2, eff. May 12, 2009; Laws 20 I 0, c. 393, § 6, eff. May 11 , 
2010; Laws 20 12, c. 390, § 5, eff. Oct. 1, 2012. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-201.7, UT ST§ 41-3-201.7 
Current through 2015 First Special Session 
End of Document c~) 2016 ·n1omson R~utas. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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~;: KeyCite Yellow Flag• Negative Treatment 
Proposed Legislation 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 41. Motor Vehicles 
Chapter 3. Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act 
Pait 2. Licensing 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-202 
§ 41-3-202. Licenses--Classes and scope 
Currentness 
(1) A new motor vehicle dealer's license permits the licensee to: 
------~-·-·------
(a) offer for sale, sell, or exchange new motor vehicles if the licensee possesses a franchise from the manufacturer of the 
motor vehicle offered for sale, sold, or exchanged by the licensee; 
(b) offer for sale, sell, or exchange used motor vehicles; 
(c) operate as a body· shop; and 
(d) dismantle motor vehicles. 
(2) A used motor vehicle dealer's license permits the licensee to: 
(a) offer for sale, sell, or exchange used motor vehicles; 
(b) operate as a body shop; and 
(c) dismantle motor vehicles. 
(3) A new motorcycle, off-highway vehicle, and small tra iler dealer's license permits the licensee to: 
(a) offer for sale, sell , or exchange new motorcycles, off-highway vehicles, or small trai lers if the licensee possesses a 
franchise from the manufacturer of the motorcycle, off-highway vehicle, or small trailer offered for sale, sold, or exchanged 
by the licensee; 
(b) offer for sale, sell , or exchange used motorcycles, off-highway vehicles, or small trailers; and 
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(c) dismantle motorcycles, off-highway vehicles, or small trailers. 
(4) A used motorcycle, off-highway vehicle, and small trailer dealer's license permits the licensee to: 
(a) offer for sale, sell, or exchange used motorcycles, off-highway vehicles, and small trailers; and 
(b) dismantle motorcycles, off-highway vehicles, or small trailers. 
(S)(a) Except as provided in Subsection (S)(b), a salesperson's license permits the licensee to act as a motor vehicle salesperson 
and is valid for employment with only one dealer at a time. 
(b) A licensee that has been issued a salesperson's license aiid that is employed by a dealer that operates as a wholesale motor 
vehicle auction may be employed by more than one dealer that operates as a wholesale motor vehicle auction al a time. 
(6)(a) A manufacturer's license permits the licensee to construct or assemble motor vehicles subject to registration under Title 
41, Chapter I a, Motor Vehicle Act, at an established place of business and to remanufacture motor vehicles. 
(b) Under rules made by the administrator, the licensee may issue and install vehicle identification numbers on manufactured 
motor vehicles. 
(c) The licensee may franchise and appoint dealers to sell manufactured motor vehicles by notify ing the division of the 
franchise or appointment. 
(7) A transporter's license permits the licensee to transport or deliver motor vehicles subject to registration under Title 41, 
Chapter la, Motor Vehicle Act, from a manufacturing, assembling, or distributing point or from a dealer, to dealers, distributors, 
or sales agents of a manufacturer or remanufacturer, to or from detail or repair shops, and to financial institutions or places o f 
storage from points of repossession. 
(8) A dismantler's license permits the licensee to dismantle motor vehicles subject to registration under Title 4 l , Chapter la, 
Motor Vehicle Act, for the purpose of reselling parts or for salvage, or selling dismantled or salvage vehicles to a crusher or 
other dismantler. 
(9) A distributor or factory branch and distri butor branch's license permits the licensee to sell and distribute new motor vehicles, 
parts, and accessories to their franchised dealers. 
( I 0) A representative's license, for factory representatives or distributor representatives permi ts the licensee to contact the 
licensee's authorized dealers for the purpose of making or promoting the· sale of motor vehicles, parts, and accessories. 
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(l l)(a)(i) A remanufacturer's license permits the licensee to construct, reconstruct, assemble, or reassemble motor vehicles 
subject to registration under Title 41, Chapter I a, Motor Vehicle Act, from used or new motor vehicles or parts. 
(i i) Evidence o f ownership of parts and motor vehicles used in remanufacture shall be available to the division upon 
demand. 
(b) Under ru les made by the administrator, the licensee may issue and install vehicle identification numbers on 
remanufactured motor vehicles. 
(12) A crusher's license permits the licensee to engage in the business of crushing or shredding motor vehicles subject to 
registration under Title 4 1, Chapter la, Motor Vehicle Act, for the purpose of reducing the useable materials and metals to a 
more compact s ize for recycl ing. 
(13) A body shop's license permits the licensee to rebui ld, restore, repair, or paint primarily the body of motor vehicles damaged 
by collision or natural disaster, and to dismantle motor vehicles. 
( 14) A special equipment dealer's license permits the licensee to: 
(a) buy incomplete new motor vehicles with a gross vehicle weight of 12,000 or more pounds from a new motor vehicle 
dealer and sell the new vehicle with the special equipment installed without a franchise from the manufacturer; 
(b) offer for sale, sell, or exchange used motor .vehicles; 
(c) operate as a body shop; and 
(d) dismantle motor vehicles. 
(15)(a) A salvage vehicle buyer license permits the licensee to bid on or purchase a vehicle with a salvage certificate as defined 
in Section 4 1-1 a- I 00 I at any motor vehicle auction. 
(b) A salvage vehicle buyer license may only be issued to a motor vehicle dealer, dismantler, or body shop who qualifies 
under rules made by the division and is licensed in any state as a motor vehicle dealer, dismantler, or body shop. 
(c) The division may not issue more than two salvage vehicle buyer licenses to any one dealer, dismantler, or body shop. 
(d) In accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, the administrator shall make rules 
establ ishing qualifications of an applicant for a salvage vehicle buyer license. The criteria shall inc lude: 
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(i) business history; 
(ii) salvage vehicle qualifications; 
(iii) ability to properly handle and dispose of environmental hazardous materials associated with salvage vehicles; and 
(iv) record in demonstrating co111pliance with the provisions of this chapter. 
Credits 
Laws 1949, c. 67, § 6; Laws 1961, c. 80, § 9; Laws 1965, c. 81, § l ; Laws 1965, c. 82, § 3; Laws 1981, c. 182, § 7; Laws 
1987, c. 171, § 5; Laws 1991, c. 153, § 4; Laws 1992, c. 234, § 24; Laws 1998, c. 165, § 2, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 2000, 
c. 311, § 2, eff. July 1, 2000; Laws 2003, c. 157, § 2, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2008, c. 382, § 558, eff. May 5, 2008; Laws 
2009, c. 78, § 1, eff. May 12, 2009. 
Codifications C. 1943, Supp.,§ 57-6-16; C. 1953, § 41-3-12. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-202, UT ST§ 41-3-202 
Current through 2015 First Special Session 
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} '- KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Treatment 
Proposed Legislation 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 41. Motor Vehicles 
Chapter 3. Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act 
Part 2. Licensing 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-203 
§ 41-3-203. Licenses--Form--Seal--Custody of salesperson's license--
Display of salesperson and dealer licenses--Licensee's pocket card 
Currentness 
( l )(a) The administrator shall prescribe the form of each license and the seal of his office shall be imprinted on each license. 
(b) The license of each salesperson shall be delivered or mailed to the dealer employing the salesperson and it shall be kept 
in the custody and control of the dealer and conspicuously displayed in the dealer's place of business. 
(c) Each licensee shall display conspicuously his own license in his place of business. 
(2)(a) The administrator shall prepare and deliver a pocket card, certifying that the person whose name is on the card is licensed 
under this chapter. 
(b) Each salesperson's card shall also contain the name and address of the dealer employing him. 
(c) Each salesperson shall on request display his pocket card. 
Credits 
Laws 1949, c. 67, § 11; Laws 1961, c. 80, § 12; Laws 198l, c. 182, § 11 ; Laws 1991, c. 153, § 8; Laws 1992, c. 234, § 25. 
Codifications C. l 943, Supp., § 57-6-2 l ; C. l 953, § 41 -3-1 9. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41 -3-203, UT ST§ 41-3-203 
Current through 2015 First Special Session 
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f"~ KcyCitc Yellow Flag- Negative Treatment 
Proposed Legislation 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 41. Motor Vehicles 
Chapter 3. Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act 
Part 2. Licensing 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-204 
§ 41-3-204. Licenses--Principal place of business as prerequisite--
Change oflocation--Relinquishment on loss of principal place of business 
Currentness 
(l)(a) The following licensees must maintain a principal place of business: 
(i) dealers; 






(viii) body shops; and 
(ix) distributors who: 
(A) are located within the state; or 
(B) have a branch office within the state. 
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(b) The administrator may not issue a license under Subsection ( l)(a) to an applicant who does not have a principal place 
of business. 
(c) If a licensee changes the location of his principal place of business, he shall immediately notify the administrator and a 
new license shall be granted for the unexpired portion of the term of the original license at no additional fee. 
(2)(a) If a licensee loses possession of a principal place of business, the license is automatically suspended and he shall 
immediately notify the administrator and upon demand by the administrator deliver the license, pocket cards, special plates, 
and temporary permits to the administrator. 
(b) The administrator shall hold the licenses, cards, plates, and permits until the licensee obtains a principal place of business. 
Credits 
Laws 1949, c. 67, § 12(A); Laws 1961, c. 80, § 13; Laws 1981, c. 182, § 12; Laws 1987, c. 171, § 9; Laws 1991 , c. 153, § 9; 
Laws 1992, c. 234, § 26; Laws 1998, c. 165, § 3, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 2008, c. 388, § 4, eff. July I, 2008. 
Codifications C. 1943, Supp., § 57-6-22(A); C. 1953, § 41-3-20. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-204, UT ST§ 41-3-204 
Current through 2015 First Special Session 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 41. Motor Vehicles 
Chapter 3. Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act 
Part 2: Licensing 
---------------· -·--------
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-205 
§ 41-3-205. Licenses--Bonds required--Maximum liability--Action against surety--Loss of bond 
Currentness 
(l)(a) Before a dealer's, special equipment dealer's, crusher's, or body shop's license is issued, the applicant shall file with the 
administrator a corporate surety bond in the amount of: 
(i) $50,000 until June 30, 2006, and $75,000 on or after July 1, 2006, for a motor vehicle dealer's license; 
(ii) $20,000 until June 30, 2006, and $75,000 on or after July 1, 2006, for a special equipment dealer's license; 
(ii i) $10,000 for a motorcycle, off-highway vehicle, or small trailer dealer's or crusher's license; or 
(iv) $20,000 for a body shop's license. 
(b) The corporate surety shall be licensed to do business within the state and have a rating of at least B+ by the A.M. Best 
Company. 
(c) The form of the bond: 
(i) shall be approved by the attorney general; 
(ii) shall be conditioned upon the applicant's conducting business as a dealer without: 
(A) fraud; 
(B) fraudulent representation; 
(C) violating Subsection 4 1-3-301(1) which requires a dealer to submi t or de liver a certificate of ti tle or manufacturer's 
certificate of origin; or 
(D) violating Subsection 4 1-3-402( I) which requires payoff of liens on motor vehic les traded in; and 
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(iii) may be continuous in form . 
(d) The total aggregate liabi lity on the bond to a ll persons making claims, regardless of the number of claimants or the number 
of years a bond remains in force, may not exceed the amount of the bond. 
(2)(a) A cause of action under Subsection ( I) may not be maintained against a surety unless: 
(i) a claim is filed in writing with the administrator within one year after the cause of action arose; and 
(ii) the action is commenced within two years after the claim was filed with the administrator. 
(b) The surety or principal shall notify the administrator ifa claim on tlie bond is successfully prosecuted or settled against 
the surety or principal. 
(3)(a) A surety or principal may not make a payment on a surety bond to any claimant until six months have expired from the 
date when the first claim on the bond was filed w ith the surety or principal in writing. 
(b) After six months have expired following the filing of the first bond claim, the surety or principal shall: 
(i) assess the validity of all claims on the bond; and 
(ii) submit a distribution assessment determined in accordance with Subsection (3)(c) regarding the bond proceeds to the 
c laimants of valid claims for approval. 
(c)(i) If the total verifiable claims on the bond are less than the bond amount, then each bond claimant shall be entitled to 
the full amount of a valid claim. 
( ii) If the total verifiable claims exceed the bond amount, then the proceeds shall be distributed pro rata to the bond 
claimants of valid claims. 
(d) If the distribution assessment under Subsection (3)(b) is not unanimously approved by the claimants of all valid claims 
on the bond, the principal or surety shall fi le an interpleader action in the state district court where the defaulting dealer 
was licensed. 
( 4)(a) A person making a claim on the bond shall be awarded attorney fees in cases success fo lly prosecuted or settled against 
the surety or principal if the bond has not been depleted. 
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(b) A surety or principal may not be awarded attorney fees that exceed $2,500 for an interpleader action filed wider Subsection 
(3 )( d). 
(5)(a)(i) If a dealer, body shop, or crusher loses possession of the bond required by this chapter, the deale r, body shop, or crusher 
license is automatically suspended. 
(ii) All licenses, pocket cards, temporary permits, and special plates issued to the licensee shall be immediately returned 
to the administrator. 
(b) A dealer, body shop, or crusher may not continue to use or permit to be used licenses, pocket cards, temporary permits; --
or special plates until the required bond is on file with the administrator and the license has been reinstated. 
(6) A representative or consignee of a dealer is not required to fi le a bond if the dealer for whom the representative or consignee 
acts fully complies with the provisions of this chapter. 
Cr edits 
Laws 1949, c. 67, § 8; Laws 196 1, c. 80, § 11; Laws 1977, c. 175, § l; Laws 1981, c. 182, § 9; Laws 1983, c. 188, § l ; Laws 
1987, c. 171, § 7; Laws 1991, c. 27, § 1; Laws 1991, c. 153, § 6; Laws 1992, c. 234, § 27; Laws 1998, c. 165~ § 4, eff. May 4, 
1998; Laws 1999, c. 239, § 2, eff. May 3, 1999; L aws 2003, c. 157, § 3, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2005, c. 90, § 1, eff. July 1, 
2005; Laws 2007, c. 2?7, § 1, eff. April 30, 2007; Laws 201 0, c. 342, § 5, eff. May 11 , 2010. 
Codifications C. 1943, Supp.,§ 57-6- 18; C. 1953, § 41-3-16. 
Notes ofDecjsions (7) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-205, UT ST§ 41-3-205 
Current through 2015 First Special Session 
End of Oornmcnt \() 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim 'to ,iriginal U.S. Government Works. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 41. Motor Vehicles 
Chapter 3. Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act 
Part 2. Licensing 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-205.5 
§ 41-3-205.5. Licenses--Criminal background check required on salesperson's licenses--Payment of cost 
Currentness 
(l)(a) Every applicant for a salesperson's license shall submit fingerprints with a completed application to the division. 
(b) A person required to renew a salesperson license on or before June 30, 2010, shall submit fingerprints to the division 
on or before November 30, 2010. 
(2) The division shall submit fingerprints for each applicant described in Subsection (I) to the Bureau of Criminal Identification 
established in Section 53-10-201. 
(3) The Bureau of Criminal Identification shall : 
(a) check the information submitted by the division for an applicant under Subsection (2) against the applicable state and 
regional criminal records databases; and 
(b) release to the division all infonnation obtained under Subsection (3)(a) relating to the applicant. 
(4)(a) The Bureau of Criminal Identification shall maintain a separate file of fingerprints submitted under Subsection (2) and 
notify the division when a new entry is made in the applicable state and regional database against a person whose fingerprints 
are held in the file regarding any matter involving an arrest under state law involving: 
(i) motor vehicles; 
(ii) controlled substances; 
(iii) fraud; or 
(iv) a registerable sex offense under Section 77-41-106. 
'Nestla-.vNexr fit 7.01 13 Th0nson Re'.! \ers. N0 claim to 0;-igir,ai U.S. Government Works. 
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(b) Upon request by the division, the B ureau of Crimina l Identification shall inform the division whether a person whose 
arrest was reported to the division under Subsection ( 4)(a) was subsequently convicted of the charge for which the person 
was arrested. 
(5) In addition to any fees imposed under this chapter, the divis ion shall: 
(a) impose on individuals submi tting fingerprints in accordance with this section the fees that the Bureau of Criminal 
Identification is authorized to collect for the services the Bureau of Criminal Identification provides under Subsections (3) 
and (4); and 
(b) remit the fees collected under Subsection (5)(a) to the Bureau of Criminal Identification. 
(6) The division shall use information received from the Bureau of Criminal Identification under this section to determine 
whether a license should be denied, suspended, or revoked under Section 41-3-209.-
Credits 
Laws 20 10, c. 291, § I, eff. July 1, 2010; Laws 2012, c. 145, § 1, eff. May 8, 2012. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-205.5, UT ST§ 41-3-205.5 
Current through 2015 First Special Session 
End ofDocnmcnl <t) 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim io origi11a[ U.S. G,ivernmcnt Works. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 41. Motor Vehicles 
Chapter 3. Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act 
Part 2. Licensing 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-206 
§ 41-3-206. Duration of licenses--Expiration date--Renewal 
Currentness 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), each license issued under this chapter expires on June 30 of each year and may be 
renewed upon application and payment of a fee required under Section 41-3-60 I, if the license has not been suspended or 
revoked. 
(2) A motor vehicle salesperson's license expires as provided under Subsection ( l) or when the salesperson terminates 
employment with .the dealer with whom he is licensed, whichever comes first. 
(3)(a) Beginning July 1, l999, the division may not renew a license for a new or used motor vehicle dealer's license, a new or 
used motorcycle dealer's license, or a small trailer dealer's license unless the renewal applicant completes a three-hour class 
approved by the division that includes education on new motor vehicle laws and rules. 
(b) The approved costs of the class shall be paid by the renewal appl icant. 
(c) The class shall be completed by the renewal applicant or any designated representative of the renewal applicant dealer. 
(d) The division shall approve: 
(i) the class providers; and 
(ii) costs of the class. 
Credits 
Laws 1992, c. 234, § 28; Laws l999, c. 239, § 3, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2008, c. 388, § 5, eff. July I, 2008. 
U.C.A. I 953 § 4 1-3-206, UT ST § 4 l-3-206 
Current through 20 I 5 First Special Session 
End of l)o,·11mr11 t .<J 2Ul6 1"11omso11 Reuters. No daim to M1g.in~I U.S. Gc"ern11te111 Works. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 41. Motor Vehicles 
Chapter 3. Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act 
Part 2. Licensing 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-207 
§ 41-3-207. New motor vehicle dealer's license--Change, addition, or loss 
of franchise--Notification--Relinquishment of license and relicensing as 
used motor vehicle dealer--Continuance in business to dispose of stock 
Currentness 
(1) If a dealer changes to, adds, cancels, or loses a franchise for the sale of new motor vehicles be shall immediately notify 
the administrator. 
(2)(a) If the dealer has cancelled or lost a franchise, the administrator shal l determine whether the dealer should be licensed 
as a used motor vehicle dealer. 
(b) If the administrator determines that the dealer should be licensed as a used motor vehicle dealer, he shall issue to the 
dealer a used motor vehicle dealer's license. 
(c) A dealer relicensed as a used motor vehicle dealer may continue to sell new motor vehicles for up to six months from the 
date of the relicensing, to enable the dealer to dispose of his existing stock of new motor vehicles. 
Credits 
Laws 1949, c. 67, § 12(B); Laws 1992, c. 234, § 29. 
Codifications C. 1943, Supp., § 57-6-22(B); C. 1953, § 4 1-3-21. 
U.C.A. l 953 § 41 -3-207, UT ST§ 41-3-207 
Current through 20 I 5 First Special Session 
[nu of Document :?-:~• 20 i 6 Thomson Rculcrs. No daim to origin~!! U .S. Govcrnmc!ll \Vorks. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated · 
Title 41. Motor Vehicles 
Chapter 3. Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act 
Part 2. Licensing 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-207.5 
§ 41-3-207.5. Liquidation of inventory for suspended used motor vehicle dealers 
Currentness 
(1) A used motor vehicle dealer whose used motor vehicle dealer's license has been suspended may liquidate ariy remaining 
inventory by selling the remaining used motor vehicles to: 
(a) a licensed auto auction; 
(b) another licensed motor vehicle dealer; or 
(c) to any person, but only after the used motor vehicle has been titled in the name of the owner, partner, or corporate officer 
of the used motor vehicle dealer for at least 12 months. 
(2) A dealer may sell inventory under Subsections (I )(a) and (b) for up to 90 days from the date the dealer's used motor vehicle 
dealer's license was suspended. 
Credits 
Laws 2008, c. 388, § 6, eff. July 1, 2008. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-207.5, UT ST § 41-3-207.5 
Current through 20 15 First Special Session 
E111I nfDnrun11•nl si) 2016 Thomson Reuters. No daim tll orig.inJ! U.S. Govcrnmcni Works. 
',\lesttawNexr 1;) 20-:1:. T1n,r11sor-, Reuters. No ciairn to origina! U.S. Covem ment w,yks. 
§ 41-3-208. Salesperson's license--Relinquishment upon loss or ... , UT ST§ 41-3-208 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 41. Motor Vehicles 
Chapter 3. Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act 
Part 2 . Licensing 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-208 
§ 41-3-208. Salesperson's license--Relinquishment upon loss or 
change of employment--Notice to salesperson--New license required 
Currentness 
(1) If a salesperson is discharged from or leaves his employer, the dealer who lasL employed the salesperson shall return the 
salesperson's license to the administrator. 
(2) The salesperson shall be notified at his last known place of residence that his license has been returned to the administrator. 
(3) A person may not act as a motor vehicle salesperson until a new license is procured. 
Credits 
Laws 1949, c. 67, § 12(C); Laws 1992, c. 234, § 30. 
Codifications C. 1943, Supp.,§ 57-6-22(C); C. 1953, § 41-3-22. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-208, UT ST§ 4 1-3-208 
Currenl through 2015 First Special Session 
End of Document 1$.;l 2016 Thomson Reuters. No daim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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Proposed Legislation 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 41. Motor Vehicles 
Chapter 3. Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act 
Part 2. Licensing 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-209 
§ 41-3-209. Administrator's findings--Suspension and revocation oflicense 
Currentness 
. (1) If the administrator finds that an applicant is not qualified to receive a license, a license may not be granted. 
(2)(a) On December 1, 2010, the administrator shall suspend the license of a salesperson who fails to submit to the division 
fingerprints as required under Subsection 41-3-205.S(l)(b) on or before November 30, 2010. 
(b) If the administrator finds that there is reasonable cause to deny, suspend, or revoke a license issued under this chapter, 
the administrator shall deny, suspend, or revoke the license. 
( c) Reasonable cause for denial, suspension, or revocation of a license includes, in relation to the applicant or license holder 
or any of its partners, officers, or directors: 
(i) lack of a principal place of business; 
(ii) lack of a sales tax license required under T itle 59, Chapter 12, Sales and Use Tax Act; 
(iii) lack of a bond in effect as required by th is chapter; 
(iv) current revocation or suspension of a dea ler, dismantler, auction, or salesperson license issued in another state; 
(v) nonpayment of required fees; 
(vi) making a false statement on any application for a license under this chapter or for special license plates; 
(vii) a violation of any state or federal law involving motor vehicles; 
(viii) a violation of any state or federal law involving controlled substances; 
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(ix) charges filed with any county attorney, district attorney, or U.S. attorney in any court of competent jurisdiction for a 
violation of any state or federal law involving motor vehicles; 
(x) a violation of any state or federal law involving fraud; 
(xi) a violation of any state or federal law involving a registerable sex offense under Section 77-41-106; or 
(xii) having had a license issued under this chapter revoked wj_thin five years from th'e date of application. 
(cl) Any action taken by the administrator under Subsection (2)(c)(ix) shall remain in effect until a final resolution is reached 
by the court involved or the charges are dropped. 
(3) If the administrator finds that an applicant is not qualified to receive a license under this section, the administrator shall 
provide the applicant written notice of the reason for the denial. 
( 4) If the administrator finds that the license holder has been convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction of violating any of 
the provisions of this chapter or any rules made by the administratqr, or fincls other rea~on.able cause, the administrator may, 
by complying with the emergency procedures of Title 630, Chapter 4, Administrative Procedures Act: 
(a) suspend the license on terms and for a period of time the administrator finds reasonable; or 
(b) revoke the license. 
(5)(a) After suspending or revoking a license,. the adminis~rator may take reasonable action to: 
(i) notify the public that the licensee is no longer in business; and 
(ii) prevent the former licensee from violating the law by conducting business without a license. 
(h) Action under Subsection (5)(a) may include s igns, banners, barriers, locks, bulletins, and not_ices. 
(c) Any business being conducted inc idental to the business for which the former licensee was licensed may continue to 
operate subject to the preventive action taken under this subsection. 
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C redits 
Laws 1949, c.67,§ 16; Laws 1987, c. 161 ,§ 141;Laws 1987,c.171 ,§ 13;Laws 1992, c. 234,§J l;Laws 1998,c.165,§ 5, 
eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 2005, c. 144, § I, eff. May 2, 2005; Laws 2008, c. 382, § 559, eff. May 5, 2008; Laws 2010, c. 291, § 
2, eff. July 1, 2010; Laws 20 10, c. 342, § 6, eff. May 11 , 2010; Laws 2012, c. 145, § 2, eff. May 8, 20 12. 
Codifications C. 1943, Supp. , § 57-6-26; C. 1953, § 41-3-26. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-209, UT ST § 41-3-209 
Current through 20 I 5 First Special Session 
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Proposed Legislation 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 41. Motor Vehicles 
Chapter 3. Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act 
Part 2 . Licensing 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-210 
§ 41-3-210. License holders--Prohib itions and requirements 
Currentness 
( I) The holder of any license issued under th is chapter may not: 
(a) intentionally publish, display, or circulate any advertising that is mis leading or inaccurate in any material fact or that 
misrepresents any of the products sold, manufactured, remanufactured, handled, or furnished by a licensee; 
(b) intentionally publish, display, or circulate any advertising without identifying the seller as the licensee by including in 
the advertisement the full name under which the licensee is licensed or the licensee's number assigned by the division; 
(c) vio late this chapter or the rules made by the administrator; 
( d) violate any law of the state respecting commerce in motor vehicles or any rule respecting commerce in motor vehicles 
made by any licensing or regulating authority of the state; 
(e) engage in business as a new motor vehicle dealer, special equipment dealer, used motor vehicle dealer, motor vehicle 
crusher, or body shop without having in effect a bond as required in this chapter; 
(f) act as a dealer, dismantler, crusher, manufacturer, transporter, remanufacturer, or body shop without maintaining a 
principal place of business; 
(g) engage in a business respecting the selling or exchanging o f new or new and used motor vehicles for which he is not 
licensed, including selling or exchanging a new motor vehicle for which the licensee does not have a franchise, but this 
Subsection ( 1 )(g) does not apply to a special equipment dealer who sells a new special equipment motor vehicle with a gross 
vehicle weight of 12,000 or more pounds aft.er insta lling special equipment on the motor vehicle; 
(h) dismantle or transport to a crusher for crushing or other disposition any motor vehic le without first obtaining a dismantling 
or junk permit under Section 4 1-1a-1009, 41- 1a-10 10, or 4 l-la- 101 I ; 
'Nestl,wvNext' © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No sfairn tu original U.S. Government Wr)rks. 
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(i) as a new motor vehicle dealer, special equipment dealer, or used motor·vehicle dealer fai l to give notice of sales or transfers 
as required in Section 4 1-3-30 I ; 
U) advertise or otherwise represent, or knowing ly a llow to be advertised or represented on his behalf or at his place of 
business, that no down payment is required in connection wi th the sale of a motor vehicle when a down payment is required 
and the buyer is advised or induced to finance a down payment by a loan in addition to any other loan financing the remainder 
of the purchase price of the motor vehicle; 
(k) as a crusher, crush or shred a motor vehicle brought to the crusher without obtaining proper evidence of ownership of 
the motor vehicle; proper evidence of ownership is a certificate of title endorsed according to law or a dismantling or junk 
permit issued under Section 41- l a-1009, 4 1-la-1010, or 4 1- l a-1011 ; 
(I) as a manufacturer or remanufacturer assemble a motor vehicle that does not comply with construction, safety, or vehicle 
identification number standards fixed by law or rule of any licensing or regulating authority; 
(m) as anyone other than a salesperson licensed under this chapter, be present on a dealer display space and contact prospective · 
customers to promote the sale of the dealer's vehicles; 
(n) sell, display for sale, or offer for sale motor vehicles at any location other than the principal place of business or additional 
places of business licensed under this chapter; this provision is construed to prevent dealers, salespersons, or any other 
representative ofa dealership from selling, displaying, or offering motor vehicles for sale from their homes or other unlicensed 
locations; 
( o )(i) as a dealer, dismantler, body shop, or manufacturer, maintain a principal place of business or additional place of business 
that shares any common area with a business or activity not directly related to motor vehicle commerce; or 
(ii) maintain any places of business that share any common area with another dealer, dismantler, body shop, or 
manufacturer; 
(p) withhold delivery oflicense plates obtained by the licensee on behalfof a customer for any reason, including nonpayment 
of any portion of the vehicle purchase price or down payment; 
(q) issue a temporary permit for any vehicle that has not been sold by the licensee; 
(r) alter a temporary permit in any manner; 
(s) operate any principal place of business or additional place of business in a location that does not comply with local 
ordinances, including zoning ordinances; 
(t) sell, display for sale, offer for sale, or exchange any new motor vehicle if the licensee does not: 
',NestlawNext <· 20: G T:1nmson Reuters. No cla im tc, origina! U.S Governmer:t \/..Jo,·-,:_s_ 2 
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(i) have a new motor vehicle dealer's license under Section 41-3-202; and 
(ii) possess a franchise from the manufacturer of lhe new motor vehicle sold, displayed for sale, offered for sale, or 
exchanged by the licensee; or 
(u) as a new motor vehicle dealer or used motor vehicle dealer, encourage or conspire with any person who has not obtained 
. a salesperson's license to solicit for prospective purchasers. 
(2)(a) If a new motor vehicle is constructed in more than one stage, such as a motor home, ambulance, or van conversion, the 
licensee shall advertise, represent, sell, and exchange the vehicle as the make designated by the final stage manufacturer, except 
in those specific situations where the licensee possesses a franchise from the initial or first stage manufacturer, presumably the 
manufacturer of the motor vehicle's chassis. 
(b) Sales of multiple stage manufactured molar vehicles shall include the lransfer to the purchaser of a valid manufacturer's 
statement or certificate of origin from each manufacturer .under Section 41-3-301. 
(3) Each licensee, except salespersons, shall maintain and make available for inspection by peace officers and employees of 
the division: 
(a) a record of every motor vehicle bought, or exchanged by the licensee or received or accepted by the licensee for sale 
or exchange; 
(b) a record of every used part or used accessory bought or otherwise acquired; 
(c) a record of every motor vehicle bought or otherwise acquired and wrecked or dismantled by the licensee; 
(d) all buyers' orders, contracts, odometer statements, temporary permit records, financing records, and all other documents 
related to the purchase, sa~e, or consignment of motor-vehicles; and 
.(e) a record of the name and address of the person to whom any motor vehicle or motor vehicle body, chassis, or motor 
vehicle engine is sold or otherw ise disposed ofand a description of the motor vehicle.by year, make, and vehicle identification 
number. 
( 4) Each licensee required by this chapter to keep records shall: 
(a) be kept by the licensee at least for five years; and 
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(b) furnish copies of those records upon request to any peace officer or employee of the division during reasonable business 
hours. 
(5) A manufacturer, distributor, distributor representative, or factory representative may not induce or attempt to induce by 
means of coercion, intimidation, or discrimination any dealer to: 
(a) accept delivery of any motor vehicle, parts, or accessories or any other commodity or commodities, including advertising 
material not ordered by the dealer; 
(b) order or accept delivery of any motor vehicle with special features, appliances, accessories, or equipment not included in 
the list price of the motor vehicle as publicly advertised by the manufacturer; 
(c) order from any person any parts, accessories, equipment, machinery, tools, appliances, or any other commodity; 
(d) enter into an agreement with the manufacturer, distributor, distributor representative, or factory representative of any of 
them, or to do any other act unfair to the dealer by threatening to cancel any franchise or contractual agreement between the 
manufacturer, distributor, distributor branch, or factory branch and the dealer; 
(e) refuse to deliver to any dealer having a franchi se or contractual arrangement for the retail sale of new and unused motor 
vehicles sold or distributed by the manufacturer, distributor, distributor branch or factory branch, any motor vehicle, publicly 
advertised for immediate delivery within 60 days after the dealer's order is received; or 
(f) unfairly, without regard to the equities of the dealer, cancel the franchise of any motor vehicle dealer; the nonrenewal of 
a franchise or selling agreement without cause is a violation of this subsection and is an unfair cancellation. 
(6) A dealer may not assist an unlicensed dealer or salesperson in unlawful activity through active or passive participation in 
sales, or by allowing use of his facilities or dealer license number, or by any other means. 
(7)(a) The holder of any new motor vehicle dealer license issued under this chapter may not sell any new motor vehicle to: 
(i) another dealer licensed under this chapter who does not hold a valid franchise for the make of new motor vehicles sold, 
unless the selling dealer licenses and titles the new motor vehicle to the purchasing dealer; or 
(ii) any motor vehicle leasing or rental company located within this state, or who has any branch office within this state, 
unless the dealer licenses and titles the new motor vehicle to the purchasing, leasing, or rental company. 
(b) Subsection (7)(a)(i) does not apply to the sale of a new incomplete motor vehicle with a gross vehicle weight of 12,000 
or more pounds to a special equipment dealer licensed under this chapter. 
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(8) A dealer licensed under this chapter may not take on consignment any new motor vehicle from anyone other than a new 
motor vehicle dealer, factory, or distributor who is licensed and franchised to distribute or sell that make of motor vehicle in 
th is or any other state. 
(9) A body shop licensed under th is chapter may not assist an unlicensed body shop in unlawful activity through active or 
passive means or by allowing use of its faci lities, name, body shop number, or by any other means. 
(10) A used motor vehicle dealer licensed under this chapter may not advertise, offer for sale, or sell a new motor vehicle that 
has been driven less than 7,500 miles by obtaining a title only to the vehicle and representing it as a used motor vehicle. 
( l l)(a) Except as provided in Subsection (1 I)( c ), or in cases ofundue hardship or emergency as provided by rule by the division, 
a dealer or salesperson licensed under this chapter may not, on consecutive days of Saturday and Sunday, sell, offer for sale, 
lease, or offer for lease a motor vehicle. 
(b) Each day a motor vehicle is sold, offered for sale, leased, or offered for lease in violation of Subsection (l l)(a) and each 
motor vehicle sold, offered for sale, leased, or offered for lease in violation of Subsection (1 l)(a) shall eonstitute a separate 
offense. 
(c) The provisions of Subsection (l l)(a) shall not apply to a dealer participating in a trade show or exhibition if: 
(i) there are five or more dealers participating in the trade show or exhibition; and 
(ii) the trade show or exhibition takes place at a location other than the principal place of business of one of the dealers 
participating in the trade show or exhibition. 
(12) For purposes of imposing the sales and use tax under Title 59, Chapter 12; .Sales and Use Tax Act, a licensee issuing a 
temporary permit under Section 41-3-302 shafl separately identify the fees required by Title 41, Chapter la, Motor Vehicle Act. 
( 13)(a) A dismantler or dealer engaged in the business of dismantling motor vehicles for the sale of parts or salvage shall identify 
any vehicles or equipment used by the dismantler or dealer for transporting parts or salvage on the highways. 
(b) The identification required under Subsection (13)(a) shall: 
(i) include the name, address, and license number of the dismantler or dealer; and 
(ii) be conspicuously displayed on both sides of the vehicle or equipment in clearly legible letters and numerals not less 
than two inches in height. 
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Credits 
Laws 1949, c. 67, § 13; Laws 1961, c. 80, § 14; Laws 1965, c. 81, §I; Laws 1965, c. 82, § 6; Laws 1967, c. 87, § I ; Laws 1981, 
c. 182, § 13; Laws 1987, c. 171, § 10; Laws 1991, c. 153, § 10; Laws 1991, c. 158, § I; Laws 1992, c. I,§ 184; Laws 1992, 
c. 234, § 32; Laws 1993, c. 4, § 78; Laws 1995, c. 7, § 2, eff. May I , 1995; Laws 1998, c. 165, § 6, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 
2000, c. 249, § 1, eff. May I, 2000; Laws 2007, c. 322, § 6, eff. Apri l 30, 2007. 
Codifications C. 1943, Supp.,§ 57-6-23 ; C. 1953, § 41-3-23. 
Notes of Decisions (2) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-210, UT ST§ 41-3-210 
Current through 2015 First Special Session 
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§ 41-3-211. Unlawful acts or practices, UT ST § 41-3-211 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 41. Motor Vehicles 
Chapter 3. Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act 
Part 2. Licensing 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-211 
§ 41-3-211. Unlawful acts or practices 
Currentness 
(I) A licensee may not knowingly or intentionally engage in any of the following unlawful acts or practices: 
(a) provide a financial institution or person being contacted to provide financing for the purchase of a motor vehicle, a motor 
vehicle contract of sale, document of sale, contract, request for proposal, or other document that does not accurately state: 
(i) the tenns of the motor vehicle purchase; or 
(ii) if the vehicle is a rebuilt vehicle; 
(b) sell a motor vehicle to a purchaser that is subject to financing that is not the motor vehicle described in a motor vehicle 
contract of sale, document of sale, contract, request for proposal, or other document as of the time the contract of sale, 
document of sale, contract, request for proposal, or other document provided to the financial institution or person providing 
financing; or 
(c) make payments on any loan or lease on a motor vehicle subject to a loan or lease that is subject to the payoff requirements 
of Subsection 41-3-402(1). 
(2) The provisions of Subsection (l)(c) do not prohibit a dealer from making one or more loan or lease payments for a motor 
vehicle if making the payments is: 
(a) stated in writing in a motor vehicle contract of sale, document of sale, contract, request for proposal, or other document; or 
(b) stated in 'the notice to the lienholder of the trade-in of the vehicle as required by Subsection 41-3-402(5). 
(3) A person who violates the provisions of this section is subject to the penalties provided in Section 41-3-70 I and Subsection 
41-3-702(l)(a). 
Credits 
Laws 2010, c. 342, § 7, eff. May 11 , 2010. 
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ADDENDUM B TO BRIEF OF PETITIONER/APPELLANT 
RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE 
NEW AUTOMOBILE FRANCHISE ACT 
UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 13-14-101, et seq. 
2 
§ 13-14-101. Title--Legislative purpose, UT ST§ 13-14-101 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 13. Commerce and Trade 
Chapter 14. New Automobile Franchise Act 
Part 1. General Administration (Refs & Annas) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 13-14-101 
§ 13-14-101. Title--Legislative purpose 
Currentness 
(l) This chapter shall be cited as the "New Automobile Franchise Act." 
(2) The Legislature finds that: 
(a) The distribution and sales of new motor vehicles through franchise arrangements in the state vitally affects the general 
economy of the state, the public interest, and the public welfare. A substantial inequality of bargaining power between motor 
vehicle franchisors and motor vehicle franchisees enables a franchisor: 
(i) to compel a franchisee to execute agreements that contain terms and conditions that a franchisee generally would not 
be agreed to absent the compulsion and duress that arise out of the inequality of bargaining power; and 
(ii) in some cases to terminate a franchise without good cause, or to force a franchisee out of business by the use of unfair 
practices. 
(b) Termination of franchises, without good cause or by unfair means: 
(i) diminishes competition and, as a result, leads to higher retail prices and fewer purchase ·options; 
(ii) adversely affects communities that depend on a franchisee to make available motor vehicles for sale or lease and to 
provide warranty work and other services related to vehicles; and 
(ii i) undercuts expectations of consumers concerning the avai labi lity of future services including warranty work from the 
franchisee. 
(c) To promote the public welfare and in the exercise of the state's police powers, it is necessary to establish statutory 
guidelines regulating the relationship between franchisors and franchisees in the motor vehicle industry. 
Credits 
Laws 1996, c. 277, § I, eff. April 29, 1996. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 13. Commerce and Trade 
Chapter 14. New Automobile Franchise Act 
Part 1. General Administration (Refs & An nos) 
-··-··-··-.... - .. -----·------------
U.C.A. 1953 § 13-14-102 
§ 13-14-102. Definitions 
Currentness 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Advisory board" or "board" means the Utah Motor Vehicle Franchise Advisory Board created in Section 13-14-103. 
(2). "Affected municipality" means an incorporated city or town: 
(a) that is located in the notice area; and 
(b )(i) within which a franchisor is proposing a new or relocated dealership that is within the relevant market area of an existing 
dealership of the same line-make owned by another franchisee; or 
( ii) within which an existing dealership is located and a franch isor is proposing a new or relocated dealership within the 
relevant market area of that existing dealership of the same line-make. 
(3) "Affiliate" has the meaning set forth in Section 16-1Oa-102. 
(4) "Aftermarket product" means any product or service not included in the franchisor's suggested retail price of the new motor 
vehicle, as that price appears on the label required by 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1232(t). 
(5) "Dealership" means a site or location in this state: 
(a) at which a franchisee conducts the business of a new motor vehicle dealer; and 
(b) that is identified as a new motor vehicle dealer's principal place of business for licensing purposes (Jnder Section 4 1-3-204. 
(6) "Department" means the Department of Commerce. 
(7) "Executive director" means the executive director of the Department of Commerce. 
1
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(8)(a) "Franchise" Oi "franchise agreement" means a written agreement, or in the absence of a written agreement, then a course 
of dealing or a practice for a definite or indefinite period, in which: 
(i) a person grants to another person a license to use a trade name, trademark, service mark, or related characteristic; and 
(ii) a community of interest exists in the marketing of new motor vehicles, new motor vehicle parts, and services related 
to the sale or lease of new motor vehicles at wholesale or retail. 
(b) "Franchise" or "franchise agreement" includes a sales and service agreement. 
(9) "Franchisee" means a person with whom a franchisor has agreed or permitted, in writing or in practice, to purchase, sell, or 
offer for sale new motor vehicles manufactured, produced, represented, or distributed by the franchisor. 
(10) "Franchisor" means a person who has, in writing or in practice, agreed with or permits a franchisee to purchase, sell, or offer 
for sale new motor vehicles manufactured, produced, assembled, represented, or distributed by the franchisor, and includes: 
(a) the manufacturer, producer, assembler, or distributor of the new motor vehicles; 
(b) an intermediate distributor; and 
(c) an agent, officer, or field or area representative of the franchisor. 
(11) "Lead" means the referral by a franchisor to a franchisee of a potential customer whose contact information was obtained 
from a franchisor's program, process, or system designed to generate referrals for the purchase or lease of a new motor vehicle, 
or for service work related to the franchisor's vehicles. 
(12) "Line-make" means: 
(a) for other than a recreational vehicle, the motor vehicles that are offered for sale, lease, or distribution under a common 
name, trademark, service mark, or brand name of the franchisor; or 
(b) for a recreational vehicle, a specific series of recreational vehicle product that: 
(i) is identified by a common series trade name or trademark; 
(ii) is targeted to a particular market segment, as determined by decor, features, equipment, size, weight, and price range; 
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(iii) has a length and floor plan that distinguish the recreational vehicle from other recreational vehicles with substantially 
the same decor, features, equipment, size, weight, and price; 
(iv) belongs to a single, distinct classification of recreational vehicle product type having a substantial degree of 
commonality in the construction of the chassis, frame, and body; and 
(v) a franchise agreement a111hori7.es a dealer to sell. 
(13) "Mile" means 5,280 feet. 
(14) "Motor home" means a self-propelled vehicle, primarily designed as a temporary dwelling for travel, recreational, or 
vacation use. 
(15)(a) "Motor vehicle" means: 
(i) a travel trailer; 
(ii) except as provided in Subsection (15)(b), a motor vehicle as defined in Section 41-3-102; 
(iii) a semitrailer as defined in Section 41-la-102; 
(iv) a trailer as defined in Section 41 -la-102; and 
(v) a recreational vehicle. 
(b) "Motor vehicle" does not include: 
(i) a motorcycle as defined in Section 4 1-1a- 102; 
( ii) an off-highway vehicle as defined in Section 4 1-3-102; and 
(iii) a small trailer as defined in Section 41-3-102. 
(16) "New motor vehicle" means a motor vehicle as defined in Subsection (15) that has never been titled or registered and has 
been driven less than 7,500 miles, unless the motor vehicle is a trailer, travel trailer, or semitrailer, in which case the mileage 
limit does not apply. 
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( 17) "New motor vehicle dealer" is a person who is licensed under Subsection 41-3-202( I )(a) to sell new motor vehicles. 
(18) "Notice" or "notify" includes both traditional written communications and all reliable forms of electronic communication 
unless expressly prohibited by statute or ru le. 
( 19) "Notice area" means the geographic area that is: 
(a) within a radius of at least six miles and no more than 10 miles from the site of an existing dealership; and 
(b) located within a county w ith a population of at least 225,000. 
(20) "Primary market area" means: 
(a) for an existing dealership, the geographic area established by the franchisor that the existing dealership is intended to 
serve; or 
(b) for a new or relocated dealership, the geographic area proposed by the franchisor that the new or relocated dealership 
is intended to serve. 
(2 l )(a) "Recreational vehicle" means a vehicular unit other than a mobile home, primarily designed as a temporary dwelling 
for travel, recreational, or vacation use, that is either self-propelled or pulled by another vehicle. 
(b) "Recreational vehicle" includes: 
(i) a travel trailer; 
(ii) a camping trailer; 
(iii) a motor home; 
(iv) a fifth wheel trailer; and 
(v) a van. 
(22)(a) "Relevant market area," except with respect to recreational vehicles, means: 
(i) as applied to an existing dealership that is located in a county with a population of less than 225,000: 
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(A) the county in which the existing dealership is located; and 
(B) the area within a I 5-mile radius of the existing dealership; or 
(i i) as applied to an existing dealership that is located in a county with a population of 225,000 or more, the area within 
a 10-mile radius of the existing dealership. 
(b) "Relevant market area," with respect to recreational vehicles, means: 
(i) the county in which the dealership is to be established or relocated; and 
(ii) the area within a 35-mile radius from the site of the existing dealership. 
(23) "Sale, transfer, or assignment" means any disposition of a franchise or an interest in a franchise, with or without 
consideration, including a bequest, inJ1eritance, gift, exchange, lease, or license. 
(24) "Serve" or "served," unless expressly indicated otherwise by statute or rule, includes any reliable form of communication. 
(25) "Site-control agreement" means an agreement, however denominated and regardless of the agreement's form or of the 
parties to the agreement, that has the effect of: 
(a) controlling in any way the use and development of the premises upon which a franchisee's business operations are located; 
(b) requiring a franchisee to establish or maintain an exclusive dealership facility on the premises upon which the franchisee's 
business operations are located; or 
(c) restricting the abili ty of the franchisee or, if the franchisee leases the dealership premises, the franchisee's lessor to transfer, 
sell, lease, develop, redevelop, or change the use of some or all of the dealership premises, whether by sublease, lease, 
collateral pledge of lease, right of fi rst refusal to purchase or lease, option to purchase or lease, or any similar arrangement. 
(26) "Travel trailer," "camping trailer," or "fifth wheel trailer" means a portable vehicle without motive power, designed as 
a temporary dwelling for travel, recreational, or vacation use that does not require a special highway movement permit when 
drawn by a self-propelled motor vehicle. 
(27) "Written," "write," " in writing," or other variations of those terms shall include a ll reliable forms of electronic 
communication. 
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Laws 1996, c. 277, § 2, eff. April 29, I 996; Laws 1997, c. 162, § l, eff. May 5, ·1997; Laws l 998, c. 339, § l, eff. May 4, I 998; 
Laws 2000, c. 86, § 2, eff. May I, 2000; Laws 2002, c. 68, § l , eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 2004, c. 123, § 1, eff. May 3, 2004; 
Laws 2005, c. 167, § I, eff. May 2, 2005; Laws 2005, c. 249, § l, eff. May 2, 2005; Laws 2008, c. 362, § I , eff. May 5, 2008; 
Laws 2008, c. 388, § l, eff. July I, 2008; Laws 2009, c. 3 18, § I, eff. March 25, 2009; Laws 20 l 0, c. 33, § 1, eff. May 11, 
20 10; Laws 2015, c. 268, § 1, eff. May 12, 20 15. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 13. Commerce and Trade 
Chapter 14. New Automobile Franchise Act 
Part 1. General Administration (Refs & Annos) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 13-14-103 
§ 13-14-103. Utah Motor Vehicle Franchise Advisory Board--Creation--
Appointment of members--Alternate members--Chair--Quorum--Conflict of interest 
Currentness 
, 
(1) There is created within the department the Utah Motor Vehicle Franchise Advisory Board that consists of: 
(a) the executive director or the executive director's designee; and 
(b) 11 members appointed by the executive director, with the concurrence of the governor as follows: 
(i) one recreational motor vehicle franchisee; 
(ii) three new motor vehicle franchisees from different congressional districts in the state; 
(iii) three members representing motor vehicle franchisors registered by the department pursuant to Section 13-14-105; 
(iv) three members of the general public, none of whom shall be related to any franchisee; and 
(v) one representative of the Utah League of Cities and Towns. 
(2).(a) The executive director shall appoint, with the concurrence of the governor, five alternate members, with one alternate 
from each of the designations described in Subsections (l)(b)(i) through (v), except that the new motor vehicle franchisee 
alternate for the designation under Subsection ( l )(b )(ii) may be from any congressional district. 
(b) An alternate shall take the place of a regular advisory board member from the same designation at a meeting of the advisory 
board where that regular advisory board member is absent or otherwise disqualified from participating in the advisory board 
meeting. 
(3)(a)(i) Members of the advisory board appointed under Subsections (I )(b) and (2) are appointed for a term of four years. 
(ii ) No specific term applies to the executive director or the executive director's designee. 
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(b) The executive director may adjust the term of members who were appointed to the advisory board prior to July I, 200 J, 
by extending the unexpired term of a member for up to two additional years in order to insure that approximately half of 
lhe members are appointed every two years. 
( c) In the event of a vacancy on the advisory board of a member appointed under Subsection ( l )(b) or ·(2), · the executive 
director with the concurrence of the governor, shall appoint an individual to complete the unexpired term of the member 
whose office is vacant. 
(cl) A member may not be appointed to more than two consecutive terms. 
(4)(a) The executive director or the executive director's designee is the chair of the advisory board. 
(b) The department shall keep a record of all hearings, proceedings, transactions, communications, and recommendations 
of the advisory board. 
(5)(a) Four or more members of the advisory board constitute a quorum for the transaction of business. 
(b) The action of a majority ·of a quorum present is considered the action of the advisory board. 
(6)(a) A member of the advisory board may not participate as a board member in a proceeding or hearing: 
(i) involving the member's licensed business or employer; or 
(ii) when a member, a member's business or fami ly, or employer has a pecuniary interest in the outcome or other conflict 
of interest concerning an issue before the advisory board. 
(b) If a member of the advisory board is disqualified under Subsection ( 6)(a), the executive director shall select the appropriate 
alternate mell1per \o act 21'! tl1e iss_11~ b~f2_re_ the advisory board as provide_d in Subsection (2). 
(7) Except for the executive director or the executive director's designee, an individual may not be appointed or serve on the 
advisory board wh ile holding any other elective or appointive state or federal office. 
(8) A member may not receive compensation or benefits for the member's service, but may receive per diem and travel expenses 
in accordance with: 
(a) Section 63A-3- l 06; 
(b1) Section 63A-3-107; and 
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(c) rules made by the Division of Finance pursuant to Sections 63A-3-106 and 63A-3-107. 
(9) The department shall provide necessary staff support to the advisory board. 
Credits 
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Laws 2002, c. 68, § 2, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 2004, c. 123, § 2, eff. May 3, 2004; Laws 2005, c. 249, § 2, eff. May 2, 2005; 
Laws 2008, c. 362, § 2, eff. May 5, 2008; Laws 2010, c. 286, § 39, eff. May 11 , 2010; Laws 2015, c. 268, § 2, eff. May 12, 2015. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 13. Commerce and Trade 
Chapter 14. New Automobile Franchise Act 
Part 1. General Administration (Refs & An nos) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 13-14-104 
§ 13-14-104. Powers and duties of the adviso1y board and the executive director 
Currentness 
(1 )(a) Except as provided in Subsection 13-14-J 06(3), the advisory board shall make recommendations to the executive director 
on the administration and enforcement of this chapter, including adjudicative and rulemaking proceedings. 
(b) The executive director shall: 
(i) consider the advisory board's recommendations; and 
(ii) issue any rules or final decisions by the department. 
(2) The executive director, in consultation with the advisory board, shall make rules for the administration of this chapter in 
accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
· (3)(a) An adjudicative proceeding under this chapter shall be conducted in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative 
Procedures Act. 
(b) In an adjudicative proceeding under this chapter, any order issued by the executive director: 
(i) shall comply with Section 63G-4-208, whether the proceeding is a formal or an informal adjudicative proceeding under 
Title 630, Chapter 4, Administrative Procedures Act;· and 
(ii) if the order modifies or rejects a finding of fact in a recommendation from the advisory board, shall be made on the 
basis of information learned from the executive director's: 
(A) personal attendance at the hearing; or 
(B) review of the record developed at the hearing. 
( 4) The executive director's decision under this section shall be made available to the public. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 13. Commerce and Trade 
Chapter 14. New Automobile Franchise Act 
Part 2. Franchises in General 
lf.C.A. 1953 § 13-14-201 
§ 13-14-201. Prohibited acts by franchisors--Affiliates--Disclosures 
Currentness 
(1) A franchisor may not in this state: 
(a) except as provided in Subsection (3), require a franchisee to order or accept de livery of any new motor vehicle, part, 
accessory, equipment, or other item not otherwise required by law that is not voluntarily ordered by the franchisee; 
(b) require a franchisee to: 
(i) participate monetarily in any advertising campaign; or 
(ii) contest, or purchase any promotional materials, display devices, or display decorations or materials; 
(c) require a franchisee to change the capital structure of the franchisee's dealership or the means by or through which the 
franchisee finances the operation of the franchisee's dealership, if the dealership at all times meets reasonable capital standards 
determined by and applied in a nondiscriminatory manner by the franchisor; 
( d) require a franchisee to refrain from participating in the management of, investment in, or acquisition of any other line of 
new motor vehicles or related products, if the franchisee: 
(i) maintains a reasonable line of credit for each make or line of vehicles; and 
(ii) complies with reasonable capital and facilities requirements of the franchisor; 
(e) require a franchisee to prospectively agree to a release, assignment, novation, waiver, or estoppel that would: 
(i) relieve a franchisor from any liability, including notice and hearing rights imposed on the franchisor by this chapter; or 
(ii) require any controversy between the franchisee and a franchisor to be referred to a third party if the decision by the 
third party would be binding; 
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(f) require a franchisee to change the location of the principal place of business of the franchisee's dealership or make any 
substantial alterations to the dealership premises, if the change or alterations would be unreasonable or cause the franchisee 
to lose control of the premises or impose any other unreasonable requirement related to the facilities or premises; 
(g) coerce or attempt to coerce a franchisee to join, contribute to, or affiliate with an advertising association; 
(h) require, coerce, or attempt to coerce a franchisee to enter int.n rm agreement. with the franchisor or do any other act that 
is unfair or prejudicial to the franchisee, by threatening to cancel a franchise agreement or other contractual agreement or 
understanding existing between the franchisor and franchisee; 
(i) adopt, change, establish, enforce, modify, or implement a plan or system for the allocation, scheduling, or del ivery of 
new motor vehicles, parts, or accessories to its franchisees so that the plan or system is not fair, reasonable, and equitable, 
including a plan or system that imposes a vehicle sales objective, goal, or quota on a franchisee, or that evaluates a franchisee's 
sales effectiveness or overall sales performance, without providing a reasonable opportunity for the franchisee to acquire the 
necessary vehicles in a timely manner from the franchisor on commercially reasonable terms; 
U) increase the price of any new motor vehicle that the franchisee has ordered from the franchisor and for which there exists 
at the time of the order a bona fide sale to a retail purchaser if the order was made prior to the franchisee's receipt of an 
official written price increase notification; 
(k) fai l to indemnify and hold harmless its franchisee against any judgment for damages or settlement approved in writing 
by the franchisor: 
(i) including court costs and attorney fees arising out of actions, claims, or proceedings including those based on: 
(A) strict liability; 
(B) negligence; 
(C) misrepresentation; 
(D) express or implied warranty; 
(E) revocation as described in Section 70A-2-608; or 
(F) rejection as described in Section 70A-2-602; and 
(ii) to the extent the judgment or settlement relates to alleged defective or negligent actions by the franchisor; 
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(I) threaten or coerce a franchisee to waive or forbear its right to protest the establ ishment or relocation of a same line-make 
franchisee in the re levant market area of the affected franchisee; 
(m) fail to ship monthly to a franchisee, if ordered by the franchisee, the number of new motor vehicles of each make, series, 
and model needed by the franchisee to achieve a percentage of total new vehicle sales of each make, series, and model 
equitably related to the total new vehicle production or importation being achieved nationally at the time of the order by each 
make, series, and model covered under the franchise agreement; 
(n) require or otherwise coerce a franchisee to under-utilize the franchisee's existing dealer facility or faci lities, including by: 
(i) requiring or otherwise coercing a franchisee to exclude or remove from the franchisee's facility operations the selling 
or servicing of a line-make of vehicles for which the franchisee has a franchise agreement to utilize the facilities; or 
(ii) prohibiting the franchisee from locating, relocating, or occupying a franchise or line-make in an existing facility owned 
or occupied by the franchisee that includes the selling or servicing ofanother franchise or line-make at the facility provided 
that the franchisee gives the franchisor written notice of the franchise co-location; 
(o) fail to include in any franchise agreement or other agreement governing a franchisee's ownership of a dealership or a 
franchisee's conduct of business under a franchise the following language or language to the effect that: "If any provision in 
this agreement contravenes the laws or regulations of any state or other jurisdiction where this agreement is to be performed, 
or provided for by such laws or regulations, the provision is considered to be modified to conform to such laws or regulations, 
and all other terms and provisions shall remain in full force."; 
(p) engage in the distribution, sale, offer for sale, or lease of a new motor vehicle to purchasers who acquire the vehicle-in this 
state except through a franchisee with whom the franchisor has established a written franchise agreement, if the fi-anchisor's 
trade name, trademark, service mark, or related characteristic is an integral element in the distribution, sale, offer for sale, 
or lease; 
( q) engage in the distribution or sale of a recreational vehicle that is manufactured, rented, sold, or offered for sale in this state 
without being constructed in accordance with the standards set by the American National Standards Institute for recreational 
vehicles and evidenced by a seal or plate attached lo the vehicle; 
(r) except as provided in Subsection (2), authorize or permit a person to perform warranty service repairs on motor vehicles, 
except warranty service repairs: 
(i) by a franchisee with whom the franchisor has entered into a franchise agreement for the sale and service of the 
franchisor's motor vehicles; or 
(ii) on owned motor vehicles by a person or government entity who has purchased new motor vehicles pursuant to a 
franchisor's fleet discount program; 
'•Nestli'lwNexr @ 20 ! 6 Thomson f~eutern. No claim to c rlginal U.S Governmer,t \/Vorks. 
• 
§ 13-14-201. Prohibited acts by franchisors--Affiliates--Disclosures, UT ST§ 13-14-201 
----· -·--·---- --·- --· 
(s) fail to provide a franchisee with a written franchise agreement; 
(t)(i) except as provided in Subsection (l)(t)(ii) and notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter: 
(A) unreasonably fail or refuse to offer to its same line-make franchised dealers all models manufactured for that line-
make; 
(B) unreasonably require a dealer to: 
(I) pay any extra fee, remodel, renovate, recondition the dealer's existing facilities; or 
(II) purchase unreasonable advertising displays or other materials as a prerequisite to receiving a model or series of 
vehicles; 
(ii) notwithstanding Subsection (l)(t)(i), a recreational vehicle franchisor may split a line-make between motor home and 
travel trailer products; 
(u) except as provided in Subsection (6), directly or indirectly: 
(i) own an interest in a new motor vehicle dealer or dealership; 
(ii) operate or control a new motor vehicle dealer or dealership; 
(iii) act in the capacity ofa new motor vehicle dealer, as defined in Section 13-14-102; or 
(iv) operate a motor vehicle service facil ity; 
(v) fail to timely pay for all reimbursements to a franchisee for incentives and other payments made by the franchisor; 
(w) directly or indirectly influence or direct potential customers to franchisees in an inequitable manner, including: 
(i) charging a franchisee a fee for a referral regarding a potential sale or lease of any of the franchisee's products or services 
in an amount exceeding the actual cost of the referral; 
(ii) giving a customer referral to a franchisee on the condition that tl1e franchi see agree to sell the vehicle at a price fixed 
by the franchisor; or 
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(iii) advising a potential customer as to the amount that the potential customer should pay for a particular product; 
(x) fail to provide comparable delivery terms to each franchisee for a product of the franchisor, including the time of delivery 
after the placement of an order by the franchisee; 
(y) if personnel training is provided by the franchisor to its franchisees, unreasonably fail to make that training available to 
each franchisee on proportionally equal terms; 
(z) condition a franchisee's eligibility to participate in a sales incentive program on the requirement that a franchisee use the 
financing services of the franchisor or a subsidiary or affiliate of the franchisor for inventory financing; 
(aa) make available for public disclosure, except with the franchisee's permission or under subpoena or in any administrative 
or judicial proceedi1i.g in which the franchisee or the franchisor is a party, any confidential financial information,regarding 
a franchisee, including: 
(i) monthly financial statements provided by the franchisee; ' .• ,.. . 
(ii) the profitability of a franchisee; or 
(iii) the status of a franchisee's inventory of products; 
(bb) use any performance standard, incentive program, or similar method to measure the performance of franchisees unless 
the standard or program: ' .. 
(i) is designed and adminis_tered in a fair, reasonable, and equitable manner; 
(ii) if based upon a survey, utilizes an act11arially generally acceptable, valid sample; and 
(iii) is, upon request by a franchisee, disclosed and explained in writing to the franchisee, including: 
(A) how the standard or program is designed; 
(B) how the standard or program will be administered; and 
(C) the types of data that will be collected and used in the application of the standard or program; 
(cc) other than sales to the federal government, directly or indirectly, sell, lease, offer to sell , or offer to lease, a new motor 
vehicle or any motor vehicle owned by the franchisor, except through a franchised new motor vehicle dealer; 
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(dd) compel a franchisee, through a finance subsidiary, to agree to unreasonable operating requirements, except that this 
Subsection (l)(dd) may not be construed to limit the right of a financing subsidiary to engage in business practices in 
accordance with the usage of trade in retail and wholesale motor vehicle financing; 
(ee) condition the franchisor's participation in co-op advertising for a product category on the franchisee's participation in 
any program related to another product category or on the franchisee's achievement of any level of sales in a product category 
other than that which is the subject of the co-op advertising; 
(ff) except as provided in Subsections (7) through (9), discriminate against a franchisee in the state in favor of another 
franchisee of the same line-make in the state: 
(i) by selling or offering to sell a new motor vehicle to one franchisee at a higher actual price, including the price for 
vehicle transportation, than the actual price at which the same model similarly equipped is offered to or is made avai lable 
by the franchisor to another franchisee in the state during a similar time period; 
(ii) except as provided in Subsection (8), by using a promotional program or dev ice or an incentive, payment, or other 
benefit, whether paid at the time of the sale of the new motor vehicle to the franchisee or later, that results in the sale 
of or offer to sell a new motor vehicle to one franchisee in the state at a higher price, including the price for vehicle 
transportation, than the price at which the same model similarly equipped is offered or is made available by the franchisor 
to another franchisee in the state during a similar time period; 
(iii) except as provided in Subsection (9), by failing to provide or direct a lead in a fair, equitable, and timely manner; or 
(iv) if the franchisee complies with any reasonable requirement concerning the sale of new motor vehicles, by using or 
considering the performance of any of its franchisees located in this state relating to the sale of the franchisor's new motor 
vehicles in determining the: 
(A) dealer's eligibility to purchase program, certified, or other used motor vehicles from the franchisor; 
(B) volume, type, or model of program, certified, or other used motor vehicles the dealer is eligible to purchase from 
the franchisor; 
(C) price of any program, certified, or other used motor vehicles that the dealer is eligible to purchase from the franchisor; 
or 
(D) availability or amount of any discount, credit, rebate, or sales incentive the dealer is eligible to receive from the 
manufacturer for the purchase of any program, certified, or other motor vehicle offered for sale by the franchisor; 
(gg)(i) take control over funds owned or under the control of a franchisee based on the findings of a warranty audit or sales 
incentive audit unless the following conditions are satisfied: 
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(A) the franchisor fully identifies in writing the basis for the franchisor's c laim or charge back arising from the audit, 
including notifying the franchisee that the franchisee has 20 days from the day on which the franchisee receives the 
franchisor's claim or charge back to assert a protest in writing to the franchisor identifying the basis for the· protest; 
(B) the francl1isee's protest shall inform the franchisor that the protest shall· be submitted to a mediator in the stale who 
is identified by name and address in the franchisee's notice to the franchisor; 
(C) if mediation is requested under Subsection (l)(gg)(i)(B), mediation shall occur no later than 30 d·ays after the day 
on which the franchisor receives the franchisee's protest of a claim or charge back; 
(D) if mediation does not lead to a resolution of the protest, the protest shall be set for binding arbitration in the same 
venue in which the mediation occurred; 
(E) binding arbitration under Subsection (l)(gg)(i)(D) shall be conducted: 
(I) by an arbitrator mutually agreed upon by the franchisor and the franchisee; and 
(II) on a date mutually agreed upon by the franchisor and the franchisee, but sh~ll be held no later than 90 days after 
the franchisor's receipt of the franchisee's notice of protest; ' ' 
(F) this Subsection (l)(gg)(i) applies exclusively to warranty audits and sales incentive audits; 
(G) Subsections (l)(gg)(i)(A) through (E) do not apply if the franchisor r~asonably believes that the amount of the claim 
or charge back is related to a fraudulent act by the franchisee; and 
(H) the costs of the mediator or arbitrator instituted under this Subsection ( l)(gg) shall be shared equally by the franchisor 
I 
and the franchisee; or 
(ii) require a franchisee to execute a wri.tten waiver of the requirements of Subsection (l)(gg)(i); 
(hh) coerce, or attempt to coerce a franchisee to purchase or sell an aftermarket product manufactured by the franchisor, or 
obtained by the franchisor for resale from a third-party supplier and the franchisor or its affiliate derives a financial benefit 
from the franchisee's sale or purchase of the aftermarket product as a condition to obtaining preferential status from the 
franchisor; 
(ii) through an affiliate, take any action that would otherwise be prohibited under this chapter; 
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Uj) impose any fee, surcharge, or other charge on a franchisee designed to recover the cost of a warranty repair for which 
the franchisee is paid by the franchisor; 
(kk) directly or indirectly condition any of the following actions on the willingness of a franchisee, prospective new 
franchisee, or owner of an interest in a dealership faci lity to enter into a site-control agreement: 
(i) the awarding of a franchise to a prospective new franchisee; 
(ii) the addition of a line-make or franchise to an existing franchisee; 
(iii) the renewal of an existing franchisee's franchise; 
(iv) the approval of the relocation of an existing franchisee's dealership faci lity, unless the franchisor pays, and the 
franchisee voluntarily accepts, additional specified cash consideration to faci litate the relocation; or 
(v) the approval of the sale or transfer of a franchise's ownership, unless the franchisor pays, and the buyer voluntarily 
accepts, additional specified cash consideration to facilitate the sale or transfer; 
(ll) subject to Subsection (11), deny a franchisee the right to return any or all parts or accessories that: 
(i) were specified for and sold to the franchisee under an automated ordering system required by the franchisor; and 
(ii)(A) are in good, resalable condition; and 
(B)(I) the franchisee received within the previous 12 months; or 
(II) are listed in the current parts catalog; 
(mm) subject to Subsection (I 2), obtain from a franchisee a waiver of a franchisee's right, by threatening: 
(i) to impose a detriment upon the franchisee's business; or 
(ii) to withho ld any entitlement, benefit, or service: 
(A) to which the franchisee is entitled under a franchise agreement, contract, statute, rule, regulation, or law; or 
(B) that has been granted to more than one other franchisee of the franchisor in the state; 
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(nn) coerce a franchisee to establish, or provide by agreement, program, or incentive provision that a franchisee must establish, 
a price at which the franchisee is required to sell a product or service that is: 
(i) sold in connection with the franchisee's sale of a motor vehicle; and 
(ii)(A) in the case of a product, not manufactured, provided, or distributed by the franchisor or an affiliate; or 
(B) in the case of a service, not provided by the franchisor or an affi liate; 
(oo) except as necessary to comply with a health or safety law, or to comply with a technology requirement compliance with 
which is necessary to sell or service a motor vehicle that the franchisee is authorized or licensed by the franchisor to sell or 
service, coerce or require a franchisee, through a penalty or other detriment to the franchisee's business, to: 
(i) construct a new dealer facility or materially alter or remodel an existing dealer facility before the date that is 10 years 
after the date the construction of the new dealer facility at that location was completed, if the construction substantially 
complied with the franchisor's brand image standards or plans that the franchisor provided or approved; or 
(ii) materially alter or remodel an existing dealer faci lity before the date that is IO years after the date the previous alteration 
or remodeling at that location was completed, if the previous alteration or remodeling' substantially complied with the 
franchisor's brand image standards or plans that the franchisor provided or approved; or 
(pp) notwithstanding the terms of a franchise agreement providing otherwise and subject to Subsection (14): 
(i) coerce or require a franchisee, including by agreement, program, or incentive provision, to purchase a good or service, 
relating to a facility construction, alteration, or remodel, from a vendor that a franchisor or its affiliate selects, identifies, 
or designates, without allowing the franchisee, after consultation with the franchisor, to obtain a like good or service of 
substantially similar quality from a vendor that the franchi•see chooses; or 
(ii) coerce or require a franchisee, including by agreement, program, or incentive provision, to lease a sign or other 
franch isor image element from the franchisor or an affiliate without providing the franchisee the right to purchase a sign 
or other franchisor image element. of like kind ,md quality from a vendor that the franchisee chooses. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (J)(r), a franchisor may authorize or permit a person to perform warranty service repairs on 
motor vehicles if the warranty services is for a franchisor of recreational vehicles. 
(3) Subsection (l)(a) does not prevent the franchisor from requiring that a franchisee carry a reasonable inventory of: 
(a) new motor vehicle models offered for sale by the franchisor; and 
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(b) parts to service the repair of the new motor vehicles. 
(4) Subsection (l)(d) does not prevent a franchisor from requiring that a franchisee maintain separate sales personnel or display 
space. 
(5) Upon the written request of any franchisee, a franchisor shall disclose in writing to the franchisee the basis on which new 
motor vehicles, parts, and accessories are allocated, scheduled, and delivered among the franchisor's dealers of the same line-
make. 
(6)(a) A franchisor may engage in any of the activities listed in Subsection (l)(u), for a period not to exceed 12 months if: 
(i)(A) the person from whom the franchisor acquired the interest in or control of the new motor vehicle dealership was 
a franchised new motor vehicle dealer; and 
(8) the franchisor's interest in the new motor vehicle dealership is for sale at a reasonable price and on reasonable terms 
and conditions; or 
(ii) the franchisor is engaging in the activity listed in Subsection (l)(u) for the purpose of broadening the diversity of its 
dealer body and facilitating the ownership of a new motor vehicle dealership by a person who: 
(A) is part of a group that has been historically underrepresented in the franchisor's dealer body; 
(8) would not otherwise be able to purchase a new motor vehicle dealership; 
(C) has made a significant investment in the new motor vehicle dealership which is subject to loss; 
(D) has an ownership interest in the new motor vehicle dealership; and 
(E) operates the new motor vehicle dealership under a plan to acquire full ownership of the dealership within a reasonable 
period of time and under reasonable terms and conditions. 
(b) After receipt of the advisory board's recommendation, the executive director may, for good cause shown, extend the lime 
limit set forth in Subsection (6)(a) for an additional period not to exceed 12 months. 
(c) A franchisor who was engaged in any of the activities listed in Subsection (l)(u) in this state prior to May 1, 2000, may 
continue to engage in that activity, but may not expand that activity to acquire an interest in any other new motor vehicle 
dealerships or motor vehicle service facilities after May l , 2000. 
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(d) Notwithstanding Subsection (i)(u), a franchisor may own, operate, or control a new motor vehicle dealership trading in 
a line-make of motor vehicle if: 
(i) as to that line-make of motor vehicle, there are no more than four franchised new motor vehicle dealerships licensed 
and in operation within the state as of January I , 2000; 
(ii) the franchisor does not own directly or indirectly, more than a 45% interest in the dealership; 
(iii) at the time the franchisor first acquires ownership or assumes operation or control of the dealership, the distance 
between the dealership thus owned, operated, or controlled and the nearest unaffiliated new motor vehicle dealership 
trading in the same line-make is not less than 150 miles; 
(iv) all the franchisor's franchise agreements confer rights on the franchisee to develop and operate as many dealership 
facilities as the franchisee and franchisor shall agree are appropriate w ithin a defined geographic territory or area; and 
(v) as of January 1, 2000, no fewer than half of the franchisees of the line-make within the state own and operate two or 
more dealership facilities in the geographic area covered by the franchise agreement. 
(7) Subsection (l)(ff) does not apply to recreational vehicles. 
(8) Subsection (l)(ff)(ii) does not prohibit a promotional or incentive program that is functionally available to all competing 
franchisees of the same line-make in the state on substantially comparable terms. 
(9) Subsection (l)(ff)(iii) may not be construed to: 
(a) permit provision of or access to customer information that is otherwise protected from disclosure by law or by contract 
between a franchisor and a franchisee; or 
(b) require a franchisor to disregard the preference volunteered by a potential customer in providing or directing a lead. 
(10) Subsection ( l )(ii) does not limit the right of an af-fi liate to engage in business practices in accordance with the usage of 
trade in which the affi liate is engaged. 
( 11 )(a) Subsection (1)(11) does not apply to parts or accessories that the franchi see ordered and purchased outside ofan automated 
parts ordering system required by the franchisor. 
(b) In determining whether parts or accessories in a franchisee's inventory were specified and sold under an automated 
ordering system required by the franchisor, the parts and accessories in the franchisee's inventory are presumed to be the 
most recent parts and accessories that the franchisor sold to the franchisee. 
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(12)(a) Subsection (l )(mm) does not apply to a good faith settlement of a dispute, including a dispute relating to contract 
negotiations, in which the franchisee gives a waiver in exchange for fai r consideration in the form of a benefi t conferred on 
the franchisee. 
(b) Subsection (12)(a) may not be construed to defeat a franchisee's claim that a waiver has been obtained in violation of 
Subsection ( l )(mm). 
(13)(a) As used in Subsection (l)(oo): 
(i) "Materially alter": 
(A) means to make a material architectural, structural, or aesthetic alteration; and 
(B) does not include routine maintenance, such as interior painting, reasonably necessary to keep a dealership facility 
in attractive condition. 
(ii) "Penalty or other detriment" does not include a payment under an agreement, incentive, or program that is offered 
to but declined or not accepted by a franchisee, even if a similar payment is made to another franchisee in the state that 
chooses to -participate in the agreement, incentive, or program. 
(b) Subsection (l)(oo) does not apply to: 
(i) a program that provides a lump sum payment to assist a franchisee to make a facility improvement or to pay for a sign 
or a franchisor image element, if the payment is not dependent on the franchisee selling or purchasing a specific number 
of new vehicles; 
(ii) a program that is in effect on May 8, 2012, with more than one franchisee in the state or to a renewal or modification · 
of the program; 
( iii) a program that provides reimbursement to a franchisee on reasonable, written terms for a substantial portion of the 
franchisee's cost of making a facility improvement or installing signage or a franchisor image element; or 
(iv) a written agreement between a franchisor and franchisee, in effect before May 8, 20 12, under which a franchisee 
agrees to construct a new dealer facility. 
(14)(a) Subsection (l)(pp)(i) does not apply to: 
(i) signage purchased by a franchisee in which the franchisor has an intellectual property right; or 
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(ii) a good used in a facility construction, alteration, Oi remodel that is: 
(A) a moveable interior display that contains material subject to a franchisor's intellectual property right; or 
(B) specifically eligible for reimbursement of over one-half its cost pursuant to a franchisor or distributor program or 
· incentive granted to the franchisee on reasonable, written terms. 
(b) Subsection (J)(pp)(ii) may not be construed to allow a franchisee to: 
(i) impair or eliminate a franchisor's intellectual property right; or 
(ii) erect or maintain a sign that does not conform to the franchisor's reasonable fabrication specifications and intellectual 
property usage guidelines. 
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Title 13 . Commerce and Trade 
Chapter 14. New Automobile Franchise Act 
Part 2. Franchises in General 
U.C.A. 1953 § 13-14-202 
§ 13-14-202. Sale or transfer of ownership 
Currentness 
(l)(a) The franchisor shall give effect lo the change in a franchise agreement as a result of an event listed in Subsection (l)(b): 
(i) subject to Subsection l 3- l 4-305(2)(b ); and 
(ii) unless exempted under Subsection (2). 
(b) The franchisor shall give effect to the change in a franchise agreement pursuant to Subsection (l)(a) for the: 
(i) sale of a dealership; 
(ii) contract for sale of a dealership; 
(iii) transfer ofownership of a franchisee's dealership by: 
(A) sale; 
(B) transfer of the business; or 
(C) stock transfer; or 
(iv) change in the executive management of the franchisee's dealership. 
(2) A franchisor is exempted from the requirements of Subsection ( 1) if: 
(a) the transferee is denied, or would be denied, a new motor vehicle franchisee's license pursuant to Title 41, Chapter 3, 
Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act; or 
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(b) the proposed sale or transfer of the business or change of executive management will be substantially detrimental to the 
distribution of franchisor's new motor vehicles or to competition in the relevant market area, provided that the franchisor has 
given written notice to the franchisee within 60 days following receipt by the franchisor of the following: 
(i) a copy of the proposed contract of sale or transfer executed by the franchisee and the proposed transferee; 
(ii) a completed copy of the franchisor's written application for approval of the change in ownership or executive 
management, if any, including the information customarily required by the franchisor; and 
(iii)(A) a written description of the business experience of the executive management of the transferee in the case of a 
proposed sale or transfer of the franchisee's business; or 
(B) a written description of the business experience of the person involved in the proposed change of the franchisee's 
executive management in the case of a proposed change of executive management. 
(3) For purposes of this section, the refusal by the franchisor to accept a proposed transferee is presumed to be unreasonable 
and undertaken without good cause if the proposed franchisee: 
(a) is of good moral character; and 
(b) otherwise meets the written, reasonable, and uniformly applied standards or qualifications, if any, of the franchisor relating 
to the business experience of executive management and financial capacity to operate and maintain the dealership required 
by the franchisor of its franchisees. 
( 4)(a) If after receipt of the written notice from the franchisor described in Subsection (1) the franchisee objects to the franchisor's 
refusal to accept the proposed sale or transfer of the business or change of executive management, the franchisee may file an 
application for a hearing before the advisory board up to 60 days from the date of receipt of the notice. 
(b) After a hearing and the executive director's receipt of the advisory board's recommendation, the executive director shall 
determine, and enter an order providing that: 
(i) the proposed transferee or change in executive management: 
(A) shall be approved; or 
(B) may not be approved for specified reasons; or 
(ii) a proposed transferee or change in executive management is approved if specific conditions are timely satisfied. 
',Nest!a•.vNe:<t· i.f.' /016 Thomsor. f"~euters. No clairn to •:>rigina! US. Goverr.rneni Wcrks. 2 
• 
• 
§ 13-14-202. Sale or transfer of ownership, UT ST § 13-14-202 
·--------·-·--·-·-------
(c)(i) The franchisee shall have the burden of proof with respect to all issues raised by the franch isee's application for a 
hearing as provided in this section. 
(ii) During the pendency of the hearing, the franchise agreement shall continue in effect in accordance with its terms. 
(d) The advisory board and the executive director shall expedite, upon written request, any determination sought under this 
section. 
Credits 
Laws 1996, c. 277, § 9, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 2005, c. 249, § 8, eff. May 2, 2005. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 13. Commerce and Trade 
Chapter 14. New Automobile Franchise Act 
Part 2. Franchises in General 
U.C.A. 1953 § 13-14-203 
§ 13-14-203. Succession to franchise 
Currentness 
(l)(a) A successor, including a family member of a deceased or incapacitated franchisee, who is designated by the franchisee 
may succeed the franchisee in the ownership and operation of the dealership under the existing franchise agreement if: 
(i) the designated successor gives the franchisor written notice of an intent to succeed to the rights of the deceased or 
incapacitated franchisee in the franchise agreement within 180 days after the franchisee's death or incapacity; 
(ii) the designated successor agrees to be bound by all of the terms and conditions of the franchise agreement; and 
(iii) the designated successor meets the criteria generally applied by the franchisor in qualifying franchisees. 
(b) A franchisor may refuse to honor the existing franchise agreement with the designated successor only for good cause. 
(2) The franchisor may request in writing from a designated successor the personal and financial data that is reasonably necessary 
to determine whether the existing franchise agreeme_rit should be honored. The designated successor shall supply the personal 
and financial data promptly upon the request. 
(3)(a) If a franchisor believes that good cause exists for refusing to honor the requested succession, the franchisor shall serve 
upon the designated successor notice of its refusal to approve the succession, within 60 days after the later of: 
(i) receipt of the notice of the designated successor's intent to succeed the franchisee in the ownership and operation of 
the dealership; or 
(ii)-receipt of the requested personal and financial data. 
(b) Failure to serve the notice pursuant to Subsection (3)(a) is considered approval of the designated successor and the 
franchise agreement is considered amended to reflect the approval of the succession the day following the last day the 
franchisor can serve notice under Subsection (3)(a). 
(4) The notice of the franchisor provided in Subsection (3) shall: 
'./VestlawNexr (1;, 20:6 T·ion,son F~euters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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(a) state the specific grounds for the refusal to approve the succession; and 
(b) that discontinuance of the franchise agreement shall take effect not less than 180 days after the date the notice of refusal 
is served unless the proposed successor fi les an application for hearing under Subsection (6). 
(5)(a) T his section does not prevent a franchisee from designating a person as the successor by written instrument filed with 
the franchisor. 
(b) If a franchisee files an instrument under Subsection (S)(a), the instrument governs the succe·ssion rights to the management 
and operation of the dealership subject to the designated successor satisfying the franchisor's qualification requirements as 
described in this section. 
(6)(a) If a franchisor serves a notice of refusal to a designated successor pursuant to Subsection (3), the designated successor 
may, within the 180-day period provided in Subsection (4), fi le with the advisory board an application for a hearing and a 
determination by the executive director regarding whether good cause exists for the refusal. 
(b) If application for a hearing is timely fi led, the franchisor shall continue to honor the franchise agreement until after: 
(i) the requested hearing has been concluded; 
(ii) a decis ion is rendered by the executive director; and 
(iii) the applicable appeal period has expired following a decision by the executive director. 
Credits 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 13. Commerce and Trade 
Chapter 14. New Automobile Franchise Act 
Part 2 . Franchises in General 
U.C.A. 1953 § 13-14-204 
~ 13-14-204. Franchisor's obligations related to service--Franchisor audits--Time limits 
Currentness 
(I) Each franchisor shall specify in writing to each of its franchisees licensed as a new motor vehicle dealer in this state: 
(a) the franchisee's obligations for new motor vehicle preparation, delivery, and warranty service on its products; 
(b) the schedule of compensation to be paid to the franchisee for parts, work, and service; and 
(c) the time allowance for the performance of work and service. 
(2)(a) The schedule of compensation described in Subsection (1) shall include reasonable compensation for diagnostic work, 
as well as repair service, parts, and labor. 
(b) Time allowances described in Subsection (1) for the diagnosis and performance of warranty work and service shall be 
reasonable and adequate for the work to be perfonned. 
(3)(a) In the determination of what constitutes reasonable compensation under this section, the principal factor to be considered 
is the prevailing wage rates being paid by franchisees in the relevant market area in which the franchisee is doing business. 
(b) Compensation of the franchisee for warranty service work may not be less than the amount charged by the franchisee 
for like parts and service to retail or fleet customers, if the amounts are reasonable. In·the case of a recreational vehicle 
franchisee, reimbursement for parts used in the performance of warranty repairs, including those parts separately warranted 
directly to the consumer by a recreational vehicle parts supplier, may not be less than the franchisee's cost plus 20%. For 
purposes of this Subsection (3)(b), the term "cost" shall be that same price paid by a franchisee to a franchisor or supplier 
for the part when the part is purchased for a nonwarranty repair. 
(4) A franchisor may not fa il to: 
(a) perform any warranty obligation; 
(b) include in wri tten notices of franchisor's recalls to new motor vehicle owners and franchisees the expected date by which 
necessary parts and equipment will be available to franchisees for the correction of the defects; or 
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(c) compensate any of the franchisees for repairs effected by the recal l. 
(5) If a franchisor disallows a rranchisee's claim for a defective part, al leging that the part is not defective, the franchisor at 
its option shall : 
(a) return the part to the franchisee at the franchisor's expense; or 
(b) pay the franchisee the cost of the part. 
(6)(a) A claim made by a franchisee pursuant to this section for labor and parts shall be paid within 30 days after its approval. 
(b) A claim shall be either approved or disapproved by the franchisor within 30 days after receipt of the claim on a form 
generally used by the franchisor and containing the generally required information. Any claim not specifically disapproved of 
in writing within 30 days after the receipt of the form is considered to be approved and payment shall be made within 30 days. 
(7) Warranty service audits of franchisee records may be conducted by the franchisor on a reasonable basis. 
(8) A franchisee's claim for warranty compensation may be denied only if: 
(a) the franchisee's claim is based on a nonwarranty repair; 
(b) the franchisee lacks material documentation for the claim; 
(c) the franchisee fails to comply materially with specific substantive terms and conditions of the franchisor's warranty 
compensation program; or 
(d) the franchisor has a bona fide bel ief based on competent evidence that the franchisee's claim is intentionally fa lse, 
fraudulent, or misrepresented. 
(9)(a) Any charge backs for warranty parts or service compensation and service incentives shall only be enforceable for the six-
month period immediately following the date the payment for warranty reimbursement was made by the franchisor. 
(b) Except as provided in Subsection (9)(c), all charge backs levied by a franchisor for sales compensation or sales incentives 
arising out of the sale or lease of a motor vehicle sold or leased by a franchisee shall be compensable only if written notice 
of the charge back is received by the franchisee with in six months immediate ly following the sooner of: 
(i) the date when the sales incentive program terminates; or 
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(ii) the date when payment for the sales compensation or sales incentive was made by the franchisor to the franchisee. 
(c)(i) Upon an audit, the franchisor shall provide the franchisee automated or written notice explaining the amount of and 
reason for a charge back. 
(ii) A franchisee may respond in writing within 30 clays after the notice under Subsection (9)(c)(i) to: 
(A) explain a deficiency; or 
(B) provide materials or information to correct and cure compliance with a provision that is a basis for a charge back. 
(d) A charge back: 
(i) may not be based on a nonmaterial error that is clerical in nature; and 
(ii)(A) shall be based on one or more specific instances of material noncompliance with the franchisor's warranty 
compensation program or sales incentive program; and 
(B) may not be extrapolated from a sampling of warranty claims or sales incentive claims. 
(e) The time limitations of this Subsection (9) do not preclude charge backs for any fraudulent claim that was previously paid. 
Credits 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 13. Commerce and Trade 
Chapter 14. New Automobile Franchise Act 
Part 2. Franchises in General 
U.C.A. 1953 § 13-14-205 
§ 13-14-205. Liability for damages to motor vehicles in transit--Disclosure required 
Currentness 
(l)(a) A franchisee is solely liable for damage to a new motor vehicle after delivery by and acceptance from the carrier. 
_(b) A delivery receipt or bill of lading, or similar document, signed by a franchisee is evidence of a franchisee's acceptance 
of a new motor vehicle. 
(2) A franc;hisor is liable for all damage to a motor vehicle before delivery to and acceptance by the franchisee, including that 
time in which the vehicle is in the control of a carrier or transporter. 
(3)(a) A franchisor shall disclose to the franchisee any repairs made prior to delivery, except a recreational vehicle franchisor 
shall disclose to a recreational vehicle franchisee any repair made to the vehicle prior to delivery only if: 
(i) the cost of the repair exceeds 3% of the manufacturer's who lesale price, as measured by retail repair costs; or 
(ii) the repair is to the exterior sidewalls or roof of the vehicle, and repairs total over $500. 
(b) Replacement of a recreational vehicle's glass, tires, wheels, audio equipment, in-dash components, instrument pane\s, 
appliances, furniture, and components other than built-in cabinetry contained in the vehicle's living quarters, is not considered 
a repair under this subsection if the component replaced has been replaced with original manufacturers parts and materials. 
(4) Notwithstanding Subsections (1), (2), and (3), the franchisee is liable for damage to a new motor vehicle after delivery to 
the carrier or transporter if the franchisee selected: 
(a) the method and mode oftranspo1tation; and 
(b) the carrier or transporter. 
Credits 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 13. Commerce and Trade 
Chapter 14. New Automobile Franchise Act 
Part 2 . Franchises in General 
U.C.A. 1953 § 13-14-206 
§ 13-14-206. Site-control agreements 
Currentness 
( I) A site-control agreement entered into on or after May 11, 20 I 0: 
(a) may be voluntarily terminated by a franchisee, subject to Subsection (2)(a); and 
(b) terminates immediately upon: 
(i) a franchisor's sale, assignment, or other transfer of the right to manufacture or distribute the line-make of vehicles 
covered by the franchisee's franchise; 
(ii) a franchisor's ceasing to manufacture or distribute the line-make of vehicles.covered by the franchisee's franchise; 
(i ii) a franchisor's termination of a franchisee's franchise without cause and against the franchisee's wi ll; or 
(iv). the failure of the franchisor or its affiliate to exercise a right of first refusal to purchase the assets or ownership of the 
franchisee's business when given the opportunity to do so under the franchise or other agreement, subject to the repayment 
requirements of Subsection (2) if the right of first refusal arises because of the voluntary action of the franchisee. 
(2)(a) If a franchisee voluntarily terminates a site-control agreement after the franchisor has paid and the franchisee or other 
recipient has accepted additional specified cash consideration, the site-control agreement remains valid only until the franchisee 
or other recipient satisfies the repayment terms specified in Subsection (2)(b). 
(b)(i) If the franchisor's additional specified cash consideration was used for the construction ofa building or improvement 
on the property that is the subject of the site-control agreement, the amount of the repayment under Subsection (2)(a): 
(A) is based on any repayment terms specified in the site-control agreement, if the parties to the site-control agreement 
have willingly agreed to the terms; and 
(B) may not exceed the market value of the portion of the building or improvement constructed with the additional 
specified cash consideration paid by the franchisor, after allowing for depreciation based on a market-based depreciation 
schedule, as determined by an independent appraiser at the request of the franchisee or other recipient. 
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(ii) If the franchisor's additional specified cash consideration was not used for construction ofa building or improvement 
on the property that is the subject of the site-control agreement, the amount of the repayment under Subsection (2)(a) is 
an equitable portion of the cash consideration, as determined under any terms specified in the s ite-control agreement for 
the equitable repayment following a franchisee's voluntary termination of the agreement. 
(c) Immediately upon the repayment under Subsection (2)(b): 
(i) the site-control agreement is terminated; and 
(ii) the franchisor or other party that is the beneficiary under the site-control agreement shall prepare and deliver to the 
franchisee a recordable notice of termination of: 
(A) the site-control agreement; and 
(B) any lien or encumbrance arising because of the site-control agreement and previously recorded against the property 
that is the subject of the site-control agreement. 
C redits 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 13. Commerce and Trade 
Chapter 14. New Automobile Franchise Act 
Part 2. Franchises in General 
U.C.A. 1953 § 13-14-201 
§ 13-14-201. Prohibited acts by franchisors--Affiliates--Disclosures 
Currentness 
(1) A franchisor may not in this state: 
(a) except as provided in Subsection (3), require a franchisee to order or accept delivery of any new motor vehicle, part, 
accessory, equipment, or other item not otherwise required by law that is not voluntarily ordered by the franchisee; 
(b) require a franchisee to: 
(i) participate monetarily in any advertising campaign; or 
(ii) contest, or purchase any promotional materials, display devices, or display decorations or materials; 
(c) require a franchisee to change the capital structure of the franchisee's dealership or the means by or through which the 
franchisee finances the operation of the franchisee's dealership, if the dealership at all times meets reasonable capital standards 
determined by and applied in a nondiscriminatory manner by the franchisor; 
(d) require a franchisee to refrain from participating in the management of, investment in, or acquisition of any other line of 
new motor vehicles or related products, if the franchisee: 
. (i) maintains a reasonable line of credit for each make or line of vehicles; and 
(ii) complies with reasonable capital and faci lities requirements of the franchisor; 
(e) require a franchisee to prospectively agree to a release, assignment, novation, waiver, or estoppel that would: 
(i) relieve a franchisor from any liability, including notice and hearing rights imposed on the franchisor by this chapter; or 
(ii) require any controversy between the franchisee and a franchisor to be referred to a third party if the decision by the 
third party would be binding; 
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(f) require a franchisee to change the location of the principal place of business of the franchisee's dealership or make any 
substantial alterations lo the dealership premises, if the change or alterations would be unreasonable or cause the franchisee 
to lose control of the premises or impose any other unreasonable requirement related to the facilities or premises; 
(g) coerce or attempt to coerce a franchisee to j oin, contribute to, or affiliate with an advertis ing association; 
(h) require, coerce, or attempt to coerce a franchisee to enter into an agreement with the franchisor or do any other act that 
is unfair or prejudicial to the franchisee, by threatening to cancel a franchise agreement or other contractual agreement or 
understanding existing between the franchisor and franchisee; 
(i) adopt, change, establish, enforce, modify, or implement a plan or system for the allocation, scheduling, or delivery of 
new motor vehicles, parts, or accessories to its franchisees so that the plan or system is not fair, reasonable, and equitable, 
including a·plan or system that imposes a vehicle sales objective, goal, or quota on a franchisee, or that evaluates a franchisee's 
sales effectiveness or overall sales performance, without providing a reasonable' opportunity for the franchisee to acquire the 
necessary vehicles in a timely manner from the franchisor on commercially reasonable terms; 
U) increase the price of any new motor vehicle that the franchisee has ordered from the franchisor and for which there exists 
at the time of the order a bona fide sale to a retail purchaser if the order was made prior to the franchisee's receipt of an 
official written price increase notification; 
(k) fail to indemnify and hold harmless its franchisee against any judgment for damages or settlement approved in writing 
by the franchisor: 
(i) including court costs and attorney fees arising out of actions, claims, or proceedings including those based on: 
(A) strict liabi li ty; 
(B) negligence; 
(C) misrepresentation; 
(D) express or implied warranty; 
(E) revocation as described in Section 70A-2-608; or 
(F) rejection as described in Section 70A-2-602; and 
(ii) to the extent the judgment or settlement relates to alleged defective or negligent actions by the franchisor; 
·---------------·-----·-··-- - --· ---- -------
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(I) threaten or coerce a franchisee to waive or forbear its right to protest the establishment or relocation of a same line-make 
franchisee in the relevant market area of the affected franchisee; 
(m) fail to ship monthly to a franchisee, ifordered by the franchisee, the number of new motor vehicles of each make, series, 
and model needed by the franchisee to achieve a percentage of total new vehicle sales of each make, series, and model 
equitably related to the total new vehicle production or importation being achieved nationally at the time of the order by each 
make, series, and model covered under the franchise agreement; 
(n) require or other.vise coerce a franchisee to under-utilize the franchisee's existing dealer facility or facilities, including by: 
(i) requiring or otherwise coercing a franchisee to exclude or remove from the franchisee's facili ty operations the selling. 
or servicing of a line-make of vehicles for which the franchisee has a franchise agreement to utilize the facilities; or 
(ii) prohibiting the franchisee from locating, relocating, or occupying a franchise or line-make in an existing facility owned 
or occupied by the franchisee that includes the selling or servicing of another franchise or line-make at the facility provided 
that the franchisee gives the franchisor written notice of the franchise co-location; 
(o) fail to include in any franchise agreement or other agreement governing a franchisee's ownership of a dealership or a 
franchisee's conduct of business under a franchise the following language or language to the effect that: "If any provision in 
this agreement contravenes the laws or regulations of any state or other jurisdiction where this agreement is to be performed, 
or provided for by such laws or regulations,_the provision is considered to be modified to conform to such laws or regulations, 
and all other terms and provisions shall remain in full force."; 
(p) engage in the distribution, sale, offer for sale, or lease of a new motor vehicle to purchasers who acquire the vehicle in this 
state except through a franchisee with whom the franchisor has established a written franchise agreement, if the franchisor's 
trade name, trademark, service mark, or related characteristic is an integral element in the distribution, sale, offer for sale, 
or lease; 
( q) engage in the distribution or sale of a recreational vehicle that is manufactured, rented, sold, or offered for sale in this state 
without being constructed in accordance with the standards set by the American National Standards institute for recreational 
vehicles and evidenced by a seal or plate attached to the vehicle; 
(r) except as provided in Subsection (2), authorize or permit a person to perform warranty service repairs on motor vehicles, 
except warranty service repairs: 
(i) by a franchisee with whom the franchisor has entered into a franchise agreement for the sale and service of the 
franchisor's motor vehicles; or 
(ii) on owned motor vehicles by a person or government enti ty who has purchased new motor vehicles pursuant to a 
franchisor's fleet discount program; 
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(s) fail to provide a franchisee •with a written franchise agreement; 
(t)(i) except as provided in Subsection (I )(t)(ii) and notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter: 
· (A) unreasonably fail or refuse to offer to its same line-make franchised dealers all models manufactured for that line-
make; 
(B) unreasonably require a dealer to: 
(I) pay any extra fee, remodel, renovate, recondition the dealer's existing facilities; or 
(II) purchase unreasonable advertising displays or other materials as a prerequisite to receiving a model or series of 
. vehicles; 
(ii) notwithstanding Subsection (l)(t)(i)," a recreati~n-al vehicletranchisor may split a line-make between motor home and 
travel trailer products; 
(u) except as provided in Subsection (6), directly or indirectly: 
(i) own an interest in a new motor vehicle dealer or dealership; 
(ii) operate or control a new motor vehicle dealer or dealership; 
' 
(iii) act in the capacity ofa new motor vehicle dealer, as defined in Section 13-14-102; or 
(iv) operate a motor vehicle service facility; 
(v) fail to timely pay for all reimbursements to a franchisee for incentives and other payments made by the franchisor; 
(w) directly or indirectly influence or direct potential customers to franchisees in an inequitable manner, including: 
(i) charging a franchisee a fee for a referra l regarding a potential sale or lease of any of the franchisee's products or services 
in an amount exceeding the actual cost of the referral; 
(ii) giving a customer referral to a franchisee on the condition that the franchisee agree to sell the vehicle at a price fixed 
by the franchisor; or 
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(iii) advising a potential customer as to the amount that the potential customer should pay for a particular product; 
(x) fail to provide comparable delivery terms to each franchisee for a product of the franchisor, including the time of delivery 
after the placement of an order by the franchisee; 
(y) if personnel t_raining is provided by the franchisor to its franchisees, unreasonably fail to make that training available to 
each franchisee on proportionally equal terms; 
(z) condition a franchisee's eligibility to participate in a sales incentive program on the requirement that a franchisee use the 
financing services of the franchisor or a subsidiary or affiliate of the franchisor for inventory financing; 
(aa) make available for public disclosure, except with the franchisee's permission or under subpoena or in any administrative 
or judicial proceeding in which the franchisee or the franchisor is a party, any confidential financial information regarding 
a franchisee, including: 
(i) monthly financial statements provided by the franchisee; 
(ii) the profitabi lity of a franchisee; or 
(iii) the status of a franchisee's inventory of products; 
(bb) use any performance standard, incentive progpm, or similar method to measure the performance of franchisees unless 
the standard or program: 
(i) is designed and administered in a fair, reasonable, and equitable manner; 
(ii) if based upon a survey, utilizes an actuarially generally acceptable, val id sample; and 
(iii) is, upon request by a franchisee, disclosed and explained in writing to the franchisee, including: 
(A) how the standard or program is designed; 
(B) how the standard or program w·ill be administered; and 
(C) the types of data that wi ll be collected and used in the application of the standard or program; 
(cc) other than sales to the federal government, directly or indirectly, sell, lease, offer to sell, or offer to lease, a new motor 
vehicle or any motor vehicle owned by the franchisor, except through a franchised new motor vehicle dealer; 
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(dd) compel a franchisee, through a finance subsidiary, to agree to unreasonable operating requirements, except that this 
• Subsection (l)(dd) may not be construed to limit the right of a financing subsidiary to engage in business practices in 
accordance with the usage of trade in retail and wholesale motor vehicle financing; 
(ee) condition the franchisor's participation in co-op advertising for a product category on the franchisee's participation in 
any program related to another product category or on the franchisee's achievement of any level of sales in a produc·t category 
other than that which is the subject of the co-op advertising; 
(ff) except as provided in Subsections (7) through (9), discriminate against a franchisee in the state in favor of another 
franchisee of the same line-make in the state: 
(i) by selling or offering to sell a new motor vehicle to one franchisee at a higher actual price, including the price for 
vehicle transportation, than the actual price at which the same model s imilarly equipped is offered to or is made available 
by the franchisor to another franchisee in tl1e state during a s imilar time period; 
(ii) except as provided in Subsection (8), by us ing a promotional program or device or an incentive, payment, or other 
benefit, whether paid at the time of the sale of the new motor vehicle to the franchisee or later, that results in the sale 
of or offer to sell a new motor vehicle to one franchisee in the state at a higher price, including the price for vehicle 
transportation, than the price at which the same model similarly equipped is offered or is made available by the franchisor 
to another franchisee in the state during a similar time period; 
(iii) except as provided in Subsection (9), by failing to provide or direct a lead in a fair, equitable, and timely manner; or 
(iv) if the franchisee complies with any reasonable requirement concerning the sale of new motor vehicles, by using or 
considering the performance of any of its franchisees located in this state relating to the sale of the franchisor's new motor 
vehicles in determining the: 
(A) dealer's -eligibility to purchase program, certified, or other used motor vehicles .from the franchisor; 
(B) volume, type, or model of program, certified, or other used motor vehicles the dealer is elig ible to purchase from 
the franchisor; 
(C) price of any program, certified, or other used motor vehicles that the dealer is elig ible to purchase from the franchisor; 
or 
(D) availability or amount of any discount, credit, rebate, or sales incentive the dea ler is eligible to receive from the 
manufacturer for the purchase of any program, ceitified, o r other motor vehicle offered for sale by the franchisor; 
(gg)(i) take control over funds owned or urider the control of a franchisee based on the findings of a warranty audit or sales 
incentive audit unless the fol lowing conditions are satisfied: 
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(A) the franchisor fully identifies in writing the basis for the franchisor's claim or charge back arising from the audit, 
including notifying the franchisee that the franch isee has 20 days from the day on which the franchisee receives the 
franchisor's claim or charge back to assert a protest in writing to the franchisor identifying the basis for the protest; 
(B) the franchisee's protest shall inform the franchisor that the protest shall be submitted to a mediator in the state who 
is identified by name and address in the franchisee's notice to the franchisor; 
(C) if mediation is requested under Subsection (l)(gg)(i)(B), mediation shall occur no later than 30 days after the day 
on which the franchisor receives the franchisee's protest of a claim or charge back; 
(D) if mediation does not lead to a resolution of the protest, the protest shall be set for binding arbitration in the same 
venue in which the mediation occurred; 
(E) binding arbitration under Subsection (l)(gg)(i)(D) shall be conducted: 
(I) by an arbitrator mutually agreed upon by the franchisor and the franchisee; and 
(II) on a date mutually agreed upon by the franchisor and the franchisee, but shall be held no later than 90 days after 
the franchisor's receipt of the franchisee's notice of protest; 
' (F) this Subsection (I )(gg)(i) applies exclusively to warranty audits and sales incentive audits; 
. (G) Subsections (l)(gg)(i)(A) through (E) do not apply if the franchisor reasonably believes that the amount of the claim 
or charge back is related to a fraudulent act by the franchisee; and 
(H) the costs of the mediator or arbitrator instituted under this Subsection (l)(gg) shall be shared equally by the franchisor 
and the franchisee; or 
(ii) require a franchisee to execute a written waiver of the requirements of Subsection ( 1 )(gg)(i); 
(hh) coerce, or attempt to coerce a franchisee to purchase or sell an aftermarket product manufactured by the franchisor, or 
obtained by the franchisor for resale from a third-party supplier and the franchisor or its affi liate derives a financial benefit 
from the franchisee's sale or purchase of the aftermarket product as a condition to obtaining preferential status from the 
franchisor; 
(ii) through an affiliate, take any action that would otherwise be prohibited under this chapter; 
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Gj) impose any fee, surcharge, or other charge on a franchisee designed to recover the cost of a warranty repai r for which 
the franchisee is paid by the franchisor; 
(kk) directly or indirectly condition any of the following actions on the willingness of a franchisee, prospective new 
franchisee, or owner of an interest in a dealership faci lity to enter into a site-control agreement: 
(i) the awarding of a franchise to a prospective new franchisee; 
(ii) the addition of a line-make or franchise to an existing franchisee; 
(iii) the renewal of an existing franchisee's franchise; 
(iv) the approval of the re location of an existing franchisee's dealership facility, unless the franchisor pays, and the 
franchisee voluntarily accepts, additional specified cash consideration to facilitate the relocation; or 
(v) the approval of the sale or transfer of a franchise's ownership, unless the franchisor pays, and the buyer voluntarily 
accepts, additional specified cash consideration to facilitate the sale or transfer; 
(ll) subject to Subsection (11), deny a franchisee the right_ to return any or all parts or accessories that: 
(i) were specified for and sold to the franchisee under an automated ordering system required by the franchisor; and 
( ii)(A) are in good, resalable condition; and 
(B)(I) the franchisee received within the previous 12 months; or 
(II) are listed in the current parts catalog; 
(mm) subject to Subsection (I 2), obtain from a franchisee a waiver of a franch isee's right, by threatening: 
(i) to impose a detriment upon the franchisee's business; or 
(ii) to withhold any entitlement, benefit, or service: 
(A) to which the franch isee is entitled under a franchise agreement, contract, statute, rule, regulation, or law; or 
(B) that has been granted to more than one other franchisee of the franchisor in the state; 
·--·-------·-·-·- -------- ----------------------
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(nn) coerce a franchisee to establish, or provide by agreement, program, or incentive provision that a franchisee must establish, 
a price at which the franchisee is required to sell a product or service that is: 
(i) sold in connection with the franchisee's sale of a motor vehicle; and 
(i i)(A) in the case of a product, not manufactured, provided, or distributed by the franchisor or an affiliate; or 
(B) in the case of a service, not provided by the franchisor or an affiliate; 
(oo) except as necessary to comply with a .health or safety law, or to comply with a technology requirement compliance with 
which is necessary to seU or service a motor vehicle that the franchisee is authorized or licensed by the franchisor to sell or 
service, coerce or require a franchisee, through a penalty or other detriment to the franchisee's business, to: 
(i) construct a new dealer facility or materially alter or remodel an existing dealer facility before the dale that is 10 years 
after the date the construction of the new dealer facility at that location was completed, if the construction substantially 
complied with the franchisor's brand image standards or plans that the franchisor provided or approved; or 
(ii) materially alter or remodel an existing dealer facility before the date that is l O years after the date the previous alteration 
or remodeling at that location was completed, if the previous alteration or remodeling substantially. complied with the 
franchisor's brand image standards or plans that the franchisor provided or approved; or 
(pp) notwithstanding the tenns of a franchise agreement providing otherwise and subject to Subsection (14): 
(i) coerce or require a franchisee, including by agreement, program, or incentive provision, to purchase a good or service, 
relating to a facility construction, alteration, or remodel, from a vendor that a franchisor or its affiliate selects, identifies, 
or designates, without allowing the franchisee, after consultation with the franchisor, to obtain a like good or service of 
substantially similar quality from a vendor that the franchisee chooses; or 
(ii) coerce or require a franchi see, including by agreement, program, or incentive provision, to lease a sign or other 
franchisor image element from the franchisor or an affiliate without providing the franchisee the right to purchase a sign 
or other franchisor image element oflike kind and quality from a vendor that the franchisee chooses. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(r), a franchisor may authorize or permit a person to perform warranty service repairs on 
motor vehicles if the warranty services is for a franchisor of recreational vehicles. 
(3) Subsection (l)(a) does not prevent the franchisor from requiring that a franchisee carry a reasonable inventory of: 
(a) new motor vehicle models offered for sale by the franchisor; and 
9 
§ 13-14-201. Prohibited acts by franchisors--Affiliates--Disclosures, UT ST§ 13-14-201 
(b) parts to service the repair of the new motor vehicles. 
(4) Subsection (l)(d) does not prevent a franchisor from requiring that a franchisee maintain separate sales personnel or display 
space. 
(5) Upon the written request of any franchisee, a franchisor shall disclose in writing to the franchisee the basis on which new 
motor vehicles, parts, and accessories are allocated, scheduled, and delivered among the franchisor's dealers of the same line-
make. 
(6)(a) A franchisor may engage in any of the activities listed in Subsection (J)(u), for a period not to exceed 12 months if: 
(i)(A) the person from whom the franchisor acquired the interest in or control of the new motor vehicle dealership was 
a franchised new motor vehicle dealer; and 
(B) the franchisor's interest in the new motor vehicle dealership is for sale at a reasonable price and on reasonable terms 
and conditions; or 
(ii) the franchisor is engaging in the activity listed in Subsection (l)(u) for the purpose of broadening the diversity of its 
dealer body and facilitating the ownership of a hew motor vehicle dealership by a person who: 
(A) is part of a group that has been historically underrepresented in the franchisor's dealer body; 
(B) would not otherwise be able to purchase a new motor vehicle dealership; 
(C) has made a significant investment in the new motor.vehicle dealership which is subject to loss; 
(D) has an ownership interest in the new motor vehicle dealership; and 
(E) operates the new motor vehicle dealership under a plan to acquire full ownership of the dealership within a r~asonable 
period of time and under reasonable terms and conditions. 
(b) After receipt of the advisory board's recommendation, the executive director may, for good cause shown, extend the time 
limit set forth in Subsection (6)(a) for an additional period not to exceed 12 months. 
(c) A franchisor who was engaged in any of the activities listed in Subsection (l)(u) in this state prior to May 1, 2000, may 
continue to engage in that activity, but may not expand that activity to acquire an interest in any other new motor vehicle 
dealerships or motor vehicle service facilities after May I, 2000. 
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(d) Notwithstanding Subsection ( l )(u), a franchisor may own, operate, or control a new motor vehicle dealership trading in 
a line-make of motor vehicle if: 
(i) as to that line-make of motor vehicle, there are no more than four franchised new motor vehicle dealerships licensed 
and in operation within the state as of January 1, 2000; 
(ii) the franchisor does not own directly or indirectly, more than a 45% interest in the dealership; 
(iii) at the time the franchisor first acquires ownership or assumes operation or control of the dealership, the distance 
between the dealership thus owned, operated, or controlled and the nearest unaffiliated new motor vehicle dealersh ip 
trading in the same line-make is not less than 150 miles; 
(iv) all the franchisor's franchise agreements confer rights on the franchisee to develop and operate as many dealership 
facilities as the franchisee and franchisor shall agree are appropriate within a defined geographic territory or area; and 
(v) as of January 1, 2000, no fewer than half of the franchisees of the line-make within the state own and operate two or 
more dealership facilities in the geographic area covered by the franchise agreement. 
(7) Subsection (l)(ff) does not apply to recreational vehicles. 
(8) Subsection (l)(ff)(ii) does not prohibit a promotional or incentive program that is functionally available to all competing 
franchisees of the same line-make in the state on substantially comparable terms. 
(9) Subsection (l)(ff)(iii) may.not be construed to: 
(a) permit provision of or access to customer information that is otherwise protected from disclosure by law or by contract 
between a franchisor and a franchisee; or 
(b) require a franchisor to disregard the preference volunteered by a potential customer in providing or directing a lead. 
(LO) Subsection (l)(ii) does not limit the right of an affiliate to e1?gage in business practices in accordance with the usage of 
trade in which the affi liate is engaged. 
( 11 )(a) Subsection ( l )(11) does not apply to parts or accessories that the franchisee ordered and purchased outside of an automated 
parts ordering system required by the franchisor. 
(b) In determining whether parts or accessories in a franchisee's inventory were specified and sold under an automated 
ordering system required by the franchisor, the parts and accessories in the franchisee's inventory are presumed to be the 
most recent parts and accessories that the franchisor spld to the franchisee .. 
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(I 2)(a) Subsection ( l)(mm) does not apply to a good faith settlement of a dispute, including a dispute relating to contract 
negotiations, in which tbe franchisee gives a waiver in exchange for fair consideration in the form of a benefit conferred on 
the franch isee. 
(b) Subsection (12)(a) may not be construed to defeat a franchisee's claim that a waiver has been obtained in violation of 
Subsection (l)(mm). 
(13)(a) As used in Subsection (l)(oo): 
(i) "Materially alter": 
(A) means to make a material architectural, structural, or aesthetic•alteration; and 
(B) does not include routine maintenance, such as interior painting, reasonably necessary to keep a dealership facility 
in attractive condition. 
(ii) "Penalty or other detriment" does not include a payment under an agreement, incentive, or program that is offered 
to but declined or not accepted by a franchisee, even if a similar payment is made to 'another franchisee in the state that 
chooses to participate in the agreement, incentive, or program. 
(b) Subsection (l)(oo) does not apply to: 
(i) a program that provides a lump sum payment to assist a franchisee to make a facil ity improvement or to pay for a sign 
or a franchisor image element, if the payment is not dependent on the franchisee selling or purchasing a specific number 
of new vehicles; 
(ii) a program that is in effect on May 8, 20 12, with more than one franchisee in the state or to a renewal or modification 
of the program; 
(iii) a program that provides reimbursement to a franchisee on reasonable, written terms for a substantial portion of the 
franchisee's cost of making a faci lity improvement or installing signage or a franchisor image element; or 
(iv) a written agreement between a franchisor and franchisee, in effect before May 8, 2012, under which a franchisee 
agrees to construct a new dealer facility. 
(14)(a) Subsection (l)(pp)(i) does not apply to: 
(i) s ignage purchased by a franchisee in which 'the franchisor has an intellectual property right; or 
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(ii) a good used in a facility construction, alteration, or remodel that is: 
(A) a moveable interior display that contains material subject to a franchisor's inte llectual property right; or 
(B) specifically e ligible for reimbursement of over one-half its cost pursuant to a franchisor or distributor program or 
incentive granted to the franchisee on reasonable, written terms. 
(b) Subsection (l)(pp)(ii) may not be construed to allow a franchisee to: 
(i) impair or eliminate a franchisor's intellectual property right; or 
(ii) erect or maintain a sign that does not conform to the franchisor's reasonable fabrication specifications and intellectual 
property usage guidelines. 
Credits 
Laws 1996, c. 277, § 8, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1997, c. 162, § 7, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws I 998, c. 339, § 2, eff. May 4, 1998; 
Laws 2000, c. 330, § 1, eff. May 1, 2000; Laws 2002, c. 68, § 3, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 2005, c. 167, § 2, eff. May 2, 2005; 
Laws 2005, c. 249, § 7, eff. May 2, 2005; Laws 2008, c. 362, § 4, eff. May 5, 2008; Laws 2009, c. 318, § 2, eff. March 25, 2009; 
Laws 2010, c. 33, § 2, eff. May 11, 2010; Laws 2011 , c. 203, § I , eff. May 10, 2011; Laws 2012, c. 186, § 1, eff. May 8, 2012. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 13 . Commerce and Trade 
Chapter 14. New Automobile Franchise Act 
Part 2. Franchises in General 
U.C.A. 1953 § 13-14-202 
§ 13-14-202. Sale or transfer of ownership 
Currentness 
( l )(a) The franchisor shall give effect to the change in a franchise agreement as a result of an event listed in Subsection (l)(b): 
(i) subject to Subsection 13-14-305(2)(b); and 
(ii) unless exempted under Subsection (2). 
(b) The franchisor shall give effect to the change in a franchise agreement pursuant to Subsection (l)(a) for the: 
( i) sale of a dealership; 
(ii) contract for sale of a dealership; 
(iii) transfer of ownership of a franchisee's dealership by: 
(A) sale; 
(B) transfer of the business; or 
(C) stock transfer; or 
(iv) change in the executive management of the franchisee's dealership. 
(2) A franch isor is exempted from the requirements of Subsection ( I) if: 
(a) the transferee is denied, or would be denied, a new motor vehicle franchisee's license pursuant to T itle 4 1, Chapter 3, 
Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act; or 
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(b) the proposed sale or transfer of the business or change of executive management will be substantially detrimental to the 
distribution of franchisor's new motor vehicles or to competition in the relevant market area, provided that the franchisor has 
given written notice to the franchisee within 60 days following receipt by the franchisor of the following: 
(i) a copy of the proposed contract of sale or transfer executed by the franchisee and the proposed transferee; 
(ii) a completed copy of the franchisor's written application for approval of the change in ownership or executive 
management, if any, including the information customarily required by the franchisor; and 
(iii)(A) a written description of the business experience of the executive management of the transferee in the case of a 
proposed sale or transfer of the franchisee's business; or 
(B) a written description of the business experience of the person involved in the proposed change of the franchisee's 
executive management in the case of a proposed change of executive management. 
(3) For purposes of this section, the refusal by the franchisor to accept a proposed transferee is presumed to be unreasonable 
and undertaken without good cause if the proposed franchisee: 
(a) is of good moral character; and 
(b) otherwise meets the written, reasonable, and uniformly applied standards or qualifications, if any, of the franchisor relating 
to the business experience of executive management and financial capacity to operate and maintain the dealership required 
by the franchisor of its franchisees. 
( 4)(a) If after receipt of the written notice from the franchisor described in Subsection ( 1) the franchisee objects to the franchisor's 
refusal to accept the proposed sale or transfer of the business or change of executive management, the franchisee may file an 
application for a hearing before the advisory board up to 60 days from the date of receipt of the notice. 
(b) After a hearing and the executive director's receipt of'. the advisory board's recommendation, the executive director shall 
determine, and enter an order providing that: 
(i) the proposed transferee or change in executive management: 
(A) shall be approved; or 
(B) may not be approved for specified reasons; or 
(ii) a proposed transferee or change in executive management is approved if specific conditions are timely satisfied. 
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(c)(i) The franchisee shall· have the burden of proof .with respect to all issues raised by the franchisee's application for a 
hearing as provided in this section. 
(i i) During the pendency of the hearing, the franchise agreement shall continue in effect in accordance with its terms. 
(d) The advisory board and the executive director shall expedite, upon written request, any determination sought under this 
section. 
Credits 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 13. Commerce and Trade 
Chapter 14. New Automobile Franchise Act 
Part 2. Franchises in General 
U.C.A. 1953 § 13-14-203 
§ 13-14-203. Succession to franchise 
Currentness 
(l)(a) A successor, including a fami ly member of a deceased or incapacitated franchisee, who is designated by the franchisee 
may succeed the franch isee in the ownership and operation of the dealership under the existing franchise agreement if: 
(i) the designated successor gives the franchisor written notice of an intent to succeed to the rights of the deceased or 
incapacitated franchisee in the franchise agreement within 180 days after the franchisee's death or incapacity; 
(ii) the designated successor agrees to be bound by al l of the terms and conditions of the franchise agreement; and 
(iii) the designated successor meets the criteria generally applied by the franchisor in qualifying franchisees. 
(b) A franchisor may refuse to honor the existing franchise agreement with the designated successor only for good cause. 
(2) The franchisor may request in writing from a designated successor the personal and financial data that is reasonably necessary 
to determine whether the existing franchise agreement should be honored. The designated successor shall supply the personal 
and financial data promptly upon the request. 
(3)(a) If a franchisor believes that good cause exists for refusing to honor the requested succession, the franchisor shall serve 
upon the designated successor notice of its refusal to approve the succession, within 60 days after the later of: 
(i) receipt of the notice of the designated successor's intent to succeed the franchisee in the ownership and operation of 
the dealership; or 
(ii) receipt of the requested personal and financial data. 
(b) Failure to serve the notice pursuant to Subsection (3)(a) is considered approval of the designated successor and the 
franchise agreement is considered amended to reflect the approval of the succession the day following the last day the 
franchisor can serve notice under Subsection (3)(a). 
(4) The notice of the franchisor provided in Subsection (3) shall: 
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(a) state the specific grounds for the refusal to approve the succession; and 
(b) that discontinuance of the franchise agreement shall take effect not less than 180 days after the date the notice of refusal 
is served unless the proposed successor files an application for hearing under Subsection (6). 
(5)(a) This section does not prevent a franchisee from designating a person as the successor by written instrument filed with 
the franchisor. 
(b) If a franchisee files an instrument under Subsection (5)(a), the instrument governs the succession rights to the management 
and operation of the dealership subject to the designated successor satisfying the franchisor's qualification requirements as 
described in this section. 
(6)(a) If a.franchisor serves a notice of refusal to a designated successor pursuant to Subsection (3), the designated successor 
may, within the 180-day period provided in Subsection (4), fi le with the advisory board an application f~r a hearing and a 
determination by the executive director regarding whether good cause exists for the refusal. 
(b) If application for a hearing is timely filed, the franchisor shall continue to honor the franchise agreement until after: 
(i) the requested hearing has been concluded; 
(ii) a decision is rendered by the executive director; and 
(iii) the applicable appeal period has expired following a decision by the executive director. 
Credits 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 13. Commerce and Trade 
Chapter 14. New Automobile Franchise Act 
Part 2. Franchises in General 
U.C.A. 1953 § 13-14-204 
§ 13-14-204. Franchisor's obligations related to service--Franchisor audits--Time limits 
Currentness 
(1) Each franchisor shall specify in writing to each of its franchisees licensed as a new motor vehicle dealer in this state: 
(a) the franchisee's obligations for new motor vehicle preparation, delivery, and warranty service on its products; 
(b) the schedule of compensation to be paid to the franchisee for parts, work, and service; and 
(c) the time allowance for the performance of work and service. 
(2)(a) The schedule of compensation described in Subsection (I) shall include reasonable compensation for diagnostic work, 
as well as repair service, parts, and labor. 
(b) Time allowances described in Subsection (I) for the diagnosis and performance of warranty work and service shall be 
reasonable and adequate for the work to be performed. 
(3)(a) In the determination of what constitutes reasonable compensation under this section, the principal factor to be considered 
is ~he prevailing ~age rates being paid by franchisees in the relevant market area in which the franchisee is doing busi~ess. 
(b) Compensation of the franchisee for warranty service work may not be less than the amount charged by the franchisee 
for like parts and service to retail or fl eet customers, if the amounts are reasonable. In the case of a recreational vehicle 
franchisee, reimbursement for parts used in the performance of warranty repairs, including those parts separately warranted 
directly to the consumer by a recreational vehicle parts supplier, may not be less than the franchisee's cost plus 20%. For 
purposes of this Subsection (3)(6), the term "cost" shall be that same price paid by a franchisee to a franchisor or supplier 
for the part when the part is purchased for a nonwarranty repair. 
(4) A franchisor may not fa il to: 
(a) perform any warranty obligation; 
(b) include in written notices of franchisor's recalls lo new motor vehicle owners and franchisees the expected date by which 
necessary parts and equipment wi ll be available to franchisees for the correction of the defects; or 
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(c) compensate any of the franchisees for repairs effected by the recall. 
(5) If a franchisor disallows a franchisee's claim for a defective part, alleging that the part is not defective, the franchisor at 
its option shall: 
(a) return the part to the franchisee at the franchisor's expense; or 
(b) pay the franchisee the cost of the part. 
(6)(a) A claim made by a franchisee pursuant to this section for labor and parts shall be paid within 30 days after its approval. 
(b) A claim shall be either approved or disapproved by the franchisor within 30 days after receipt of the claim on a form 
generally used by the franchisor and containing the generally required information. Any claim not specifically disapproved of 
in writing within 30 days after the receipt of the form is considered to be approved and payment shall be made within 30 days. 
(7) Warranty service audits of franchjsee records may be conducted by the franchisor on a reasonable basis. 
(8) A franchisee's claim for warranty compensation may be denied only if: 
(a) the franchisee's claim is based on a nonwarranty repair; 
(b) the franchisee lacks material documentation for the claim; 
(c) the franchisee fails to comply materially with specific substantive terms and conditions of the franchisor's warranty 
compensation program; or 
(d) the franchisor has a bona fide belief based on competent evidence that the franchisee's claim is intentionally false, 
fraudulent, or misrepresented. 
(9)(a) Any charge backs for warranty parts or service compensation and service incentives shall only be enforceable for the six-
month period immediately fo llowing the elate the payment for warranty reimbursement was made by the franchisor. 
(b) Except as provided in Subsection (9)(c), all charge backs levied by a franchisor for sales compensation or sales incentives 
arising out of the sale or lease ofa motor vehicle sold or leased by a franchisee shall be compensable only if written notice 
of the charge back is received by the franchisee within six months immediately following the sooner of: 
(i) the date when the sales incentive program terminates; or 
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(ii) the date when payment for the sales compensation or sales incentive was made by the franchisor to the franchisee. 
(c)(i) Upon an audit, the franchisor shall provide the franchisee automated or written notice explaining the amount of and 
reason for a charge back. 
(ii) A franchisee may respond in writing within 30 days after the notice under Subsection (9)(c)(i) to: 
(A) explain a deficiency; or 
(B) provide materials or information to correct and cure compliance with a provision that is a basis for a charge back. 
( d) A charge back: 
(i) may not be based on a nonmaterial error that is clerical in nature; and 
(ii)(A) shall be based on one or more specific instances of material noncompliance with the franchisor's warranty 
compensation program or sales incentive program; and 
(B) may not be extrapolated from a sampling of warranty claims or sales incentive claims. 
(e) The time limitations of this Subsection (9) do not preclude charge backs for any fraudulent claim that was previously paid. 
Credits 
Laws 1996, c. 277, § 11, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1997, c. 162, § 8, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 2004, c. 123, § 3, eff. May 3, 
2004; Laws 2009, c. 318, § 3, eff. March 25, 2009; Laws 2010, c. 33, § 3, eff. May 11, 2010. 
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§ 13-14-205. Liability for damages_ to motor vehicles in transit--Disclosure required 
Currentness 
(l)(a) A franchisee is solely liable for damage to a new motor vehicle after delivery by and acceptance from the carrier. 
(b) A delivery receipt or bill of lading, or simi Jar document, signed by a franchisee is evidence of a franchisee's acceptance 
of a new motor vehicle. 
(2) A franchisor is liable for all damage to a motor vehicle before delivery to and acceptance by the franchisee, including that 
time in which the vehicle is in the control of a carrier or transporter. 
(3)(a) A franchisor shall disclose to the franchisee any repairs made prior to delivery, except a recreational vehicle franchisor 
shall disclose to a recreational vehicle franchisee any repair made to the vehicle prior to delivery only if: 
(i) the cost of the repair exceeds 3% of the manufacturer's wholesale price, as measured by retail repair costs; or 
(ii) the repair is to the exterior sidewalls or roof of the vehicle, and repairs total over $500. 
(b) Replacement of a recreational vehicle's glass, tires, wheels, audio equipment, in-dash components, instrument panels, 
appliances, furniture, and components other than built-in cabinetry contained in the vehicle's living quarters, is not considered 
a repair under this subsection if the component replaced has been replaced with original manufacturers parts and materials. 
(4) Notwithstanding Subsections (1), (2), and (3), the franchisee is liable for damage to a new motor vehicle after delivery to 
the carrier or transporter if the franchisee selected: 
(a) the method and mode of transportation; and 
(b) the carrier or transporter. 
Credits 
Laws 1996, c. 277, § 12, eff. Apri l 29, 1996; Laws 1997, c. 162, § 9, eff. May 5, 1997. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 13. Commerce and Trade 
Chapter 14. New Automobile Franchise Act 
Part 2. Franchises in General 
U.C.A. 1953 § 13-14-206 
§ 13-14-206. Site-control agreements 
Currentness 
(1) A site-control agreement entered into on or after May 11, 2010: 
(a) may be voluntarily terminated by a franchisee, subject to Subsection (2)(a); and 
(b) terminates immediately upon: 
(i) a franchisor's sale, assignment, or other transfer of the right to manufacture or distribute the line-make of vehicles 
covered by the franchisee's franchise; 
(ii) a franchisor's ceasing to manufacture or distribute the line-make of vehicles covered by the franchisee's franchise; 
(iii) a franchisor's tennination of a franchisee's franchise without cause and against the franchisee's will; or 
(iv) the failure of the franchisor or its affiliate to exercise a right of firsfrefusal to purchase the assets or ownership of the 
franchisee's business when given the opportunity to do so under the franchise or other agreement, subject to the repayment 
requirements of Subsection (2) if the right of first refusal arises bec~use of the voluntary action of the franchisee. 
(2)(a) If a franchisee voluntarily terminates a site-control agreement after the franchisor has paid and the franchisee or other 
recipient has accepted additional specified cash consideration, the site-control agreement remains valid only until the franchisee 
or other recipient satisfies the repayment terms specified in Subsection (2)(b). 
(b)(i) If the franchisor's additional specified cash consideration was used for the construction ofa building or improvement 
on the property that is the subject of the site-control agreement, the amount of the repayment under Subsection (2)(a): 
(A) is based on any repayment tenns specified in the site-control agreement, if the parties to the site-control agreement 
have willingly agreed to the terms; and 
(B) may not exceed the market value of the portion of the building or improvement constructed with the additional 
specified cash consideration paid by the franchisor, after allowing for depreciation based on a market-based depreciation 
schedule, as detenpined by an independent appraiser at the request of the franchisee or other recipient. 
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(ii) If the franchisor's additional specified cash consideration was not used for construction of a building or improvement 
on the property that is the subject of the site-control agreement, the amount of the repayment under Subsection (2)(a) is 
an equitable portion of the cash consideration, as determined under any terms specified in the site-control agreement for 
the equitable repayment following a franch isee's voluntary termination of the agreement. 
(c) Immediately upon the repayment under Subsection (2)(b): 
(i) the site-control agreement is terminated; and 
(ii) the franchisor or other party that is the beneficiary under the site-control agreement shall prepare and deliver to the 
franchisee a recordable notice of termination of: 
(A) the site-control agreement; and 
(B) any lien or encumbrance arising because of the site-control agreement and previously recorded against the property 
that is the subject of the site-control agreement. 
Credits 
Laws 2010, c. 33, § 4, eff. May 11, 2010. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 13. Commerce and Trade 
Chapter 14. New Automobile Franchise Act 
Part 3. Restrictions on Termination, Relocation, and Establishment of Franchises 
U.C.A. 1953 § 13-14-301 
§ 13-14-301. Termination or noncontinuance of franchise 
Currentness 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), a 'rranchisor may not terminate or refuse to continue a franchise agreement or the 
rights to sell and service a line-make pursuant to a franchise agreement, whether through termination or noncontinuance of the 
franchise, termination or noncontinuance of a line-make, or otherwise, unless: 
(a) the franchisee has received written notice from the franchisor 60 days before the effective date of termination or 
noncontinuance setting forth the specific grounds for termination or noncontinuance that are relied on by the franchisor as 
establishing good cause for the termination or noncontinuance; 
(b) the franchisor has good cause for termination or noncontinuance; and 
(c) the franchisor is willing and able to comply with Section 13-14-307. 
(2) A franchisor may tem1inate a franchise, without complying with Subsection (1): 
(a) if the franchi see's license as a new motor vehicle dealer is revoked under T itle 41 , Chapter 3, Motor Vehicle Business 
Regulation Act; or 
.(b) upon a mutual written agreement of the franchisor and franchisee. 
(3)(a) At any time before the effective date of termination or noncontinuance of the franchise, the franchisee may apply to the 
advisory board for a hearing on the merits, and following notice to all parties concerned, the hearing shall be promptly held 
as provided in Section I 3-1 4-304. 
(b) A termination or noncontinuance subject to a hearing under Subsection (3)(a) may not become effective until: 
(i) final determination of the issue by the executive director; and 
(i i) the applicable appeal period has lapsed. 
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(4) A franchisee may voluntarily terminate its franchise if the franchisee provides written notice to the franchisor at least 30 
days prior to the termination. 
Cr·cdits 
Laws 1996, c. 277, § 13, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 2005, c. 249, § 10, eff. May 2, 2005; Laws 2009, c. 318, § 4, eff. March 
25, 2009. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 13. Commerce and Trade 
Chapter 14. New Automobile Franchise Act 
Part 3. Restrictions on Termination, Relocation, and Establishment of Franchises 
U.C.A. 1953 § 13-14-302 
§ 13-14-302. issuance of additional franchises--Relocation of existing franchisees 
Currentness 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (6), a franchisor shall provide the notice and documentation required under Subsection 
(2) if the franchisor seeks to: 
(a) enter into a franchise agreement establishing a motor vehicle dealership within a relevant market area where the same 
line-make is represented by another franchisee; or 
(b) relocate an existing motor vehicle franchisee. 
(2) In determining whether a new or relocated dealership is within a relevant market area where the same line-make is 
represented by an existing dealership, the relevant market area is measured from the closest property boundary line of the 
existing dealership to the closest property boundary line of the new or relocated dealership. 
(3)(a) Ifa franchisor seeks to take an action listed in Subsection (1), before taking the action, the franchisor shall, in writing, 
notify the advisory board, the clerk of each affected municipality, and each franchisee in that line-make in the relevant market 
area. 
(b) The notice required by Subsection (3)(a) shall: 
(i) specify the intended action described under Subsection (l); 
(ii) specify the good cause on which it intends to rely for the action; and 
(iii) be delivered by registered or cei'tified mail or by any form ofreliable delivery through which receipt is verifiable. 
(4)(a) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(c), the franchisor shall provide to the advisory board, each affected municipality, 
and each franchisee in that line-make in the relevant market area the following documents relating to the notice described under 
Subsection (3): 
(i)(A) any aggregate economic data and all existing reports, analyses, or opinions based on the aggregate economic data 
that were relied on by the franchisor in reaching the decision to proceed with the action described in the notice; and 
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(B) the aggregate economic data under Subsection (4)(a)(i)(A) includes: 
(I) motor vehicle registration data; 
(II) market penetration data; and 
(III) demographic data; 
(ii) written documentation that the franchisor has in the francisor's possession that it intends to rely on in establishing good 
cause under Section 13-14-306 relating to the notice; 
(iii) a statement that describes in reasonable detail how the establishment ofa new franchisee or the relocation of an existing 
franchisee will affect the amount of business transacted by other franchisees of the same line-make in the relevant market 
area, as compared to business available to the franchisees; and 
(iv) a statement that describes in reasonable detail how the establishment of a new franchisee or the relocation of an existing 
franchisee will be beneficial or injurious to the public welfare or public interest. 
(b) The franchisor shall provide the documents described under Subsection (4)(a) with the notice required under Subsection 
(3). 
(c) The franchisor is not required to disclose any documents under Subsection (4)(a) if: 
(i) the documents would be privileged under the Utah Rules of Evidence; 
(ii) the documents contain confidential proprietary information; 
(iii) the documents are subject to federal or state privacy laws; 
(iv) the documents are correspondence between the franchisor and existing franchisees in that line-make in the relevant 
market area; or 
(v) the franchisor reasonably believes that disclosure of the documents would violate: 
(A) the privacy of another franchisee; or 
(B) Section 13-14-201. 
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(5)(a) Within 30 days of receiving notice required by Subsection (3), ·any franchisee that is required to rece ive notice under 
Subsection (3) may protest to the advisory board the establishment or relocation o f the dealership. 
(b) No later than 10 clays a fter the clay on which a protest is filed, the department shall in form the franchisor that: 
(i) a timely protest has been filed; 
(ii) a hearing is requi red; 
(iii) the franchisor may not establish or relocate the proposed dealership until the advisory board has held a hearing; and 
(iv) the franchisor may not establish or relocate a proposed dealership if the executive director determines that there is not 
good cause for permitting the establishment or relocation of the dealership. 
(6) If multiple protests are filed under Subsection (5), he~rings may be consolidated to expedite the disposition of the issue. 
(7) Subsections ( l) through (6) do not apply to a relocation ofan existing or successor dealer to a location that is: 
(a) within the same county and less than two miles from the existing location of the existing or successor franchisee's · 
dealership; or 
(b) further away from a dealership of a franchisee of the same line-make. 
(8) For purposes of this section: 
(a) relocation of an existing franchisee's dealership in excess of two miles from the dealership's existing location is considered 
the establishment of an additional franchise in the I ine-make of the re locating franchise; 
(b) the reopening in a relevant market area ofa dealership that has not been in operation for one year or more is considered 
the establishment of an additional motor vehicle dealership; and 
(c)(i) except as provided in Subsection (8)(c)(ii), the establishment of a temporary addi tional place of business by a 
recreational vehicle franchisee is considered the establishment of an additional motor vehicle dealership; and 
( ii) the establishment of a temporary additional place of business by a recreational vehic le franchisee is not considered 
the establishment ofan additional motor vehicle dealership if the recreational vehicle franchisee is participating in a trade 
show where three or more recreational vehicle dealers are participating. 
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Credits 
Laws I 996, c. 277, § 14, eff. Apri l 29, 1996; Laws 2000, c. 86, § 3, eff. May I, 2000; Laws 2004, c. 123, § 4, eff. May 3, 2004; 
Laws 2004, c. 187, § I, eff. May 3, 2004; Laws 2005, c. 249, § 11 , eff. May 2, 2005; Laws 2010, c. 33, § 5, eff. May 11, 2010; 
Laws 20 11, c. 203, § 2, eff. May I 0, 201 1.; Laws 2015, c . 268, § 4, eff. May 12, 2015. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 13. Commerce and Trade 
Chapter 14. New Automobile Franchise Act 
Part 3. Restrictions on Termination, Relocation, and Establishment of Franchises 
U.C.A. 1953 § 13-14-302.5 
§ 13-14-302.5. Application of new franchise process with respect to certain terminated franchises 
Currentness 
(I) As used in this section: 
(a) "Covered franch isee": 
(i) means a person who was a franchisee under a pre-bankruptcy franchise; and 
(ii) is a "covered dealership," as that term is defined in the federal franchise arbitration law. 
(b) "Covered franchisor": 
(i) means a person who was a franchisor under a pre-bankruptcy franchise; and 
(ii) is a "covered manufacturer," as that term is defined in the federal franch ise arbitration law. 
(c) "Federal franchise arbitration law" means Section 747 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-117. 
(d) "New franchisor": 
(i) means a person who is a franchisor of the same line-make as the franchisor under a pre-bankruptcy franchise that has 
become a terminated franchise; and 
(ii) is a "covered manufacturer," as that term is defined in the federal franchise arbitration law. 
(e) "Pre-bankruptcy franchise" means a franchise in effect as of October 3, 2008. ., 
(f) "Reinstated franchise" means: 
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(i) a terminated franchise that a reinstatement order determines should be reinstated, renewed, continued, assigned, or 
assumed; or 
(ii) a franchise that a reinstatement order otherwise determines should be reestablished in or added to the dealer network 
of a new franchisor in the geographic area where the covered franchisee was located before October 3, 2008. 
(g) "Reinstated franchisee" means a covered franchisee: 
(i) whose franchise became a terminated franchise with less than 90 days' notice prior to termination; and 
(ii) that becomes entitled to a reinstated franchise under a reinstatement ordf?r. 
(h) "Reinstatement order" means an arbitrator's written determination: 
(i) in an arbitration proceeding held under the federal franchise arbitration law; and 
(ii)(A) that a terminated franchise should be reinstated, renewed, continued, assigned, or assumed; or 
(B) that a covered franchisee should otherwise be reestablished a_s a franchisee in or added to the dealer network of a 
new franchisor in the geographic area where the covered franchisee was located before October 3, 2008. 
(i) "Terminated franchise" means a covered franchisee's pre-bankruptcy franchise that was terminated or not continued or 
renewed as a result of a bankruptcy proceeding involving a covered franchisor as the bankruptcy debtor. 
(2) The process under Sections 13-14-302, 13-14-304, and 13-14-306 for the issuance of a franchise, including Subsections 
13-14-302(5) and (6) and Section 13-14-304 relating to a protest by another franchisee in the line-make in the relevant market 
area against the establishment or relocation of a franchise, does not apply to a reinstated franchise or reinstated franchisee. 
Credits 
Laws 2010, c. 41, § I, eff. March 22, 2010; Laws 2015, c. 268, § 5, eff. May 12, 2015. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 13. Commerce and Trade 
Chapter 14. New Automobile Franchise Act 
Part 3. Restrictions on Termination, Relocation, and Establishment of Franchises 
U.C.A. 1953 § 13-14-303 
§ 13-14-303. Effect of terminating a franchise 
Currentness 
If under Section 13-14-301 the executive director pe1mits a franchisor to terminate or not continue a franchise and prohibits 
the franchisor from entering into a franchise for the sale of new motor vehicles of a line-make in a relevant market area, the 
franchisor may not enter into a franchise for the sale of new motor vehicles of that line-make in the spe~ified relevant market 
area unless the executive director determines, after a recommendation by the advisory board, that there has been a change of 
circwnstances so that the relevant market area at the time of the establishment of the new franchise agreement can reasonably 
be expected to support the new franchisee. 
Credits 
Laws 1996, c. 277, § 15, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 2005, c. 249, § 12, eff. May 2, 2005. 
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Chapter 14. New Automobile Franchise Act 
Part 3. Restrictions on Termination, Relocation, and Establishment of Franchises 
U.C.A. 1953 § 13-14-304 
§ 13-14-304. Hearing regarding termination, relocation, or establishment of franchises 
Currentness 
(l)(a) Within 10 days after the day on which the advisory board receives an application from a franchisee under Subsection 
13-14-301(3) challenging a franchisor's right to terminate or not continue a franchise, or an application under Section 13-14-302 
challenging the establishment or relocation of a franchise, the executive director shall: 
(i) enter an order designating the time and place for the hearing; and 
(ii) send a copy of the order by certified or registered mail, with return receipt requested, or by any form ofreliable delivery 
through which receipt is verifiable to: 
(A) the applicant; 
(B) the franchisor; and 
(C) if the application involves the establishment of a new franchise or the relocation of an existing dealership, each 
affected municipality and to each franchisee in the relevant market area engaged in the business of offering to sell or 
lease the same line-make. 
(b) A copy of an order mailed under Subsection (1 )(a) shall be addressed to the franchisee at the place where the franchisee's 
business is conducted. 
(2) An affected municipality and any other person who can establish an interest in the application may intervene as a party to 
the hearing, whether or not that person receives notice. 
(3) Any person, including an affected municipality, may appear and testify on the question of the public interest in the 
termination or noncontinuation of a franchise or in the establishment of an additional franchise. 
( 4)(a)(i) Any hearing ordered under Subsection ( I) shall be conducted no later than 90 days after the day on which the application 
for hearing is filed. 
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(ii) A final decision on the challenge shall be made by the executive director no later than 20 days after the day on which 
the hearing ends. 
(b) Failure to comply with the time requirements of Subsection (4)(a) is considered a determination that the franchisor acted 
with good cause or, in the case of a protest of a proposed establishment or relocation of a dealer, that good cause exists for 
permitting the proposed additional or relocated new motor vehicle dealer, unless: 
(i) the delay is caused by acts of the franchisor or the additional or relocating franchisee; or 
(ii) the delay is waived by the parties. 
(5) The franchisor has the burden of proof to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that under the provisions of this 
chapter it should be granted permission to: 
(a) terminate or not continue the franchise; 
(b) enter into a franchise agreement establishing an additional franchise; or 
(c) relocate the dealership ofan existing franchisee. 
(6) Any party to the .hearing may appeal the executive director's final decision in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 4, 
Administrative Procedures Act, including the franchisor, an existing franchisee of the same line-make whose relevant market 
area,includes the site of the proposed dealership, or an affected municipality. 
Credits 
Laws 1996, c. 277, § I 6, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 2000, c. 86, § 4, eff. May I, 2000; Laws 2004, c. 187, § 2, eff. May 3, 2004; 
Laws 2005, c. 249, § 13, eff. May 2, 2005; Laws.2008, c. 362, § 5, eff. May 5, 2008; Laws 2015, c. 268, § 6, eff. May 12, 20 15. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 13-14-304, UT ST§ 13-14-304 
Current through 2015 First Special Session 
End ofDocumc111· •D 2016 Thomson R~utcrs. No claim ro miginni U.S. Gowrnmem Works. 
Westla11vNexr @ 2016 Thomson Reuters. No cla im to 0(9in3i U .S Govern,r,ent 1N0,ks. 2 • 
§ 13-14-305. Evidence to be considered in determining cause ... , UT ST§ 13-14-305 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 13. Commerce and Trade 
Chapter 14. New Automobile Franchise Act 
Part 3. Restrictions on Termination, Relocation, and Establishment of Franchises 
U.C.A. 1953 § 13-14-305 
§ 13-14-305. Evidence to be considered in determining cause to terminate or discontinue 
Currentness 
(1) In determining whether a franchisor has established good cause for terminating or not continuing a franchise agreement, 
the advisory board and the executive director shall consider: 
(a) the amount of business transacted by the franchisee, as compared to business available to the franchisee; 
(b) the investment necessarily made and obligations incurred by the franchisee in the performance of the franchisee's part 
of the franchise agreement; 
(c) the permanency of the investment; 
(d) whether it is injurious or beneficial to the public welfare or public interest for the business of the franchisee to be disrupted; 
· (e) whether the franchisee has adequate motor vehicle sales and service facilitie~, equipment, vehicle parts, and qualified 
service personnel to reasonably provide for the needs of the consumer for the new motor vehicles handled by the franchisee 
and has been and is rendering adequate services to the public; 
(f) whether the franchisee refuses to honor warranties of the francl1isor under which the warranty service work is to be 
performed pursuant to the franchise agreement, if the franchisor reimburses the franchisee for the warranty service work; 
(g) failure by the franchisee to substantially comply with those requirements of the franchise agreement that are determined 
by the advisory board or the executive director to be: 
(i) reasonable; 
(ii) material; and 
(iii) not in violation of this chapter; 
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(h) evidence of bad faith by the franchisee in complying with those terms of the franchise agreement that are determined by 
the advisory board or the executive director to be: 
(i) reasonable; 
(ii) material ; and 
(iii) not in violation of this chapter; 
· (i) prior misrepresentation by the franchisee in applying for the franchise; 
U) transfer of any ownership or interest in the franchise without first obtaining approval from the franchisor or the executive 
director after receipt of the advisory board's recommendation; and 
(k) any other factor the advisory board or the executive director consider relevant. 
(2) Notwithstanding any franchise agreement, the following do not constitute good cause, as used in this chapter for the 
termination or noncontinuation of a franchise: 
(a) the sole fact that the franchisor desires gr~ater market penetration or more sales or leases of new motor vehicles; 
(b) the change of ownership of the franchisee's dealership o·r the change of executive management of the franchisee's 
dealership tinless the franchisor proves that the change of ownership or executive management will be substantially 
detrimental to the distribution of the franchisor's motor vehicles·; or 
( c) the fact that the franchisee has justifiably refused or declined to participate in any conduct covered by Section 13-14-201. 
(3) For purposes of Subsection (2), "substantially detrimental" includes the fai lure of any proposed transferee to meet the 
objective criteria applied by the franchisor in qualifying franchisees at the time of application. 
C redits 
Laws 1996, c. 277, § 17, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 2005, c. 249, § 14, eff. May 2, 2005. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 13. Commerce and Trade 
Chapter 14. New Automobile Franchise Act 
Part 3. Restrictions on Termination, Relocation, and Establishment of Franchises 
U.C.A. 1953 § 13-14-306 
§ 13-14-306. Evidence to be considered in determining 
cause to relocate or establish a new franchised dealership 
Currentness 
In determining whether a franchisor has established good cau~e for relocating an existing franchisee or establishing a new 
franchi sed dealership for the same line-make in a given relevant market area, the advisory board and the executive director 
shall consider: 
( l) the amount of business transacted by other franchisees of the same line-make in that relevant market area, as compared to 
business available to the franchisees; 
(2) the investment necessarily made and obligations incurred by other franchisees of the same line-make in that relevant market 
area in the performance of their part of their franchisee agreements; 
(3) the permanency of the existing and proposed investment; 
( 4) whether it is injurious or beneficial to the public welfare or public interest for an additional franchise to be established, 
including: 
(a) the impact on any affected municipali ty; 
(b) population growth trends in any affected municipality; 
(c) the number of dealerships in the primary market area of the new or re located dealership compared to the number of 
dealerships in each primary market area adjacent to the new or relocated dealership's primary market area; and 
(d) how the new or relocated deale rship would impact the distance and time that an individual in the new or relocated 
dealership's primary market area would have to travel to access a dealership in the same line-make as the new or relocated 
dealership. 
(5) whether the franchisees of the same line-make in that relevant market area are providing adequate service to consumers for 
the motor vehicles of the line-make, w hich shall include the adequacy of: 
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(a) the motor vehicle sale and service facilities; 
(b) equipment; 
(c) supply of vehicle parts; and 
(d) qualified service personnel; and 
(6) whether the relocation or establishment would cause any material negative economic effect on a dealer of the same line-
make in the relevant market area. 
Credits 
Laws 1996, c. 277, § 18, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 2005, c. 249, § 15, eff. May 2, 2005; Laws 2008, c. 362, § 6, eff. May 5, 
2008; Laws 2015, c. 268, § 7, eff. May 12, 2015. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 13. Commerce and'Trade 
Chapter 14. New Automobile Franchise Act 
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Part 3. Restrictions on Termination, Relocation, and Establishment of Franchises 
U.C.A. 1953 § 13-14-307 
§ 13-14-307. Franchisor's obligations upon termination or noncontinuation of franchise or line-make 
Currentness 
(l) Upon the termination or. noncontinuation of a franchise or a line-make, the franchisor shall pay the franch isee: 
(a) an amount calculated by: 
(i) including the franchisee's cost of unsold motor vehicles that: 
(A) are in the franchisee's inventory; 
(B) were acquired: 
(I) from the franchisor; or 
(II) in the ordinary course of business from another franchisee of the same line-make ; 
(C) are new, undamaged, and, except for franchisor accessories, unaltered; or 
(D) represent the current mode l year at the time oftennination or noncontinuation, or the two model years immediately 
before the time of termination or noncontinuation; 
(ii) reducing the amount in Subsection (I )(a)(i) by a prorated I% for each 1,000 miles over 500 miles registered on a new 
vehicle's odometer; 
(iii) adding any charges made by the franchisor, "for distribution, delivery, or taxes; 
(iv) adding the franchisee's cost of any franchisor accessories added on the vehicle, except only those recreational vehicle 
accessories that are listed in the franchisor's wholesale product literature as options for that vehicle shall be repurchased; 
and 
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(v) subtracting all allowances paid or credited to the franchisee by the franchisor; 
(b) the franchisee's cost of new and undamaged motor vehicles in the franchisee's inventory of demonstrator vehicles, reduced 
by a prorated 1 % for each 1000 miles over 500 miles registered on the demonstrator vehicle's odometer, except recreational 
vehicles whose cost shail be reduced by 2% for each 1,000 miles registered on the odometer of demonstrator self-propelled 
recreational vehicles, exclusive of miles incurred in delivery of the vehicle, and the cost of demonstrator nonself-propelled 
recreational vehicles shall be reduced by I 0% of the franchisee's vehicle cost: 
(i) plus any charges made by the franchisor for distribution, delivery, or taxes; 
(ii) plus the franchisee's cost of any accessories added on the vehicles, except only those recreational vehicle accessories 
that are listed in the franchisor's wholesale product literature as options for that vehicle shall be repurchased; and 
(iii) less all allowances paid or credited to the franchisee by the franchisor; 
(c) the cost of all new, undamaged, and unsold supplies, parts, and accessories as set forth in the franchisor's catalog at the 
time of termination or noncontinuation for the supplies, parts, and accessories, less all allowances paid or credited· to the 
franchisee by the franchisor; 
( d) the fair market value, but not less than the franchisee's depreciated acquisition cost of each undamaged sign owned by the 
franchisee that bears a common name, trade name, or trademark of the franchisor if acquisition of the sign was recommended 
or required by the franchisor. If a recreational vehicle franchisee has a sign with multiple manufactureis listed, the franchisor 
is only responsible for its pro rata portion of the sign; 
(e) the fair market value, but ·not less than the franchisee's depreciated acquisition cost, of all special tools, equipment, and 
furnishings acquired from the franchisor or sources app:oved by the franchisor that v.,ere required by ,the franchisor and are 
in good and usable condition; 
j 
(f) the cost of transporting, handling, packing, and loading motor vehicles, suppl ies, parts, accessories, signs, special tools, 
equipment, and furnishings; 
(g) subject to Subsection (5), reasonable compensation to the franchisee for any cost incurred pertaining to the unexpired 
term of a lease agreement for the dealership's existing location; 
(h) the negotiated fair market value of the dealership premises, based on the fair market value of the real property, if the 
aealer opts to sell the dealership premises; and 
(i) compensate the franchisee for the blue sky or goodwill of the dealership, as determined in accordance with the applicable 
industry standards taking into consideration the effect that the timing of the manufacturer's announcement of discontinuance 
of a line make has or will have on future profitability of the dealership. 
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(2) Subsections (I )(g), (h), and (i) do not apply if a franchise is terminated: 
(a) by the franchisor for cause as defined in Subsections 13-14-J 0l(l )(b) and (2)(a); 
(b) upon mutual written agreement of the franchi sor and franchisee as provided in Subsection 13-14-301 (2)(b ); or 
(c) upon voluntary termination by the franchisee as provided in Subsection 13-14-301(4). 
(3) The franchisor shall pay the franchisee the amounts specified in Subsection (I) within 90 days after the tender of the property 
to the franchisor if the franchisee: 
(a) has clear title to the property; and 
(b) is in a position to convey title to the franchisor. 
( 4) If repurchased inventory, equipment, or demonstrator vehicles are subject to a security interest, the franchisor may make 
payment jointly to the franchisee and to the holder of the security interest. 
(5) Subsection (l)(g) does not relieve the franchisee or its lessor from an obligation under their lease agreement to mitigate 
damages. 
(6)(a) This section does not apply to a franchisee's voluntary termination or noncontinuation of its franchise that occurs as a 
result of the franchisee's sale of its dealership business entity or substantially all of the assets of that entity to a third party if 
the franchisor contemporaneously grants a franchise to the third party on terms and conditions that are comparable to those of 
the terminating or noncontinuing franchise. 
(b) Subsection (6)(a) may not be construed to impair a contractual right of a terminating or noncontinuing franchisee under 
a franchise or related agreement with a franchisor or its affiliate, including a right to return unsold parts. 
(7) This section does not apply to a termination, cancellation, or nonrenewal of: 
(a) a recreational vehicle franchise; or 
(b) a line-make by a.recreational vehicle franchisor. 
Credits 
Laws 1996, c. 277, § 19, eff. Apri l 29, 1996; Laws 1997, c. 162, § 10, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 2008, c. 362, § 7, eff. May 5, 
2008; Laws 2009, c. 3 18, § 5, eff. March 25, 2009; Laws 2010, c. 33, § 6, eff. May 11, 20 I 0. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 13. Commerce and Trade 
Chapter 14. New Automobile Franchise Act 
Part 3. Restrictions on Termination, Relocation, and Establishment of Franchises 
U.C.A. 1953 § 13-14-307.5 
§ 13-14-307.5. Termination, cancellation, or nonrenewal of a recreational vehicle franchise agreement 
Currentness 
(I) This section applies only to a recreational vehicle franchisee's termination, cancellation, or nonrenewal of: 
(a) a recreational vehicle franchise; or 
(b) a recreational vehicle line-make. 
(2)(a) A recreational vehicle franchisee may, at any time and with or without good cause, terminate, cancel, or not renew 
its recreational vehicle franchise agreement or a recreational vehicle line-make by giving 30 days' prior written notice to the 
recreational vehicle franchisor. 
(b) A franchisee has the burden of showing that a termination, cancellation, or nonrenewal is for good cause. 
(c) Good cause for a franchisee's termination, cancellation, or nonrenewal is considered to exist if: 
(i) the franchisor is convicted of or enters a plea of nolo contendere to a felony; 
(ii) the business operations of the franchisor are: 
(A) abandoned; or 
(B) closed for 10 consecutive business days, unless the closing is due to an act of God, a strike, a labor difficulty, or 
another cause over which the franchisor has no control; 
(iii) the franchisor makes a misrepresentation that materially and adversely affects the business relationship with the 
recreational vehicle franchisee; 
(iv) a material violation of this chapter is not cured within 30 days after the franchisee gives 30 days' written notice oft11e 
violation to the recreational vehicle franchisor; or 
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(v) the recreational vehicle franchisor: 
(A) becomes insolvent; 
(8) declares bankruptcy; or 
(C) makes an assignment for the benefit of creditors. 
(3) If the franchisee tem1inates, cancels, or does not renew the recreational vehicle franchise agreement or line-make for cause, 
the franchisor shall, at the franchisee's election and within 45 days after termination, cancellation, or nonrenewal, repurchase: 
(a)(i) all new, unaltered recreational vehicles, including demonstrators, that the franchisee acquired from the franchisor within 
18 months before the date of the termination, cancellation, or nonrenewal; and 
(ii) for a repurchase price equal to 100% of the original net invoice cost, including transportation, reduced by: 
(A) any applicable rebates and discounts to the franchisee; and 
(B) the cost to repair any damage to a repurchased recreational vehicle, if the vehicle is damaged after delivery to the 
franchisee but before repurchase occurs; 
' (b)(i) a ll undamaged accessories and proprietary parts sold by the recreationa l vehicle franchisor to the franchisee within one 
year before termination, cancellation, or nonrenewal , if accompanied by the original invoice; and 
(ii) for a repurchase price equal to I 00% of the original net invoice cost, plus an additional 5% of the original net invoice 
cost to compensate the franchisee for packing and shipping the returned accessories and parts to the franchisor; and 
(c)(i) any properly functioning diagnostic equipment, special tools, current signage, and other equipment and machinery that: 
(A) the franchisee purchased: 
(I) from the franchisor within five years before termination, cancellation, or nonrenewal; and 
(II) at the franchisor's request or because of the franchisor's requirement; and 
(B) are no longer usable in the normal course of the franchisee's ongoing business, as the franchisee reasonably 
determines; and 
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(ii) for a repurchase price equal to 100% of the original net cost that the franchisee paid, plus any applicable shipping 
charges and sales taxes. 
(4) A recreational vehicle franchisor shall pay the franchisee all money due under Subsection (3) within 30 days after the 
franchisor's receipt of the repurchased items. 
Credits 
Laws 20 10, c. 33, § 7, eff. May 11 , 2010. 
U.C.A.1953 § 13-14-307.5, UTST§ 13-14-307.5 
Current through 20 15 First Special Session 
Ent! of Uorumenl' ~ 2016 Thomson Rc111crs. No cbim to ongin;1l U.S. Gov~rnmcn1 Works. 
'./\-'estlc'l..vNexr (i:,i 2015 1 homson Rel!iers. ~fo ciaim to original US Governrner.t Wor'r<s. 
§ 13-14-308. Private right of action, UT ST§ 13-1 4-308 
- - --- - --- - - - - - ------------- ---------·--·--------- -
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 13. Commerce and Trade 
Chapter 14. New Automobile Franchise Act 
Part 3. Restrictions on Termination, Relocation, and Establishment of Franchises 
U.C.A. 1953 § 13-14-308 
§ 13-14-308. Private right of action 
Currentness 
(I) A franchisee has a private right of action for actual damages and reasonable attorney fees against a franchisor for a violation 
of this chapter that results in damage to the franchisee. 
(2)(a) As used in this Subsection (2): 
(i) "New franchisor" has the same meaning as defined in Section 13-14-302.5. 
(ii) "Reinstated franchise" has the same meaning as defined in Section 13-14-302.5. 
(iii) "Reinstated franchisee" has the same meaning as defined in Section 13-14-302.5. 
(b) A reinstated franchisee has a private right of action for actual damages and reasonable attorney fees against a new 
franchisor if: 
(i) the new franchisor: 
(A) establishes a new franchisee of the same line-make as a line-make of the reinstated franchisee within the relevant 
market area of the reinstated franchisee; or 
(B) adds a line-make lo another franchisor's existing franchisee within the relevant market area of the reinstated 
franchisee that is the same line-make as a line-make of the reinstated franchisee; and 
(ii) the franchisor's action under Subsection (2)(b)(i) causes a substantial diminution in value of the reinstated franchisee's 
reinstated franchise. 
(c) A new franchisor may not be held liable under Subsection (2)(b) based on a franchisee's purchase of another existing 
franchise, both o f which are within the relevant market area of a reinstated franchisee, for the purpose of combining the 
purchased franch ise with the franchise of the purchasing franch isee. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 13. Commerce and Trade 
Chapter 14. New Automobile hanchise Act 
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U.CA. 1953 § 13-14-309 
§ 13-14-309. Change in ilistribution plan 
Currentness 
If there is a change in the plan of distribution of a line make that contemplates a continuation of that line make in the 
state, a manufacturer or distributor may not directly or indirectly, through the action of any parent of the manufacturer or 
distributor, subsidiary of the manufacturer or distributor, or common entity cause a termination, cancellation, or nonrenewal of 
a dealer franchise agreement by a present or previous manufacturer or distributor unless, by the effective date of the action the 
manufacturer or distributor offers the new motor vehicle dealer whose dealer franchise agreement is terminated, cancelled, or 
not renewed, a dealer franchise agreement that is substantially similar to the dealer franchise agreement that existed with the 
previous manufacturer or distributor allowing the dealer to represent the line make under the new plan of distribution. 
Credits 
Laws 2008, c. 362, § 9, eff. May 5, 2008. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 13. Commerce and Trade 
Chapter 14. New Automobile Franchise Act 
Part 3. Restrictions on Termination, Relocation, and Establishment of Franchises 
U .C.A. 1953 § 13-14-310 
§ 13-14-310. Reporting requirement 
Currentness 
By November 30 of each year, the advisory board shall submit an annual report to the Business and Labor Interim Committee 
that, for the 12 months before the day on which the report is submitted, describes: 
(!) the number of applications for a new or relocated dealership that the advisory board received; and 
(2) for each application described in Subsection (I): 
(a) the number of protests that the advisory board received; 
(b) whether the advisory board conducted a hearing; 
(c) if the advisory board conducted a hearing, the disposition of the hearing; and 
(d) the basis for any disposition described in Subsection (2)(c). 
Credits 
Laws 2015, c. 268, § 8, eff. May 12, 2015. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 13. Commerce and Trade 
Chapter 14. New Automobile Franchise Act 
Part 3. Restrictions on Termination, Relocation, and Establishment of Franchises 
U.C.A. 1953 § 13-14-301 
§ 13-14-301. Termination or noncontinuance of franchise 
Currentness 
. 
(I) Except as provided in Subsection (2), a franchisor may not terminate or refuse to continue a franchise agreement or the 
rights to sell and service a line-make pursuant to a franchise agreement, whether through termination or noncontinuance of the 
franchise, termination or noncontinuance of a line-make, or otherwise, unless : 
(a) the franchisee has received written notice from the franchisor 60 days before the effective date of termination or 
noncontinuance setting forth the specific grounds for termination or noncontinuance that are relied on by the franchisor as 
establishing good cause-for the termination or noncontinuance; 
(b) the franchisor has good cause for termination or noncontinuance; and 
(c) the franchisor is willing and able to comply with Section 13-14-307. 
(2) A franchisor may terminate a franchise, without complying with Subsection (1): 
(a) if the franchisee's license as a new motor vehicle dealer is revoked under Title 41, Chapter 3, Motor Vehicle Business 
Regulation Act; or 
(b) upon a mutual written agreement of the franchisor and franchisee. 
(3)(a) At any time before the effective date of termination or noncontinuance of the franch ise, the franchisee may apply to the 
advisory board for a hearing on the merits, and following notice to all parties concerned, the hearing shall be promptly held 
as provided in Section 13-14-304. 
(b) A termination or noncontinuance subject to a hearing under Subsection (3)(a) may not become effective until: 
(i) final determination of the issue by the executive director; and 
(ii) the appl icable appeal period has lapsed. 
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(4) A franchisee may voluntarily terminate its franchise if the franchisee provides written notice to the franchisor at least 30 
days prior to the termination. 
C redi ts 
Laws 1996, c. 277, § l3, eff. Apri l 29, 1996; Laws 2005, c. 249, § 10, eff. May 2, 2005; Laws 2009, c. 3 18, § 4, eff. March 
25, 2009. 
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§ 13-14-302. Issuance of additional franchises--Relocation of ... , UT ST§ 13-14-302 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 13. ·commerce and Trade 
Chapter 14:New Automobile Franchise Act 
Part 3. Restrictions on Termination, Relocation, and Establishment of Franchises 
U.C.A. 1953 § 13-14-302 
§ 13-14-302. Issuance of additional franchises--Relocation of existing franchisees 
Currentness 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (6), a franchisor shall provide the notice and documentation required under Subsection 
(2) if the franchisor seeks to: 
(a) enter into a franchise agreement establ ishing a motor vehicle dealership within a relevant market area where the same 
line-make is represented by another franchisee; or 
(b) relocate an existing motor vehicle franchisee. 
(2) In determining whether a new or relocated dealership is within a relevant market area where the same line-make is 
represented by an existing dealership, the relevant market area is measured from the closest property boundary line· of the 
existing dealership to the closest property boundary line of the new or relocated dealership. 
(3)(a) Ifa franchisor seeks to take an action listed in Subsection (I), before taking the action, the franchisor shall, in writing, 
notify the advisory board, the clerk of each affected municipality, and each franchisee in that line-make in the relevant market 
area. 
(b) The notice required by Subsection (3)(a) shall: 
(i) specify the intended action described under Subsection (I); 
(ii) specify the good cause on which it intends to rely for the action; and 
(iii) be delivered by registered or certified mail or by any form of reliable delivery through which receipt is verifiable. 
(4)(a) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(c), the franchisor shall provide to the advisory board, each affected municipality, 
and each franchisee in that line-make in the relevant market area the following documents relating to the notice described under 
Subsection (3): 
(i)(A) any aggregate economic data and all existing reports, analyses, or opinions based on the aggregate economic data 
that were relied on by the franchisor in reaching the decision to proceed wi th the action described in the notice; and 
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(B) the aggregate economic data under Subsection ( 4)(a)(i)(A) includes: 
(I) motor vehicle registration data; 
(II) market penetration data; and 
(III) demographic data; 
(ii) written documenta tion that the franchisor has in the francisor's possession that it intends to rely on in establ ishing good 
cause under Section 13-14-306 relating to the notice; 
(iii) a statement that describes in reasonable detai l how the establishment of a new franchisee or the relocation of an existing 
franchisee will affect the amount of business transacted by other franchisees of the same line-make in the relevant market 
area, as compared to business available to the franchisees; and 
(iv) a statement that describes in reasonable detail how the establishment of a new franchisee or the relocation of an existing 
franchisee will be beneficial or injurious to the public welfare or public interest. 
(b) The franchisor shall provide the documents described under Subsection (4)(a) with the notice required under Subsection 
(3). 
(c) The franchisor is not required to disclose any documents under Subsection (4)(a) if: 
(i) the documents would be privileged under the Utah Rules of Evidence; 
(ii) the documents contain confidentia l proprietary information; 
(iii) the documents are subject to federal or state privacy laws; 
(iv) the documents are correspondence between the franchisor and existing franchisees in that line-make in the relevant 
market area; or 
(v) the franchisor reasonably believes that disclosure of the documents would violate: 
(A) the privacy of another franchisee; or 
(B) Section 13-14-20 l. 
------------------- ·------ ·-~---------- -----------------
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(S)(a) Within 30 days of receiving notice required by Subsection (3), any franch isee that is required to receive notice under 
Subsection (3) may protest to the advisory board the establishment or relocation of the dealership. 
(b) No later than IO days after the day on which a protest is fi led, the department shall inform the franchisor that: 
(i) a timely protest has been filed; 
(ii) a hearing is required; 
(iii) the franchisor may not establ ish or relocate the proposed dealership until the advisory board has held.a hearing; and 
(iv) the franchisor may not establish or relocate a proposed dealership if the executive director determines that there is not 
good cause for permitting the establishment or relocation of the dealership. 
(6) If multiple protests are filed under Subsection (5), hearings may be consolidated to expedite the disposition of the issue. 
(7) Subsections (1) through (6) do not apply to a relocation of an existing or successor dealer to a location that is: 
(a) within the same county and less than two miles from the existing location of the existing or successor franchisee's 
dealership; or 
(b) further away from a dealership of a franchisee of the same line-make. 
(8) For purposes of this section: 
(a) relocation of an existing franchisee's dealership in excess of two miles from the dealership's existing location is considered 
the establishment ofan additional franchise in the line-make of the relocating franchise; 
(b) the reopening in a relevant market area ofa dealership that has not been in operation for one year or more is considered 
the establishment of an additional motor vehicle dealership; and 
(c)(i) except as provided in Subsection (8)(c)(ii), the establishment of a temporary additional place of business by a 
recreational vehicle franchisee is considered the establishment of an additional motor vehicle dealership; and 
(ii) the establ ishment of a temporary additional place of business by a recreational vehicle franchisee is not considered 
the establishment ofan additional motor vehic le dealership if the recreational vehicle franchisee is participating in a trade 
show where three or more recreational vehicle dealers are participating. 
--------------------·-··-·----------- --
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C redits 
Laws 1996, c. 277, § 14, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 2000, c. 86, § 3, eff. May I, 2000; Laws 2004, c. 123, § 4, eff. May 3, 2004; 
Laws 2004, c. 187, § 1, eff. May 3, 2004; Laws 2005, c. 249, § 11, eff. May 2, 2005; Laws 20 10, c. 33, § 5, eff. May 11, 2010; 
Laws 20 11, c. 203, § 2, eff. May 10, 201 1; Laws 20 15, c. 268, § 4, eff. May 12, 2015. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 13. Commerce and Trade 
Chapter 14. New Automobile Franchise Act 
Part 3. Restrictions on Terminat ion, Relocation, and Establishment of Franchises 
U.C.A. 1953 § 13-14-302.5 
§ 13-14-302.5. Application of new franchise process with respect to certain terminated franchises 
Currentness 
(I) As used in this section: 
(a) "Covered franchisee": 
(i) means a person who was a franchisee under a pre-bankruptcy franchise; and 
(ii) is a "covered dealership," as that term is defined in the federal franchise arbitration law. 
(b) "Covered franchisor": 
(i) means a person who was a franchisor under a pre-bankruptcy franchise; and 
(ii) is a "covered manufacturer," as that term is defined in the federal franchise arbitration law. 
(c) "Federal franchise arbitration law" means Section 747 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-117. 
(d) "New franchisor": 
(i) means a person who is a franchisor of the same line-make as the franchisor under a pre-bankruptcy franchise that has 
become a terminated franchise; and 
I (ii) is a "covered manufacturer," as that term is defined in the federal franchise arbitration law. 
(e) "Pre-bankruptcy franchise" means a franchise in effect as of October 3, 2008. 
(f) "Reinstated franchise" means: 
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(i) a terminated franchise that a reinstatement order determines should be reinstated, renewed, continued, assigned, or 
assumed; or 
(ii) a franch ise that a reinstatement order otherwise determines should be reestablished in or added to the dealer network 
of a new franchisor in the geographic area where the covered franchisee was located before October 3, 2008. 
(g) "Reinstated franchisee" means a covered franchisee: 
(i) whose franchise became a terminated franchise with less than 90 days' notice prior to termination; and 
(ii) that becomes entitled to a reinstated franchise under a reinstatement order. 
(h) "Reinstatement order" means an arbitrator's written determination: 
(i) in an arbitration proceeding held under the federal franchise arbitration law; and 
(ii)(A) that a terminated franchise should be reinstated, renewed, continued, assigned, or assumed; or 
(B) that a covered franchisee should otherwise be reestablished as a franchisee in or added to the dealer network of a 
new franchisor in the geographic area where the covered franchisee was located before October 3, 2008. 
(i) "Terminated franchise" means a covered franchisee's pre-bankruptcy franchise that was terminated or not continued or 
renewed as a result of a bankruptcy proceeding involving a covered franchisor as the bankruptcy debtor. 
(2) The process under Sections 13-14-302, 13-14-304, and 13-14-306 for the issuance of a franchise, including Subsections 
13-14-302(5) and (6) and Section 13-14-304 relating to a protest by another franch isee in the line-make in the relevant market 
area against the establishment or relocation of a franchise, does not apply to a reinstated franchise or reinstated franchisee. 
Credits 
Laws 2010, c. 41, § 1, eff. March 22, 2010; Laws 20 15, c. 268, § 5, eff. May 12, 2015. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 13. Commerce and Trade 
Chapter 14. New Automobile Franchise Act 
Part 3. Restrictions on Termination, Relocation, and Establishment of Franchises 
U.C.A. 1953 § 13-14-303 
§ 13-14-303. Effect of terminating a franchise 
Currentness 
If under Section 13-14-301 the executive director permits a franchisor to terminate or not continue a franchise and prohibits 
the franchisor from entering into a franchise for the s~le of new motor vehicles of a line-make in a rele'-'.ant market area, the 
franchisor may not enter into a franch ise for the sale of new motor vehicles of that line-make in the specified relevant market 
area unless the executive director determines, after a recommendation by the advisory board, that there has been a change of 
circumstances so that the relevant market area at the time of the establishment of the new franchise agreement can reasonably 
be expected to support the new franchisee. 
Credits 
Laws 1996, c. 277, § 15, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 2005, c. 249, § 12, eff. May 2, 2005. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 13. Commerce and Trade 
Chapter 14. New Automobile Franchise Act 
Part 3. Restrictions on Termination, Relocation, and Establishment of Franchises 
U.C.A. 1953 § 13-14-304 
§ 13-14-304. Hearing regarding termination, relocation, or establishment of franchises 
Currentness 
(l)(a) Within 10 days after the day on which the advisory board receives an application from a franchisee under Subsection 
13-14-301(3) challenging a franchisor's right to terminate or not continue a franchise, or an application under Section 13-14-302 
challenging the establishment or relocation of a franchise, the executive director shall: 
(i) enter an order designating the time and place for the hearing; and 
(ii) send a copy of the order by certified or registered mail, with return receipt requested, or by any form ofreliable delivery 
through which receipt is verifiable to: 
(A) the applicant; 
.(B) the franchisor; and 
(C) if the application involves the establishment of a new franchise or the relocation of an existing dealership, each 
affected munic ipa lity and to each franchisee in the relevant market area engaged in the business of offering to sell or 
lease the same line-make. 
(b) A copy of an order mailed under Subsection ( l )(a) shall be addressed to the franchisee at the place where the franchisee's 
bus iness is conducted. 
(2) An affected municipality and any other person who can establish an interest in the application may intervene as a party to 
the hearing, whether or not that person receives notice. 
(3) Any person, including an affected munic ipality, may appear and testify on the question of the public interest in the 
termination or noncontinuation of a franchise or in the establishment of an additional franchise. 
(4)(a)(i) Any hearing ordered under Subsection ( I) shall be conducted no later than 90 days after the day on which the application 
for hearing is filed. 
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(ii) A final decision on the challenge shall be made by the executive director no later than 20 days afl:er the day on which 
the hearing ends. 
(b) Failure to comply with the time requirements of Subsection (4)(a) is considered a detem1inati'on that the franchisor acted 
with good cause or, in the case of a protest of a proposed establishment or relocation of a dealer, that good cause exists for 
permitting the proposed additional or re located new motor vehicle dealer, unless: 
(i) the delay is caused by acts of the franchisor or the additional or relocating franchisee; or 
(ii) the delay is waived by the parties. 
(5) Th.e franchisor has the burden of proof to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that under the provisions of this 
chapter it should be granted permission to: 
(a) terminate or not continue the franch ise; 
(b) enter into a franchise agreement establishing an additional franchise; or 
(c) relocate the dealership ofan existing franchisee. 
(6) Any party to the hearing may appeal the executive director's final decision in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 4, 
Administrative Procedures Act, including the franchisor, an existing franchisee of the same line-make whose relevant market 
area includes the site of the proposed dealership, or an affected municipality. 
Credits 
Laws 1996, c. 277, § 16, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 2000, c. 86, § 4, eff. May 1, 2000; Laws 2004, c. 187, § 2, eff. May 3, 2004; 
Laws 2005, c. 249, § 13, eff. May 2, 2005; Laws 2008, c. 362, § 5, eff. May 5, 2008; Laws 2015, c. 268, § 6, eff. May 12, 20 15. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 13. Commerce and Trade 
Chapter 14. New Automobile Franchise Act 
Part 3. Restrictions on Termination, Relocation, and Establishment of Franchises 
U.C.A. 1953 § 13-14-305 
§ 13-14-305. Evidence to be considered in determining cause to terminate or discontinue 
Currentness 
(1) In determining whether a franchisor has established good cause for terminating or not continuing a franchise agreement, 
the advisory board and the executive director shall consider: 
(a) the amount of business transacted by the franchisee, as compared to business available to the franchisee; 
(b) the investment necessarily made and obligations incurred by the franchisee in the performance of the franchisee's part 
of the franchise agreement; 
(c) the permanency of the investment; 
(d) whether it is injurious or beneficial to the public welfare or public interest for the business of the franchisee to be disrupted; 
(e) whether the franchisee has adequate motor vehicle sales and service facilities, equipment, vehicle parts, and qual ified 
service personnel to reasonably provide for the needs of the i:;onsumer for the new motor vehicles handled by the franchisee 
and has been and is rendering adequate services to the public; 
(f) whether the franchisee refuses to honor warranties of. the franchisor under which the warranty service work is to be 
performed pursuant to the franchise agreement, if the franchisor reimburses the franchisee for the warranty service work; 
(g) fai lure by the franchisee to substantially comply with those requirements of the franchise ~greement that are determined 
by the advisory board or the executive d irector to be: 
(i) reasonable; 
( ii) material; and 
(iii) not in violation of this chapter; 
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(h) evidence of bad faith by the franchisee in complying with those terms of the franchise agreement that are determined by 
the advisory board or the executive director to be: 
(i) reasonable; 
(ii) material; and 
(iii) not in violation of this chapter; 
(i) prior misrepresentation by the franchisee in applying for the franchise; 
U) transfer of any ownership or interest in the franchise without first obtaining approval from the franchisor or the executive 
director after receipt of the advisory board's recommendation; and 
(k) any other facto'r the advisory board or the executive director consider relevant. 
(2) Notwithstanding any franchise agreement, the fo llowing do not constitute good cause, as used in this chapter for the 
termination or noncontinuation of a franchise: 
(a)° the sole fact that the franchisor desires greater market penetration or more sales or leases of new motor vehicles; 
(b) the change of ownership of the franchisee's dealership or the change of executive management of the franchisee's 
dealership unless the franchisor proves that the change of ownership or executive management will be substantially 
detrimental to the distribution of the franchisor's motor vehicles; or 
(c) the fact that the franchisee has justifiably refused 9r declined to participate in any conduct covered by Section 13-14-20 I. 
,• 
(3) For purposes of Subsection (2), "substantia lly detrimental" includes the failure of any proposed transferee to meet the 
objective criteria applied by the franchisor in qualifying franchisees at the time of application. 
C redits 
Laws 1996, c. 277, § 17, cff. April 29, 1996; Laws 2005, c. 249, § 14, eff. May 2, 2005. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 13. Commerce and Trade 
Chapter 14. New Automobile Franchise Act 
-----
Part 3. Restrictions on Termination, Relocation, and Establishment of Franchises 
U.C.A. 1953 § 13-14-306 
§ 13-14-306. Evidence to be considered in determining 
cause to relocate or establish a new franch ised dealership 
Currentness 
In determining whether a franchisor has established good cause for relocating an existing franchisee or establishing a new 
franchised dealership for the same line-make in a given relevant market area, the advisory board and the executive director 
shall consider: 
(!) the amount of business transacted by other franchisees of the same line-make in that re levant market area, as compared to 
business available to the franchisees; 
(2) the investment necessarily made and obligations incurred by other franchisees of the same line-make in that relevant market 
area in the performance of their part of their franchisee agreements; 
(3) the permanency of the existing and proposed investment; 
(4) whether it is injurious or beneficial to the public welfare or public interest for an additional franchise to be established, 
including: 
(a) the impact on any affected municipality; 
(b) population wowth trends in any affected municipality; 
(c) the number of dealerships in the primary market area of the new or relocated dealership compared to the number of 
dealerships in each primary market area adjacent to the new or relocated dealersh ip's primary market area; and 
(d) how the new or relocated dealership would impact the distance and time that an individual in the new or relocated 
dealership's primary market area would have to travel to access a dealership in the same line-make as the new or relocated 
dealership. 
(5) whether the franchisees of the same line-make in that relevant market area are providing adequate service to consumers for 
the motor vehicles of the line-make, which shall include the adequacy of: 
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(a) tl1e motor vehicle sale and service facili ties; 
(b) equipment; 
(c) supply of vehicle parts; and 
(cl) qualified service personnel; and 
(6) whether the relocation or establishment would cause any material negative economic effect on a dealer of the same line-
make in the relevant market area. 
Credits 
Laws 1996, c. 277, § 18, eff. Apri l 29, 1996; Laws 2005, c. 249, § 15, eff. May 2, 2005; Laws 2008, c. 362, § 6, eff. May 5, 
2008; Laws 2015, c. 268, § 7, eff. May 12, 2015. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 13. Commerce and Trade 
Chapter 14. New Automobile Franchise Act 
Part 3. Restrictions on Termination, Relocation, and Establishment of Franchises 
U.C.A. 1953 § 13-14-307 
§ 13-14-307. Franchisor's obligations upon termination or noncontinuation of franchise or line-make 
Currentness 
(1) Upon the termination or noncontinuation of a franchise or a line-make, the franchisor shall pay the franch isee: 
(a) an amount calculated by: 
(i) including the franchisee's cost of unsold motor vehicles that: 
(A) are in the franchisee's inventory; 
(B) were acquired: 
(I) from the franchisor; or 
(II) in the ordinary course of business from another franchisee of the same line-make; 
(C) are new, undamaged, and, except for franchisor accessories, unaltered; or 
(D) represent the current model year at the time of termination or noncontinuation , or the two model years immediately 
before the time oftem1ination or noncontinuation; 
(ii) reducing the amount in Subsection ( l )(a)(i) by a prorated l % for each 1,000 miles over 500 miles registered on a new 
vehicle's odometer; 
(iii) adding any charges made by the franchisor, for distribution, delivery, or taxes; 
(iv) adding the franchisee's cost of any franchisor accessories added on the vehic le, except only ~1ose recreational vehicle 
accessories that are listed in the franchisor's who lesale product literature as options for that vehicle shall be repurchased; 
and 
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(v) subtracting all allowances paid or credited to the franchisee by the franchisor; 
(b) the franchisee's cost of new and undamaged motor vehicles in U1e franchisee's inventory of demonstrator vehicles, reduced 
by a prorated 1 % for each I 000 miles over 500 miles registered on the demonstrator vehicle's odometer, except recreational 
vehicles whose cost shall be reduced by 2% for each 1,000 miles registered on the odometer of demonstrator self-propelled 
recreational vehicles, exclusive of miles incurred in delivery of the vehicle, and the cost of demonstrator nonself-1jropelled 
recreational vehicles shall be reduced by 10% of the franchisee's vehicle cost: 
(i) plus any charges made by the franchisor for d istribution, delivery, or taxes; 
(ii) plus the franchisee's cost of any accessories added on the vehicles, except only those recreational vehicle accessories 
that are listed in the franchisor's wholesale product literature as options for that vehic le shall be repurchased; and 
(iii) less a ll allowances paid or credited to the franchisee by the franchisor; 
(c) the cost of all new, undamaged, and unsold supplies, parts, and accessories as set forth in the franchisor's catalog at the 
time of termination or noncontinuation for the supplies, parts, and accessories, less all allowances paid or credited to the 
franchisee by the franchisor; 
(d) the fa ir market value, but not less U1an the franchisee's depreciated acquisition cost of each undamaged sign owned by the 
franchisee that bears a common name, trade name, or trademark of the franchisor if acquisition of the sign was recommended 
or required by the franchisor. If a recreational vehicle franchisee has a sign with multiple manufacturers listed, the franchisor 
is only responsible for its pro rata portion of the s ign; 
(e) the fair market value, but not less than the franchisee's depreciated acquisition cost, of all special tools, equipment, and 
furnishings acqui red from the franchisor or sources approved by the franchisor that were required by the franchisor and are 
in good and usable condition; 
(f) the cost of transporting, handling, packing, and loading motor vehicles, supplies, parts, accessories, signs, special tools, 
equipment, and furnishings; 
(g) subject to Subsection (5), reasonable compensation to the franchisee for any cost incurred pertaining lo the unexpired 
term of a lease agreement for the dealership's existing location; 
(h) the negotiated fair market value of the dea lership premises, based on the fai r market va lue of the real property, if the 
dealer opts to sell the dealership premises; and 
(i) compensate the franchisee for the blue sky or goodwill of the dealership, as determined in accordance with the applicable 
industry standards taking into consideration the effect that the timing of the manufacturer's announcement of discontinuance 
ofa line make has or will have on future profitability of the dealership. 
'-Nr~stli'lwNext ,::j 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to originai US. Government 'No,ks. 2 
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(2) Subsections ( I )(g), (h), and (i) do not apply if a franchise is terminated: 
(a) by the franchisor for cause as defined in Subsections 13-l4-301(l)(b) and (2)(a); 
(b) upon mutual written agreement of the franchisor and franchisee as provided in Subsection 13-1 4-30 l(2)(b); or 
(c) upon-voluntary termination by the franchisee as provided in Subsection 13- I 4-301 ( 4). 
(3) The franchisor shall pay the franchisee the amounts specified in Subsection (1) within 90 days after the tender of the property 
to the franchisor if the franchisee: 
(a) has clear title to the property; and 
(b) is in a position to convey title to the franchisor. 
(4) If repurchased inventory, equipment, or demonstrator vehicles are subject to a security interest, the franchisor may make 
payment jointly to the franchisee and to the holder of the security interest. 
(5) Subsection (l)(g) does not re lieve the franchisee or its lessor from an obligation under their lease agreement to mitigate 
damages. 
(6)(a) This section does not apply to a franchisee's voluntary termination or noncontinuation of its franchise that occurs as a 
result of the franchisee's sale of its dealership business entity or substantially all of the assets of that entity to a third party if 
the franchisor contemporaneously grants a franchise to the third party on terms and conditions that are comparable to those of 
the terminating or noncontinuing franchise. 
(b) Subsection (6)(a) may not be construed to impair a contractual right of a terminating or noncontinuing franchisee under 
a franchise or related agreement with a franchisor or its affiliate, including a right to return unsold parts. 
· (7) This section does not apply to a termination, cancellation, or nonrenewal of: 
(a) a recreational vehicle franchise; or 
(b) a line-make by a recreational vehicle franchisor. 
Credits 
Laws 1996, c. 277, § 19, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1997, c. 162, § 10, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 2008, c. 362, § 7, eff. May 5, 
2008; Laws 2009, c. 3 18, § 5, eff. March 25, 2009; Laws 2010, c. 33, § 6, eff. May 11 , 2010. 
'-NestL:1•.vNe:<r ~ 2016 Thomson Reuters. No ciain, to or:gina, U.S Government Works. 3 
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Current through 2015 First Special Session 
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§ 13-14-307.5. Termination, cancellation, or nonrenewal of a ... , UT ST§ 13-'14-307.5 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 13. Commerce and Trade 
Chapter 14. New Automobile Franchise Act 
--------------- --
Part 3. Restrictions on Termination, Relocation, and Establishment of Franchises 
U.C.A. 1953 § 13-14-307.5 
§ 13-14-307-5- Termination, cancellation, or nonrenewal of a recreational vehicle franchise agreement 
Currentness 
(1) This section applies only to a recreational vehicle franchisee's termination, cancellation, or nonrenewal of: 
(a) a recreational vehicle franchise; or 
(b) a recreational vehicle line-make. 
(2)(a) A recreational vehicle franchisee may, at any time and with or without good cause, terminate, cancel, or not renew 
its recreational vehicle franchise agreement or a recreational vehicle line-make by giving 30 days' prior written notice to the 
recreational vehicle franchisor. 
(b) A franchisee has the burden of showing that a termination, cancellation, or nonrenewal is for good cause. 
(c) Good cause for a franchisee's termination, cancellation, or nonrenewal is considered to exist if: 
(i) the franchisor is convicted of or enters a plea of nolo contendere to a felony; 
(ii) the business operations of the franchisor are: 
(A) abandoned; or 
(B) closed for 10 consecutive business days, unless the closing is due to an act of God, a strike, a labor difficulty, or 
another cause over which the franchisor has no contro l; 
(ii i) the franchisor makes a misrepresentation that materially and adversely affects the business relationship with the 
recreational vehicle franchisee; 
(iv) a material violation of this chapter is not cured within 30 days after the franchisee gives 30 days' written notice of the 
violation to the recreational vehicle franchisor; or 
'./VestlawNexr rs-;; 2016 Thomson Reuters. No clairr, to 0:·igina! U.S. Government ·works. 
§ 13-14-307.5. Termination, cancellation, or nonrenewal of a ... , UT ST § 13-14-307.5 
(v) the recreational vehicle franchisor: 
(A) becomes insolvent; 
(B) declares bankruptcy; or 
(C) makes an assignment for the benefit of creditors. 
(3) If the franchisee terminates, cancels, or does not renew the recreational vehic le franchise agreement or line-make for cause, 
the franchisor shall, at the franchisee's election and within 45 days after termination, cancellation, or nonrenewal, repurchase: 
(a)(i) all new, unaltered recreational vehicles, including demonstrators, that the franchisee acquired from the franchisor within 
18 months before the date of the termination, cancellation, or nonrenewal; and 
(ii) for a repurchase price equal to I 00% of the original net invoice cost, including transportation, reduced by: 
(A) any applicable rebates and discounts to the franchisee; and 
(B) the cost to repair any damage to a repurchased recreational vehicle, if the vehicle is damaged after delivery to the 
franchisee but before repurchase occurs; 
(b)(i) all w1damaged accessories and proprietary parts sold by the recreational vehicle franchisor to the franchisee within one 
year before termination, cancellation, or nonrenewal, if accompanied by the original invoice; and 
(ii) for a repurchase price equal to I 00% of the original net invoice cost, plus ·an additional 5% of the original net invoice 
cost to compensate the franchisee for packing and shipping the returned accessories and parts to the franchisor; and 
( c)(i) any properly functioning diagnostic equipment, special tools, current sign age, and other equipment and machinery that: 
(A) the franchisee purchased: 
(l) from the franchisor within five years before termination, cancellation, or nonrenewal; and 
(II) at the franchisor's request or because of the franchisor's requirement; and 
(B) are no longer usable in the normal course of the franchi·see's ongoing business, as the franchisee reasonably 
determines; and 
'Nestl,:iwNext' t> 2015 T!,,m1son Reuters. No claim •o odgina! U S. Government 1/•lorks. 2 
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(ii) for a repurchase price equal to I 00% of the original net cost that the franchisee paid, plus any applicable shipping 
charges and sales taxes. 
( 4) A recreational vehicle franchisor sha ll pay the franchisee all money due under Subsectioi1 (3) within 30 days after the 
franchisor's receipt of the repurchased items. 
Credits 
Laws 2010, c. 33, § 7, eff. May 11 , 2010. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 13-14-307.5, UT ST § 13-14-307.5 
Current through 2015 F irst Special Session 
End of Dol·u1111·ni {'; 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim tn origin~! U.S. Gol'l.'.rnmcnt Works. 
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§ 13-14-308. Private right of action, UT ST§ 13-14-308 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 13. Commerce and Trade 
Chapter 14. New Automobile Franchise Act 
Part 3. Restrictions on Termination, Relocation, and Establishment of Franchises 
U.C.A. 1953 § 13-14-308 
§ 13-14-308. Private right of action 
Currentness 
( I) A franchisee has a private right of action for actual damages and reasonable attorney fees against a franchisor for a violation 
of this chapter that results in damage to the franchisee. 
(2)(a) As used in this Subsection (2): 
(i) "New franchisor" has the same meaning as defined in Section 13- 14-302.5. 
(ii) "Reinstated franchise" has the same meaning as defined in Section 13-14-302.5. 
(iii) "Reinstated franchisee" has the same meaning as defined in Section 13-14-302.5. 
(b) A reinstated franchisee has a private right of action for actual damages and reasonable attorney fees against a new 
franchisor if: 
(i) the new franchisor: 
(A) establishes a new franchisee of the same line-make as a line-make of the reinstated franchisee with in the relevant 
market area of the reinstated franch isee; or 
(B) adds a line-make to another franchisor's existing franchisee with in the relevant market area of the reinstated 
franchisee that is tile same line-make as a line-make of the reinstated franchisee; and 
(ii) the franchisor's action under Subsection (2)(b)(i) causes a substantial diminution in value of the reinstated franchisee's 
reinstated franchise. 
(c) A new franchisor may not be held liable under Subsection (2)(b) based on a franchisee's purchase of another existing 
franch ise, both of which are within the relevant market area of a reinstated franchisee, for the purpose of combining the 
purchased franchise with the franchise of the purchas ing franchisee. 
',\'.,c,tlawNexf ;2=;, 2o~s Thomsor, Reuters. No ciairn to •)ri;Jinai U.S Gowm, rr.cnt Wor'r<.s. 
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Cr edits 
Laws 2008, c. 362, § 8, eff. May 5, 2008; Laws 20 I 0, c. 41, § 2, eff. March 22, 20 I 0. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 13-1 4-308, UT ST§ 13- 14-308 
Current through 2015 First Special Session 
End of Documen t -r;, 2016 Thomson Reuters. No daim to ,1rigin:1l U.S. Govcrnrnenl Works. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 13. Commerce and Trade 
Chapter 14. New Automobile Franchise Act 
Part 3. Restrictions on Termination, Relocation, and Establishment of Franchises 
U.C.A. 1953 § 13-14-309 
§ 13-14-309. Change in distribution plan 
Currentness 
If there is a change in the plan of distribution of a line make that contemplates a continuation of that line make in the 
state, a manufacturer or distributor may not directly or indirectly, through the action of any parent of the manufacturer or 
distributor, subsidiary of the manufacturer or distributor, or common entity cause a termination, cancellation, or nonrenewal of 
a dealer franchise agreement by a present or previous manufacturer or distributor unless, by the effective date of the action the 
manufacturer or distributor offers the new motor vehjcle dealer whose dealer franchise agreement is terminated, cancelled, or 
not renewed, a dealer franchise agreement that is substantially similar to the dealer franchise agreement that existed with U1e 
previous manufacturer or distributor allowing the dealer to represent the line make under the new plan of distribution. 
Credits 
Laws 2008, c. 362, § 9, eff. May 5, 2008. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 13-14-309, UT ST § I 3-14-309 
Current through 2015 First Special Session 
End of Doru111rn1 IC 2016 Thomson Reuters. No daim to original U.S. Govanmcnl Works. 
'//estl<1•:1Nexr (f;·• 20 16 Thornson Reuters. No claim to origimi! U.S Government I.Nor;<.s. 
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}. ' KcyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Treatment 
Proposed Legislation 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 13. Commerce and Trade 
Chapter 14. New Automobile Franchise Act 
··--· -·---·-··--------·--------·-···--·-··-·-- ··--· -·· - . - -· 
Part 3. Restrictions on Termination, Relocation, and Establishment of Franchises 
U.C.A. 1953 § 13-14-310 
§ 13-14-310. Reporting requirement 
Currentness 
By November 30 of each year, the advisory board shall submit an annual report to the Business and Labor Interim Committee 
that, for the 12 months before the day on which the report is submitted, describes: 
(1) the number of applications for a new or relocated dealership that the advisory board received; and 
(2) for each application described in Subsection (1 ): 
(a) the number of protests that the advisory board received; 
(b) whether the advisory board conducted a hearing; 
(c) if the advisory board conducted a hearing, the disposition of the hearing; and 
(d) the basis for any disposition described in Subsection (2)(c). 
Credits 
Laws 2015, c. 268, § 8, eff. May 12, 2015. 
U.C.A. I 953 § 13-1 4-310, UT ST§ 13-14-310 
Current through 2015 First Special Session 
End of Ooc111nc11t ' r},J '20 I (1 Tlwmson Rc:tlll.:rS No claim to original U.S. Gu,crnm~nt \\it)rks. 
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RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
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Sec. 2. [All political power inherent in the people], UT CONST Art. 1, § 2 
-----------------------·----·----
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Constitution of Utah 
Article I. Declaration of Rights 
U.C.A. 1953, Const. Art. 1, § 2 
Sec. 2. [All political power inherent in the people] 
Currentness 
All political power is inherent in the people; and all free governments are founded on their authority for their equal protection 
and benefit, and they have the right to a lter or reform their government as the public welfare may require. 
Notes of Decisions (67) 
U.C.A. 1953, Const. Art. I, § 2, UT CONST Art. I, § 2 
Current through 2015 First Special Session 
E nd of Document ~ 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim 10 original U.S. Govemmcnt Work~. 
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Sec. 7. [Due process of law), UT CONST Art. 1, § 7 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Constitution of Utah 
Article I. Declaration of Rights 
U.C.A. 1953, Const. Art. 1, § 7 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law] 
Currentness 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or properly, without due process of law. 
Notes of Decisions (635) 
U.C.A. 1953, Const. Art. 1, § 7, UT CONST Art. I, § 7 
Current through 201 5 First Special Session 
End of Document ({:, 2016 Tho,nslln Reuters. No claim to origin~! U.S. Gowrnmcm Works. 
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Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press--Libel], UT CONST Art. 1, § 15 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Constitution of Utah 
Article I. Declaration of Rights 
U.C.A. 1953, Const. Art. 1, § 15 
Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press--Libel] 
Currentness 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech or of tl1e press. In all_ criminal prosecutions for libel the 
truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the iTl{ltter charged as libelous is true, and was 
published with good motives, and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right to determine 
the law and the fact. 
Notes of Decisions (130) 
U.C.A. 1953,Const. Art. I,§ 15, UT CONST Art. I,§ 15 
Current through 20 I 5 First Special Session 
Entl of l)nl'lllllcnt © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim hl original U.S. Ciov..:rnmelll Works. 
',\:estl,,wNe:-:t r;~: 20°0 'T,1,_;r,-:son Reute;s. No claim to original U.S. Governn1e;:t Works. 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws], UT CONST Art. 1, § 24 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Constitution of Utah 
Article I. Declaration of Rights 
U.CA 1953, Const. Art. 1, § 24 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws] 
Currentness 
All law$ of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
Notes of Decisions (333) 
U.C.A. 1953, Const. Art. 1, § 24, UT CONST Art. 1, § 24 
Current through 2015 First Special Session 
E nt! of Document ,{:, 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to originlll (.J.S. Government Works. 
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Sec. 26. [Private laws forbidden], UT CONST Art. 6, § 26 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Constitution of Utah 
Article VI. Legislative Department 
U.C.A. 1953, Const. Art. 6, § 26 
Sec. 26. [Private laws forbidden) 
Cur-rentness 
No private or special law shall be enacted where a general law can be applicable. 
Credits 
Laws 1972, S.J.R. l. 
Notes of Decisions (92) 
U.C.A. 1953, Const. Art. 6, § 26, UT CONST Art. 6, § 26 
Current through 2015 First Special Session 
End of Document © 2016 Thomson Rt:utcrs. No claim 10 original U.S. Go"cmmcnt W(lrks. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Constitution of Utah 
Article XII. Corporations 
U.C.A. 1953, Const. Art. 12, § 20 
Sec. 20. [Free market system as state policy--Restraint of trade and monopolies prohibited] 
Currentness 
It is the policy of the state of Utah that a free market system shall govern trade and commerce in this state to promote the 
dispersion of economic and political power and the general welfare of all the people. Each contract, combination in the forn1 of 
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce is prohibited. Except as otherwise provided by statute, it is 
also prohibited for any person to monopolize, attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons 
to monopolize any part o f trade or commerce. 
Credits 
Laws 1992, S.J.R. 7, § 18, adopted at election Nov. 3, 1992, eff. Jan. l , 1993. 
Notes of Decisions (27) 
U.C.A. 1953, Const. Art. 12, § 20, UT CONST Art. 12, § 20 
Current through 2015 First Special Session 
End of Document f:; 2016 Thomson Reuters. No cla11n to origin3I U.S. Ciowmmcnt Works. 
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Section 8, Clause 1. Powers of Congress; Levy of Taxes ... , USCA CONST Art. I § ... 
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United States Code Annotated 
Constitution of the United States 
Annotated 
-------------·-------------•·---····--
Article I. The Congress (Refs & Annos) 
U.S.C.A. Const. Art. I § 8, cl. 1 
Section 8, Clause 1. Powers of Congress; Levy of Taxes for 
Common Defense a nd General Welfare; Uniformity of Taxation 
Currentness 
The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the 
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout 
the United States; 
Notes of Decisions (359) 
U.S.C.A. Const. Art. I § 8, cl. l , USCA CONST Art. I § 8, cl. I 
Current throl!gh P.L. J 14-112 (excluding 114-92, 114-94 and 114-95) approved 12-18-2015 
F:nd of Document i::, 20 !6 Thomson Reuter~. No claim to original U.S. Govcrnm~nt Works. 
--------------·-·--·--------·- · ··-·-
• 
Section 8, Clause 3. Regulation of Commerce, USCA CONST Art. I § 8, c l. 3 
United States Code Annotated 
Constitution of the United States 
Annotated 
Article I. The Congress (Refs & Annos) 
U.S.C.A. Const. Art. I § 8, cl. 3 
Section 8, Clause 3. Regulation of Commerce 
Currentness 
<Notes of Decisions for Constitution Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, Regulation of Commerce, are displayed in two separate 
documents. Notes of Decisions for subdivisions I to XV are contained in this document. For Notes of Decisions for 
subdivisions XVI to end, see second document for Constitution Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, Regulation of Commerce.> 
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes; 
Notes of Decisions (29 I 2) 
U.S.C.A. Const. Art. I § 8, cl. 3, USCA CONST Art. I § 8, cl. 3 
Current through P.L. 11 4-11 2 (excluding 114-92, 114-94 and 114-95) approved 12-18-2015 
E nd of Jloc11111cn1 ~, 2016 Thnmsnn Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Govcrnm~m Works. 
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Amendment I. Freedom of Religion, Speech and Press; ... , USCA CONST Amend .... 
United States Code Annotated 
Constitution of the United States 
Annotated 
Amendment I. Freedom of Religion, Speech and Press; Peaceful Assemblage; Petition of Grievances 
(Refs & Annos) 
U.S.C.A. Const. An1end. I-Full text 
Amendmentl. Freedom of Religion, Speech and Press; Peaceful Assemblage; Petition of Grievances 
Currentness 
Congress shall make no law respecting an ·establislunent of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances. 
<This amendment is further displayed in three separate documents according to subject matter> 
<see USCA Const Amend. I, Religion> 
<see USCA Const Amend. I, Speech> 
<see USCA Const Amend. I, Assemblage> 
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. I-Full text, USCA CONST Amend. I-Full text 
Current through P.L. 114-112 (excluding 114-92, 114-94 and 114-95) approved 12-18-2015 
End of l)ocumcnl t) 20 16 Thomson Reuter$. No claim to original U.S. Go\lcrnmenr Works. 
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AMENDMENT XIV. CITIZENSHIP; PRIVILEGES AND ... , USCA CONST Amend .... 
United States Code Annotated 
Constitution of the United States 
Annotated 
----- ------- -· 
Amendment XIV. Citizenship; Privileges and Immunities; Due Process; Equal Protection; 
Apportionment of Representation; Disqualification of Officers; Public Debt; Enforcement 
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. XIV-Full Text 
AMENDMENT XIV. CITIZENSHIP; PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES; DUE 
PROCESS; EQUAL PROTECTION; APPOINTMENT OF REPRESENTATION; 
DISQUALIFICATION OF OFFICERS; PUBLIC DEBT; ENFORCEMENT 
Currentness 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the j urisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any pe~son of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the 
whole ·number of persons in _each State, excluding Indians not taxed. Bu·t when the right to vote at any election for the choice of 
electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers 
of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one 
years of age, and c itizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the 
basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole 
number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any 
office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of 
Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of 
any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or 
given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. 
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of 
pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States 
nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, 
or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legis lation, the provisions of th is article. 
<Section I of this amendment is further displayed in separate documents according to subject matter,> 
<see USCA Const Amend. XIV,§ I-C itizens> 
<see USCA Const Amend. XIV,§ I-Privileges> 
--------------··--·-- ---------- ·---------
Westl.;wNext (i.') 20~6 Th:xnson Reu\8rs. No ciairn to originai U.S. Government \ivorks. 
AMENDMENT XIV. CITIZENSHIP; PRIVILEGES AND ... , USCA CONST Amend .... 
<see USCA Const Amend. XIV,§ l-Due Proc> 
<see USCA Const Amend. XIV, § I -Equal Protec..:t> • 
<sections 2 to 5 of this amendment are displayed as separate documents,> 
<see USCA Const Amend. XIV, § 2,> 
<see USCA Const Amend. XIV, § 3,> 
<see USCA Const Amend. XIV,§ 4,> 
<see USCA Const Amend. XIV,§ 5,> 
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. XIV-Full Text, USCA CONST Amend. XIV-Full Text 
Current through P .L. 114-11 2 ( excluding 114~92, 114-94 and 114-95) appr~ved 12-18-2015 
Encl of Document 
,g 20 16 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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Account No. 47-2748833 
MOTOR VEHICLE ENFORCEMENT DIVISION, 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Type: Dealer License Denial 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission for a Formal Hearing on August 14, 
2015, in accordance with Utah Code §630-4-201 et seq. Based upon...1h.~ .. evidence. ancLtestimonx __ . . 
presented at the hearing, the Tax Commission hereby makes its: 
' 
,' 
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FINDINGS OF FACT1 
I. On February 12, 2015, Tesla Motors Utah, Inc. ("Tesla UT") filed an application for a 
new motor vehicle dealer's license (the "February Application").2 
2. In letters dated February 26, 2015 and March 2, 2015, Assistant Attorney General Gale 
Francis notified Tesla UT that the Respondent, Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division ("MVED"), would 
deny Tesla UT's new motor vehicle dealer's license application.3 
3. On March 4, 2015, Tesla UT submitted a letter to the MVED and Mr. Francis responding 
to Mr. Francis' letters ofFebruary.26, 2015 and March 2, 2015.4 
4. On April 13, 2015, Tesla UT submitted a second application to the MVED for a new 
mot9r vehicle dealer's license (the "April Application").5 
5. On May .P, 2015, TesJa UT submitted a letter to the Utah Attorney General's office 
supporting Tesla UT's April Application.6 
6. On May 14, 2015, Mr. Francis submitted a letter to the MYED recommending the denial 
of Tesla UT's April Application for a new motor vehicle dealer's license.7 l . 
7. On May 21, 2015, the MVED formally denied Tesla UT's .application, stating that Tesla 
UT 9-oes. not meet the relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act and New 
Automobile Franchise Act. 8 
. ~ . . '., 
8. Curtis Stoddard, Assistant Director of the Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division, testifiea 
it was ~i.H mderstiµiding of the law.in effect when he reviewed the applieation that in order to hold n new 
motor vehicle dealer license, the dealer had to have a franchise. After review of Tesla UT's Februruy 
Appli~~ion he !equested legal counsel for,MVED.to .review the matter. 
9. Tesla Motors, Inc. ("TMf') is the manufacturer of Tesla motor vehicles. · Tesla UT- is a 
whollx owned sQbsidiary ofTMI.9 TMI had incorporated.and registered Tesla Motors UT, Inc., with the 
State of Utah Dep~rtment of Commerce on January 6, 2015 .10 
1 Findings of Fact, Nos. 1-7 are from a Stipulation of Facts entered into between the parties on August 4, 2015, and 
received into the Fonnal Hearing record. 
2 Exhibit I. 
3 Exhibit 2. 
4 Exhibit 3. 
5 Exhibit 4. 
6 Exhibit 5. 
7 Exhibit 6. 
8 Exhibit 7. . 
9 Exhibit 1, Letter dated February 10, 2015, from Jonathan Chang. Tesla Deputy General Counsel, and Exhibit 3. 
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l0. TMI manufactures all-electric vehicles using technology that is relatively new to 
perspective purchasers of these vehicles. TMl's vehicles have won awards such as Motor Trend's Car of 
the Year. TMI's sales and service operations have also-received top marks from Consumer Repo1is} 1 
11. TMI does not sell the vehicles· it manufactures through independent franchise dealers 
anywhere in the world. TMI sells its vehicles using a· direct sales and distribution: model through retail 
locations owned by TMI or wholly owned subsidiaries of TMI, via its internet website or over the 
telephone. TMI currently has 21 stores in the United·States.12 TMI had incorporated Tesla UT, a ·~lwlly 
owned subsidiary to operate and sell vehicles from the Utah retail and service location. · ·· 
12." On November -IS, 2014,-i'fMI entered· into an agreement to· lease 'property at 2312 South 
State Street, in South Salt Lake City, Utah. The lease provided a five year tenn at a rate of $15,000 per 
month and options for renewal. The; lease did have some provisions for termination b'y TM! ifit was 
unable to obtain certain licenses or approvals. 13 
. 13. .TMI incwTed significant expense-in settihg up'·its retail store iocation a't this address.14 
Photographs submitted of the 2312 South State, Street 1location indicate 'that the site ha§ "a showroom. 
There is also a charging·station,and · service center at this location. 15 
14; On tlre·Bonded Motor Vehicle Business Applicati0n, dated January rs, 2015, to obtaih a 
new motor vehicle dealer license, Tesla UT listed the business address for the veliicl'e tl&lbish'if 'to 'be 
2312,South State Street; South Salt Lake City.16 1 -~ • : ·, · 
15'.- The· retail store .portion has had to remain~ shuttered due to MVED!s derilal-'to issiie the 
lkense.1·7 
16, Effective April 13, 2015; TMI 'and 'Festa UT entered into a ''Dealer Agree·ment" ~lii6h· 
provided'that TMI would -sell Tesla vehicles a'nd parts'to·~esla UT•and Tesla UT would sell the v~hicles 
and,,parts, and:1ptovide customer services on behalf•of ·tli'e·owriers and prospective ·owriefs•:of.these · 
products.18 Tesla UT is referred to as "Dealer" in llie Bealer-Agreement, which contains'-itf pertinent part 
the following provisions: 
11 Testimony ofDiarmuid O'Connell, Vice President for Business Development, Tesla Motors: Inc'. 
12 Testimony of Mr. O'Connell. 
13 Exhibit l, Lease between Tesla Motors, Inc. and 2312 South State Street, LLC. The termination provisions are at 
Sec. 1.2.3 of the Lease. This order makes no conclusions and offers no opinion regarding whether TMI may 
terminate the lease under these provisions. 
14 Testimony of Mr. O'Connell. 
15 Exhibit l. 
16 Exhibit 1. 
17 Testimony of Mr. O'Connell, Exhibit 1. 
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2. OBLIGA TIO.NS OF TMI. TMI agrees to sell and deliver Tesla Products to Dealer in 
accordance with the terms and conditions of this Agreement. 
3.1 TMI agrees to allocate and sell Tesla Vehicles to Dealer in confonnity with TMl sale 
practices, as detennined by TMI from time to time. 
3.2 Payment to TMI for Tesla Vehicles is due and will be made by Dealer upon 
presentation of TMl's invoice for said Tesla Vehicles to Dealer or by such other method 
as TMI may from time to time adopt. Title and ownership to Tesla Vehicles will-remain 
wi~h TMI until payment in full for such V(?hicles has actually been received by TMI. 
6.2 1.'l~roughout the term of. this Agreement, Dealer will keep its De~lership Facilities 
open for business during, and for not less than, the customary business hours of the trade 
in E>ealer.'s area . 
. . ., . ' ' 6:s Dealer will use its best efforts to comply with all reasonable directives and 
.. suggestions of TMI in the marketing and sale of Tesla Vehicles, the sale of Tesla Parts 
anq ~e performance _of custqmer:set-vices. 
7 .1 Dealer will us~ i,ts best ~fforts to actively promote th~ sale of T ~sla Products through 
systematic contacts with existing and potential owners of Tesla Veliicles and through 
such other reasonable means as TMI. may.from. time to time suggest. Unless otherwise 
approv,e~ in w_rjting b_y 'ffy[I, . Dealer . sh~,11 <?ffe1: Tesla f rodu,sts for retail sale a~ the 
;llla~ufacturei-'~ ~suggested retail price established by TMI. · ' ' 
· ... ,. ,. t' n · f• 
:.iii: 10'.1 Deai~r may not . use. TMits'.' ~ade name, trademark, service mark, or 'related 
, .. characteristic (collectively; '"f.esla Trademarks'?) for any purpose or in-any manner. 
, 10.2 Deale.r;. acknowledges the e~clusive ownership by TMI of, and the validity of, the 
-.J \' I ' ~ I I. ' J l ~-- l I ,~ • 
Tesla Trademarks and all registrations thereof. ' · · · 
10.3 Dealer and TMI hereby agree that nothing in this Agree·ment shall constitute a grant 
,of~ 1~cfnse1 by. TJ4I to,prater ,of Tesla Trademar~s., All J~_la Trad~arks are the sol~ 
and exclus ive property of TMf and no license or other right to such Tesla Trademarks is 
granted-or implied hereby. ,r 
16. l 'Dealer is •an in<lependent•contractor• and is not an agent, servant,. employee, legali 
rcpresentat.ive, p_artnef or join~ VCl}tp.f~ orTMI. In additio11, _:qeaier hereby agrees that th1s 
Agreement does not form a franchise relationship between Dealer and TMI, and Dealer 
further agrees -that it is not a franchisee (as such tem1 may be defend under'UCA 1953 
~ec . . _1,3-14:-102). JMI hereby agrees (hat this Agreement does not form ~ franchi~e 
between Dealer and TMI, and TMI further agrees that it is not a franchisor (as such tenn 
may be defined underUCA 1953 Sec. 13-14-102) . 
17. The Dealer Agreement does not provide for the arrangement between TMI and Tesla UT 







agreement does note it is "between Tesla Motors, Inc., a Delaware corporation having its headqua1ters 
,. . .. ·-
offices at 3500 Deer Creek Road Palo Alto, CA 94304 ("TMI"), and Tesla Motors UT, Inc., a Delaware 
corporation ,and .wholly owned subsidiary of TMI, having its principal place of business at _2312 South 
1 ✓ ~ I l • ~ tt; t 
State Street, South Salt Lake City, Utah 84115." The Tesla name 'and logo are on the building at 2312 
South State Street. 19 
18. Tesla UT's retail operations are based on a direct sales business model, which, based on 
the testitnony ofTMI's Vice President of Business Development, Diarmuici O'Comfei1;20· is thb ni~del that 
TMI has chosen to utilize to sell its vehicles. Mr. O'Connell testified that TMI does not sell vehicles 
through independent franchisees anywhere in the .worlcl. Mr: 'O'Connell testified a factoi· itl' using this 
' 
1 
•• ,. • • 1 1' 'I- ' • , ' l & •• !"'• 
model is that TMI wanted to encourage the adoption and ownership of electric vehicles, ~nd ,that there 
' 
was a "huge education requirement" in introducing this new technology. He testified that they have 
• 1 • 
optimized a sales and service m:odel for education, and that it.takes roughly 25 'days from ,first, contact 
with a customer to a purchase. Prospective purchasers must first'°lea\-ri ~bbut electric 'vJfiicle technology in 
general, then about TMI's product, and then they may decide to purchase.21 
.. t . ' • • • \ -. '· • • • ... ) 
19.. Mr. O'Connell' testifieo that the price for the vehicles; "is transparent and consistent 
• • t, ') , + ,, , t.'l \ ' 1 o • t 'I • t, I f 
across all markets'.' and that " the Model S is,- - and its various-options are the same price ever,y.where in 
the world.". He goes on to note for exampl~ tliat\a, ~1o~~l .. ~}n. phini ~~ult ~-e· tl~e· sa~~Ji~ice'~s in the 
U.S., but they would add on transportation and duty costs.22 Another factor in TM['s sales model that is 
different it th~t their reta.il loc~tions !U~(J ~aye ~?ly~
1
one, vei11icle, iQ ~ -e s~o,~room ~d only, ~-couple 
vehicles there available· for test drives: • Thewehiclys·are generally; .custo[l_l •built to>bµyers' specifications 
once the buy~r has p~~chased the veliicle .. Abottt';95% of its :ve~ict~s <l!"e c~.~tom b'J ilf i?j th~ m~nrier. He 
testified theo:fMI salespeople,are not· incentiviied,.to / 'up~sell folks''•i"into,options and feaa,ires that they 
may or may not wa~t.,;23 .A!lditionally,'~e ,state.s thl seiyi~ qepa.rtin,ent i~ not operate:d·as a profit center 
I • • I • I J • ! . . • • I • , • ' • • I. ~ 
and their successful perfo1mance is based on "customer happiness."24 · Anoth,er · differ,en~e .h~ noted 
between traditional manufacturers is that TMI does not engage in paid advertisements for their vehicles. 
Additionally, 'L'MI does not buytrade-in_s•. If a customer wants·to,trade in-another manuf~cturer'.s:vehicle, 
they will help facilitate the ~ustomer making i; cont~ct with a thit'd1 party business' tliat Buys the tracle-in. 
I I • • I • ' t • ,, ft' ' J'I ; • ,, •,: , 1 J 
20: One factor noted at the hearing was the relatively small number, of vehicles that TMI 
manufncl:ufed. For example, TMI'.s .'first generation product was the Tes!~ Roadster. :TMr produced 
• ' f • • •• 
19 Exhibit l. 
20 Mr: O'Copnell's testimony is found at pages 33-74 of the hearing transcript. 
21 Hearing Transcript, pg. 50. · 
22 Hearing Transcript, pg. '52! . I 
23 Hearing Transcript, pg. 55. 
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roughly 800 of these vehicles per year from 2008 to 2011. Then TMI developed the Model S, a mid-
volume, mid-price sedan, which it launched mid 2012. Mr. O'Connell testified that TMI produced 3,000 
of these vehicles in 2012 and ,he noted, "To fast forward to this year where we will be producing and 
delivering 50,000, at least 50,000 vehicles to the market."25 
21. Tesla UT presented expert witness testimony of Fiona Scott Morton, Ph.D.26 Dr. Morton 
testified that she had reviewed relevant Utah statutes, the Utah Constitution, publically available 
information concerning TMI anq _this dispute, research on retail sales, the dealership model, consumer 
preferences in the industry, re~orts that examine the economics of automobile distr:ibution and the impact 
of franchise laws that restrict distribution. It was Dr. Morton's expert opinion that . Tesla',s business 
model, which she referred to as a vertically integrated sales model,· was highly eff~ctive for a firm 
producing a new and novel product ancJ a lower-cost altern~tive to the traditional franchised dealer model. 
. . . 
She stated that the manufacturer should be able to choose the business model it uses to. sell its vehicles 
. I I · · 
.. 
and the free market would let us know if it was a good choice ... When asked, she did acknowledge that it 
was possible for T1vfl to use a model where it sol~ vehicl~ through third party dealers, stating, "If Tesla 
wanted to do so:111ething like that, it - it could. The fact that it's choosing not to and that we're here 
ex.plaining why it really wants to sell through its own_ stores suggests to me that there are good reasons 
why it wants to sell tqrough i~s own stores."27 
' . . . . 
22. It was Dr. Morto1;1's opinion that probibiting TMI from selling new vehicles di_x:ectly to 
consumers in Utah harms Utah consumers and Utah's eq~nomy. She states prohipiting this is anti-
competitive, will mean a l.oss of jobs in Utah, does n~t benefit the public, and will ca.u!le.more pollution. 
~ I I • • • 
23. Dr. Morton testified that because this was a young firm, it had to b~,co~cemed.with brand 
. r . 
building. It also was attempting to build its brand without paid advertisements .. For thi~ reason, TMI had 
. . t • 
to set up its stores and make the customer service _exactly how it wanted it to be done. It was her opinion 
that TMI's vertically integrated sales model elimin~ted double marginalization, where b~th the 
0 I , t , 
manufacturer and the dealer add a mark-up. She testified double marginalization may increase the price 
• I 
the consumer pays for the vehicle. She also noted that there were c?st effective savings in TMI's brand 
building approach: TMI had a cost savings because it did no~.pay for advertise?1ent There was also a 
savings to TMI because of its inventory. TMI did not fill up lots with cars in .hope they would sell, they 
' . .. 
instead built the cars that the customers wanted and the vehicles are not constructed µntil they are 
purchased, so there is better cash flow. 
25 Hearing Transcript, pg. 4 1. 
26 Dr. Morton's Testimony is found at pages 74-120 of the Hearing Transcript. 
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• 
24. Dr. Morton testified that the traditional franchised dealer model, where a manufacturer 
sells its vehicles through numerous franchised dealers, leads to intrabrand competition. The various 
franchised dealers of a single brand may compete against each other for sales. There is a lso interbrand 
competition, or competition between brands. She noted that TMI'~ vertically integrated sales model 
would still lead to interbrand competition. Dr. Morion testified in her opinion that the state did not have 
an interest in requiring a manufacturer to sell through franchised dealers, but did ackn; wledge the state 
had an•interest irfprotecting dealers who are cun-ently in the dealership format from predatory actions on 
the part of their own manufacturers.28 Dr. Morton was asked du~ing the hearing, "So it's your testimony 
then that there is a state interest in protecting dealers once you have a dealer and franchise a.tTangement. 
But if you always stay as a company store and never go to the franchise ~ode!; that's where you then say 
... there is a laclc1 of state interest in protecting that particular model." In response Dr. Morton testified, 
"I think there's a ·state interest in protecting that' mo.de!, in allowing it to enter, but I don't think there's 
any entity within the Tesla column that needs protecting."29 To further clarify Dr. Morton was asked if 
TMI grew in size to the point where franchising became impmtant, if it would be "important to prohibit 
them from owning coinpany-owned stores," Dr. Morton stated in part ... "As I said, there is some 
controversy about how much dealeri need to be protected. . . But if Te~ia were to grow and decide it 
wanted this traditional franchise model, then I think under Utah law, thefra.nchise laws would apply to 
. that -that ·..:.. if Tesla created third-party 'independent stores that ·were dealers iliat 'were 'selling i~ product, 
then you already ha~e a law in pla'.c~ for regulating that.';30 
25: Tesla UT presented an Ex.pert Witness Statement.from Herbert E. Waltner, MBA, BBA, 
SPA, and CFE, which was teceiv~ ·into the record at the Formal Hearing.it Mr. Waltner had 25 years of 
1 \ •• j,' • 'f• •I ' , ! , • ' • 
experience in the automotive industry, most of which was focused on automotive retail. In his written 
testimony he described the retail operations of independent franchise dealerships and compared that to 
- Tesla' s di;ect sales model. It was his testimony thal the "tradition;! dealersltip~ are massive operations, 
relative to a Tesla store, with higi'1 overhead, requiring a high volume of fa~t-paced vehicle sales and 
serv1ce wodc to rem'ain pro.fitable."32 He ~]so states th~t. "traditional dealerships d~rive signifi~ant profits 
. . 
from sales of service and parts, used vehicles, financing, insurance products and other 'ad-ons.'" He 
notes that "traditional deal~rships rely on nianufacturers to fund advertising and incentive programs."33 
He expiains that TMI's direct sales ·model r~lies on much smaller facilities with low overhead. He states, 
is Hearing Transcript, pg, 110. 
29 Hearing Transcript, pg. 114. 
30 Hearing Transcript, pg. 115. 
31 Exhibit 11. 
32 Exhibit l.l, pg. 2, lines 23-24. 
33 Exhibit 11, pg. 3. 
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"Because Tesla cars are custom manufactured for each purchaser, Tesla stores generally have only one or 
two Tesla vehicles on-site for test drives and education purposes."34 He also indicated that the sales pace 
is slower in the Tesla stores stating, "The public is often skeptical of electric vehicle technology because 
it is new and unfamiliar to them. The sale of a Tesla car requires significant time and a low-pressure 
environment to teach consumers about the operation and benefits of electric vehicles.',3s His written 
testimony is that.traditional dealerships have other profit centers, like the sale of used vehicles, financing 
or sales of insurance as ,vell as a service and parts department. He notes in contrast that "Tesla derives the 
vast majority of its profits from the sale of new Tesla cars. Tesla's operations are not based on profits 
derived from servicing Tesla cars, used vehicle sales, financing or sale~ of insurance products."36 It was 
Mr. Waltner's opinion "that it would not be viable for Tesla to sell its cars to conswners through 
independent franchised dealerships in Utah."37 
APPLICABLE LAW 
. ,. 
Utah law requires a person to obtain .a _license from MVED before they can sell tlyW or used 
vehicles in this state. Utah Code Sec. 41-3-201(2) provides: 
A person may not act as any of the following without having procured a license issued by 
the administrator: (a) a dealer; . . . 
For purposes of Utah Code Sec. 41-3-201(2) "dealer" is defined at Utah Code 41-3-102(8) to be: 
' (a) "Dealer'' means a person: (i) whose business in whole or in part involves selling new, 
used or new and used motor vehicles or off-highway vehicles; and (ii) who sells, displays 
for sale, or offers for sale or exehange three or more new or used vehicles or" off-highway 
vehicles in any 12-mqnth peri~d. 
Utah Code Sec. 41-3-202(1) of the Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act provides the actions a 
new motor vehicle dealer license pennits a dealer to lawfully perform in this state as follows: 
( 1) A new motor vehicle dealer's license permits the licensee to: 
(a) offer for sale, sell, or exchange __ .new motor vehicles if the licensee ,p<;>.ssesses -a 
franchise from the manufacturer· for the motor vehicle offered ·.for sale, so}d or 
exchanged by the lice~see; . 
(b) offer for sale, sell 'or exchange used motor vehicles; 
( c) operate as a body shop; and 
( d) dismai1tle motor vehicles. 
Utah Code Sec. 41-3-210(1) provides actions that are prohibited on the part of a l~cense holder. 
In relevant part this subjection provides: 
34 Exhibit 11, pgs. 11-12. 
35 Exhibit 11, pg. 12. 
36 Exhibit l l, pg. 13. 
37 Exhibit 11, pg. 2. 
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(I) The holder of any license issued under this chapter may not: 
(d) violate any law of the state respecting commerce in motor vehicles or any rule 
respecting commerce in motoi· vehicles made by any licensing or regulating authority 
of the state; 
(g) engage in a business respecting the selling or exchanging of new or new and used 
motor vehicles for which he is not licensed, including selling or exchanging a new 
motor vehicle for which the licenseb does not l1ave a francl~ise 
The Motor Vehicle Business Regu!at'ion Act defines "franchise" at Utah Code Sec. 41-3-102(16) 
as follows: 
"Franchise" means a contract or agr.eement beM1een a dealer and a manufacturer of 
new motor vehicles or its distributor or factory branch by which the dealer is 
authorized 'to sell any specified make or makes of'new motor vehicles. 
Under the Motor Vehicle Business ~egulation Act, MVED deqies . issuance of a license at Utah 
Code Sec. 41-3-209(1) as follows: 
If the administrator finds that a:n applicant is not qualified to receive a license, a 
license may not be granted. 
t 
State laws respecting c.ommerce in, motor vehicles are also found in the New Automobile 
Franchise Act. That Act defines "dealership," "franchise" or "franchise agreement,'' "franchisee," 
"franchisor" and "new motor vehicle dealer" at Utah Code Sec. I 3-I 4-102 as follows: 
As used in this chapter: 
(5) "Dealership'' means a site oi; location· in this st~te: ( a) at which a franchisee conducts 
the business 'of'a nt w motor vehicle dealer; and (b) that is id~ntified as a .new motor 
vehicle dealer's principal place of bus~,n~s~ for li'?~n~ir:g, P.~fP.O~~-un~~! Sect,i9n 41-3-204. 
(8) (a) "Franchise" or "Franchise agreement" means a written agreeme~t, or: in 'the 
absence of a written agreement, then a course of dealing or a practice for a definite or 
indefinite period, in "(µich: (i) a pe1:son grants to an9ther person ~ license to use a trade 
name, trademark, service mark, or related characteristic; and (ii) a community of interest 
exists in the marketing of new motor vehicles, new motor vehicle parts; and services 
related to the sale or lease of new motor vehicles at wholesale or retail. 
(b) "Franchise" or "Franchise agreement" includes a sales and service agreement. 
(9) "Franchisee" means a person with whom a franchisor has agreed with or permits a 
franchisee to purchase, sell, or offer for sale new motor vehicles manufactured, produced, 
assembled, represented, or distributed by the franchisor. 
9 
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(10) "Franchisor" means a person who has, in writing or in practice, agreed with or 
permits a franchisee to purchase, sell, or offer for sale new motor vehicles manufactured, 
produced, assembled, represented, or distributed by the franchisor, and includes: (a) the 
manufacturer, producer, assembler, or distributor of the new motor vehicles; (b) an 
inte1mediate distributor; and (c) an agent, officer, or field or area representative of the 
franchisor. 
(17) "New motor vehicle dealer" is a person who is licensed under Subsection 41-3-
202( l )(a) to sell new motor vehicles. 
The New Automobile Franchise Act lists acts that are prohibited by a franchisor 
at Utah Code Sec. 13-14-201 as follows: 
(1) A franchisor may not in this state: 
(u) except as provided Subsection (6), directly or indirectly: (i) own an interest in a 
new motor vehicle dealer or dealership; (ii) operate or control a new motor vehicle 
deale~ or de_alership; (iii) act in the capacity of a new motor vehicle dealer, as defined 
in Sect!_on 13-14-102; or (iv) operate a motor vehicle service facility; 
DISCUSSION 
Regardless of whether the traditional franchise model for sales of new motor vehicles may not be 
the best business model for TMI • or • Tesla UT, or whether it is merely not the sales model TMI has 
decided to employ, the traditional franchise model is the manner under which new motor vehicles may be 
sold in this state based on longstanding provisions of Utah Jaw. Under the Motor Vehicle Business 
Regulation Act at Utah Code Sec: 41-3.-201, a person may not act as a motor vehicle dealer without 
obtaining a license from MVED. Utah Code Sec. 41-3-202(1), makes it clear·that a new motor vehicle 
dealer license pennits a dealer to lawfully offer for sale, sell, or exchange new motor vehicles if the dealer 
possesses a "franchise" from the manufacturer for the motor vehicle offered for sale. Additionally, Utah 
Code Sec. 41-3-21-0(l)(g) prohibits a licensee from selling a new motor vehicle for which the licensee 
' does not have a "franchise." With these provisions, the current law requires a franchise arrangement for 
the sale of new motor vehicles, which is consistent with the traditional dealership sales model pursuant to 
which new.motor vehicles have been sold in this state for years. 
Under the Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act, at Utah Code Sec. 41-3-102(16), a "franchise" 
is defined as, "a contract or agreement between a dealer and a manufacture of new motor vehicles . . . by 
which the dealer is authorized to sell any specified make or makes of new motor vehicles." When Tesla 
UT filed its February Application, it did not provide a written agreement or contract. The Division, after 
consultation with counsel from the Attorney General's Office, concluded that Tesla UT did not have a 
10 
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franchise and, therefore, found that Tesla UT was not qualified to receive the license. Mr. Gale Francis, 
Assistant Attorney General, notified Tesla UT on Febniary 26, and March 2, 2015 that MVED would 
deny the license. Under Utah Code Sec. 41-3-209, if the applicant was found not qualified, MVED may 
not issue the license. 
On April 13, 20 I 5, Tesla UT submitted to MVED a second application for a new motor vehicle 
dealer's license ("April Application"). With this application Tesla UT included the Dealership 
Agreement, with ari' effective date of April 13, 2015.38 Under this agreement TM1 agreed to allocate and 
sell Tesla vehicles to Tesla UT and Tesla UT agreed to "use its best efforts to comply with all reasonable 
directives and suggestions of TMI in the marketing and sale of Tesla vehicles."39 Sec. 16.1 of the 
Dealership Agreement states, "Dealer [Tesla U11 hereby agrees that this Agreement does not fonn a 
franchise relationship between Dealer and TMI, and Dealer further agrees that it is not a franchisee (as 
such term may be defined under UCA 1953 Sec. 13-14-102). TMI hereby agrees that this Agreement 
does not form a franchise relationship between Dealer ~nd TM~, and 1MI furth~r ~grees tha~ it is not a 
franchisor (as such term may be defined unde1'. UCA 1953 Sec. 13'--14·102)." After reviewing the April 
. .. 
Application with the Dealership Agreement, Mr. Francis recommended the denial of the license and 
MVED formally denied the license, which denial is the subject of this hearing. 
At the hearing in this matter, although Tesla UT had entered into the Dealership·Agreement and 
argued that it provided authorization to Tesla UT to sell Tesla vehicles, it was Tes!~ UT's position that it 
was not a "franchise agreement." Therefore, it was Tesla UT's assertion that this agreement was a 
"franchise" for purposes, of the Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act, but not a "franchise" or 
"franchise agreement''. for purposes of the New Automobile Franchise Act. Tesla UT's counsel point out 
the agreement specifically states that Tesla UT may not "use TMI's trade name, trademark, service mark 
or related characteristic.'..io It was not explained at the hearing how this would work with the riame and 
trademark already on the building which Tesla UT had designated as its dealership. AdditionaUy Tesla 
UT's counsel point to Sec. 16.l of the Dealership Agreement ,in which the parties "agree" that the 
agreement does not form a franchise relationship, that TMI is not a frwchisor or Tesla UT a franchisee as 
that term is defined under Utah Code Sec. 13-14· l 02. 
It appears from review of the arguments presented at the hearing, the reason for the distinction 
that Tesla UT attempts to make is that under the New Automobile Franchise Act, TMI is prohibited from 
being a franchisor with Tesla UT as the franchisee, because TMI is the sole, or I 00% owner, of Tesla UT. 
JS Exhibit 4. 
39 Exhibit 4, pg. 3. 
40 Exhibit 4, pg. 4. 
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As noted by MVED at the hearing, Utah Code Sec. l3-l4-20l(l)(u) provides, "a franchisor may not in 
this state ... directly or indirectly: (i) own an interest in a new motor vehicle dealer or dealership; (ii) 
operate or control a new motor vehicle dealer or dealership; (iii) act in the capacity of a new motor 
vehicle dealer ... " For this reason Tesla UT argues it has a franchise for purposes of the Motor Vehicle 
Business Regulation Act, but that there is no Franchise Agreement for purposes of the New Automobile 
Franchise Act. For support of this claim, Tesla UT's counsel makes the assertion that there were different 
legislative purposes for these two acts. Therefore, he argues they may be subject to differing 
interpretations. It was his argument that the intent of the Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act was to 
protect the public or consumers from unfair practices when they purchased motor vehicles. He argued 
that the intent of the legislature in adopting the New Automobile Franchise Act was to protect franchisees 
or dealerships from exploitation by the franchisors. Tesla's counsel also made the point that the two acts 
are enforced by different government divisions and asserted that MVED did not have the authority to 
make determinations regarding violations und_er the N:ew Automobile Franchise. Act. 
It is MVED's position at the hearing that Tesla UT must_ have a franchise to sell the Tesla 
vehicles in order for the Division to issue it a new motor vehicle dealer's license, and if the Dealer 
Agreement or practice between TM1 and Tesla UT rose to the level of a franchise, it violated provisions 
. 
of the New Automobile Franchise Act because Tesla UT was a wholly owned subsidiaryofTMI. MVED 
argues that Tesla UT must comply with provisions of both the Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act 
, ., . . 
. . 
and the New Automobile Franchise Act, citing for authority Utah Code Sec. 41-3-210(1), which provides 
•• I • 
that a holder of a license may not violate any law of the state respecting commerce in motor vehicles. 
Considering the patties' arguments and the applicable statutory provisions, the New Automobile 
. . ' . ~ . . . 
Franchise Act is certainly made up of laws respecting commerce in motor vehicles. Addition~ly, the New 
Automobile Franchise Act specifically referenc~s provisions in the Motor Vehicle Business Regulation 
Act that are r~levant in this case. "New mot~r vehicle dealer,"41 which is what' T~sla UT has requested a 
license for in U t~h, is defined at Utah Code Sec. 13-14-1_02( 17) to be "a person who js licensed under 
Subsection 41-?-202(l)(a)." Utah Code Sec. 41_-3-202(1) provides the actions that may be performed by 
a "new motor vehicle dealer" which include to sell in this state new motor vehicles if the dealer posses a 
. . 
franchise from the manufacturer. Bas~d on the plain language of these two acts, MVED's position is 
correct that MVED must consider provisions of the New Motor Vehicle Franchise Act, and if the issuance 
41 The definitions of"Dealership" and "Motor Vehicle" provided in the New Automobile Franchise Act, at Utah 
Code Sec. 13-14-102(5) and (15) respectively also specifically reference provisions in the Motor Vehicle Regulation 
Act. 
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of the license would cause TMI and Tesla UT to be in violation of the New Automobile Franchise Act., 
MVED may not issue the license to Tesla UT. 
Tesla UT had argued that the legislative intent and basis of these two acts were distinct and 
should be interpreted based on that distinct intent. However, in regards to statt!tory interpretation the 
courts have noted, "'When interpreting statutory language, our primary objective is to ascertain the intent 
' I I 
of the legislature. To discern legislative intent, we first look to the plain language of the statute.'" lvo,y 
Homes, Ltd, v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 2011 UT 54, ,i 21, Citing LP! Services v McGee, 2009 UT 41, 11, 
215 P.3d 135. The Court in Ivory goes on to note, "'We presume that the legislature used each word 
. : ' \ 
advisedly and read each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning." However, "our plain 
language analysis is not so limited that we only inquire into individual words and subsections in isolation; 
our interpretation of a statute requires that each part of a section be construed in connection with every 
other part of section so as to produce a harmonious whole (Emphasis in Original, Internal Citations 
Omitted)."' Id. at 2011 UT 54, ,r 21. To reach th~ interpretation requested by Tesla UT, the Commission 
wo'uld have to ignore the plain language of the applielilile provisions in both the Motor Vehicle Business 
j '. ' ' 
Regulation Act and the New Automobile Franchise Act. 
. ' 
Tesla UT has also asserted in this proc·~eding that its Dealership Agreement is not a franchise 
' , 
agreement, therefore it should not be constmed a violation of the New Automobile Franchise Act TMI 
and T~sla Uf drafted into· their agreement a provision th~t says, "this Agreement does not form a 
franchise" and "TMI further agrees that it is not a franchisor (as such term ·may be defined under UCA 
1953 Sec 13-14-102).',42 Parties may not contract away applicable provisions of l'aw they 'nnd 
.·,' 
'• I \ > • > 
inconvenient. If the agreement or the relationship between TMI and Tesla UT meet the i·equirements of 
. ,, ,. '. . . ·; •. :;1 . 
"Franchisor," or "Franchisee" as t~10se terms are defined in Utah Code Sec. 13-14-102, then they are a 
"Franchisor" and "Franchisee," for purpO;SCS of ~he New Automob_ile Franchise Act regardless of their 
written aieement. Utah Code Sec. 13-14-102(10) defines "franchisor'' to be "a person who l1as, in 
!-· 
writing or in pr~ctice, agreed with or permits a franchisee to purchase, sell, or offer for sale new motor 
vehi~l~~ ~andia~tti;-~ ... by the frinchisor.'' Based on the plain language of these provisions,43 TMlis a 
Franchisor bec'ause TMI is permitting Tesla UT to' purchase, sell or offer for sale new Tesla vehicles 
. :, 
manufactured by TM1. Utah Code Sec. 13-14-102(~) defines "franchisee" as "a person with whom a 
42 Exhibit 4, Dealer Agreement, pg. 6. 
43 As noted by the Utah Supreme Court in Maefar/ane v. State Tax Comm'n, 134 P.3d, 1116, l l 18 (Utah 2006), 
"We look first to the plain language of a statute to determine its meaning. Only when there is ambiguity do we look 
further." Citing J. Pochynok co:, Inc. v. Smedsrud, 2005 UT 39, if 15, ! 16 P.3d 353. The Court in Macfarlane goes 
on to state, "Moreover, "[wjhen examining ihe plain language, we must assume that each term included in the 
[statute] was used advisedly." Citing Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98, iJ30, 104 P.3d 1208. 
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franchisor has agreed with or permits a franchisee to purchase, sell, or offer for sale new motor vehicles 
rn_anufactured . . by the franchisor." Tesla UT is a franchisee under this definition. 
As TMI is a "franchisor" its agreement or practice with its franchisee Tesla UT is in violation of 
Utah Code Sec. 13-14-201(1)(u) because under that section TMI may not in this state directly or 
indirectly own an interest in a new motor v~hicle dealer or dealership. Because the franchisor/franchisee 
agreement or practice is directly in violation of Utah Code Sec. 13-14-201(1)(u), MVED appropriately 
determined that Tesla UT did not qualify for the license, as under Utah Code Sec. 41-3-210(l)(d) the 
holder of a license may not violate any law of the state respecting com~erce in motor vehicles. The 
franchise agreement or practice that resla UT is participating in is unequivoc~lly in violation of Utah 
I , C •• 
Code Sec. 13-14-201(l)(u). Based on the agreement ,or practice between TMI !ind Tesla ur, and the 
applicable provisions of the Utah Code which are currently in effect, a new motor vehicle ~~aler license 
may not be issued to Tesla UT. 
Tesla UT. argues that MVED's decision to deny Tesla UT a new motor vehicle dealer license 
' ' • • • • • ~ I 
violates .th~ Constitution of Utah and the U.S. Constitution and argues that.the Commission should avoid 
• t • I • I '•• 
an unconstitutional interpretation of the statutes by finding that they do not bar the grant of Tesla UT's 
. • ! 
license. Tesla UT cites4~ to How.e-.v. '{ax Commission, 353 P.2d 4µ8, 470 (Utah 1960) in which the court 
. . . . 
had stated "[I]f there is _doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning to be given to a statute, one of which 
would make it unconstitutional and the other constitutional, the latter should be given effect." However, 
.. . . . 
there is not a plain language reading of the applicable laws at issue in this case that would allow a new 
• • • •.• 1, • I • I ~ 
motor vehicle dealer. license to be issued to Tesla UT. Under the .Motor Vehicle Regulation Act, Tesla 
' • I I • ; I ' : 
UT needs a franchise in order to sell new motor vehicles in this state. Under the New Automobile 
, 1, . 
Franchise Act, based on the agre~ment or practice, TMI is a franchisor and t~e fact.that TMI is the sole 
owner of Tesla UT violates provisions of that act. 
Tesla UT argues that MVED's statutory interpretation violates Utah Const. art. XII, Sec. 20, 
- . ' ·.1• 
which provides, "It is the policy of the state of Utah that a free market system shall govern .trade and_ 
. . . . . 
commerce in this state to promote the dispersion of economic and political power and the general welfare 
of the people." Tesla UT points out that the Utah Supreme Court has rejected legislative actions that 
violate this section, citing45 to Gen. Elec. Co. v. Thrift Sales, Inc., 301 P.2d 741, 751-52 (Ut~l 1956); 
. . . 
Pride Oil Co. v. Salt Lake Cnty., 370 P.2d 355, 355-56 (Utah 1962); Gammon v Federated Milk 
44 See Tesla UT's Prehearing Brief, pg. 20. For the position that the Commission should avoid !lll unconstitutional 
interpretation of the statutes, Tesla UT also cites to Elks Lodges No. 719 (Ogden) and No. 2021 (Moab) v. 
Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 905 P.2d 1189, 1202 (Utah 1995); Society ofSeparationists, /re. v, 
Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 920 (Utah 1993); Chris & Dick"s Lumber & Hardware v. Tax Comm 'n, 791P.2<1511, 516 
(Utah 1990). 
45 Tesla UT's Prehearing Brief, pg. 20. 
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Producers Ass'n, Inc., 360 P.2d 1018, 1023 (Utah 1961). It was Tesla UT's argument that MVED's 
statutory interpretation of the New Motor Vehicle Regulation Act and the New Automobile Franchise Act 
created artificial state-sanctioned ban·iers to enfry and shie.lded incumbents from competition. 
In addition, Tesla UT' ai:gues that MVED's denial of'the license violates the substantive Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S. Constittition (U.S. Const. Amend. XN, Sec. 1) and 
• ' I f 
article I, Sections 2, 7, and 24, and Article VI, section 26 o'f'tli.e Utah Constitution. Tesla UT cites46 to 
Washington v. 'Glitcksburg, 52l"U.S. 702, 720 (1997); Bartell v.' Aurora Pub. Schs., 163 F.3d 1143, i 149 
(lOi" Cir. 2001); Palisades°J•r~itLands v. Todd, 279 F.3d 1204, 1210 (10th Cir. 2002). It was Tesla UT's 
contention that denying \ he lice1\°se did ·not serve the pu.rposes of the Motor V ehide Business Regulation 
Act or th·e purbosJs of the New Automeibile Franchise Act and )the'only purpose served was the economic 
ptotection ottftlh's cun'ent 6~w motor vehicle dealers. Tesla· UT asserts that the majority of cirduits 
have rejected pure economic protectionism.47 
' ., ··,1, : ... ,. 
Tesla UT has also'hi.ade the argument fli.at the den'ial of the license violates the Commerce Clause 
of the U.S. Constitution, U.S. Const. art. 1, Sec. 8', ci.3,' because it imposes' a '.bu.rden 6n interstate 
commerce that is excessiv6 in ·r~lation to its focal benefits,48 as well as violates its right to freedom of 
commercia·J'i;p~h ·undei-' thtFi~st Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and· article 1 section 1s·of the 
Utall Constitutio'n.49\ · ··~ 
)' · · kegarding the state an·d federal constitutional arguments provided ·by Tesla UT, as the law in this 
matter is ciear'and unambiguous: this is not s imilar t6 the findings in Howe V. ·y~·commission, 353 P.2d 
. ~ . .! ; ' . • ' . • 1 - I '' ' ' • • • • • t I 468, 470 (Utah 1960) where there were two possible meanings, one of which would ma'ke it constitutional 
a1t'<i'°the other uriconstitufibnal. Thci statutes· in this case provide that the license-'sho'tild be denied. Tesla 
UT argues that tlii~. is an u~constitutional resuit and argued the constitutional daims in this proc_eeding as 
may be required by the courts if this decision is to be appealed. As the Utah Supreme Court in Jim 
• : # ' • • J 
Nebeker, dba, Jim Nebeker Trucking v Uta7i State Tax Comni'n, 2001 UT 74, ,t18, held, "[t]he district 
'. . . . . 
court could not have'beard the constitutional claims because Nebeker failed to raise these claims in his 
in.itiai pro2eeding beforJ•'ii1e Tax Commission. Having failed to raise the issue in the initial proceeding, 
46Tesla UT's Prehearing. Brief, pg 26. · 
47 In its··Prehearing Brief, pg 28, Tesla UT cites to Compare Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220,224 {6th Cir. 2002); 
St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 222 (5th Cir.2013); and Powers v Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1223-25 (10th 
Cu:. 2004) . 
48 Tesla UT Prehearing Brief, pg. 30, citing Blue Circle Cement, Inc. v, Bd. Of Cnty. Comm 'rs of Cnty. of Rogers, 
27 F.3d 1;i99, 151 i (10th Cir. 1994); Wendover City v. 1-V.. Wendover City, 404 F. Supp: 2d 1324, P31 (D. Utah 
~QOS); and·Over;_s,tork.com, Inc. v. SmartBargains, Inp., No. 0409095?5, 2~06 WL6200977 (Utah Dist. Ct. Dec. 
2006). 
49 For this position Tesla UT cites to Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Co,p. v. Pub. Serv. Comm 'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 
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Nebeker waived any opportunity to bring it later either before the distTict court or in another forum." In 
Nebeker at ,i 15, the Courts had cited to State Tax Commission v. Wright, 596 P.2d 6~4 (Utah· 1979) for the 
position that '"[I]t is not for the Tax Commission to determine questions of ~egality or constitutionality of 
legislative enactments."' The Nebeker court also noted the decision in Johnson v. Utah State_ Ref. Office, 
621 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Utah 1980) in which that court held, "while "[a]dministrative agencies do not 
generally determine the constitutionality of their organic legislation, ... the mere introduction of a 
constitutional issue does not obviate the need for exhaustion of administrative remedies." 
In this appeal both parties recognized that the Utah State Tax Commission does not have 
author~ty to find provision~ qf the Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act or the N~w Automobile 
Franchise Act to be unconstitutional and the arguments were proffered to preserve them on appeal. The 
expert witness testimony lays out the direct marketing approach that TMI would _like to pursue in Utah, 
how that approach may be more .beneficial to TMI than the traditional franchise model given that TMI is a 
start up, low volume manufacturer of a new technology. The testimony also indicates that while Tesla's 
. ,, 
direct marketing approach may create _interbrand competition it may reduce intrabrand competition. 
There were arguments made as to how the acts provided protections deemed to be needed by the Utah 
legislature for consumers and franchisees. The <;:ommission does not have authority to find the acts as set 
. ' .) 
out by the Utah Legislature to be unconstitutional and so does not issue a conclusi?n on the constitutional 
arguments. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Under Utah Code Sec. 41-3-201(2) and 41-3-202(1) Tesla UT needs a new motor vehicle 
license to sell new motor vehicles in Utah. Utah Code Secs. 41-3-210(l)(g) and 41-3-202(1) provide that 
new motor vehicles may only_ be sold by someone with a franchise. Tesla UT argues · its Dealership 
Agreement provides it adequate authorization to sell Tesla vehicles and meets the requirements of being a 
franchise under the Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act. 
2. Utah Code Sec. 41-3-210(1) provides a license holder may not violate any law of the 
state respecting commerce in motor vehicles. The New Automobile Franchise Act contains laws 
respecting commerce in motor vehicles. Additionally, under the New Automobile Franchise Act, at Utah 
Code Sec. 13-14-102(17), a "new motor vehicle dealer'' is a persoi1 who is licensed under the Motor 
Vehicle Business Regulation Act. Notwithstanding Tesla UT's argument that the Division lacked 
authority to consider the New Automobile Franchise Act, the Division was correct in its interpretation 
that it must consider whether the licensee violates provisions of that Act. 
3. Although Tesla UT argues that they met the franchise requirements under the Motor 
Vehicle Enforcement Act, they argue they did not have a franchise or franchise agreement under the New 
16 
Appeal No. 15-11 70 
Automobile Franchise Act. However, this argument does not have merit. Based on the agreement or 
practice between TMI ·and Tesla UT, TMI is a franchisor and Tesla UT a franchisee as t:11ose tem1s are 
defined at Utah Code Sec. 13-14-102, of the New Automobile Franchise Act. Because TMI is
1
the 100% 
mvner of Tesla UT, this is in violation of Utah Code Sec. 13-14-201(1)(uJ. 
4. Under Utah Code Sec. 41-3-209(1) MVED may not issue a new motor vehicle dealer 
license to Tesla UT because to do so would immediately put Tesia UT in violation of Utah Code Sec. 13-
14-201( l )(u). 
5. Tesla UT has made the arguments discussed above that denial of this license is a 
• ' l • 
violation of the Utah Constitution and the U. S. Constitution. If the Commission had found there was a 
statutory construction that was consistent with constitutional principles and one' that was nof, the 
Commis·sion could taice into consideration the constituti6nal argwnents· As this was noted in Howe v. Tax 
. . 
Commission, 353 P.2d 468, 470 (Utah 1960). However, in this appeal the applicable law requires the 
license be denied. As the Courts have already noted, "'[l]t is not for the Tax Commission to determine 
questi~ns of legality or constitutionality of legisiative enactments. "'Jim Nebeker Trucking v Utah State 
Tax Comm 'n, 2001 UT 74, 118, citing State Tax Coimnission v. Wr'ight, 596 P.2d 634 (Utah 1979). The 
Tax Commission has received these arguments and testimony, but should not· issue a conclusion ·on 
t' ::,•, I 
whether provisions of the Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act or the New Automobile Franchise Act 
are in violation of the Utah Constitution or the U.S. Constitution. 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Coriciusions of law, the Commission should deny 
Tesla UT's appeal. ~P~ 
Administrative Law Judge 
17 
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DECISION AND ORDER 
Based on the foregoing, the Commission upholds MVED's decision to deny Tesla UT a new 
motor vehicle dealer's license. It is so ordered. 
Notice of Appeal Rights: You have tv,renty (20) days after the date of this order to file a Request for 
Reconsideration with the Tax Commission Appeals Unit pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63G-4-302. A 
Request for Reconsideration must allege newly discovered evidence or a mistake oflaw or fact. If you do 
not file a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission, this order constitutes final agency action. 
You have thirty (30) days after the date of this order to pursue judicial review of this order in accordance 
with Utah Code Ann. §59-1-601 et seq. and §63G-4-401 et seq. 
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Re: Denial of New Motor Vehicle License Application 
Dear Ms. Robertson: 
I• 
BRIAN l. TARBET 
Chief Civll Dopu1~, 
I have beeri asked to re,view the appl_ication of Tesla Motors UT, Inc. From 
prior correspondence to and between you and the Motor Ve_hicle Enforcement 
Division ("MVED") of the Utah State Tax Commission ! recite the following 
understanding of facts: 
A. Tesla Motors, UT, Inc. is deemed by you to be a manufacturer of new 
motor vehicles. 
8. The same business entity is the applicant for the new motor vehicle 
dealer's license. 
C. Tesla Motors, UT, Inc. has admitted that its business model does not 
include being a franchisor, will not issue a franchise in the state of Utah, 
nor does it have franchisees in other states. 
With these facts in mind, the MVED has determined that it must deny the 
application. Reasoning for this conclusion is based on the following rationale. 
The Utah Code Ann. Chapter 41-3 is known as the Motor Vehicle Business 
Regulation Act. It defines a franchise in Section 41-3-201: 41-3.-202 defines the 
types, classes, and sr.:ope of license for various licenses issued by the -state of Utah. 
Additionally, Section 41-3-210 lists a number of prohibitions and requirements for 
the various license holders. Included in those prohibitions, is the following: 
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(g) engage in a business respecting the selling or exchanging of new 
or new and used motor vehicles for which he is not licensed, 
including selling- or·exchanging a new motor vehicle for which the 
licensee does not have a franchise, but this Subsection .Lll(g)_ does 
not apply to a.special equipment dealer who sells a new special 
. equipn1ent motor vehicle with a gross vehicle weight of 12,000 or 
mor~ pounds after _installing _special equipment on the motor 
vehicle; .. . . • 
. . 
Since Tesla Motor UT, Inc. is not a franchisee, MVED cannot 
issue a license as a new car deaier. MVED sees no prohibition 
against ~ license for other_ classes of licensure, including a used 
motor vehicle dealer, but it cannot hold a new motor vehicle 
I, 
license. Even if this provision were not found to prohibit issuance 
of such license, however, there are additional problems found in 
the Utah Commerce Code, as stated below. 
In conjunction with the research on your application, Tesla Motors, UT, Inc. is 
also licensed by the Utah Department of Commerce. Regulation of franchises and 
specifically, the New Automobile Franchise Act found in Utah.Code Ann., Title 13, 
Chapter 14 regulates franchise law for new·automobile (motor vehicle) franchises. 
Section 13-14-102(9) defines a franchisor as: 
·(9) · "Franchisor" means a person who has, in writing or in practice, agreed 
with-or permits a franchisee to purchase, sell, or offer for sale new motor 
vehicles manufactured, P.roduced, assembled, represented, or distributed 
by the franchi_sor, and includes:. 
(a) the manufacturer, producer, assembler, or distributor of the new 
motor vehicles; 
(b) an intermediate distributor; and 
(c) an agent, officer, or field or area representative of the franchisor. 
Therefore, the conclusion of MVED is that by being a manufacturer, Tesla 
Motors UT, Inc., is specifically defined by statute as a franchisor, under the 
Commerce Code. 
In Section 13-14--201 (l)(u), there is a prohibition against the following: 
· (1) A franchisor may not in this state: ... 
(u) except as pr?vided in Subsection .(fil, directly or indirectly: 
(i) own an interest in a new motor vehicle dealer or 
Ingrid Robertson 
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dealership; 
(ii) operate or control a new motor vehicle dealer or 
dealership; 
(iii) act in the capacity of a new motor vehicle dealer, as 
defined in Section 13-14-102; or 
(iv) operate a motor vehicle service facility; ... 
Section 13-14-201(6) (d)(ii) further restricts ownership of a new car dealer: 
(6) (d) Notwithstanding Subsection Qluu, a franchisor may own, operate, 
or control a new motor vehicle dealership trading in a line-make of 
motor vehicl~ if: · · 
(i) as to that lin~-make of motor v·ehicle, there are no more than four 
franchised new motor' vehicle dealerships licensed and in 
operation within the state as of January 1, 2000; 
. . 
(ii) the franchisor does not own directly or indirectly, more than a 
45% interest in the d.ealership~ · · · · 
(iii) at the time the franchisor first acquires ownership or assumes 
operation or control of the deahtrship, the distance· between the 
dealership thus owned, operated, or controlled and the nearest 
. unaffiliated new motor vehicle dealership tradirg in the same 
line-make is not l~ss than 150 miles; 
(iv) all the franchisor's franchise ~greements confer rights on the 
franchisee to develop and ·operate as many dealership facilities 
as the franchisee and franchisor shall agree are appropriate 
within a defined geographic te1Titory or area; and 
(v) as of January 1, 2000, no fewer than half of-the franchisees of 
the line-make within the state own and operate two or more 
dealership facilities in the geographic area covered by the 
franchise agreement. 
Since you have identified the corporation applying for the New Dealer license 
as NOT being a franchisor, or franchisee, and yet defined it as a manufacturer, the 
entity is by definition a franchisor under the Commerce Code. Therefore, for all of 
the reasons above, MVED is prohibited from issuing a license.to this business. 
·an 1s 
Assistant Attorney General 
GKF:ds 
SPENCER E. A USTIN 
Chief Criminal Oepu1y 
Ingrid Robertson 
Tesla Motors, UT, Inc. 
3500 Deer Creek Rd. 
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BRIDGET K. ROMANO 
Solicito r General 
Palo Alto, CA 94304-13 I 7 
B RIAN l. T ARBET 
Chiof Civil Oepuly 
Re: Addendum to Denial of New Motor Vehicle License-Application letter of 
February 26, 2015 
Dear Ms. Robertson: 
. In light of events concerning the consideration of the application above, and in order to 
inform all interested individuals of the current law on New Motor Vehicle Dealerships, I've been 
asked to alert you to other relevant provisions .. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 41-3-201(2) declares that a license is required to act as a defined 
licensee. It states: "(2) A person may not act as any of the following without having procured a 
license issued by the Administrator: ... (a) a dealer; . · . . . " 
Additionally, Utah Code Ann. Section 41:-3-202(1) specifically relates to a "new motor 
vehicle dealer's license, declaring: "(l) A new motor vehicle dealer's license permits the licensee 
tc: (!>) \·,ffr r for sak, :sell, 01· exd1ange new mcitor behicles if the iicensee possesses a franchise 
from the manufacturer of the motor vehicle offered for sale, sold, or exchanged by the licensee .. 
. . " (Other subdivisions relate to used motor vehicle dealers, body shops, and dismantlers 
licenses.) 
The language of these statutes within the Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Code (Title 
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5 -Ln 
March 4, 2015 
Re: Tesla Motors UT, ln'c. Dealer License Application 
Dear Mr. Francis, 
I am in receipt of your letters dated February 26, 2015 and March 2, 2015 regarding Tesla 
Motors· UT, lnc.'s ("Tesla UT") new motor vehicle dealer license application. We have reviewed the law 
on the matter, including the statutes you cite in your letter.s, and we disagree with the preliminary 
conclusions that you have made regarding our ability to be licensed as a new motor vehicle dealer in 
Utah. This letter will detail our analysis of the relevant statutes and their proper interpretation as 
' ' 
applied to Tesla. •We ask that you reconsider your stated position in light of the arguments presented 
and allow Tesla UT to be licensed as a new motor vehicle dealer. This.is the legally correct result and is 
consistent with how virtually every other state with a similar statutory framework has looked at the 
issue. In addition, denial of our license application would be anti-business, anti-free market, and anti-
environment. 
Background 
Tesla Motors, Inc. designs and manufactures the world's most advanced electric vehicles. Tesla 
has won multiple industry awards for the capabilities of its vehicles as well as for its customer focused 
• I • 
sales and service operations. The Tesla Model S has won Motor Trend's C[!r of the Year among 
numerous other awards, and our' sales and service operations have received top marks from various 
surveys and reviews by Consumer Reports, beating out all traditional franchised dealers and 
independent shops. 
Most importantly to the legal analysis, Tesla does not have any independent franchise dealers 
anywhere in the world. This is t he key fact that distinguishes us from virtually all other car 
TESLA MOTORS, INC. I 3500 Deer Creek Rd, Palo Alto, CA 94304 I P.:650.681.6311 I f:650.681 .5203 I e:jchang@teslamotors.com 
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manufacturers, and is the central reason why the direct sale prohibition does not apply to a non-
franchising manufacturer like Tesla. 
We sell our cars directly to consumers because the traditional franchise dealer model does not 
make sense for our products or Ol!r business model. Traditional franchise dealers survive on high 
volume sales and rely on significant revenue from used car sales and service. Tesla, on the other hand, 
. . ,. .. 
is a relatively small volume manufacturer that does not generate any significant revenue f~om used car 
1 r , • 1 , 
sales or from service. In fact, Tesla operates its service department as a non-profit operation under the 
.. ., 
principle that it should not profit from having a vehicle that requires repair. Even regular or scheduled 
• • ~ _, * - I 
maintenance is minimal with electric vehicles, which do not require oil and other fluid changes, and only 
require an annual inspection. There is a plethora of other reasons why the traditional franchise dealer 
model does not make sense for Tesla cir consumers, but the overarching reason is that Tesla would not 
survive if it were forced to sell vehicles through franchise·dealers. 
-I. , , • "j. 
Tesla's direct-to-consumer distribution model is new for the U.S. motor vehicle industry; an 
\ ', . ,, 
industry thi3t h~s been dominated by century old manufacturers that had the freedom to choose a 
distribution method (they.chose the franchise dealer system) that made sense for their business. While 
'\. ,., t • 
statutes have been enacted over time with the franchise model in mind, none ot"them forecloses the 
ability of a manufacturer that does n~t have any franchises from selling its products. In fact, ~owhere in 
Utah law does it require that all new m;tor vehi~les must be sold and purchased.through franchise 
dealers. 
Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act 
The Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act (U.C.A. § 41-3-201, et. seq.) (the "BRA") is a licensing 
statute that grants regulatory authority to the Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division '(the "MVED") and 
provides a framework for regulation. The overriding purpose of the BRA is to provide for licensure of 
certain business activities so as to monitor and regulate the activities to prevent fraud and other 
untoward acts on consumers. T_his is clear in the provisions of the BRA which regulate, for example, 
disclosures for the sale of vehicles; criminal background checks and training for salespersons; bonds for 
surety to fulfill obligations; advertising; and titling and registration of vehicles. These provisions are 
- . . 
enacted for the purpose of consumer protection and should be liberally construed to effect such 
purpose. 
In your letters, you reference U.C.A. §§ 41-3-202(1)(a), a~d 210(1)(g) for the proposition that 
new vehicles must be sold through a franchise dealer. However, keeping the BRA's purpose in mind, it is 
clear that the franchise requirement for licensure is for the purpose of ensuring that privity exists 
between the manufacturer (the party that will be ultimately responsible for the vehicle and warranty) 
and the dealer (the party purporting to sell "authorized" goods). The requirement.is clearly intended to 
prevent a dealership from selling a "new motor vehicle" when it has not been authorized by the 
manufacturer to sell its vehicles. That relationship and assurance of the legitimacy of its products are no 
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stronger than if the manufacturer is the"seller of the vehicle, in 'whicli ca~e there isno issue of an 
unscrupulous dealer selling gray market, unauthorized goods. 
It ;,._,ould b~ in ·illogical result for Utah consumers, who the BRA is intended to protect, to be 
prohibited'from purchi sing vehi~les dire~tly from·a' manufacttirer'wh~re there if~b ~uestion of : . 
auth~nticity and manufact~-rer'"s'upport. It would also be illogical that Tesla\ Jciuld' not tie 'aole to subfect 
itself t~ th~ MV
1
fo's reguia\ory ·authority a·na 'that Utah·co~sume}s would instea~-tia1e to purchase Tesla 
. '1h; 1(\ J I .• ,. , • ' • , I , , , , • • t ) ) , ._ 
vehicles from out-of-state without the protections of Utah law and the MVED. The BRA's'purpose is to· 
protect:'~o~s~m~rs, not'to c'reate a vehicle distrib.ution monopoly for fr~n'chise dealers, '.Jnd it"'should be 
I ' ,,: -~ 
interwe\ed to give effect to its purpose. 




• Even assuming that a franchise is require'd by the BRA, Tesla u:rs· application should ,satisfy the · 
requirement. "Franchise" is defined under the'BRA as "a .contract or agreement between a dealer and a•. 
manufacturer of new motor vehicles or its distributor or factory branch by which the dealer is 
; ..., ;: · •••• ·• '. ·., •• !.· •.. - . . . . • - . •t 1:·••·- ·• - •·:-· - • -- r- -.- -- ,-... - - °\-7 
authorize'd tci sell any specified make or makes of new motor vehicles." (U.C.A. § 41-3-102(16). In its 
corporate stru~tu;e,.Tesl~M6tors, ·1nc. i~ the manufacturer of Tesla rri~tor"veh'fcles. Tesla UT, 'a wholly' 
owned subsi~iary of T~sla Motor;, Inc., is the dealer (as defined undk'r the BRA) that would be selling 
and t~~id~g vel1kles in Utah. As a wholly owned subsidiary ofTesla1 Motors, Inc:, Tesla UT is' a-ri' 
authoriz~q d~a:ler ofT~·sla ·vehi~!e_s, there~y satisfying' the BRA's ~~~uirement_. 
' , . •, ; .. • r 
Before submitting our dealer license application, we had initial conversations with the MVED in . 
which MVED personnel had agreed that we could meet all requirements for licensure. Relying on 
MVED's advice, Tesla invested significant amounts in committing to a °long-term leasei~nd·construction 
of a facHity in South s~.!t Lake City. If MVED has now.changed i.ts .?pinio~ on o.µ~ a9ility to be licensed, 
we are willing to put in place-an agreement between Tesla Motors, Inc. and Tesla UT (two distinct and 
., I I , ' 
separate entities), such that the "franchise" requirement under the BRA woulc;I be satisfied in all 
. ., , . - . ,. 
respects under your new interpretation. While we maintain our1position that sucJ,,an agreement is· . . , 
unnecessary for the.r!=!asons outlined above, we·can es~abl.ish the relationship to satisfy the purpo~ed 
dealer licensing requirement. 
New Automobile Franchise Act 
In your February 26 letter, you cite the New Automobile Franchise Act (the "AFA") for the 
propositions that: (1) Tesla is a "fran~hisor" un~~r the AFA (referencing U.C. A. § 13-14-102(9)); and (2) 
that Tesla cannot sell vehic_les except through a franchise deale'r"(referendng U.C.A. §§ 13-14-201(1)(u) 
and 201(6)(d)(ii)). This, however, is not the proper application of the AFA to Tesla. In fact, the AFA does 
,,, ... 
not apply to Tesla c\nd its direct-to-consumer business model. 
Given that Tesla does not have any independent franchise dealers anywhere, the AFA simply 
does not apply. The AFA governs relationships between franchisors and their respective franchisees. Its 
• 
• 
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provisions dictate what the parties can and cannot do with respect to each other. This is codified in the 
statute itself, which explicitlv, states as follows: 
The Legislature finds that: 
(a) The distribution and sales of new motor vehicles through franchise arrangements in the state 
vitally affects the general economy of the state, the public interest, and the public welfare. A 
substantial inequality of bargaining power between motor vehicle franchisors and motor vehicle 
franchisees enables a franchisor: 
(i) To compel a franchisee to execute agreements that contain terms and conditions that a 
franchisee generally would not be agreed to absent the compulsion and duress that arise 
out of the inequality of bargaining power; and 
(ii) In some cases to terminate a franchise without goad cause, or to farce a franchisee out of 
business by the use of unfair practices. 
(b) Termination of franchises, without good cause or by unfair means: 
(i) diminishes competition and, as a result leads to higher retail prices and fewer purchase 
options; 
(ii) adversely affects communities that depend on a franchisee to make available motor 
vehicles for sale or lease and to provide warranty work and other services related to 
vehicles; and 
(iii) undercuts expectations of consumers concerning the availability of future services including 
warranty work from the franchisee. 
(c) To promote the public welfare and in the exercise of the state's police powers, it is necessary to 
establish statutory guidelines regulating the relationship between franchisors and franchisees in 
the motor vehicle industry. 
U.C.A. § 13-14-101 (emp_hasis added). 
It is clear from the stated "Legislative Purpose" that the AFA was enacted to address the 
"substantial inequality of bargaining power" between franchisors and franchisees and to prevent abuses 
of franchisees by their respective franchisors. Tesla does not have any independent franchise dealers 
anywhere. As such, there is no "bargaining power" to be equalized. Tesla's business model does not fall 
within the explicit scope of the AFA. Even if an arrangement were made between Tesla' Motors, Inc. and 
its wholly owned subsidiary, Tesla UT, that relationship would not be governed by the AFA. Even in that 
relationship, there is no inequality in bargaining power and no concern regarding abuse of a franchisee 
because Tesla UT is wholly owned and controlled by Tesla Motors,· Inc. 
It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in 
their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. V. 
E.P.A., 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2411, 189 L. Ed. 2d 372 (2014). Here, the Legislature has expressly codified the 
purpose of the AFA and, in the context of the overall statutory scheme, it cannot apply to Tesla. Indeed, 
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each and every section of the AFA governs the relationship between a franchisor and its independent 
franchise dealer. That relationship is fundamental to the provisions of the AFA, which cannot operate 
outside of that scope. For example: 
• § 13-14-201- Prohibited Acts: lists numerous acts that a franchisor cannot do to its franchisee, such as: 
o . Requiring a franchisee to order or take delivery of a vehicle or other item not required by law; 
' ~ , ,, .• 
o Forcing a franchisee to participate in an advertising campaign; 
o Requiring a franchisee to change capital structure; 
o Requiring a release of liability from the franchisee; 
o·· Requiring third party dispute resolution for conflicts with a franchisee; 
o Requiring a franchisee to change location; 
o Requiring a franchisee to join an advertising association; •, 
o Threatening to cancel an agreement to coerce franchisee to act; 
o Adopting objectives; goals and quotas that cannot be reasonably met by the franchisee; 
o Increasing pricing on existing franchisee orders; 
o Failing to indemnify a franchisee; 
o Threatening franchisee and its right to protest; 
o Failing to ship product to franchisee; 
o Requi~i,ng franchisee to underutilize assets; 
o Failing to include certain provisions in franchise agreements; 
o Co!"llpeting against the franchisee; 
o Failing to provide a written franchise agreement; 
o Selectively allocating inventory to other franchisees; 
o Fajling to tin_,ely reimburse franchisees for certciin.costs; 
o Selectively directing potentii)I customer to other franc~isees; 
o ... the list continues on from subparagraph (a) to (pp) ... 
• §§ 13-14-202 and 203 - deal with the sale or transfer of ownership of a franchise. 
• § 13-14~204-: deal with franchisors obligations for service and for a~di~s of franchisees: 
• § 13-14-205.:... assigns liability for vehicles in transit as between a franchisor and franchisee. 
• § 13-14-206 - deals with site control agreements between a franchisor and its franchisee. 
• § 13-14-301 - deals with termination of franchises. 
• § 13-14-302 - deals with relocation of franchises. 
• § 13-14-302.5 - deals with new franchises. 
• §§ 13-14-304 to 307.5 - deal with termination of franchises. 
• §§ 13-14-308 - deals with a franchisee's private right of action against its franchisor. 
• 
• 
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• § 13-14-309 -deals with changes in distribution plans between a franchisor and a franchisee. 
In this sea of provisions that make up the AFA, every provision requires the existence of a 
franchisor and an independent franchisee. Without that relationship, the provisions do not make sense. 
Given the context of the AFA and taking into account the entire statutory scheme, it would be wholly 
inapposite to interpret any provision to apply outside of the independent franchise relationship. 
Indeed, the codified legislative purpose in U.C.A. § 13-14-101 confirms this and leaves no room for 
doubt. 
Even if you assume that the AFA applies outside of the franchise relationship (which it does not), 
Tesla does not fall under its purview. In your letter, you conclude that Tesla UT is a "franchisor" as 
defined under the AFA, U.C.A. § 13-14-102(9). This is not correct. The plain language of the statute 
does not dictate that every manufacturer is a "franchisor." A "franchisor" is defined as: 
A person who has. in writing or in practice, agreed ~ith or permits a franchisee to purchase. 
sell, or offer for sale new motor vehicles manufactured, produced. assembled. represented, or 
distributed by the franchisor, and includes: 
(a) The manufacturer, producer, assembler, or distributor of the new motor vehicles; 
(b) An intermediate distributor; and 
(c) An agent, officer, or field or area representative of the franchisor. 
U.C.A. § 13-14-102(9) (emphasis added). 
In your letter, you state that because the term "manufacturer" is listed in subparagraph (a) that 
Tesla is therefore a "franchisor," however, such a reading is clearly wrong because it ignores the 
definition that requires that a franchise relationship exist. Additionally, as the words" ... and includes:" 
plainly indicate, the listing of the parties under (a'), (b) and (c) are examples of what would contemplate 
a franchisor, but this of course does not undo the expressly stated requirement in the definition that a 
franchise relationship must exist in order for an entity to be a franchisor. Moreover, saying that a 
manufacturer~ automatically a franchisor is like defining a species as an entire phylum. A franchisor is 
one possible type of manufacturer, but not all manufacturers are franchisors. As such, Tesla's business 
model should not and cannot be shoehorned into the auspices of the AFA. 
Your letter further st ates that the AFA, through U.C.A. §§ 13-14-201(1)(u) and 201{6){d)(ii), 
creates a distribution monopoly for franchise dealers. But, applying the fundamental canons of 
statutory construction, it is clear that this is not the-proper interpretation. As described above, the 
purpose of the AFA is to address the " inequality in bargaining power between motor vehicle franchisors 
and motor vehicle franchisees." (U.C.A. U.C.A. § 13-14-101). This codified purpose of the AFA is critical 
to the analysis of its applicability to Tesla, which does not have any independent franchise dealers. The 
sections you cite in your letter address interbrand competition only-that is, competition between a 
franchisor and its affiliated franchisee. The entire AFA regulates only this relationship. It would only 
apply to Tesla if Tesla had an independent franchise dealer for which there could exist an inequality in 
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bargaining power. Where no inequality exists, the AFA serves no purpose and cannot be applied to 
Tesla. The AFA should not ,be interpreted to regulate anything outside the independent franchise 
relationship. Its limited scope is expressly stated in the first section of the AFA. 
Precedent 
Tesla's interpretation of these statutes· is not a unique or unfounded interpretation. In fact, 
statutes similar to the AFA and BRA have been tried and litigated in Tesla's favor. There are no courts 
that have ruled to the contrary. 
In Massachusetts, a similar matter was resolved at the Supreme Judicial Court, the highest court 
of the state. Massachusetts has laws that are very_similar to Utah's AFA and BRA, and Tesla was sued by 
the Massachusetts State Automobile Dealers Association fo'r the alleged violation of Massachusetts' AFA 
equivalent. The lawsuit was dismissed and affirmed by the Supreme Judicial Court. In ruling in favor of 
.. - . . . 
Tesla, the Court held that: 
"[Massachusetts' AFA equivalent] is aimed primarily at protecting motor vehicle dealers 
from injury caused by the unfair business practices of manufacturers and distributors with which 
' ' 
they are associated, generally in a franchise relationship." 
MSADA v. Tesla Motors MA, Inc., 469 Mass. 675! 676 (2014). 
'"It would be anomalous to find, within this detailed list of rights and protections that are 
conferred on dealers vis-a-vis their manufacturers and dis~_ributors, a lone provision giving 
dealers protection against competition from an unaffiliated manufacturer." 
.. 
Id. at 685. 
The Greater New York Automobile Dealers Association (the "GNYADA") brought a similar lawsuit 
against the New York OMV and Tesla. The GNYADA claimed that Tesla was in violation of certain 
provisions (similar to those-in Utah's AFA), which preclude a franchisor owni11g an interest in a franchise. 
The New York'Supreme•Court dismissed the lawsuit in favor of Tesla and in its opinion stated that: 
"The Franchised Dealer Act regulates th_e relationship between a car company 
(manufacturer) and its franchised dealers ... Manufacturers and dealers cannot' utilize the 
Franchised Dealer Act as a means to sue their competit_ors." 
GNYADA v. OMV, 969 N.Y.S.2d 721, 726 (Sup. Ct. 2013). 
The Ohio Automobile Dealers Association brought a •similar lawsuit a·gainst the Ohio State 
Department of Public Safety and Tesla. As with the other lawsuits, the presiding magistrate ruled in 
favor of Tesla, and in his decision stated that: 
" ... although these sections [simi lar to Utah'.s AF~).reference franchise relationships and 
resp?nsibilities, it is readily apparent that ~hey do so only in the context of when such an 
arrangement first contractually exists in writing." 
OADA v. Ohio DPS, Case No. 13CVH12-13334, 19 (Ct. of Common Pleas 2014). 
• 
• 
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Numerous other Attorney Generals and agencies of other states that have statutes that are 
extremely similar to Utah's AFA and BRA have also interpreted their respective statutes in favor of Tesla. 
These include Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
Tennessee, and Washington. Tesla is a licensed dealer in all of these states, among others. If Utah were 
to deny Tesla's license application under the type of statute that exists in Utah, it would be acting 
inconsistently with the licensing agencies of every other similarly situated state. 
We hope that this letter helps to clarify Tesla's business model and how Utah's franchise and 
licensing laws apply to us. It is not the purpose or intent of the AFA or BRA to create a distribution 
monopoly for franchise dealers. If that were the case, such a policy would have broad ranging effects 
that are detrimental to Utah's residents, and an interpretation of law stretching the bounds of the AFA 
and BRA in such way would be anti-consumer, anti-free market, anti-business, anti-innovation, and anti-
environment. 
We request that you reconsider our dealer license application in light of the i~formation 
presented in this letter. Please feel free to contact me should you have any questions or would like to 
discuss the matter further. We appreciate the continued dialogue and look forward to bringing our 
award winning cars and service to Utah. 
Sincerely, 
ci6 
Deputy General Counsel 
cc: Attorney General Sean Reyes (sreyes@utah.gov) 
Parker Douglas, General Counsel & Chief of Staff (pdouglas@utah.gov) 
Brian L. Tarbet, Chief Civil Deputy (btarbet@utah.gov) 
T 
VIA EMAIL 
Office of.the Attorney General 
State c:if Utah 
. • l, I I 
160 East_ 300 South, 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0874 
Attn: Gale Francis (gfrancis@utah.gov) 
SLn 
May 11, 2015 
· Re: Tesla Motors UT, Inc. Dealer License Application 
Dear Mr. Francis, 
Thank you for your continued review of our most recent dealer license application. In addition 
to the arguments presented in our previous communications, I want to reiterate the arguments below 
as to why our current dealer license application satisfies all requirements of Utah law. As you know, this 
issue is the last hurdle for us to open our-store, which has been shuttered for the past several months. 
In the meantime, we continue to expend reso.urces on this facility, and our store staff continues to be on 
standby, eagerly awaiting to be gainfully employed. 
In our letter to you dated March 4, 2015 and in our meeting in April, we discussed our original 
dealer license application and expressed our ability to be flexible with our corporate structure. While 
we do not believe the structures are necessary under the purpose and i~tent of the applicable statutes 
(as we describe in our March 4, 2015 le~ter, a copy of which is enclosed), we remain~d open ·.l'"llinded. 
Our most recent dealer license application, submitt_ed on April 13, 2015, reflects our flexibility. 
TESLA UT'S DEALER LICENSE APPLICATION MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE 
BUSINESS REGULATION ACT 
The most recent dealer license application for Tesla Motors UT, Inc. (Tesla UT) includes a dealer 
agreement between Tesla Motors, Inc. (as the manufacturer) and Tesla UT (as the dealer). There should 
be no question that this qualifies us for licensure under the Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act 
(U.C.A. § 41-3-201, et. seq.) (BRA). There is a bona fide legal contract between Tesla Motors and Tesla 
UT that meets all the requirements of the BRA. The BRA defines a "franchise" as "a contract or 
agreement between a dealer and a manufacturer of new motor vehicles or its distributor or factory 
branch by which the dealer is authorized to sell any specified make or makes of new motor vehicles." 
TESLA MOTORS, INC. I 3500 Deer Creek Rd, Palo Alto, CA 94304 I p:650.681.6311 i f:650.681 .5203 I e:jchang@teslamotors.corn 
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(U.C.A. 1953 § 41-3-102(16)). The dealer agreement that we submitted with our application is an 
agreement between Tesla UT (a dealer) and Tesla Motors (a manufacturer) that authorizes Tesla UT to 
sell Tesla vehicles. The dealer agreement thus forms a "franchise" under the BRA, and Tesla UT 
undeniably qualifies for licensure. 
The MVED need not look any further. With respect to dealer licensing, the MVED is only tasked 
and statutorily authorized to review licensing applications under the BRA as the "Administrator." There · 
is no crossover into other statutory acts such as the New Automobile Franchise Act (U.C.A. 1953 § 13-
14-1) (Franchise Act). MVED is not tasked as an administrator of the Franchise Act. Indeed, the State of 
Utah recognizes this as well by separating the functions within different state agencies. The MVED 
operates under the Tax Commission, while the Department of Commerce administers the Franchise Act. 
For purposes of MVED's review of our license application they need look no further than the BRA; and 
under the BRA, we meet all requirements of licensure. Nevertheless, even if the MVED goes beyond 
their statutory authorization and reads in the Franchise Act, Tesla UT still qualifies for licensure. 
THE FRANCHISE ACT DOES NOT PROHIBIT TESLA UT FROM BECOMING A LICENSED DEALER 
As we explained in our March 4, 2015 letter, the Franchise Act does not apply to Tesla UT or 
Tesla Motors. It would be wholly inconsistent with the express purpose of the Franchise Act for it to 
govern a relationship where no "inequality of bargaining power" exists. But, not only is the legislative 
intent conclusive in this analysis, so is the plain language of the statute. 
While Tesla UT's dealer agreement qualifies as a "franchise" under the BRA, it does not qualify 
as a "franchise agreement". under the Franchise Act. This distinction is in the plain language of the 
statutes. Under the Franchise Act, a "franchise" or "franchise agreement" is defined as: 
." ... a written agreement, or in the absence of a written agreement, then a course of dealing or a practice 
for a definite or indefinite period, in which: 
·(i) A person grants io another person a license to use a trade name, trademark, service 
mark, or related characteristic; and 
(ii) A community of interest exists in the marketing of riew motor vehicles, new motor 
vehicle parts, and services related to the sale or lease of new motor vehicles at 
wholesale or retail." 
U.C.A. 1953 § 13-14-102(7)(a) (emphasis added) 
The dealer agreement between Tesla UT and Tesla Motors does not contain the important and 
explicit first prong of the definition. The legislature was express in this requirement that there must be 
a grant of a license to use a trademark or-related characteristics to qualify as a "franchise agreement" 
under the Franchise Act. Tesfa UT's dealer agreement does not meet this requirement. In fact, the 
parties expressly state in the dealer agreement that there is no grant of any license to any trade name, 
trademark, service mark or related characteristic. Undeniably, there is no grant of any type of 
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intellectual property rights between the parties. Despite forming a "franchise" under the BRA, the 
dealer agreement between Tesla UT and Tesla Motors does not form a "franchise" under the Franchise 
Act. That is plain fact. 
TESLA MOTORS (THE MFG.) DOES NOT OWN A "DEALERSHIP" THAT WOULD PROHIBIT TESLA UT FROM 
BECOMING A LICENSED DEALER 
Even if you blatantly ignore the plain language of the FPA and the express legislative purpose of 
the FPA and deem Tesla to be a franchisor, Tesla UT is still not prohibited from obtaining a dealer 
license. You have cited the alleged prohibition in the Franchise Act to b·e U.C.A. 1953 § 13-14-201(1)(u),' 
however, there is an exception under U.C.A. 1953 § 13-14-201(6)(d), for which Tesla Motors would 
qualify. The exception reads as follows: 
"Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(u), a franchisor may own, operate, or control a new motor vehicle 
dealership trading in a line-make of motor vehicle if: 
(i) As to that line-make of motor vehicle, there are no more than four franchised new 
motor vehicle dealerships licensed and in operati_on within the state as of January 1, 
2000; 
(ii) .The franchisor does not own directly or indirectly, more ~han a 45% interest in the 
dealership; 
(iii) At the time the franchisor first acquires ownership or assumes operation or control of 
the dealership, th·e distance between the dealership thus owned, operated, or · 
controlled and the nearest unaffiliated ·new. motor vehicle dealership, trading:in the 
same line-make is not less than 150 miles; , , 
(iv) All the franchisor's franchise agreements confer rights on the franchisee to develop and 
operate as many dealership facilities as the4ranchis·ee and franchisor shall agree are 
appropriate within a defined geographic territory or a_rea; and 
(v) As of January 1, 2qoo, no fewer t~an ~alf,~{ the franchisees of the line-make within the 
state own and operate two or m_ore dealersqip_ ffcilities io_ the geographic area covered 
by the franchise agreement." 
U.C.A. 1953 § 13-14-201{6)(d) 
We can apply each of this exception's requirements to Tesla in turn: 
(i) The first requirement is satisfied because, as of January 1, 2000, Tesla had no more than 
four franchised new motor vehicle dealerships within .Utah (Tesla has never had any 
franchised dealers). 
(ii) The second requirement is satisfied because Tesla Motors does not oJ,Vn, directly 0r 
indirectly, more than a 45% interest in any dealership. A "dealership" is defined under the 
FPA as "a site or location in this state: (a) at which a franchisee conducts the business of a 
new motor vehicle dealer; and {bl that is identified-as a new motor vehicle dealer's principal 
• 
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place of bu'siness for licensing purposes under Section 41-3-204." (U.C.A. 1953 § 13-14-
102(4)). Key to this definition is "site or location." "Dealership" is not defined as the 
business of the dealer. Tesla Motors owns neither the site nor location (either directly or 
indirectly) at which the business is conducted or that is identified as the dealer's principal 
place of business. In fact, Tesla Motors owns 0% interest in any site or location in Utah. The 
· site or location from which Tesla UT wishes to operate from is leased from a landlord, 
unaffiliated with Tesla, who owns the property. 
(iii) The third requirement is satisfied because there are no Tesla dealers anywhere in Utah. 
(iv) This fourth requirement is satisfied because, as noted above, Tesla Motors has no "franchise 
agreements" as defined in the FPA. · 
(v) This fifth requirement is satisfied because Tesla Motors had no franchisees as of January 1, 
2000. 
As you can plainly see, Tesla affirmatively satisfies every prong of the exemption provided for by 
U.C.A. 1953 § 13-14-201(6)(d). 
~ ' . ' · .. 
ANY INTERPRETATION OF UTAH LAW TO PROHIBIT TESLA.UT FROM BECOMING A LICENSED DEALER IS 
. . 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
If the statutes were interpreted to prohibit Tesla UT from obtaining a·i:Jealer license, they-would 
be interpreted in an unconstitutional manner. Such an interpretation would violate the due process 
clauses of the United States and Utah constitutions, as it would put undue limitations on Tesla's ability 
to conduct business in the state. Moreover, such an interpretation would deprive Tesla equal protection 
of the laws in violation of the Unit~d States Constitution by treating franchise dealers differently from 
Tesla without any rational or legitimate basis.1 Lastly, the Utah Constitution in Article XII, Section 20 
expressly states that the "free market shall govern trade and commerce in this state to promote the 
dispersion of economic and political power and the general welfare of the people." Given the weight of 
the plain language and statutory intent of the BRA and Franchise Act, it would be inapposite for the 
statutes to be interpreted in a manner that would restrict the free mar.ket and concentrate economic 
and political power in the hands of franchised dealers. 
The arguments are clear. There is no reason that Tesla UT should not be able to obtain a dealer 
license. This outcome is consistent at every level of statutory interpretation. The plain language of the 
1 In Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir., 2002) and Stjoseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215 (5th Cir., 
2012), the Court of Appeals struck down laws that P.urported to prohibit manufacturers of caskets from 
selling their products except through middlemen distributors. The courts held that economic protectionism 
is not a legitimate state interest 
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statutes permits licensure. The express legislative intent is consistent with licensure. Even if we look to 
the U.S. Constitution and Utah Constitution, the laws must be interpreted to allow Tesla UT's licensure. 
I want to be clear that Tesla's goal is not to upend the franchise dealer system. Our positions 
regarding the statutes are not inconsistent with the franchise dealer model, which will continue to 
thrive. Other manufacturers that distribute their vehicles through the franchise system freely chose the 
best system for their respective businesses, and they remain subject to the Franchise Act and its 
provisions. Tesla, on the other hand, has no ind.ependent franchised dealers anywhere. The Franchise 
Act provides protections for.franchiseesifrom:their respective franchisors. It does not create a 
monopoly on new vehicle distribution for franchised dealers. The creation of such a monopoly is 
anticompetitive, anti-consumer2 and unconstitutional, and should not be so casually and erroneously 
read into the statutes. The plain language of the statutes, the express legislative intent and the guiding 
constitutional provisions weigh clearly and heavily in favor of Tesla UT obtaining its dealer license. 
As you continue to review our application, Tesla UT's store remains closed. The facility stands 
ready to employ scores of Utah residents and to bring Tesla's award winning yehicles and unparalleled 
service to Utah. You can visit the closed facility in South Salt Lake City at Free Spirit Plaza. Below a 
' ' . ! . ' (\ : ) • ,·, ,. . . ... '~· ,. 
memorial flag;·you will find a dedication· plaque that reads as follows: "Free Spirit Plaza - Dedicated to 
the independence and free spirit of Americans as exemplified by the Free Enterprise System." We 
sincerely hope that these virtues are indeed celebrated and honored in Utah. 
, I 
Deputy General Counsel 
Cc: Attorney General Sean Reyes (sreyes@utah.gov) 
Parker Douglas, General Counsel & Chief of Staff (pdouglas@utah.gov) 
Brian L. Tarbet, Chief Civil Deputy (btarbet@utah.gov) 
Curtis Stoddard, Assistant Director, MVED (mved@utah.gov) 
Enclosure: Tesla's March 4, 2015 Letter 
2 See opinions and commentary of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission at: https://www.~c.gov/news-
event,;/blogs/competjtion-matters/2014/04/who-decides-how-consumers-should-shop: 
h ttps: //www.ftc.gov/ news-events /press-re leases /2014 /0 5 / ftc-staff-mi ssou ri-new-j ersey-should-repea 1-
th ei r-proh ib itions: and most recently: https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/competition-
matters/2015/05/direct-consumer-aui:o-sales-its-not-just-about-tesla. See, also, correspondence by 70 of 
the world's leading economists and scholars: http://law.wm.edu/documents /Tesla letter.pdf. 
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Re: Tesla Motors, Inc. - Second_ Application for Distributor and Dealership 
Licenses 
Dear Kent and Curtis: 
You have requested an informal evaluation of the distributor and dealership applicatio11-s 
of Tesla Motors, Inc., submitted on or about April 15, 2015. 
RECOMMENDATION 
Although Jonathan Chang, in his letter of April 13, 2015, believes that the "Dealer 
Agreement" creates a franchise under UCA §§ 41-3-102,° and 201 , the language in the Dealer 
Agreement, Exhibit "A," paragraph 16.-l specifically denies that the agreement creates a 
franchise relationship. These positions seem contradictory. Mr. Chang doesn't think they do 
conflict because "franchise" is defined differently in Title 13 thai1 it is in Title 4 I. 
Without an actual franchise agreement between TMI and TMUT, absent ownership 
of a dealer by the franchisor, under current Utah law, the dealer license applicati~n should 
be denied. 
SUMMARY: 
• 41 -3-202(1) A New Motor Vehicle Dealer's license permits selling new motor vehicles if 
the licensee possesses a franchise from the manufacturer of the vehicle. 
• 41-3-2 10( 1 )( d) Prohibits a holder of any license from violating any la~ of the state 
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respecting commerce in motor vehicles made by any licensing or regulating authority of 
the state. (MVED cannot ignore UCA 13-14 as a regulatory authority of the state.) 
• UCA 41-3-210( 1 )(g) Prohibits engaging in business selling new motor vehicles for which 
the licensee does not have a franchise. 
• UCA 41-3-102(16) defines "Franchise" as a contract or agreement between a dealer and a 
manufacturer of new motor vehicles. 
• TMI's "Dealer Agreement" 116. l specifies that the agreement does not form a franchise 
relationship (as defined in UCA 13-14), while claiming that it does create a franchise for 
purposes of UCA 41-3-102. TMI has·previously declared that its business model does 
NOT include traditional franchise dealers, but direct sales from the manufacturer. 
• TM I's "Dealer Agreement" specifies that TMUT is a wholly owned subsidiary of TMI. 
• UCA 13-14-102 defines a franchise by law (de jure) as created by agreement or contract, 
or by fact ( de facto) "in practice," or by "a comse of dealing." 
• UCA 13-14- l 02 includes a manufacturer as a franchisor, by definition. 
• UCA 13-14-201 prohibits acts by franchisors, including the owning of an interest in a 
new 'motor vehicle dealer or dealership by a franchisor. 
CONCLUSION: Either TMI and TMUT do exist as a franchise, (by law/agreement or 
fact/practice) and are disqualified as a New Car Dealer licensee because the 
manufacturer/franchisor (TMI) owns the franchisee (TMUT), or they by declaration ofTMI, are 
NOT a franchise. This disqualifies TMIUT as a dealer licensee; because both the Motor Vehicle 
Business Regulation, or New Motor Vehicle Franchise Act require dealers to have a franchise 
relationship. 
BACKGROUND 
In'Febniafy, 2015, during the legislative session, Tesla Motors, Inc. ("TMI") was given 
, I 
two letters from the Attorney General's Office regarding a·denial of their previous application 
for a Utah New Car Dealer license. (See my prior correspondence dated February 26, 2015 and 
March 3, 2015.) As you_ w_ill recall for the reasons articulated in that correspondence, you asked 
our office,,to communicate .rhe denial of the New Car Dealer License· t\pplication to TMI. On or 
about A.pi-ii 15, 2015, Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division "MVED" sent me a letter from 
Jonathan Chang, Deputy General Counsel ofTMI, dated April 13, 2015. Included with that 
correspondence were a letter from Mr. Chang, a new application for a distributor' s license, and a 
new car dealer license. Because no statutory notice letter from MVED was sent in the first 
application, we believe MVED should do so now, with their notice of appeal rights. 
, I 
On April 28, 2015, you requested a review of these applications. We now make, with 
help from our Commercial Enforcement:Oivision, this recommendation to assist you in your 
decision. Attached are documents which we received: 
• 
• 
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a. Exhibit "A," Dealer Agreement, between Tesla Motors, Inc. ("TMI") and Tesla 
Motors UT, Inc. ("TMUT"}. 
b. Exhibit "B," Letter from Jonathan Chang, Deputy General Counsel, TMI dated April 
13, 2015. 
c. Exhibit "C," Bonded Motor Vehicle Business Application, Utah form TC-301, 
Distributor branch/Distributor factory branch application for license dated 1/15/2015. 
d. Exhibit "D," Bonded Motor Vehicle Business Application, Utah form TC-301 for 
New Motor Vehicle Dealer license application dated 1/15/2015. 
e. Exhibit "E," Department of Commerce documents showing the public filings for TMI 
and TMUT. 
As TMI established in Mr. Chang's letter of March 4, 2015, TMI believes a legal 
precedent has been set in other states where this technique allowed the licensing administrative 
agency to issue a dealer's license. On page 7 of that letter, they use Massachusetts, New York, 
and Ohio as examples. (I have previously forwarded to you PDF versions of these state 
decisions for your reference.) Mr. ,Chang argues that because of the Dealer Agreement with 
TMUT, it complies with our Motor V~hicle Regulation, and TMUT should be given its licenses. 
We disagree. · · 
REASONING 
1. Evaluating the statements of TMI in both the correspondence relating to the first application 
as well as documentation,supplied relating to the second application, TMI itself rules out 
having a franchise relationship._ In TMI's letter of Mar:ch 4, 2015, they stated "most 
importantly to the legal analysis, Tesla does not have any independent franchise dealers 
anywhere in the world. This is the key fact that distinguishes us from virtually all other car 
manufacturers, and is the central reason why the direct sell prohibition does not apply to a 
non-franchising manufacturer like 'Tesla."' That statement, and repeated comments like it 
which state that Tesla's business model is a direct sale, rather thari franchise model, appear to 
rule out franchises per se, in Massachusetts, New York, and Ohio as well. Even in the Dealer 
Agreement (Exhibit "A"), paragraph 16. l s_tates "Dealer" hereby agrees that this Agreement 
does not form a franchise relationship between 'Dealer' and TMI, and Dealer further agrees 
that it is not a franchisee (a~ su_ch teim may be defined under U.C. A. 1953, § 13-14-102). 
TMI hereby agrees that this Agreement does not form a franchise between 'Dealer' and TMI, 
and TMI further agrees that it is not a franchisor (as such term may be defined under U. C. A. 
1953 § 13-14-102)." 
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2. TMUT appears to want its cake and be able to eat it as well. The Chang letter of April 13, 
20 15, argues that for purposes of the Motor Vehicle Enforcement Act (Title 41 ), TMUT is a 
franchisee; but for purposes of the New Automobile Franchise Act (Title 13, Chapter 14), it 
is not a franchisee. It should not be able to have it both ways. MVED should include the 
Franchise Act in its consideration, since UCA 4 I -3-21 0(l)(d) mandates it. Both·applicable 
chapters in Utah law will be discussed. 
NEW AUTOMOBILE DEALERS MUST BE FRANCHISED UNDER CURRENT 
UTAH LAW 
A. New Automobile Franchise Act 
In the definitions section of the New Automobile Franchise Act, the legislature has 
defined the terms "franchise," "franchise agreement," "franchisee" and "franchisor." These 
definitions are given as follows: 
In Utah Code Ann.§ 13-14-102, Subparagraphs (7), (8), and (9). 
UCA 13-14-102 
(7) (a) "franchise" or "franchise agreement" means a written agreement, or in 
the absence of a written agreement, then a course of dealing or a practice 
for a definite or indefinite period, in which: 
(i) a person grants to another person a license to use a trade 
name, trademark, service mark, or related characteristic; 
and 
(ii) a community of interest exists in the marketing of new 
·moto~· vehicles, new motor vehicle partsi·and services· 
related to the sale or lease of new motor vehicles at· 
wholesale or retail. 
(b) "Franchise" or "franchise agreement" i"ncludes a·sales and 
service agreement. 
(8) "Franchisee" means a person with whom a franchisor has agreed or 
. permitted, in writing or in.practice, to purchase, sell, or•offer for sale new motor 
vehicles manufactured, produced, represented, or distributed by the franchisor. 
(9) "Franchisor" means a person who has, in writing or in practice, agreed 
with or permits a franchisee to purchase, sell, or offer for sale new motor vehicles 
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manufactured, produced, assembled, represented, or distributed by the franchisor, 
and includes: 
(a) the manufacturer, producer, assembler, or distributor of the new 
motor vehicles; 
13-14-20 l Prohibited acts by franchisors -- Affiliates -- Disclosures. 
( l) A franchisor may not in this state: 
(u) except as provided in Subsection (6), directly or indirectly: 
(i) own an interest in a new motor vehicle dealer or 
dealership; 
(ii) operate or control a new motor vehicle dealer or 
dealership; 
(iii) act in ,the capacity of"a new motor vehicle dealer, as 
-defined in Section 13-14-102; or 
(iv) operate a motor vehicle service facility; 
(6) (a) A franchisor may engage in any of the activities listed in 
Subsection (l)(u), for a period not to exceed 12 months if: 
(A) the person from whom the franchisor acquired 
the interest in or control of the new motor vehicle 
dealership was a franchised new motor vehicle 
dealer; and 
(B) the franchisor's interest in the new motor 
vehicle dealership is for sale at a reasonable price 
and on reasonable terms and conditions; or 
(ii) the franchisor is engaging in the activity listed in 
Subsection (l)(u) for the purpose of broadening the 
diversity of its dealer body and facilitating the ownership of 
a new motor vehicle dealership by a person who: 
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.) 
(A) is part of a group that has been historically 
unde1Tepresented in the franchisor's dealer body; 
(B) would not otherwise be able to purchase a new 
motor vehicle dealership; 
(C) has made a significant investment in the new 
motor vehicle dealership which is subject to loss; 
(D) has an ownership interest in the new motor 
vehicle dealership; and 
(E) operates the;new motor vehicle dealership under 
a plan to acquire full ownership of the dealership 
within a reasonable period of time and under 
reasonable terms and conditions. 
(b) After receipt of the advisory board's recommendation, the 
executive director may, for good cause shown, extend the time 
limit set forth in Subsection (6)(a) for an additional period not to 
exceed 12 months. 
( c) A franchisor who was engaged in any of the activities listed in 
Subsection (l)(u) in this state prior to May l, 2000, may continue 
to engage in that activity, but may not expand that activity to 
acquire an interest in any other new motor vehicle dealerships or 
motor vehicle service facilities after May I, 2000. · 
(d) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(u), a franchisor may own, 
operate, or control a new motor vehicle dealership trading in a line-
make of motor vehicle if: 
(i) as t<? that line~make of motor vehicle, there are no more 
than fou,r franchised new motor vehicle dealerships 
licensed and in operation within the state as of January 1, 
2000; 
(ii) the franchisor does not own directly or indirectly, more 
than a 45% interest in the dealership; 
(iii) at the time the franchisor first acquires ownership or 
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assumes operation or control of the dealership, the distance 
between the dealership thus owned, operated, or controlled 
and the nearest unaffiliated new motor vehicle dealership 
trading in the same line-make is not less than 150 miles; 
(iv) all the franchisor's franchise agreements confer rights 
on the franchisee to develop and operate as many 
dealership facilities as the franchisee ·and franchisor shall 
agree are appropriate within a defined geographic territory 
or area; and as of January 1, 2000, no fewer than half of the 
franchisees of the line-make within the state own and 
operate two or more dealership facilities in the geographic 
area covered by the franchise agreement. 
Note that these definitions specifically state that a franchise may exist without agreement, 
by saying, "in the absence of a written agreement, that the course of dealing or practice," (§ l 3-
14-l 02(7)(a)), or in "writing or in practice,"(§ 13-14-102 (8) and (9)). This implies that a · 
franchise may exist by the way it is operated (de facto) or by agreement meaning by operation of 
law (de jure). 
TMI is caught in a dilemma of franchise terms regarding this chapter, as was pointed out 
in our previous correspondence. Refer to § 13-14-201, which includes "prohibited acts by 
franchisors." Sub paragraph (1) (u) states: "a franchisor may not in this state: . . . except as 
provided in subsection (6) (and subsections there), directly or indirectly, (i) own an interest in a 
new motor vehicle dealer or dealership; ... or (iii) act in the capacity of a new motor vehicle 
dealer, as defined in section lJ-14-102; .... " (As we previously mentioned in correspondence 
about TMI's first application, the limited exception in subsection (6) would limit ownership to 
less than or equal to 45% of the dealership that ownership can only last for a period not to exceed 
12 months). This chapter in the Franchise Act would disqualify a TMI - TMUT franchise 
relationship based on TMUT's status as a wholly owned subsidiary ofTMI. 
R. Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Analysis 
Even if the MVED determines that a de facto franchise relationship exists between TMI 
and TMUT, or within the definition of franchise in Title 41, issuing a new automobile dealer 
license may still be prohibited due to the restrictions within the current Motor Vehicle Business 
Regulation. UCA 41-3-210(1 )(d) states: "The holder of any license issued under _this chapter 
may not: .. . (d) violate any law of the state respecting commerce in motor vehicles or any rule 
respecting commerce in motor vehicles made by any licensing or regulating authority of the 
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state: ... " T\rns, MVED must consider the commercial codes of the state, and the New Motor 
Vehicle Franchise Act in particular, in its licensing authority. Because this section broadly 
includes licen.sing and regulatory authorities, the commerce code relating to new motor vehicle 
franchise codes. 
Section 41-3-210(1 )(g) also requires that the licensee have a franchise, which also raises 
the dilemma. betwe~n Mr. Chang'.s letter claiming TMI's franchise ~greement satisfies the Motor 
Vehicle Code, needs, yet the written agreement specifically denies a franchise. Considering the 
fact that both the Commerce Code and Motor Vehicle Code focus on the requirement of being a 
franchise, and that the Dealer Agreement denies a franchise relationship exists, licensing this 
dealer is prohibited. 
· Even if it is determined to be a franchisee,' TMUT still has a problem with the facts given 
in the Dealer Agreement identifying TMUT as wholly owned by TML Attached as Exhibit "E" 
is current Utah Department pf Commerce information regarding Tesla Motors UT, Inc. 
("TMUT"), anct T°esla Mot~rs, Inc. ("TMI"). Ownership is not disclosed'fo the public documents 
in Exhibit •'E;'; butit does show a common principal in both·entities, Deepak Ahuja. 
TMI would specifically be defined as a "franchisor" as previously mentioned in 
correspondence dated February 26, 2015, because UCA § 13-14-102(9) defines a franchisor as 
including a manufa~turer, which TMI admits it is. (See Jonathan Chang's letter dated March 4, 
2015.) 
MVED mus,t .consider whether wholly owning a subsidiary, which is seeking to be a · 
dealer of new motor vehicles in Utah, is an acceptable relationship between the franchisor 
(manufacturer), and the fran~hisee (deal_er). MVED should review prior con-espondence 
regarding.TM! ~d TM;UT and Franchise Restrictions within Chapter 3 of Title 41. 
Though Mr. Chang believes that TMI and TMUT have done everything necessary to 
obtain a dealer license in the state of Utah, creating a defacto "franchise" under the ·Motor 
Vechicle Business Regulation Act, MVED must make its independent determination based on 
the applicable laws, documentation, and facts presented. 
COURT OPINION SUMMARY 
Having reviewed the three court cases referenced in Tesla's correspondence, the 
Massachusetts Supr~me Court case of MSADA v. !esla Motors MA. Inc .• 469 Mass. 675 (2014), 
the New York easy of GNYAD v. DMV, 969. N.Y.S.2d 721, (sup CT 2013) and OADA v. Ohio 
DPS, Case No. 13CVH12-13334, (ct.) of common Pleas 2014), here is our summary of these 
cases. 
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fn each of these cases, the three state administrative agencies issued a dealer license to a 
TMI entity which applied for a dealer license. Then the automobile dealer associations in ea~h · 
stale sued TMI, and the administrative agencies who granted the licenses. In each decision 
reviewed, the Courts ruled that the Automobile Dealer's Associations did not have standing, and 
therefore each case was dismissed as a matter of law. TMI was allowed to open the dealership. 
The reasoning of the courts included the lack of provable harm to the dealerships within 
the dealer associations. Also, two of the cases found that in the protective nature of the state 
statutes, their legislative intent was restricted in scope to protecting motor vehicle dealers from 
unfair acts and practices from their own brand. manufacturers, and distributors. (Commonly 
referred to as "Line make.") Since this was not their line make, they had no risk of harm. None 
of these cases discussed whether their statutes included the requirement of franchise language. 
CONCLUSION 
TMI was involved during the last Utah legislative session with attempting to amend Utah 
law to allow for an exception to the typical franchise requirements for new automobile dealers. 
However, no new changes were made with regard to statutory construction relating to new 
automobile dealers. Until that is done, the dilemma within which TMI finds itself, continues. 
Our conclusion is that unless a franchise relationship actually exists, and unless the franchisor 
does not own the entity or "person" that is the -new automobile dealer, a license shoulc;l_ not be 
granted. 
Gale K. Francis 
Assistant Attorney General 
GKF:lr 
I 
State of Utah 
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Utah State Tax Commission 
R. BRUC~~ ,JOHNSON 
Co1nmwio11 Chair 
D'ARCY DIXON PIGNAN~:LJ.I 
Commi ... ioncr 
MICHAm,J. CRAGUN 
Cvmmiuiona 
ROBERT P. PERO 
Commi,iaioMr 
BARRY C. CONOVER 
Encutit'CI Dirtttor 
Tesla Motors UT Inc 
3500 Deer Creek Road 
Palo Alto CA 94304 
We have received your form TC-301, Bonded Motor Vehicle Application. Upon receiving 
recommendation from legal counsel, Tesla Motors UT, doesn't not CU(rently meet the 
requirement-necessary under UCA 41-3 and UCA 13-14 to receive a "N~w fylotor Vehicle 
Dealer's license." Therefore the license is denied. 
Enclosed are the applications, bond and payment. 
' . ' . 
You·dd have appeal rights. If you disagree with this decision, you may appeal by filling out and 
sending in form TC-739, Petition for Expedited Hearing (Appeal Form), before June 20, 2015. 
Get the TC-739 on line at taxexpress.utah.gov Attach a copy of this letter to your petition and 
return both to: Utah State Tax Commission, Appeals Unit, 210 N 1950 W, SLC UT 84134-6200. 
If you have questions about the appeal scheduling or events, call the Appeals Unit at 801-297-
3900 or 1-800-662-433_5 ext 3900. 
If you have any other questions, please contact the Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division at 801-
297-2600 or you may write to· MVED at 210 N 1950 W, SLC UT 84134-6200. 
Sincerely, 
Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division 
210 North 1960 We11t 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84134 
801-297-2200 
\ Fu: 801·297-6368 
www.lax.utah.gou 
If you nud an auommodotu,n und,r the .ilmcriroM with DiM:ibilitiu Act, roll 801-291-381 l or T,lta>mmunirotion Devi« 
for tht D,af (TDD) 801,297,2020. Pleau allow thr .. worlcing day, for a r,1pon«. 
Scanned by CamScanner 
ADDENDUM G TO BRIEF OF PETITIONER/APPELLANT 
STIPULATION OF FACTS 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
TESLA MOTORS UTAH, INC. , 
Petitioner, . 
Appeal No. 15-1170 
vs. 
MOTOR VEHICLE ENFORCEMENT 
DIVISION OF THE UT AH STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
STIPULATION OF FACTS 
Tesla Motors Utah, Inc. ("Tesla UT") and the Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division of 
the Utah State Tax Commission ("MVED) submit the following stipulation of facts to be 
received into evidence in lieu of further proof or testimony. Tesla UT and the MVED hereby 
stipulate that: 
1. On February 12, 2015, Tesla UT filed an application for a new motor vehicle 
dealer's license (the "February Application"). A true and correct copy of Tesla UT's February 
Application is attached as Exhibit I. 
2. In letters dated February 26, 2015 and March 2, 2015, Assistant Attorney General 
Gale Francis notified Tesla UT that the MVED would deny Tesla UT's new motor vehicle 
dealer's license application. A true and correct copy of Mr. Francis's correspondence is attached 
as Exhibit 2. 
3. On March 4, 2015, Tesla UT submitted a letter to the MVED and Mr. Francis 
responding to Mr. Francis's letters of February 26, 2015 and March 2, 2015. A true and correct 
copy of Tesla UT's letter is attached as Exhibit 3. 
4. On April 13, 2015, Tesla UT submitted a second application to the MVED for a 
new motor vehicle dealer's license (the "April Application"). A true and correct copy of Tesla 
UT's April Application is attached as Exhibit 4. 
5. On May 11 , 2015, Tesla UT submitted a letter to the Utah Attorney General's 
office supporting Tesla UT's April Application. A true and correct copy of Tesla UT's letter is 
attached as Exhibit 5. 
6. On May 14, 2015, Mr. Francis submitted a letter to the MVED recommending the 
denial of Tesla UT's April Application for a new motor vehicle dealer's license. A true and 
correct copy of Mr. Francis's letter is attached as Exhibit 6. 
7. On May 21, the MVED formally denied Tesla UT's application, stating that Tesla 
UT does not meet the relevant provisions of the MVBRA and NAFA. A true and correct copy of 
the MVED's denial is attached as Exhibit 7. 
DATED this 4th day of August, 2015. 
~/Ji 
FRANCIS M. 4r_~r~ 
MICHAEL P. PETROGEORGE 
Parsons Behle & Latimer 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
~~--.. -✓- . . ·: . .. · _:. .- · . , . 
_.. . . . 
GAL7ciiAITT~ ··· ··· 
LARON J. LIND 
Assistant Attorney General 
SEAN D. REYES 
Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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1 I, Herbert E. Walter, hereby declare as follows: 
2 I. QUALIFICATIONS 
3 1. I am an independent consultant with more than 35 years of fim.mcial and 
4 managemept consulting exper~ence. I have an MBA from the University of Cincinnati with 
5 concentrations in Finance and Quantitative Analysis and a BBA from the University of Cincinnati 
6 with majors in Finance qnd Accow1ting. I .am also certified as a CPA and a Certified.Fraud 
7 Exarr.iiner (CFE)1 I was employed by PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP for 32 years, the last 20 of 
8 which I was a partner. My curriculum vitae is attached as Exhibit 1 .. 
9 2. I hav~ approximately 25 years of experience in the automotive industry, most of 
10 . which has focused on automotive retail. I have studied hundreds of dealerships across the United 
11 States- including dealerships in Utah-by ( 1) reviewing their financial records to evaluate the 
12 financial and <?peratio~al performance of dealerships overall, and of each department; (2) 
13 evaluating_their finap,cil;lg and capital-structure; (3) studying their sales and inventory. 
14 management; (4) analyzing-t4~ir.reJationship with manufacturers, finance companies, and 
. . ' . 
15 c:ustomers; and (5) reviewing their ~erformance according to the franchise agreements. I have 
16 been retained by most ~~jar vehicle manuf~cturers including Audi, Chrysler, 1 Ford, GM, Honda, 
17 Hyundai, Jaguar, Kia, LaTT1borgb+µi, Nis_san, Subaru, S~uki, Toyota, and VW. I haye also 
18 consulted for manufacturers and dealers in cases in which incumbent dealer~hips objected to the 
19 opening of a new dealership or. to the relocation of an existing deal~rship close to the incumbent 
20 dealerships. _This wprk has involved dealerships ranging from small, exclusive-branci dealerships 
2.1 to major dealer:ships owned_ ~y large, privately-capitalized companies or publicly owned 
22 companies. 
23 3. . I have been qualified to testify as an expert regarding the retail operations of 
24 independent franchise dealerships and have testified concerning my opinions in federal and state 
25 couri trials and in administrative hearings approximately 40 or 50 times in roughly 20 different 
26 states. My work related to dealerships in Utah has included evaluating their financial 
27 
28 1 Previously Chrysler Group and now FCA - Fiat Chrysler Automobiles. 
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performance as described above, both individually and as part of groups of dealerships included 
2 in composite financial results. 
3 II. 
4' 
SCOPE OF TESTIMONY 
4. I have been retained by Tesla Motors, Irie. ("Tesla") to compare Tesla's business 
5 model for selling new cars through its network of company-owned stores to that of a traditional 
6 independent franchised dealership. In preparation for my testimony, I reviewed Tesla's 
7 applications for a Utah new motor vehicle dealer license as well as the correspondence between 
8 Tesla and the MVED2 regarding those applications, researched and analyzed data relating to 
9 vehicie3 sales in Utah, interviewed several Tesla employees about Tesla's sales model and 
10 business operations in: Utah and otll'er states, visited a Tesla store, reviewed Tesla's· SEC filings, 
11 and relied on my knowledge of the automotive indust1yand dealerships. I also heard and 
12 re-viewed·testimony in a prior action in Georgia from Tesla employees and an economist (Dr. 
13 Fiona Scott Morton) about Tesla's business rnodel1 and sales p'ractices. 
14 5. Tesla has retained me at an hourly rate df $475. I was assisted in preparing my 
15 analysis by associates at Urban Science4 whose rates ran~e from $200 to $300 per hour. I have 
16' · spent more than 150 hours studying· Tesla's business model for selling cars and comparing that 
17 model to the operation of ttaditional franchised dealerships. 
18 m. 
19 
SUMMARY OF OPINIONS 
6. ' Based on my analysis and.expertise ih the industry, it is my opinion that it would 
· 20 · noi'be viable for Tesla to sell its cars to consumers through· independent franchised dealerships in 
21 . Utah. This is true for a·variety ·bf reasons that arise from'the vast disparities between Tesla's 
22 direct sales model and the independent franchised dealership model. See infra§§ IV, V and VI. 
• • J 
23 First, traditional dealerships are massive operations, relative to a Tesla store, with high overhead, 
24 requiring a high volume of fast-paced vehicle sales and. service work to remain profitable. This 
25 
26 2 The Motor Vehicle Enforce'ment Division of the Utah State Tax Commission. 
3 The term "vehicles" refers to and includes cars, SUVs, pickup trucks, and other light trucks. 
27 4 Urban Science is a business-solutions company focused on supporting the needs of the sales and marketing function 
of the automotive industry. 
28 
- 2 -
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varies dramatically from Tesla's direct sales model, which relies on much smaller faci lities that 
2 focus on customer education and the highest-quality customer service. Second, traditional 
3 dealerships derive significant profits from sales of service and parts, used vehicles, financing, 
4 insurance products and other "add-ons." These sources of profits, however, are largely 
5 unavailable to a traditional dealership selling Tesla cars. Thisd; traditional dealerships rely on 
6 manufacturers to fund advertising and incentives programs. Tesla does not advertise and does not 
7 offer incentives programs; thus, dealerships selling Tesla cars would be forced to pay for 
8 advertising and incentives programs on their own. Fi~ally, Tesla will continue to offer its 
9 standard, "no haggle" pricing for sales through Tesla-owned stores and on Tesla's website. 
10 Dealerships that mark up the ,retail price of the Tesla cars they sell in order to cover their costs 
11 and make a profit will be unable to compete with Tesla's "no haggle" pricing. 
12 7. In addition, studies demonstrate that traditional dealerships, when given the 
13 opportunity to sell electric vehicles, have either declined to do so or been wholly ine~fective at 
14 doing so. See infra ~ VIL Fin~lly, existing Utah dealerships are likely contractually prohibited 
15 by their franchising manufacturers from selling Tesla cars. See infra§ VIII. To reinforce their 
16 brand image, most franchising manufacturers preclude their franchised dealerships from1selling 
. . 
17 new vehicles from other manufacturers in the same faci lity. 
18 8. I will begin by comparing the independent franchised dealership model to Tesla's 
19 direct sales model. I will then explain in detail why the independent franchised dealership model 
20 is not a viable means for selling Tesla cars. I will then discuss the studies demonstrating that 
21 traditional dealerships are ineffective at selling electric cars. Finally, I will explain the standard 
22 contract between franchising manufacturers and their franchised dealerships that will likely 








Traditional dealerships are massive enterprises, typically with large facilities 




l dealerships, frequently tens and sometimes hundreds of dealerships. Franchised dealerships must 
2 sell large volumes of new vehicles because the profit margin on sales of new vehicles is very low. 
3 In addition, due to this low profit margin, dealerships must make substantial sales of used 
4 vehicles and service and parts to remain profitable. This significant volume of sales of both new 
5 and used vehicles requires that traditional dealers have large lots on which to store their new and 
6 used vehicle inventory. 
7 10. The ave.rage Utah dealership sold 899 new vehicles in 2014.5 These vehicles were 
8 sold from the dealership's new vehicle inventory or obtained through trades with other 
9 dealerships. In 2014, dealerships maintain.ea in new vehicle inventory an approximately 55 to 70 
10 days supply ofvehicles,6 i.e., the'immber of vehicles they would sell over that time peri~d, given 
11 • their average rate of sales.7· Assuming a 60 days supply, 'the average·Utah dealersh:ip·maintained 
12 148 vehicles in new v·ehicle inventory:8 An inventory 'this size would cost a dealership roughly 
13 ·$4.l million to purchase.9• 10 ' 
14 11. A traditional dealership that selis 899 new vehicles per year, like the ave~age Utah 
15 dealership, typically sells around 54 7 used vehicles per year.11 These vehicles are obtained froin 
16 ' trade-ins when customers purchase new vehicles or are purchased by the dealerships at vehicle 
17 auctions or from other sources. 12 In 2014, the average·Utah dealership maintained 4213 vehicles 











5 NADADATA: Annual Financial Profile pf.~erica's Franchi~ed New-Vehicle De~lerships 2014,.pages 4 and 16 
(New Vehicles Sales for Average Utah Dealership (899) = New Vehicles Sales in Utah (123,170) / New Vehicle 
Dealerships in J]tah (137)). . 
6 NADADATA: Annual Financial Profile of America's Franchised New-Vehicle Dealerships 2014, page 7. 
7 "Days supply" is the number of days a dealership could continue selling vehicles without receiving new inventory. 
."Days supply" is based on current month-end inventory and average sales rate over some period, and it assumes that 
the sales rate remains .constant going forward. For ,example, if a d!!alership has 30 vehicles in inventory and sells ten 
new vehicles per rhonth, it has' a three-month, or a 90-day supply. 
8 148 = (899/365) X 60. 
9 New v_ehicles estimated average cost = NADA 2014 average selling price x 85%; $27,725 = $32,618 x 85%. 
10 Approximate new vehicles inventory value; $4, 103,344 = ( 148 x $27,725). . 
11 Used to New Ratio = Used Veliicle Retailed /New Vehicle Unit Sales = 10,000,000/16,436,991 = 0.608; 0.608 * 
·899 = 547. 
12 2014 NADA State-of-the-Industry Report, page I 0. 
13 41.6 = (74.75/265.75) x 148. See infra ii 13. 
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2 12. There are 137 new vehicle dealerships in Utah. 16 Utah's dealerships cumulatively 
3 reported $7 .144 billion in sales in 2014, averaging sales of $52.1 million per dealership. 17 In 
4 2014, the average dealership made a profit of over $ 1 million before taxes and employed 64 
5 employees.18 
6 13. There are four dealerships located near Tesla's store on State Street in Salt Lake 
7 City (from across the street to 2.2 11}.iles away). 19 These dealerships reported an average of 266 
8 vehicles in new vehicle inventory on July 25, 20 15.20 A new vehicle inventory of this size would 
9 cost the dealership roughly $7.3 million to purchase.21 These dealerships also reported an 
10 average of75 vehicles in used vehicle inventory on July 25, 2015.22 A used vehicle inventory of 
11 this size would cost the dealer roughly $1 .2 million to purchase. 23• 24 The total average inventory 
12 for these four dealerships was 341 new and used vehicles, with a combined purchase cost to the 
13 dealerships of approximately $8.5 million.25 These four dealerships operate on lots ranging from 
14 2.6 acres to 9.5 acres, with an average lot size of 5. 1 acres.26 
15 14 . Traditional franchised dealerships require many millions of dollars in financing to 
16 fund the cost of purchasing vehicle inventory. The business model for a traditional dealership is 
17 centered on acquiring, selling, and servicing large numbers of new and used vehicles. The 








14 Used vehicles estimated average cost = NADA 2014 average selling price x 85%; $ 16,019 = $18,846 x 85%, 
15 Approximate used vehicles inventory value; $666,390 = ( 41.6 x $ 16,019). 
16 NADADATA: Annual Financial Profile of America's Franchised New-Vehicle Dealerships 2014, page 4. 
17 NADADATA: Annual Financial Profile of America's Franchised New-Vehicle Dealerships 2014, page 5. 
18 NADADATA: Annual Financial Profile of America's Franchised New-Vehicle Dealerships 2014, pages 3 and 13. 
19 The dealerships are Audi Salt Lake City (1.8 miles away), Salt Lake City Buick GMC (2.0 miles away), Salt Lake 
City Chrysler Jeep Dodge RAM (0.1 miles away), and Ken Garff Nissan (2.2 miles away). 
20 New vehicles in inventory July 25, 20 15: Audi Salt Lake City 223, Salt Lake City Buick GMC 200, Salt Lake City 
Chrysler Jeep Dodge RAM 279, Ken Garff Nissan 361; average 265.75 = (223 + 200 + 279 + 361)/4. 
21 Approximate new vehicles inventory value; $7,367,998 = (265.75 x $27,725). 
22 Used vehicles in inventory July 25, 20 15: Audi Salt Lake City 72, Salt Lake City Buick GMC 107, Salt Lake City 
Chrysler Jeep Dodge RAM 61 , Ken Garff Nissan 59; average 74.75 = (72 + 107 + 61 + 59)/4. 
23 Used vehicles estimated average cost = NADA 2014 average selling price x 85%; $16,019 = $18,846 x 85%. 
26 . 24 Approximate used vehicles inventory value; $ 1,197,428 = (74.75 x $ 16,019). 
25 Estimated total inventory value; $8,565,426 = ($7,367,998 + $ 1, 197,428). 
27 
28 
26 Based on Google Earth Pro mapping; Audi Salt Lake City 2.60 acres, Salt Lake City Buick GMC 9.47 acres, Salt 
Lake City Chrysler Jeep Dodge RAM 4.32 acres, Ken Garff Nissan 3.90 acres. 
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operation of this massive enterprise and to produce a bottom-line profit. 
The Purchase Process B. 
15. A traditional franchised dealership typically relies on a high-pressure sales 
approach that incenrivizes closing sales as quickly as possible at the highest negotiated price. 
Dealerships are incentivized to sell products quickly not only to make sufficient profits to sustain 
their'business model, but because the highest performing dealerships earn relatively more vehicle 
allocation from their franchising manufacturers. Ideally, from the dealership's perspective, a 
potential customer drives to the dealership in one vehicle and drives away a few hours later in a 
new vehicle. Because the purchase process often occurs in a few hours, rather than days or 
weeks, customers have limited·time to ask questions, test drive the new vehicle, trade in their old 
vehicle, and complete their financing and insurance paperwork. 
16. As a result, customers often arrive at a traditional franchised dealership with the 
intent of purchasing a specific new vehicle. Many customers have researched the vehicle brand 
and model along with competitive brands and models before visiting the dealership. The 
salesperson, therefore, need not spend significant time educating the customer about any 
particular vehicle. 
17. The base compensation for salespeople at traditional franchised deale1'ships is low, 
sometimes as low as minimum wage. Salespeople are compensated primarily through 
commissions from new vehicle sales, with the depai1ment's overall profits contributing to 
commissions and bonuses for the dealership's management team. This compensation structure 
incentivizes the high-pressure sales environment in which dealerships attempt to make sales as 
quickly as possible. The consistency and quality of customer service with respect to new vehicle 
sales varies from salesperson to salesperson, from dealership to dealership, and from brand to 
brand. 
- 6 -
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C. Pricing 
2 18. Traditional dealerships do not adhere to set vehicle prices, but rather negotiate 
3 prices with customers in an effort to sell the vehicle for the highest price possible.27 The price of 
4 a vehicle is frequently obscured by the multiple transactions taking place simultaneously-for 
5 example, the new vehicle sale, the used vehicle trade-in, the vehicle financing, and the sale of 
6 add-ons sold with the vehicle, such as an extended service contract or various insurance products. 
7 Each of these components of a single new vehicle transaction provides a traditional dealership 






Traditional franchised dealerships rely heavily on profits from used car sales, sales 
11 of service and parts, and sales of various .other add-ons. They operate three departments: ( l) new 
12 vehicle sales, (2) service and parts sales, and (3) used vehicle sales.28• 29 The new vehicle sales 
13 department of a traditional dealership generates a large amount ofrevenue (57 .6%30), but 
14 contributes little to the net profits (4.6%31). Thus, to make a profit, traditional dealerships rely on 
15 the service and parts department (33% of net profits32) and used vehicle sales (12% of net 
16 profits33). "Miscellaneous income" makes up the rest of a dealership's profits. Miscellaneous 












27 A few traditional dealerships have experimented with "no haggle" pricing for new vehicles. There are also various 
buying programs that offer purchaser pre-arranged discounts when purchasing a vehicle through these programs, e.g. 
AAA, ,Costco, and American Bar Association. 
28 The NADA Report com~ines the service and parts departments for most of the reported metrics. For purposes of 
this Declaration, I will combine the service and parts departments as the NADA Report has done. 
29 Some dealerships a lso operate a body shop as a fourth department. A. fifth, the Fin~cing and Insurance 
department, operates within and supports both the new and the used vehicle departments. 
30 NADADATA: Annual Financial Profile of America's Franchised New-Vehicle Dealerships 2014, page 3. 
31 NADADATA: Annual F inancial Profi le of America's Franchised New-Vehicle Dealerships 2014, pages 3 and 6 
(% of Net Profit (4.6%) = (Department Net Profit ($50,000)/ Net Profit Before Taxes ( l ,093,805)) x 100). 
32 NADADATA: Annual Financial Profi le of America's Franchised New-Vehicle Dealerships 2014, pages 3 and 6. 
33 NADADATA: Annual Financia l Profile of America's Franchised New-Vehicle Dealerships 20 14, pages 3 and 6. 
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20. Traditional dealerships maximize profits from their serv~ce and parts department 
by leveraging the large base of vehicles eligible for service. Traditional dealerships have 
generally been in business for a long tim~ and sold a large number of new and used vehicles that 
need servicing. The b~se of vehicles from which a traditional dealership draws most of.its service 
and parts business is referred to in the in1ustry as its "units in operation" ("UIO"). UIO is 
typically measur~d based on the five to seven most recent ~ode) years for a given vehicle brand, 
as these are the vehicles most likely to be brought into a dealership for service work. In 2014, 
Utah dealerships sold on average 899 new vehicles per dealership. See supra ,r 10. Assuming the 
same average over five to seven years, each Utah dealership would have a UIO base of 
approximately 3,700 to 4,900 vehicles from which to draw its service and parts business.34 
2 1. Traditional dealerships may also increase profits from their service and parts 
department ·by pushing the sale of additional services, which is referred to as "up selling." 
Dealerships often compensate their service advisors with ·commissions, incentivizing them to 
recommend a~ditional work to customers. In addition, service work is paid on a flat rate, 
25 
26 
meaning_th~t service employees are compensated by the job rather than by the hour. This can 
27 34 NADADATA: Annual Financial Profile of America's Franchised New-Vehicle Dealerships 2008 to 2014; 3,680 = 
(553 + 656 + 748 + 823 + 899); 4,851 = (647 + 523 + 553 + 656 + 748 + 823 + 899. 
28 
- 8 -
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encourage service technicians to rush work, thereby maximizing their compensation and the 
2 dealership's profits. 
3 22. As noted above, sales of used vehicles are a major source of profit for franchised 
4 dealerships. A used vehicle department that, like the average Utah dealership, sells 547 used 
5 vehicles per year generates $10.3 million in revenue from those sales.35 
6 23. Traditional dealerships realize a profit on used vehicle sales by obtaining used 
7 vehicles at lower trade-in prices and reselling them at higher retail prices. Traditional dealerships 
8 acquire approximately 66% of the used vehicles they sell through trade-ins on new or used 
9 vehicle purchases.36 Traditional dealerships conduct theii· own inspections of trade-in vehicles, 
10 creating a potential conflict of interest because they want to purchase the vehicle for as low a 
11 price as possible. This incentivizes the dealership to identify as many "issues" as possible, 
12 whether or not they are issues that actually affect the vehicle resale value. 
13 24. The used vehicle department and the service and parts departments of traditional 
14 franchised dealerships are critical profit centers that help insulate these dealerships during 
15 economic downturns. As shown below, the average new vehicle department reported losses 
16 between 2006 and 2010.37 This trend was evident in Utah, where total new vehicle unit sales 
17 declined from 116,550 in 200538 to 72,703 in 200939, a 37.6%.decline.40 During this time, 
i-8 however, profits from used vehicle sales and service and parts sales increased, as consumers 
I 






35 (Average Retail Selling price of a used vehicle ($18,846)) x (Used vehicle sales (547)) = $ 10,308,762. 
· 25 36 NADADA TA: Annual Financial Profile of America's Franchised New-Vehicle Dealerships 20 I 4, page I 0. 
37 NADADATA: Annual Financial Profile of America's Franchised New-Vehicle Dealerships 2014, page 6. 
26 38 NADADATA: Annual Financial Profile of America's Franchised New-Vehicle Dealerships 2006, page 19. 
39 NADADATA: Annual Financial Profile of America's Franchised New-Vehicle Dealerships 2010, page 16. 
27 40 (New Vehicle Registrations in 2005 - New Vehicle Registrations in 2009)/New Vehicle Registrations in 2009 = 
(1 16,550-72,703)/ 116,550 = 37.6%. 
28 
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25. The Financing and Insurance ("F&I") department of a traditional dealership is 
14 highly lucrative. In 2014, it accounted for roughly 23% of the gross profit derived from new and 
15 used vehicle departments.41 The F&I department generally charges a "dealership markup" on the 
16 interest rate a lender offers. If a lender, for example, agrees to finance a loan for 5.0% interest, 
17 the dealership may charge that customer 6.0% interest and retain the 1.0% markup as profit.42• 43 
18 The markup percentage varies from dealership to dealership and from deal to deal. Employees of 
19 a traditional dealership's F&I department typically earn a commission for successfully selling 




24 41 NADADATA: Annual-Financial Profile of America's Franchised New-Vehicle Dealerships 2014, page 9. 
42 Chicago Tribune: "Dealers defend car loan mark ups," May 28, 2014 - "As compensation, most lenders typically 
25 allow dealers to add as much as 2.5 percentage points to the interest rate on loans up to 60 month and 2 percent for 
longer than 60 moµths." . · 
26 43 USNews: "The Hidden Cost of Car Loans," February 27, 2014 - "What most car buyers don't know is that the 
bank funding the loan allows the dealer to increase the interest rate for compensation. For example, a bank may be 
27 willing to buy a contract as long as the interest rate is at least 4 percent, but will permit the dealer to charge the 
consumer up to 6.5 percent interest." · 
28 
- 10 -
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E. Advertising And Incentives 
2 26. Traditional dealerships rely heavi ly on advertising to draw customer traffic to the 
3 dealership. The typical advertising model for the automotive industry involves multiple levels or 
4 tiers. First, there are advertisements from the manufacturer. Then, there are ads sponsored by 
5 groups of dealerships or co-ops, recognizable with statements or tag lines such as " brought to you 
6 by [city or area] [brand] dealer's association" and listing the participating dealerships by name. 
7 Finally, there are advertisements sponsored by individual dealerships. Many manufacturers 
8 include a percentage in the vehicle invoice that is accumulated to fund adve1iising . . Thus, while 
9 the dealership is "paying" for the advertising, it is being subsidized by the manufacturer and/or 
10 reimbursed through the cost of the vehicle. In total, traditional dealerships spent $8 billion on 
11 advertising in 2014.44 A dealership selling ~99 new vehicles, as the average dealership in Utah 
12 does, incurred about $539,400 in advertising expenses in 2014.45 
13 27. Traditional dealerships also move inventory using incentives offered by 
14 manufacturers such as "cash back" on vehicle purchases, or special interest rate financing such as 
15 0.9% financing for "qualified customers." Through special rate financing, the manufacturer 
16 subsidizes the customer's interest rate or supports higher lease residuals, with lower monthly 
17 lease payments, through its captive finance company. Manufacturer incentive programs to 
18 stimulate sales have become nearly ubiquitous in the automotive retail industry, such that they are 
19 regularly available on many, if not most, brands and models. 






In sharp contrast to large franchised dealerships that have significant new and used 
23 vehicle inventory, Tesla stores are generally small and have no inventory. Because Tesla cars are 





44 NADADATA: Annual Financial Profile of America's Franchised New-Vehicle Dealerships 2014, page 17. 
45 NADADATA: Annual Financial Profile of America's Franchised New~Vehicle Dealerships 2014, page 17 (Total 
Dealership Advertising Expense ($539,400) = (Total Dealership Advertising per New Unit Sold ($600) x New 
Vehicle Units Sold (899))). 
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vehicles on-site for test drives and educational purposes. One of these cars is often a "naked 
2 chassis," i.e., a car without the body used to display its inner elements-the battery, motor, drive 
3 units, suspension systems, etc.- for educational purposes. 
4 B. The Purchase Process 
5 29. Tesla's retail staff is trained to educate potential customers about electric vehicle 
6 technology and Tesla cars. The public is often skeptical of electric vehicle technology because it 
7 is new and unfamiliar to them. The sale of a Tesla car requires significant time and a low-
8 pressure· environment to teach consumers about the operation and benefits of electric vehicles. 
9 Potential Tesla customers may have such unique questions as: 
10 • How is the car designed? How does it work? 
11 • How far can I drive on one charge? 
12 • How does the cost of charging compare to the cost of gas? 
13 • How does the carbon footprint of a Tesla car compare to that of a gas vehicle? 
14 • How long does the car take to charge? 












• Do I have to rewire my house to install a charger at home? How does that work? 
Who does this for me? 
• Can you show me the different routes I might take from my home to Florida for a 
vacation that I'm planning, and charge my car along the way? 
• What are the differences in electric usage between hot and cold weather? 
• What is regenerative braking? 
• The touch screen computer in the console-how does that run the car? 
• What does the computer tell me about the car? 
• What will need to be serviced on my car? 
• How does the service process work? Where does the service take place? 
Tesla encourages customers to take their time in asking these and many other 
27 questions, often over multiple visits to the Tesla store. It often takes weeks for a customer to 
28 
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progress from the initial visit to a Tesla store to his or her purchase of a Tesla car. Tesla's 
2 internal data show that, on average, 25 days pass between the time a customer provides Tesla 
3 with a valid email address and the time the customer pmchases a Tesla car. This 25-day period 
4 does not include customer visits to the store before the customer provides Tesla w ith an email 
5 address. 
6 31. Tesla's salespeople are salaried employees. While they are paid cetiain 
7 commissions, these commissions are significantly less and structw-ed differently than those paid 






Information on all aspects of Tesla's cars, such as price, warranties, and financing, 
11 is transparent and uniform. Tesla sells its cars at a set, "no haggle" list price. The list price 
12 depends on the configuration of and options for each car, but nothing else. Tesla does not offer 
13 negotiated prices, sales pricing, special rate financing, or cash incentives on its cars. Tesla 
14 customers pay the same price whether they purchase through Tesla's website, at a local store, or 






Unlike traditional franchised dealerships, Tesla derives the vast majority of its 
18 profits from the sale of new Tesla cars. Tesla's operations are not based on profits derived from 
19 servicing Tesla cars, used vehicle sales, financing, or sales of insw-ance products. 
20 34. Tesla does not operate its service and parts department as a profit center. First, 
21 Tesla's service base, i. e., the Tesla cars on the road that need servicing, is extremely small 
22 compared to that of a traditional franchised dealer. Tesla sold 2,650 Model S cars worldwide in 
23 2012, 22,500 in 2013, and 32,000 in 2014.46 Since the release of the Model S in 2012, Tesla has 
24 sold 24 7 Model S cars to Utah residents. In contrast, traditional dealerships sold more than 16.5 




46 See Tesla Motors, Inc. Annual Report for the year ending December 31, 20 14; Tesla Motors, Inc. Forms 8-K for 
2012-2015. 
47 2 Automotive News: U.S. Car and Light-Truck Sales by Make December 2014, Total Vehicle Sales in 2014. 
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35. Second, Tesla's national service platform takes advantage of new teclmologies that 
reduce the need for customer trips to the Tesla service center. Tesla can perform over-the-air 
software updates to its cars, and can diagnose cars remotely to h·ack problems before they occur. 
In addition, Tesla's service technicians are in close communication with Tesla engineers to· 
troubleshoot and solve problems quickly. 
36. Third, Tesla service employees, unlike the service employees at traditional 
dealerships, are paid by the hour rather than the job and are not paid commissions. This 
eliminates the incentive to perform hasty work to complete more jobs in a shorter amount of time, 
or to encourage customers to purchase potentially unnecessary additional work, both of which are 
techniques that may be used to increase service profits at a traditional dealership. 
37. Tesla does not derive significant profits from used vehicle sales. While Tesla 
recently began selling pre-owned Tesla cars;Tesla has never bought or sold non-Tesla used 
vehicles.48 If a customer wishes ·to "trade-in" a non-Tesla vehicle in connection with the purchase 
ofa Tesla car, Tesla arranges for an independent third-party inspection and collects one or more 
offers from other dealerships. The customer then decides whether to sell his or her used vehicle 
and to which dealership, presumably the dealership that made the highest offer. Tesla does not 
receive any monetary compensation, from either the customer or the dealership that purchases the 
used car, for assisting the customer with the trade-in. Thus, in contrast to traditional dealerships 
accepting a trade-in on the purchase of a new or used car, Tesla's participation in th'e trade-in 
process creates no perceived or actual conflict of interest. 
38. Tesla does not operate its financing department as a profit center. Tesla's 
centralized financing group, in Palo Alto, California, works with banks with which Tesla has an 
established relationship to secure financing options for Tesla's customers. Tesla does not mark 
up the financing plans offered by its financial partners. Tesla receives only a small referral fee 
from the lender that is based on a fixed percentage of the loan size. The fee does not vary based 
on the c~nsumer's credit score or credit tier, or the interest rate to the consumer. 
48 In April 2015, Tesla began selling a small number of pre-owned Tesla cars. 
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E. Advertising and Incentives 
2 39. Tesla does not use paid advertising or provide incentive programs to encourage 
3 consumers to purchase Tesla cars. Instead, Tesla relies on brand recognition, goodwill and word 
4 of mouth among consumers. T hus, it needs to provide the highest level of customer service 




TESLA CANNOT SELL ITS CARS THROUGH THE INDEPENDENT 
FRANCHISED DEALERSHIP MODEL 
40. As described above, Tesla's direct sale model has proven to be a highly effective 
9 means of selling Tesla's im1ovative electric vehicle technology. Customers have been more than 
10 willing to adopt th.is new technology when given significant time to learn about it in the 
11 environment of Tesla's stores. Because Tesla maintains control of its sales and service 
12 operations, it is abl~ to provide the highest level of customer service at all stages of the car-
13 buying process, thereby solidifying its-brand reputation ap.d promoting its cars. A,.nd by 
14 maintaining a lean operation with small stores and custom-made cars rather than massive 
15 facilities an<,l large .inventories, Tesla is not burdened with the overhead cost associated with 
16 traditional dealerships and is ~ot reql!ired to pass that cost on to consumers through increased 
17 retail pi:ices, increased service prices, or other means. For all of these reasons, Tesla has 
18 determined that its direct sales model is the only viable m~ans for selling its cars. 
19 4 1. Even if the traditional dealership model, with its fast-paced sales tac~ics, variable 
20 customer service, and massive inventories and overhead costs, were an effective means of selling 
21 Tesla cars, traditional dealerships would not make a sufficient profit to justify the investment. 
22 Th.is is true for the following reasons: (1) traditior:ial dealerships cannot derive a significant profit 
23 from s_ervicing Tesla cars; (2) traditional dealerships cannot derive a significant profit from 
24 selling used Tesla or non-Tesla cars; (3) dealerships would be individually responsible for the 
25 expenses associated with adve11ising and incentives programs;.and (4) to cover the additional 
26 costs and make a profit, dealerships would be forced to .mark up the price of Tesla cars a~d would 
27 
28 
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Dealerships Cannot Derive Any Significant Profit From Servicing Tesla Cars 
Thirty-tlu·ee percent of a traditional dealership's profit is generated by the service 
5 and parts department. See supra ,r 19. Tl'lis is 'possible in large part because traditional 
6 dealerships have a la1:ge UIO base of vehicles; I estima!ed 3,700 to 4,900 vehicles for each Utah 
7 dealership. See supra ,r 20. Tesla, on the other hand, has sold in total only 247 Tesla cars to Utah 
.8 residents. See supra ,r 34. A UIO base of 247 cars is dramatically lower than the UIO base of 
9 thousands of vehicles typically relied on by dealerships to generate a profit thro_ugh service. 
10 There are simply not enough existing Tesla cars on the road to generate the service profits 
11 necessary to support the traditional'c:lealersltip model. 
12 43. In addition, Tesla's vehicles and service model minimize the need for in~person 
13 repairs. See supra ,r 35. Tesla performs over-the-air software updates to its cars, thus often 





Dealerships Cannot Derive Any Significant Profit From Used Vehicle Sales 
Twelve percent of a traditional dealership's profit is generated from the sale of 
17 used vehicles. See supra·,r 19 _i The majofity of these vehicles is acquired through trade-ins when 
18 a customer purchases a new vehicle. A dealership's used inventory is stored on the deale·rship's 
19 ' ' lot. 
20 45. The average Utah dealership sells ·around 54-7 used vehicles per year. See supra ,r 
21 11. This dramatically excee·a~ the number of pre-owned Tes!~ cars available for sale in. Utah. As 
' 22 stated above, Tesla has sold 24 ?-Tesla ·cars tb Utah residents since 2012. See supra ,r 34. 
23 Moreover, the magnitude of Tesla's worldwide sales is eclipsed by the magnitude of sales made 
24 · by traditional dealerships. Frain its r~lease hi 2012 'through the end of 2014, Tesla sold 
25 approximately 57,150 of its Model Scars worldwide. Id. In 2014 alone, traditional dealerships 





available for sale in Utah, nationwide, and even worldwide is insufficient to support the 
2 magnitude of profit from used vehicle sales traditional dealerships have come to expect. 
3 46. In addition, traditional dealerships obtain a large percentage of their used cars 
4 through trade-ins when customers purchase new cars. Because Tesla sells significantly fewer 
5 cars than a traditional dealership selling gas-powered vehicles, a traditional dealership selling 
6 Tesla cars would be able to acquire far fewer trade-ins (either Teslas or non-Te$las). As a result, 
7 the number of used cars in its inventory and its ability to profit from used car sales would be 
8 extremely limited, if at a ll. 
9 47. Finally, Tesla's existing stores typically do not have lots and, as a result, Tesla 
10 need not pay the overhead cost associated with having lots. A traditional dealership, which relies 
11 on profits from used vehicle sales, would be forced to acquire a lot for storing used vehicles and 
12 somehow absorb the overhead cost of the lot, thereby reducing the profits associated with used 






Dealerships Would Be Individually Responsible For Advertising Expenses 
And Incentives Programs 
Traditional dealerships rely heavily on vehicle manufacturers to ~d incentives 
17 programs, and manufacturers and dealership co-ops to fund advertising. See supra~~ 26-27. 
18 Incentives and advertising are two of the primary tools used by traditional franchised dealerships 
19 to generate potential customers as " traffic" through the door, into the dealerships. Id. Tesla does 
20 not use paid advertising or provide incentive programs to encourage consumers to purchase Tesla 
2 1 cars, instead relying on its brand and excellent customer service to promote its technology 
22 through word of mouth. See supra~ 39. It is unlikely that traditional dealerships would be able 
23 to replicate Tesla's high quality customer service on an individualized basis in order to Slclstain 
24 that reputation. As a result, they would need to rely on dealership-funded advertising and 










Independent Dealerships Would Have To Markup Retail Prices And Could 
Not Compete With Tesla's Uniform "No Haggle" Prices 
A traditional 'dealership selling Tesla cars would, like Tesla, need to derive the 
4 majority of its profits from new car sales. As explained above, sales of service and parts and 
5 sales of used cars are not viable sources of profits for dealerships selling Tesla cars. See supra 
6 §§ VI(A)-(B). In addition, dealerships selling Tesla cars would be required to absorb the cost of 
7 any advertising and incentives programs they wished to implement. See supra § VI(C). Thus, the 
8 vast majority of the dealerships' profits and costs (including advertising costs, overhead, etc.) 
9 would need to be included in the markup_ the dealership adds to the retail pric_e of a Tesla car. 
10 50. However, increasing the retail price above the "no haggle" prices offered by Tesla 
11 would ndt be viable for a dealer because customers could turn to Tesla stores or Tesla's website 
12 to purchase cars at the lower prices. Tesla, moreover, has set its "no haggle" price at a level that 
13 supports the operation of its business and given the low volumes of Tesla cars sold and the 
14 custom-made nature of Tesla vehicles, there is no basis for Tesla to offer a dealership reduced 
15 pricing. Thus, since Tesla would be selling its cars to dealerships at the same retail prices it 
16 offered to customers in its Tesla-owned stores and through its website, dealerships could not 
17 recover their costs and remain profitable while competing with Tesla's "no haggle" prices. 
18 51. The same would be true if dealerships attempted to profit from financing and 
19 insurance. See supra 125. Customers are far more likely to choose the low cost financing made 
20 available by Te_sla stores in other states than to select the "marked-up" financing typicaJiy offered 
21 by traditional dealerships. See supra 138. 
22 VII. EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT INDEPENDENT FRANCHISED DEALERSHIPS 
ARE INEFFECTIVE AT SELLING ELECTRIC CARS 
23 
24 52. Existing studies demonstrate that traditional dealerships are not well-suited to sell 
25 electric cars. In particular, the studies reveal that salespeople at traditional dealerships are often 
26 unfamiliar with electric vehicle teclmology and the costs and benefits of owning an electric 
27 vehicle, and lack incentive to spend the time. and energy necessary to sell an electric vehicle. See 
28 
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infra iJ~ 53-58. As a result, customers are dissatisfied with the experience of purchasing an 
2 electric vehicle from a traditional dealership. See id. It is not surprising that the vast majority-
3 93.5%49-of new vehicles sold in the United States are gas-powered, and only 0.5% of new 
















53. A study by Consumer Reports regarding experiences of potential customers 
interested in an electric vehicle at a traditional dealership found: 
54. 
"Overall, many dealership sales people [at traditional dealerships] 
were not as knowledgeable about electric cars as one might expect. 
While we discovered several very knowledgeable salespeople at 
some dealerships, few provided accurate and specific answers about 
battery life and battery warranties. And many seemed not to have a 
good understanding of electric-car tax breaks and other incentives 
or of charging needs and costs."51 
A Green Car Reports article entitled "Many Car D~alers Don't Want to Sell 
Electric Cars: Here's Why" found: 
"The salient point is that it takes much longer to sell a plu·g-in 
electric car, today, than it does a gasoline or diesel car. And dealers 
maximize their profits by exploiting the difference in information 
about complex financial transactions between buyers who do it 
once every five of six years, on average, and salespeople who sell 
multiple cars per day. Every salesperson's mission is to close the 
deal, today, at maximum profit with minimum time invested. 
Selling a plug-in car takes three to five times as long for a deal as 
does seUing.,_a ga1>oline car. .It requir~s explana,tion, ~ducation,-
training, all of the fuss and bother associated with installing a 
charging station in the garage if the buyer wants one, and so on. "52 
55. · In 2014, Cadillac launched its ELR model, its first plug-in hybrid vehicle. The 
20 ELR, a hybrid powered by gasoline and a rechargeable battery, is similarly priced to the Tesla 
21 Model S. In connection with its launch, Cadillac announced that 41_0 of its 940 traditional 







49 NADA Market Beat: Review of New Light-Vehicle Sales, December 2014, page 3. 
so Id. 
51 Consumer Reports, "Dealers Not Always Plugged in About Electric Cars," April 22, 2014, 
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/news/20 l 4 /04/ dealers-not-always-plugged-in-abotit-electric-cars-secret-
shopper-study-reveals/index. htm. · 
52 Green Car Reports, "Many Car Dealers Don't Want To Sell Electric Cars: Here's Why," February 14, 2014, 
http://www.greencarreports.com/news/ I 0902 81 _ many-car-dealers-dont-want-to-sel I-electric-cars-heres-why. 
53 Edmunds Inc., ''.Cadi!lac Tallies Dealers Set to Sell 2014 Cadillac ELR," February 13, 2014, 
http://www.edmunds.com/car-news/cad i 11 ac-tal Ii es-dealers-set-to-set 1-20 14-cad i l lac-elr .html. 
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launched in 2014, Cadillac offered incentives to its dealerships to sell the ELR, agreeing to "pay 
2 $5,000 for each ELR assigned to the test [drive]' tleet"55 up to $10,000. Cadilla_c also offered 
3 dealership and customer incentives with the sale of an ELR vehicle. 
4 56. A 2014 study by the UC Davis Institute of Transportation Studies that analyzed 
5 · sales satisfaction and customer satisfaction data for new vehicle buyers found that purchasers of 
6 electric vehicles from franchised dealerships had a poor customer experience-worse than that of 
7 buyers of gasoline-powered cars. The experience of Tesla customers, by contrast, was the most 
8 positive experience of all.56 The UC Davis study analyzed the J.D. Power 2013 Sales Satisfaction 
9 Index (SSI) data reflecting customer satisfaction at traditional dealerships and Tesla retail outlets. 
10 As shown below, the customer experience of most electric vehicle purchasers at traditional 
11 dealerships was very low, whereas buyer satisfaction for Tesla customers was much higher.57 
12 Buyer satisfaction with the new vehicle purchase experience 
13 • Plug-in Vehicle _Buyer (non-premium segment, N=?68) 
• Conventional Vehlcle Buyer (non-premium segment, N-=4,658) 

















■ Tesla (premium segment N=168; California data unavailable) 
• I 
1. nl 
750 800 8S0 
The UC Davis study found: 
"[Ojn average, plug-in car buyers rated dealers much lower in sales 
satis_faction than c9nvent~0nal car buyers. In contrast, buyei;s ranked 
Tesla inuch more favorably. The rriagnitude of these disparities is 





54 Automotive News, "GM offers dealers.$5,000 for Cadillac ELR test drives," May 12, 2014, 
http://www.autonews.com/article/20140512/RET AJLO I /140519983/gm-offers-dealers-$5000-for-cadil lac-elr-test-
drives. 
55 Automotive News, "GM offers dealers $5,000 for Cadillac ELR test drives," May 12, 2014, 
http://www.autonews.com/article/20140512/RET A.ILO I /140519983/gm-offers-dealers-$5000-for-cad ii lac-elr-test-
drives. . 
56 UC Davis Institute of Transportation Studies-New Vehicle Dealers and R~tail Iirnovation in California's Plug-In 
Electric Vehicle Market (Working Paper, October'2014). · 
57 UC Davis Institute of Transportation Studies- New Vehicle Dealers and Retail Innovation in California's Plug-In 
Electric Vehicle Market at page 7. 
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likely systemic. Poor purchase experience may adversely impact 
PEV sales and the growth of the nascent plug-in car market through 
missed opportunities to attract and retain customers to the 
technology. "58 
58. The UC Davis study explai_ned that the experiences of non-Tesla electric vehicle 
buyers varied significantly from dealership to dealership, contributing to the low satisfaction 
scores, because of the structure of the franchised dealer system. The study stated: 
"The highly decentralized nature of the franchise model, in which 
contractual arrangements_ and franchise laws confer a great degree 
of operating freedom to new car dealers, translates into divergent 
processes across the dealer: community. Franchise la~s bar 
automakers from setting uniform processes for its retail 
networks. "59 
VIII. EXISTING UTAH DEALERSHIPS ARE CONTRACTUALLY PROHIBITED 
FROM SELLING TESLA CARS ALONGSIDE NEW VEHICLES FROM OTHER 
MANUFACTURERS 
59. Traditional dealerships are generally prohibited from selling Tesla cars alongside 
new vehicles made by other manufacturers. 
60. Manufacturers have developed and implemented various programs to reinforce 
their brand image. This is the case not only for automotive dealerships, but for fast-food 
restaurants, retail establishments, and service industry locations. For traditional dealerships, these 
programs have included faci lity image programs that present a manufacturer's brand in a 
consistent and recognizable way. As a result, the facades, showrooms, and service areas of most 
dealerships for a brand have the same elements, including building design, walls and flooring, 
furniture and fixtures, and signage. 
61. Conctmently with the focus on implementing brand image programs, 
manufacturers typically require that dealerships sell only their brand of vehicle. It would be 
incongruous to have a brand image facility for a given brand, while having multiple brands on 
26 58 UC Davis Institute of Transportation Studies-New Vehicle Dealers and Retail Innovation in California's Plug-In 
Electric Vehicle Market at page 7. 
27 59 UC Davis Institute of Transporta tion Studies-New Vehicle Dealers and Retail Innovation in California's Plug-ln 
Electric Vehicle Market at page 8 
28 
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display iri. that facility. As a result, traditional dealerships are generally prohibited from selling 
2 multiple brands 'in a single fac ility. 
3 62. Dualed dealers~ips- dealerships that sell more than one manufacturer's new 
4 vehicles from a single facility-were once popular, but are now rare. Driven by manufacturers' 
5 desire to protect the exclusivity of their brands, the trend for many years has been to "de-dual" 
6 dealerships. Many dealerships that were once dualed have moved into separate buildings so that 





ln'Utah, only 13 out of 137 dealerships are still dualed. 
It is unlikely that existing Utah dealerships would be permitted to sell Tesla cars at 



















I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is hue and correct. 
Executed on July 28, 2015. 
Herbert E. Walter 
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I. My name is Fiona Scott Morton and I am the Theodore Nierenberg Professor of 
4 Economics at the Yale University School of Management, where I teach comses in the area of 
5 competitive strategy and conduct research into empirical industrial organization. I am also a 
6 Visiting Professor at the University of Edinburgh, a Seni_or Consultant at Charles River 
7 Associates, and a Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research. I hold a 
8 Bachelor's degree in Economics from Yale and a Ph.D. in Economics from the Massachusetts 


















2. I have been a professor at Yale since 1999, during which time I have been the 
Senior Associate Dean for Faculty Development. Before becoming a professor at Yale, I was an 
Assistant Professo1: of Economics and Strategy at the University of Chicago's Graduate School of 
Business. Before that, I was an Assistant Professor of Strategic Management at Stanford 
University's Graduate School of Business. 
3. From 2011 to 2012, I held the position of Deputy Assistant Attorney General for 
Economic Analysis in the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice. In this role, I 
supervised the economists in the Antitrust Division analyzing the cases that came before the 
Division. In many of these cases, the economists at t~e Division developed and assessed 
evidence of whether an organization's behavior was pro- or anti-competitive in light of the net 
impact of the behavior on consumers in terms of price, innovation, ~r quality. 
4. I currently teach two courses at the Yale School of Management: Competitive 
Strategy, and Advanced Competition Economics and Policy. Competitive Strategy is an MBA 
elective course covering theories of how firms compete, including competition with respect to 
price, quantity, entry and exit into the market, research and development, and product 
differentiation. Advanced Competition Economics and Policy focuses on antitrust concepts. 
5. I have published more than 20 articles in peer-reviewed journals. I also serve in an 
27 editing role on various academic economics journals, and I am a referee for a number of journals, 
28 including the Review of Economic Studies, the Quarterly Journal of Economics, the RAND 
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Journal of Economics, the Journal of Industrial Economics, and the Journal of Law and 
2 Economics. I am also a member of the American Economic Association. 
3 6. My research is in the field of empirical indush·ial organization, which is the 
4 application of empirical methods to the field of industrial organization. The field of industrial 
5 organization examines the structure of firms and markets, inc luding competitive markets and 
6 monopolies. My work focuses on empirical stud ies of competition among companies and firms, 
7 including in areas such as pricing, entry, and product differentiation. 
8 7. I have researched and published peer-reviewed articles about the automotive 
9 industry, including research and publications on price negotiation in the U.S. auto retailing 
10 industry, state franchising laws related to dealer terminations, internet car retailing and 
11 transactfons, pf-ice discrimination against women and minorities at dealerships, and i"nventory 
12 fluctuations at deale1'ships. Several of these papers received awards, including the Green Award 
13 from the Journal of Marketing Research for the paper on internet car retailing and transactions. 
14 8. I have testified as a qualified expert' about the franchise system, including the 
15 economics of the franchise system and the reasons that auto manufacturers reorganized their 
16 franchise network in the wake of the financial crisis. I have testified in front of Congress on 
17 pricing in the pharmaceutical industry. A copy of rriy cw-ricuH.tm vitae is attached as Exhibit 1. 
SCOPE OF TESTIMONY 18 II. 
19 9. , . Counsel for Tesla Motors, Inc. ("Tesl~") asked me to review tli.e economic 
20 rationales for Tesla's sales model, whith involves selling its cars directly to consumers, and the 
21 independent franchised dealership model. 
22 10. In preparation for my testimony, I reviewed the relevant Utah statutes, including 
23 the Utah Business Regulation Act and the Utah New Automobile Franchise Act, the Utah 
24 Constitution and relevant amendments to the constitution, publicly available information 
25 concerning Tesla and this dispute, and research on retail sales, the dealership model, and 
26 consumer preferences in the automotive industry. I have also spoken to and heard and reviewed 
27 testimony from Tesla employees and an automotive expe1t (Herb Walter) about Tesla's business 
















also read a number of reports that examine the economics of automobile distribution as well as 
letters from the Federal Trade Commission and other economists describing the impacts of 
franchise laws that restrict distribution. 
11. Tesla has retained me at an hourly rate of$ l ,000. I have spent more than 50 hours 
studying the economic rationales for Tesla's sales mode l and the independent franchised 
dealership model. 
12. It is my opinion that Tesla's retail business 1nodel is highly effective for a firm 
producing a new and novel product and represents a lower-cost alternative to the traditional 
franchised dealer model. It is also my opinion that prohibiting any non-franchising manufacturer, 
including_ Tesla, from selling new vehicles directly to consumers in Utah would harm Utah 
consumers and its economy, be inefficient and anti-competitive, and serve no legitimate 
government purpose. 
ill. TESLA'S DIRECT-SALES MODEL IS CRITICAL TO ITS SUCCESS 
13. Tesla's sales and distribution model differs significantly from the traditional 
15 manufacturer-independent franchise model used to sell almost all new vehicles in the United 
16 States. Under the franchise model, each franchised dealer has a contract with a car manufacturer. 
17 The dealer buys vehicles from the manufacturer and maintains an inventory of vehicles on its lot. 
18 The dealer maintains a showroom and sales staff to sell new vehic les, and offers service and 
19 repairs, including warranty repairs, for existing vehicles from that manufacturer. The staff at a 
20 traditional dealership is educated about gasoline-powered cars, is trained to sell those cars, and 
2 1 receives financial incentives to sell those cars. The base compensation for salespeople at 
22 traditional franchised dealerships is low,, sometimes minimwn wage. Salespeople are 
23 compensated primarily through commissions-calculated based on the sale price of the new car 
24 - with the department's overall profits contributing to commissions/bonuses for the dealership's 
25 management team. T he franchise dealer usually offers financing at a significant mark-up. 
26 Typically the staff is also incentivized through commissions (often higher than the commissions 




Prices fo r new vehicles and "add-ons" are usually negotiable, with the dealer attempting to obtai n 
2 the highest price that he or she can. 
3 14. In contrast with the traditional independent franchise model, Tesla sells its cars 
4 directly to consumers through stores it owns and operates. These stores are staffed by Tesla 
5 employees with a thorough knowledge of Tesla vehicles. The stores generally have no inventory 
6 in stock and only one or two vehicles for test drives and service loaners. Tesla cars are made to 
7 order, and delivered to the store or other locations for pick-up by customers. Tesla's salespeople 
8 are salaried employees. While they are paid certain commissions on the sales of cars, the 
9 commissions are significantly less in amount and are structured differently than those paid by 
10 traditional dealerships that incentivize haggling over price and "add-ons." Tesla offers assistance 
11 with financing through its financial partners, but it does not mark-up the finance with points or 
12 fees. Tesla receives only a small referral fee, which is based on a fixed percentage of the loan 
13 size. Unlike traditional dealerships, Tesla does not try to develop revenue streams th.rough 
14 financing and insurance or the sale of add-on features. 
15 15. Tesla's view is that it would be financially disastrous if Tesla were forced to sel_l 
16 its cars through a franchised dealer model because Tesla cars are extremely different from 
. . 
17 gasoline-powered cars, must be sold in a different environment, and are currently sold on a 
18 relatively small scale. It is my opinion that there are several strong economic justifications for 
19 these beliefs and that selling Tesla cars th.rough the existing network of traditional dealers would 









A. Independent Franchised Dealers Are Not Incentivized To Sell Tesla Cars 
Ov.er Gasoline-Powered Cars 
16. Tesla's direct-sales model is incompatible with the independent franchised dealer 
model because dealers that sell gasoline-powered cars are not incentivized to promote Tesla's 
novel cars effectively for a number of reasons. 
17. First, the amount of information that needs to be conveyed to the buyer of an 
electric vehicle is large and the information is complex. A sales force focused primarily on 
selling gasoline-powered cars is unlikely to have the time or incentive to master it, particularly 
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given Tesla's very small number of sales compared to other car manufacturers. With Tesla's car 
2 production still at an early stage, Tesla's sales are relatively low, especially compared to gasoline-
3 powered car sales. In 2014, for example, Tesla delivered 31 ,655 Model Scars worldwide.1 In 
4 contrast, traditional dealers in the United States sold more than 16.5 million cars in 2014, the vast 
5 majority of which were gasoline-powered.2 To date, Tesla has sold 247 cars in Utah. To ensure 
6 that customers are provided with sufficient information about Tesla cars in an attractive and 
7 relaxed environment, Tesla has opened its own stores staffed with its own employees. Similar 
8 motivations have led other firms selling innovative and novel products (Apple, for example) to 
9 establish their own company-owned and operated stores. 
10 18. Second, a traditional dealership does not provide incentives to its salespeople to 
11 spend the time necessary to educate consumers about a new and innovative technology for a small 
12 market. The people who come in to Tesla stores are often simply curious about its innovative 
13 product and often visit multiple times before they buy a vehicle. A salesperson at a traditional 
14 dealership would not find it financially worthwhile to spend time educ<!,ting a potential purchaser 
15 of a Tesla vehicle when he or she could be engaging in a much quicker sale of a gasoline-
16 powered vehicle. 
17 19. Third, in order to cover their costs and make a profit, a franchised dealership 
18 selling Tesla cars would have to mark up the retail price of the car. 1?ut such a price could not 
19 compete with (or match) the uniform "No Haggle" prjces Tesla offers over the Internet and 
20 througµ its wholly-owned stores in other stat~s. The franchised dealership could not then make 
21 up this loss through service revenue or by selling used Tesla cars because of the relatively low 
22 volume of Tesla sales to date. 
23 20. Several studies have researched consumer satisfaction with the process of 
24 purchasing an electric vehicle at a traditional dealership. These studies have uniformly shown 
25 that buying an electric vehicle at a traditional dealership is not a successful experience. 
26 According to an article in Consumer Reports, for example, "when asked about a Prius plug-in, a 
27 
28 1 Tesla Motors, Inc. Annual Report for the year ending December 3 1, 2014. 
2 Automotive News: U.S. Car and Light-Truck Sales by Make December 201 4. 
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salesperson at Star Toyota Scion of Bayside, New York, would not even show our shopper the 
2 car, despite having one in stock."3 For this article, Consumer Reports undertook a study where it 
3 sent secret shoppers to traditional dealerships to try and buy electric cars. T he secret shoppers 
4 reported that salespeople at traditional dealerships usually did not know very much about electric 
5 cars and were not particularly enthusiastic about the electric cars. Another study performed by 
6 the University of California at Davis found that plug-in vehicle buyers were unhappy with their 
7 experiences at traditional dealerships.4 In that study, a number of interviews were conducted at 
8 dealerships, surveys were sent to buyers in California, and national sales data was collected from 
9 J.D. Power that allowed the authors to compare the survey answers with data about the sales 
10 transaction underlying the survey questions. 
11 21. These studies support Tesla's conclusion that it could not successfully sell its cars 
12 through traditional dealers. This result is not surprising in light of the underlying economics. A 
13 ' traditional dealership incentivizes its salespeople to obtain high margins on every car sold 
14 because a salesperson is paid more if he obtains a higher price on a vehicle. In contrast, the price 
15 of a Tesla car is fixed, so there· is no role for the salesperson to assess the consumer's willingness 
16 to pay and increase the margin accordingly. Furthermore, because electric vehicles are a new 
17 · technology that many people aren' t familiar with, it takes time to educate them before they are 
18 ready to make a purchase. Traditional dealerships are not incentivized to invest this time on this 
19 new, relatively low-voluine techlfology-when they could be making higher profits on the faster-
20 selling gasoline-powered vehicles. Nor can they be expected to promote the advantages of 





Tesla's Direct-Sales Model Is More Cost-Effective 
Tesla 's direct-sales model also makes sense economically because selling its cars 
24 through traditional dealerships would not be feasible for Tesla. As a new brand that is still at an 
25 early stage of ramping its vehicle production, Tesla has very low sales as compared to long-
26 
3 Dealers Not Always Plugged in About Electric Cars, Consumer Reports ' Study Reveals, ConsumerReports.org 
27 (Apr. 22, 20 l4); see also 2014 BMW i3 Test Drive: No Help from Salesman for Electric-Car Buyer, Green Car 
Reports (May 23, 2014). 
28 4 UC Davis Institute o f Transportation Studies - New Car Dealers and Retai l Innovation in California's Plug-In 
Electric Veh icle Market at p. 6. 
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established car manufacturers. The cost of sustaining a ded icated franch isee on a large plot of 
land with a repair shop to se ll only a handfuJ of cars per month would be prohibitively high, 
especially in light o f the low number of existing Tesla cars that would need serv ice and repairs. It 
is highly unlikely that prospective franch isees would be willing to commit significant assets to 
build such a facility. Because of these high fixed costs for traditional dealers, they need to sell 
large volumes of cars quickly, a sales model incompatible with Tesla's need to patiently educate 
consumers about a relatively new company and new technology. 
23. By contrast, Tesla's stores in operation today have very low fixed and variable 
costs because they typically have onJy a few people on staff and no inventory because Tesla cars 
are custom-made. Tesla's use of rented space for its stores allows it to free up capital and readily 
expand or relocate as circumstances warrant. This low level of overhead is practical and cost-
effective given the still-early stage of Tesla's vehicle production and the relatively low amount of 
sales that go with it. These choices are driven by the needs of the technology as well as the scale 
of the firm. It would significantly increase Tesla's costs to require it to sell through independent 
franchised dealers, which, assuming that Tesla cars would even sell through that model, would 
make its cars more expensive and less accessible to consumers. 
24. Based on Tesla's product and scale, Tesla's sales model makes sense for its 
business, while the standard franchised dealership model is incompatible with Tesla's business 
and products. Tesla's business model undercuts the primary source of profits for a standard 
dealership-used car sales and the repairs and maintenance business. Tesla does not buy and sell 
non-Tesla used vehicles, and its pool of available Tesla used vehicles is tiny compared to 
franchised dealers. And Tesla's service and parts revenue is constricted because Tesla's past and 
current sales are relatively quite low. Traditional franchised dealerships would need to compete 
with Tesla's uniform reta il prices in Tesla-owned stores and over the Internet. Moreover, because 
the product (as well as the company) is new and novel, Tesla requires different selling behavior, 
different sales skills, and a different environment than other manufacturers. Because of all of 





























IV. DENYING TESLA A NEW MOTOR VEHICLE DEA!:,ER LICENSE WOULD 
HARM CONSUMERS AND COMPETITION 
25. As an economist who has studied regulation and competition, it is my opinion that 
preventing Tesla from adopting a direct-sales model in Utah would have a negative effect on 
consumers and competition. If Tesla were denied a new motor vehicle dealer license, consumers 
in Utah would have fewer choices, and in particular, they would not have the option of easily 
shopping for Tesla's innovative car, which has the potential to create s ignificant utility and 
consumer welfare. 
26. In general, studies show that consumers dis like shopping for cars_at traditional 
independent franchised dealerships, and find it to be a very unpleasant experience. For example, 
a report by McKinsey & Company5 on the automotive retail market found that one in fom 
customers is not satisfied with his experience at a dealership. Recognizing this reality, Tesla 
adopted a very different business model and chose to set uniform prices, promote education, and 
create a low-pressure and relaxed environment. The creation of this alternative model is good for 
the consumer because it creates more choices. If consumers like this retail experience, and the 
retail experience is one factor that drives Tesla's sales, this will put competitive pressure on 
traditional dealers. Competing dealers will want to improve their own buying experience in order 
I 
to retain consumers-and all consumers will benefit from this competition. 
27. Tesla's direct-sales approach has been endorsed by its customers. In a recent 
survey of its subscribers conducted by Consumer Reports covering quality, reliability, and 
consumer satisfaction, the Tesla Model S earned a score of 99, the highest score any car has ever 
. ' ' 
received.6 This syperior overall score suggests that Tesla Model S owners are pleased with their 
sales and service experience as well as by the inherent quality of the vehicle. As an economist, I 
. . . 
put significant weight on the behavior of consumers because it is an indicator of what they prefer. 
I 
If consumers are purchasing Tesla cars, it's because they like the car at the price they paid better 
. ; 
I • 
27 5 McKinsey & Company, Innovating Automotive Retail (Feb. 20 14) ( discussing resitlts of McKinsey's 2013 Retail 
Innovation Consumer Survey). 
28 6 Tesla Model S Takes the Top Spot in Consumer Reports Car Owner-Satisfaction Ratings, ConsumerReports.org 
(Nov. 2 1, 20 13); see also Would You Buy Your Car Again?, ConsumerReports.org (Dec. 2014). 
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than the other available options in the market. The fac t that consumers rate Tesla highly indicates 
2 that consumer loss would be significant if Tesla vehicles were not available. 
3 28. Tesla's direct control of service and maintenance has also generated significant 
4 benefits to the consumer. First, Tesla's national service platform takes advantage of new 
5 technologies. Tesla, for exa~ple can perform over-the-air software updates to its cars, thus 
6 avoiding a trip to a service center. Second, Tesla's service technicians are also in close 
7 communication with Tesla engineers to troubleshoot and solve problems quickly. Third, Tesla 
8 service employees, unlike those at dealerships, are paid by the hour rather than the job and are not 
9 paid commissions. This eliminates the incentive to perform hasty work to complete more jobs in 
10 a shorter amount of time or encourage CW?tomers to purchase potentially unnecessary additional 
11 work, both of v.:hich can increase service profits at a traditional dealership. A Consumer Reports 
12 survey gave Tesla's service operation its highest marks, beating all other repair facilities 
13 (including franchised dealerships and independent repair shops) for repair satisfaction, on-time 
14 repairs, courtesy, price, quality, find overall satisfaction.7 
15 29. Moreover, if Tesla were not granted a dealer license, Utah consumers would be 
) ~ • .1 
16 denied ready access to T~sla's new vehicles. While some Utah consumers might still choose to 
17 purchase Tesla ciµs in neighboring states (Nevada and Cqlorado have Tesla stores) or online, 
18 these consumers would be inconvenienced by having to travel out of state or to self-register their 
19 "out of state" vehicles with the Divis-ion of Motor Vehicles of the Utah State Tax Commission. 
20 Other potential Tesla buyers in Utah might never hear of the car, never obtain purchase 
2 1 information, or otherwise be deterred from purchasing Tesla cars because Tesla will be precluded 
22 from actively marketing its cars in the state. Further, if Tesla were prohibited from selling 
23 directly to consumers in Utah and had to use an inefficient method of distribution, this wo,uld 
24 raise prices. These higher prices would be borne by GOnswners. 
25 30. In contrast, if Tesla were permitted to open a store to sell its cars in Utah, 
26 consumers would have more car-buy ing choice and readily available information about those 
27 




1 choices, which is good for competition. Additional ly, the arrival of Tesla in the state would not 
2 be just like adding another manufacturer similar to the ones already present; the impact on 
3 consumer choices would likely be larger because Tes la is so different. It uses a different and 
4 itmovative technology, has a different environmental impact, and offers a ve1y different shopping 
5 experience in the automotive industry. These new options in the car market hold great potential 
6 for Utah consumers, whether they purchase electric vehicles or gas-powered ones. If Tesla were 
7 denied a license, dealers ·of competing models would no longer face increased incentives to 
8 compete on the basis of lower prices and/or superior customer service. 
9 3 l. One of the two government agencies tasked with enforcing US competition laws 
10 supports the conclusion that automobile firms, including Tesla, should be free to choose the 
11 distribution model-that is best-suited for their needs. The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), 
12 whose mandate is to protect consumers and ensure competition, submitted comments in three 
13 states as they considered permitting direct distribution in the autom'.otive industry-in two states 
14 the FTC specifically urged legislators to lift prohibitions on Tesla's direct sales.8 The FTC 
15 explained that government-imposed mandates requiring companies tb' tun their business through 
16 · dne particular business model does not serve the best interest of consumers. By contrast, giving 
17 companies the freedom to choose the model that makes the most sense for them, ·and letting the 








Directors of three FTC divisions also authored a blog post endorsing Tesla's 
direct-th-consumer sales strategy finding that "American consumers an'd businesses benefit from 
23 8 See FTC StaffCommenfBefore the Missouri House of Representatives Regarding House Bill 11 24, Which Would 
Expand the Current Prohibition on Direct-to-Consumer Sales by Manufacturers of Automobiles, May 15, 2014, 
24 available at http://www.ftc.gov/system/fi les/documents/advocacy documents/ftc-staff-comment-missouri-house-
representatives-regarding-house-bill-l I 24-which-would-expand/140515mo-autoadvocacy.pdf; FTC Staff Comment 
25 Before the New Jersey General Assembly Regarding Assembly Bi lls 2986, 3096, 304 1, and 3216, Which Would 
Create Limited Exceptions to New Jersey's Prohibition on Direct-to-Consumer Sales by Manufacturers of 
26 Automobiles, May 16, 20 14, available at http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/advocacy documents/ftc-staff-
comment-new-jersey-general-assembly-regard ing-assembly-bi I ls-2986-3096-304 1-3216-which/l 40516nj-
27 autoadvocacy.pdf; and FTC Staff Comment Regarding Michigan Senate Bill 268 Which Would Create A Limited 
Exception To M ichigan Law, May 7, 2015, available at 
28 https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/advocacy documents/ftc-staff-comment-regarding-michigan-senate-bill-





a dynamic and diverse economy where new technologies and business models can and have 
2 disrupted stable and stagnant industries, often by responding to w1met or under-served consumer 
3 needs."9 The blog post concluded that "efforts by auto dealers and others to bar new sources of 
4 competition [are] expressions of a lack of confidence in the competitive process that can only 
5 make consumers worse off." Academic literature also contains studies that show why firms 
6 might choose direct distribution in some cases and franchising in other cases. 
7 V. DENYING A LICENSE TO TESLA WOULD HARM UTAH'S ECONOMY 
8 33. Barring Tesla from selling vehicles in Utah would produce several deleterious 
9 effects on Utah's economy. First, Utah would lose potential new jobs if Tesla were not granted a 
10 dealer license. Without a license, Tesla would not be able to open full-service stores in Utah, 
11 which would likely employ Utah residents. With fewer Tesla vehicles being sold to Utah 
12 residents, Tesla might also fi.nd it uneconomical to operate its service facility in Salt Lake City. 
13 Such actions would risk the jobs of the Utah residents that Tesla already employs. 
14 34. Second, the state government could be expected to suffer a loss of sales tax 
15 revenues if Tesla ~ere precluded from selling vehicles directly in Utah. Some of these losses 
16 might be offset if prospective Tesla buyers opt to purchase other vehicles in Utah instead, but 
17 because ( 1) Tesla's novel product may attract buyers who otherwise would not have chosen to 
18 purchase a new vehicle and (2) Tesla vehicles command a premium price compared to all but a 
19 few gasoline-powered models, any such offset is likely to be incomplete. The state also could 
20 expect to lose income tax revenue if Tesla moves jobs from Utah to other states. 
21 35. Third, with fewer electric cars on its roads, Utah would forego environmental 
22 benefits that occur when electric cars replace gasoline-powered cars, including reductions in local 
23 air pollution and in greenhouse gas emissions. 
24 VI. NO RATIONAL ECONOMIC INTEREST SUPPORTS THE DENIAL OF A NEW 
MOTOR VEIDCLE DEALER LICENSE TO TESLA 
25 
36. Utah's Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division ("MVED") may claim that the· 
26 
restriction on direct sales in the current franchised dealer system is justified because it provides 
27 
28 9 See "Who Decides How Consumers Should Shop?" dated April 24, 2014, available at https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/blogs/cornpetition-rnatters/20 14/04/who-decides-how-consurners-should-shop 
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price competition or ensures important consumer protections. It is my opinion that neither of 
these claims is valid. Denying a new motor vehicle license to Tesla will reduce price competition 
and will not provide protections to purchasers of Tesla cars. 
A. 
37. 
Tesla's Vertically Integrated Sales Model Eliminates Double Marginalization 
The MVED may claim that the presence of independent franchised dealerships 
promotes price competition. There are two types of competition: competition among dealers of 
the same brand (intrabrand competition) and competition among manufacturers of different 
brands (interbrand competition). Independent franchised dealerships only promote intrabrand 
price competition- i.e., competition for the same brand of automobile. But the use of 
independent franchised dealerships brings with it the problem of "double marginalization" that 
increases prices for consumers. Tesla's vertically integrated s·ales model avoids this entirely 
while promoting competition with other automobile brands. 
38. "Double marginalization""is an econoniics term that refers to the problem that 
arises when two companies both apply mark-ups to the same product. Double marginalization ·is 
inherent in the traditional franchised dealership model: first, the manufacturer marks-up its 
manufacturing costs to arrive at the wholesale price; second, the dealership adds an additional 
mark-up to produce the retail price. Interbrand competition occurs at the first stage-
manufacturers compete with each othe·r as they set the wholesale price of the vehicle. Intrabrand 
competition occurs in the second.stage-dealerships selling the same car brand compete with 
each other by reducing their dealer markup over the manufacturer's price. The franchised 
dealership model only promotes intrabrand competition and it does not affect the manufacturer 's 
wholesale price. 
39. The magnitude of doubfe marginalization de·pends on the level of competition 
24 among dealers. For example, ifthere are a number of Ford dealers in a particular area all 
25 competing against each other for the same customers, the dealers' margins will be low. But if a 
26 dealer faces minimal intrabrand competition from other dealers, then the dealer controls retail 
27 margins without being disciplined by competition from other dealers. Without competition, the 
28 Ford dealer charges a monopoly price for its retailer services on top of Ford's wholesale price for 
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the car. Competition among franchise dealers may be limited by state law restrictions on the 
2 establislunent of new franch ise dealers for a particular area. For example, a 1986 study by the 
3 FTC estimated that franchising laws restricting the establishment of new automobile dealerships 
4 raised the average price of the Chevrolet cars that were sampled by about 6 percent. 10 
5 40. As demonstrated in the following hypothetical illustration, Tesla's sales model 























1 dealer sells compete to sell Manufacturer sells 
desired car desired car directly 
Manufacturer cost of sales $950 $950 $950 
Manufacturer retail costs (rent and staff) $25 
+ Manufacturer mark-up $50 $50 $51 
Dealer invoice cost for vehicle $1,000 $1,000 
Dealer cost of sales (rent, advertising, fioor plan) $50 $50 
I Dealer mark-up $100 $10 
Consumer Pays $1,150 $1,060 $1,026 
41. In this example, the manufacturer's whotesale price for a c'ar is $1,000. In the first 
scenario there is only one franchise dealer in the region, that i~, then:ns limited intraorand 
competition. This example assumes the franchised dealer's retail cost is $50 per car, which 
covers the dealer's rent, advertising, sales staff, etc .. The franchised d'ealer exerts significant 
market power and the dealer may charge a relatively high mark-up over the wholesa1e price -and 
the dealer's costs. In this case the dealer mark-up is $100, and the final retail price of the car is 
$1,150. In the second scenario three competing dealers purchase the vehicle from the 
manufacturer at an identical wholesale price (as is generally required by law). Because of the 
competition between dealers, each dealer exerts le~s market power and the dealer mark-~p falls to 
$10, resulting in a lower retail price. 
42. A vertically integrated sales model, which Tesla employs, is vastly different from 
the first two scenarios. The manufacturer's retail costs are lower because it does not carry an 
inventory of cars, has no advertising costs, and employs fewer salespeople. While the 
28 10 Robert P. Rogers, The Effect of State Entry Regulation on Retail Automobile Markets, Bureau of Economics Staff 
Report to the federal Trade Commission (Jan. 1986). 
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manufacturer may charge a higher mark-up (e.g., $5 1 rather than $50), the final retail price is 
2 much lower than it would be if the vehicle was marked-up by both the manufacturer and the 
3 dealer. 
4 43. · In the vertically integrated sales model, Tesla ' s manufacturer mark-up is limited 
5 by interbrand competition. Tesla has strong incentives to manage its sales operations as 
6 efficiently as possible and has no incentive to raise prices at the retail level beyond those that best 





Tesla' Already Has Powerful Incentives To Protect Its Consumers 
Utah may also claim that independent franchised dealerships are necessary to 
IO protect consumers. But this claim ignores the powerful incentives Tesla has to ensure their 
11 customers are well-se1iied and well-serviced. Tesla's incentives to provide excellent service to its 
12 customers are particularly high as its cars .are a new and novel product. Te_sla is building a 
13 reputation for excellent customer service that enhances the reputation of its cars. 11 In r~cent 
1
1
4 comments, the FJ;C concwT~P tl~a~ P,roviding inadequate customer service is contrary to the 
15 econoi;nic self-int~r~?,t of an f1Uto manufactw-er. 12 
16 45. Tesla al;m has a clear incentive to carry out repairs quickly and well because it 
. . . ' . ' 
17 faces no extemaµties; a g{:>od brand with a good reputation for quali,ty redounds entirely to the 
18 cprqpany. Tesla's sterli.qg rept,1tation is particularlx important becaus~, in addition to having to 
• • , I 
19 sell the public on a no,vel technology, it is doing .so without any paid advertising. If Tesla fails to 
I " '• • ' ' • ' 
20 provide adequate warranty repairs for its cars, consumers will find out rapid,ly, and the brand will 
21 be harmed. In contrast, because an independent franchised dealer earns its own profits from 
22 warranty repairs, it may maximize those profits in a way that harms _the brand; the harm to the 
23 
11 Consumer Reports, "Tesla Model S Takes the Top Spot in Consumer Reports Car Owner-Satisfaction Ratings," 
24 November 21, 2013, available at http://pressroom.consumerreports.org/pressroom/20 13/1 l/my-entry-2.html. 
12 See FTC Staff Comment Before the Missouri House of Representatives Regarding House Bill 1124, Which Would 
25 Expand the Current Prohibition on Direct-to-Consumer Sales by Manufacturers of Automobiles, May 15, 2014, p. 7, 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/system/fi !es/ documents/a·d vocacy _ documents/ftc-staff-comment-m issouri-house-
26 representatives-regarding-house-bill-1124-which-would-expand/l40515mo-autoadvocacy.pdf and FTC Staff 
Comment Before the New Jersey General Assembly Regarding Assembly Bills 2986, 3096, 3041 , and 3216, Which 
27 Would Create L imited Exceptions to New Jersey's Prohibition on Direct-to-Consumer Sales by Manufacturers of 
Automobiles, May 16, 20 14, pp. 6-7, available at 
2 8 http://www.ftc.gov/system/fi !es/documents/advocacy_ documents/ftc-staff-commen t-new-jersey-general-assemb ly-
regard ing-assemb I y-bills-2986-3096-304 1-32 16-which/l 405 16n j -au toad vocacy. pd f. 
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brand is not fully absorbed by the dealer, but is shared with the manufacturer and all the other 
2 franchised dealers. A dealership has imperfect incentives to preserve ~ts brand 's reputation with 
3 good service because other dealers and the manufactmer may share in the benefits of its efforts. 
4 Tesla, on the other hand, has incentives to make sure that each store provides top quality service 
5 to each customer, no matter the store visited. It is, therefore, unsurpris ing that Tesla consistently 
6 receives top marks for customer service, repairs and maintenance. See 1127-28. 
7 VII. CONCLUSION 
8 46. The denial of a new motor vehicle dealer license to Tesla in Utah would harm 
9 Utah conswners and its economy, would be anti-competitive, and is not in the public interest. 
10 Refu_sing to grant a license to Tesla would effectively bar an innovative entrant from selling 
11 automobiles in the state of Utah and would hamper future efforts by Tesla or other manufacturers 
12 to use new and potentially more efficient methods to sell and distribute new automobiles. 
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JUOOE PHAN: Everyone have a seat. All 
right. I'm turning on the recording system. Let's 
see, and I kncM we do have a court re!X)rter here for 
the record, but we will be keeping a recording as well. 
Okay. We are here for the formal hearing in 
the matter of Tesla Motors Utah, Inc. versus Motor 
Vehicle Enforcement Division. I'm Jane Phan. I'm the 
Jl.dministrative Law Judge here at the State Tax 
Conrnission. 
Presiding at this hearing, we have 
Conrnissioner Chair John Valentine. We have all 
conrnissioners here, Conrnissioner Michael Cragun d01-m. 
there, Conrnissioner Robert Pero, and Conrnissioner 
Rebecca Rockwell at the end. 
So let's have the parties introduce 
themselves for the record. Those who are representing 
Tesla, go ahead. 
MR. PETROG0JRGE: Michael Petrogeorge from 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer. 
MR. RILEY: George Riley from O'Melveny & 
Meyers for Tesla. 
JUOOE PHAN: All right . Those who are here 
representing the Res!X)ndent Di:..n.sion? 
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1 MR. FRANCIS: Gale Francis, Assistant 1 TIIB l'II'INESS: Curtis. 
2 Attorney General , on behalf of the Motor Vehicle 
J Enforcement Division. 
2 MR. FRANCIS: Curtis Stoddard from the 
4 MR. LIND: Laron Lind, Assistant Attorney 
3 Di vision. Also in the room is Helen Frohrich, who is 
4 an Assistant Attorney General with our Division as 
5 General, also here on behalf of the Division. 5 well. 
6 JUOOE PHAN: Okay. And we have in the 6 JUOOE PHAN: All right . And generally our 
7 audience at this time -- why don't you go ahead and 
8 introduce the people who are here as your witnesses. 
7 hearings are closed to ~he pub~ic. But I just let you 
8 know in the back of the room are two Tax Catrnission 





Your Honor. First, Diarmuid O'Connell, who is the 10 
Vice President of Business Development from Tesla. Our 11 
second witness will be Professor Fiona Scott Morton, 
who is endowed chair at the Yale School of Management 
12 
13 
14 in economics . 14 
15 And with the Court's permission, I'd like to 15 
16 introduce two other individuals who are here from 16 
17 Tesla. First is Todd Maron. Todd Maron is the General 17 
18. Counsel of Tesla. And then we have Lynn Miller, who is 18 
19 the Associate General Counsel fro.~ Tesla . Finally, my 19 
20 colleague from O'Melveny & Meyers, Elysa Wan. Thank 20 
21 you. 21 
22 JUOOE PHAN: Okay. All right . And the 22 
23 Division, who do you intend to call as witnesses? 23 
24 MR. FRANCIS: We intend to call George -- 24 
25 excuse me -- what is your first name? 25 
Let's go ahead and have opening statements. 
OPENING ARGUMENT 
BY MR. RILEY: 
Thank you, Your Honor. Chairman Valentine, 
honorable conrnissioners, I'm George Riley. And it is a 
privilege to appear before you today to ·represent Tesla 
in the appeal from .the May 21st, 2015, denial' of the 
application for a new motor vehicle license. On behalf 
of Tesla, I thank you for making the time available to 
us on an expedited basis for this hearing and for all 
conrnissioners being here present. 
We believe that the evidence will show in 
this case that these applications were wrongly denied 
as a matter of law by the Division. Under the proper 
construction of the statutes, indeed, under the 
constitutional construction of the statutes, a new 
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1 motor vehicle dealer's license should have been issued 1 
2 to Tesla Utah. 2 
3 First, some background on Tesla . Founded in 3 
4 2003, Tesla i s revolutionizing the automobile industry. 4 
5 From i ts award-winning electric vehicles to its unique 5 
6 methods of selling and servicing these vehicles, Tesla 6 
7 is setting new standards in a market long dominated by 7 
8 old assumptions and outdated methods . 8 
9 ~s a U.S. manufacturer of cars, Tesla ' s 9 
10 innovation and customer services have brought much 10 
11 needed competition to the marketplace. This is Tesla ' s 11 














unique combination pf engineering genius and design 13 
innovation. One version of the Model Scan travel 265 14 
miles on a single charge, yet it 's powerful enough to 15 
go from Oto 60 in 3.2 seconds. 16 
But safety comes f irst at Tesla. This car 17 
has achieved the highest rankings in safety ever given 18 
by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. 19 
Consumers have embraced the benefits offe~ed by Tesla. 20 
This is demonstrated in the sales. Just a few years 21 
ago, this upstart corrpany only sold a few thousand cars 22 
a year. This year, 2015, they plan to sell 50,000 23 
automobiles, all made at its fac~ory in Fremont, 24 
California. 25 
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1 both in its methods of distribution and sale, as well 1 
2 as in .the design of the· cars, ha::i challenged other 2 
~ corrpanies to up their game·, ~o improve their delivery 3 
4 of services and automobiles to consumers. This is the 4 
5 free market at its best . 5 
6 Well, to survive in a market ~hat is 6 
7 dominated by gasoline-pow~red cars, today electric 7 
8 vehicles, for all the success that ' Tesla '.has had, less 8 
9 t.hsm 1 p_erc~nt of all car~ sold in the Ufli ted States 9 
10 are electric vehicles. 10 
11 In order to survive, Tesla has h_ad to create 11 
12 a direct sales model that is as efficient, consumer 12 
13 friendly, and innovative as its cars . Indeed, t he 13 
14 evidence will show in this case that it would not be 14 
15 viable for Tesla to sell to an in9epende~t franchise 15 
16 dealer . In fact, Tesla nowhere in the world sells i ts 16 
17 cars through independent franchis~ dealers. 17 
18 In his t estimony, Mr. O'Connell will explain 18 
19 the principle aspects of the direct sales model. 19 
20 Professor Scott Morton will discu~s the broader 20 
21 economic implic~tions of this model and explain why 21 
22 Tesla cannot viably sell cars thro':gh independent 22 
23 franchise dealers . 23 
24 Now, key to this model is the contrast with 24 
25 an independent franchise dealer. Unlike the highly 25 
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In the first quarter of 2015, Tesla sold 
10,030 cars . That's a 55 percent increase over the 
same quarter in 2014 . But the benefits to consumers i s 
also evidenced in the extraordinary rankings in 
consumer rankings that Tesla has received. 
For example, in 2012, the Models got the 
CNET Tech car of the year. Motor Trend Magazine in 
2013 voted it car of the year . This is the first time 
a car has received' a unanimous vote as the top car of 
the year. 
Consumer Reports says it ' s the best car ever 
tested and the best overall car. And then finally 
Consumer Reports says best service and repair. And 
this is an interesting survey because it corrpared Tesla 
not only to other manufacturers, but independent 
franchise dealers and independent service facilities. 
And Tesla outranked them all in every single category. 
Finally, car and Driver deems the 2015 
Model S the car of the century, even thougµ we're only 
a few years into the current-century. I'm sorry for 
the technical difficulty. 
But beyond the benefits to consumers who 
purchase Tesla, Tesla's obvious benefits are for the 
environment. These are zero emission vehicles, all 
electric vehicles. And, finally, these innovations 
Page 9 
pressu~ized fast-paced environment in a traditional 
franchise dealer, Tesla employees, empioyees of Tesla, 
in Tesla-owned and operated stqres , take their time 
with customers. 
It _can take as long as _a month to educate a 
customer in this environment in order to introduce 
them to the technology and convince them to buy an 
autoirooile . Th~t just doesn't 'work in a traditional 
franchise dealer. 
In a traditional frarichise dealer model, 
sales people are incentivized by structured commission 
to sell, up,-sel l consumers on various features. 
Sometimes th~ir commissions ·increase depending on the 
feature . That's not the case at Tesla . At Tesl a, the 
sales people are_under no such incentives to try to 
up-sell consumers to new w_heels or vari~us features on 
the car. 
Again, Tesla i s tryi~g to remove the f riction 
froni puying a car to make the experience the best it 
possibly can be because t hey're selling a new 
technology to a public that's skeptical about electric 
vehic.les . They have a lot of ques'tions about electric 
vehicles. 
Traditional dealerships are characterized by 
massive inventories. They buy cars from the 
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manufacturer, and they sit on the lots . Tesla doesn't 1 
do that. Its stores don't carry inventories. They 2 
build the car to the custom specifications of the 3 
consumer. This saves money. It's highly efficient and 4 
delivers a car specifically designed to the customer's 5 
preferences. 
We have sul:xnitted testimony fran Herb Walter, 
who is a very experienced, well-known expert in the 
field of retail dealer econanics. .l\ccording to 
Mr. Walter, independent dealers traditionally look to 
service and used cars and other things such as 
financing for their profit margins. 









Tesla offers the best service in the industry, but it ' s 14 
not a profit center. They don't pay their technicians 
based on the job that they perform. They pay them on 




that ' s not necessary. 18 
Tesla doesn't add points and unnecessary fees 19 
to financing . It doesn't make money. It's not a 20 
profit center to finance t he cars. It does this as a 21 
unique form of customer service, customer service that 22 
is inconpatible with the traditional f ranchise dealer 23 
model. 24 
In addition, Tesl a maintains transparent 25 
Page 12 
service, for fraud, for improper tit ling of 1 
automobiles, nothing . Its record is absolutely 2 
inrnaculate. 3 
And in addi tion, in all of t hese states, 4 
Tesla operates selling directly to customers through 5 
its stores alongside other manufacturers who sel l 6 
through franchise deal ers . The two models can coexist, 7 
direct sal es by Tesla t hrough its 0\-m operated stores,· 8 
as well as a franchise syst em oper ated by other 9 
manufacturers . 10 
So the direct sales model, which exists in 11 
all of these 20 states, as wel l . as over the Internet, 12 
has been a great success for consumers, as well as for 13 
the environment. 14 
Well, let's talk about Utah. In Utah, there 15 
are 270 residents who own Tesla automobiles. ,NO\~, 16 
these residents -- approximately 270. These residents 17 
had to go to Nevada or Colorado or California to buy 18 
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uniform pricing. If you buy a Tesla off of its 
website, you pay the same price that you do if you buy 
it fran a Tesla-0\-med store in New Jersey. All of the 
pricing is laid out . There's no haggling, no 
negotiation, no incentive to try to up-sell you on 
features that you may not want or need. 
Finally, as Mr. Walter and Professor Scott 
M9rton will testify, t he traditional dealer model · 
simply will not work for Tesla in light of this uniform 
transparent pricing. There's no roon for a traditional 
middleman to add a margin to cover his or _her cost. 
That just doesn't exist in the Tesla model. 
Well, this direct sales model has had a great 
success for consumers. As a growing canpany, Tesla 
sells di rect ly over the Internet, but it also sells in 
conpany-=ed and operated stores in 20 states. These 
states i nclude, for example, California, which is t he 
largest retail autarobile market in the country. It 
includes Nevada and Colorado, your neighbor states . 
Now, we would like to include Utah in this 
list of states where Tesla 0\-mS and operates and sel ls 
directly to custaners. But in all of these 20 states, 
and I think this is very conpell ing evidence, there's 
never been a single claim against Tesla by any 
government agency for improper qusiness, for improper 
Page 13 
couple million dollars in the lease and in building out 
the Tesla store. 
Nc:M, unfortunately, this store is shuttered. 
There's no sales activity going on there because t he 
new motor vehicle dealers licenses were improperly 
denied by MVED. Well , let's look at the basis for that 
denial. 
There really were two separate bases, which 
we will discuss in this hearing. The first is citing 
the Licensing Act. The Division said that Tesla was 
not a franchise, had to be a franchise in order to sell 
through.a dealer here in Utah. That was the first 
basis. 
This is a quote fran Exhibit 2 in your 
exhibit books. This is the letter that was sent to 
Tesla by the Attorney General on behalf of the 
Division. "Since Tesla Motors Utah is not a 
franchisee, MVED cannot issue a license as a new car 
19 their car, or they bought it over the Internet because 19 dealer." 
20 we do not have a store in Utah to sell_ directly to 20 This is an interesting denial because the 
21 customers . 
22 Well, to that end, Tesla in 2014-2015 formed 
23 Tesla Utah, a wholly-=ed subsidiary of Tesla, Inc. 
24 And in addition, they took out a lease on a store at 
25 2312 State Street here in Salt Lake City, invested a 
21 word "franchisee" does not appear in the Licensing Act 
22 at all. Doesn't appear. The word "franchise" 
23 appeared, and we will go through that definition. But 
24 the fact that Tesla Motors Utah was not a franchisee is 
25 no proper basis for denying the application. 
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1 The second basis which was given by the 1 
2 Department was t hat if you are in compliance with the 2 
3 Licensing Act, you are violating the Franchise Act 3 
4 because in order to be in compliance with the Licensing 4 
5 Act, you had to be a franchisee. But if you own and 5 
6 operate the franchisee , you're in violation of the 6 
7 Franchise Act. 7 
8 So what the Division said was that this was a 8 
9 dileITTT\a . That t his was a dilell11\a; t hat if Tesla wasn't 9 
10 a franchise, it couldn't get a license. But if Tesla 10 
11 had a franchise, Tesla Utah had a franchise, then it 11 
12 was in violation of the Franchise Act, which says a 12 
13 franchisor cannot own and operate a licensed motor 13 
14 vehicle dealer. You ' re in a dilemma, Tesla. 11e can't 14 
15 issue the l icense to you. That was the explanation 15 
16 that we received. 16 
17 But I would suhnit it's a false dilenrna 17 
18 because the Licensing Act, properly construed, does not 18 
19 require Tesla Motors Utah to be a franchisee. Again, 19 
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didn't, there was an agreement between Tesla, the 
parent, and Tesla Utah, the subsidiary, that authorized 
Tesla Utah to sell cars . So Tesla was in compl iance 
with the Licensing Act. Licenses should have been 
issued. 
With regard to the Franchise Act, the 
Franchise Act does not apply to a company that is 
selling directly to consumers through its wholly-0\-med 
subsidiary. Does not apply. So let ' s go to the 
Licensing Act and take a look at the provisions that 
allegedly applied here. 
· First, and I think this is highly 
significant , when the legislature passed the Licensing 
Act -- and it was signifi cantly amended in 1992 -- the 
legislator did not say that a licensee could not be 
owned by a manufacturer. 
There i s no prohibition against ccmnon 
ownership of the licensed dealer and a manufacturer in 
the Licensing Act. It's not t here. If the legislature 
20 the word "franchisee" is nowhere in.the statute. What 
21 it does require is that there 's some evidence of 
20 had wanted a separation of O\o/llership, it could have 
21 been in the statute. But it wasn't there. 
22 authorization by Tesla Motors Utah, the subsidiary, to 
23 sell Tesla autOll'Obiles. 
22 The terms "dealer" and "manufacturer " 
23 definitions in t he act do not refer to a franchise. 
24 Now, we can contrast that with t he definit i on of 24 As a wholly-owned subsid1ary, it has the 



























from the manufacturer. Not so with the dealer. Dealer 1 
is someone who sells, is licensed to sel l new motor 2 
vehicles. The franchi se i s not required in the 3 
defini~ion of dealer. 4 
Irl fact, in 1992, when t he legislature 5 
amended the statute, they repealed the definition of 6 
dealer, new motor vehicle dealer, that included a 7 
franchise. So the point of this is by their very 8 
definitions, "dealer" and "manufacturer" do not require 9 
evidence· of a franchise. 10 
And, in fact, when you go to apply for a 11 
license, in the items that you have to submit, it 12 
13 doesn't require proof of franchise. Some states do. 
Some states say when you apply, when you fill out the 14 
application, we need some evidence of authority to sell 15 
the cars that you are going to display and advertise. 16 
Some states ask for a franchise agreement. 17 
Not so here in Utah. The material s suhnitted 18 
do not require proof of franchise. The reasons to 19 
revoke -- that the Division can use to revoke a license 20 
don't include the absence of a franchise. 21 
So what then i s the purpose of "franchise" as 22 
defined in the Licensing Act? The purposes of 23 
"franchise" as defined in the Licensing Act is to 24 
evidence authority, authority to sell the cars that you 25 
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are displaying, offering to sell . 
And t hat is indeed the way in which the 
statute is written. The scope of the license that's 
issued does not exceed the scope of the franchise. A 
Ford dealer is not authorized to sell Chevrolets. 
That's the purpose of the franchise. 
• For Tesla, which is selling only its own cars 
and sell ing them direct ly to residents and consumers, 
this would have no applicabili ty at all. So, again, 
the argument is there is no franchise requirement that 
would apply to Tesla because Tesla is selling directly 
and, hence, doesn't need a separate authorization by a 
manufacturer in order to sell. 
So the denial of the license on this basis 
was improper. And this goes directly to the dile1T111a. 
Since there is no requirement for a 
franchisor-franchisee relationship, it doesn't run 
afoul of the Franchise Act, which says that a 
franchisor cannot O\o/ll and operate a licensed motor 
dealer. This i s a way out of the alleged dilell11\a. 
But even if the Carmission decides to 
construe the statute as requiring a franchise, which we 
believe will be the wrong const ruction, Tesla still 
satisfies that requirement. And that is because there 
was a dealer agreement . 
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1 Again, after the first application was 1 
2 denied, Tesla met with the Attorney General and said, 2 
3 Well, what if we had an agreement between Tesla, Inc. 3 
4 and Tesla Utah, would that be sufficient? And Division 4 
5 agreed to reconsider a new application. So Tesla 5 
6 signed an agreement between Tesla, Inc. and Tesla Utah, 6 
7 which would authorize Tesla Utah to sell cars. We 7 
8 don't believe that's necessary, but we did that . 8 
9 Now, again, the Licensing Act does not 9 
10 prohibit a manufacturer Eran o,,ming a dealer. That is 10 
11 clear from the statute. Nor does it prohibit in any 11 
12 way a manufacturer who owns a dealer from entering into 12 
13 a contract with that dealer. Parents and subsidiaries 13 
Page 19 
between the parent, Tesla, Inc., and the subsidiary 
that runs the store, Tesla Utah, which is a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of Tesla, Inc. So the dealer 
agreement -- if the Commission imposed a franchise 
requirement, the dealer agreement satisfies that and, 
hence, the license should have been granted. 
Now, we believe that that is the end of the 
matter. If the statute is properly construed, the 
franchise is not required. If a franchise is required, 
it is satisfied by the dealer agreement, in which 
case -- in either case the license should have been 
granted. 
But let's turn to the second part of the 
14 under Utah law can enter into enforceable agreements . 
15 A parent can enter into an agreement with its 
14 dilemna, which was if you comply with this, if you have 
15 a dealer agreement, then you necessarily are a 
16 wholly-owned subsidiary. 
17 And here 's the definition of franchise: "A 
18 contractor agreement between a dealer and a 
19 manufacturer of new motor vehicles by which the dealer 
20 is authorized to sell any specified make or makes of 
21 new motor vehicles. " Nothing (IK)re is required than 
22 that. There 's no further formalization of a franchise 
23 than what you see in this definition. 
24 Well, the dealer agreement does just that. 
25 The dealer agreement is an enforceable agreement 
Page 20 
16 franchisor. If you're a franchisor, you can't own a 
17 wholly owned -- you cannot own a motor vehicle license 
18 dealer under the Franchise Act. So now you're in 
19 violation of the Franchise Act. That's the dilenrna. 
20 So let's take a look at the Franchise Act. 
21 Well, it's important to understand the differences. I 
22 know that you're familiar with these -- these statutes, 
23 and we provide copies for you in the exhibit book. But 
24 the Licensing Act is really a consumer protection 
25 measure. It protects consumers from unfair business 
1 practices by dealers. 1 
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wholly-owned subsidiary of the manufacturer. 
2 And all of the provisions of the act really 2 
3 speak to that. There are background checks and 3 
4 training for sales people . We had to submit, for 4 
5 exarrple, materials for background checks for people who 5 
6 are going to work in our store. We had to post a bond 6 
7 that consumers can go against if they ' re treated 7 
8 unfairly or illegally. 8 
9 The license can be revoked for unfair, 9 






as we've seen, the franchise provisions ensure that 11 
customers can rely on the dealer's authority to sell 12 
cars. Of course, the Licensing Act is enforced by the 13 
Division. 14 
On the other side is the Franchise Act, which 15 
So these provisions of protecting franchisees 
fran unjust termination by·their franchisors, it atlo..;s 
franchisees to challenge new franchises formed by their 
franchisors in the relevant market area. 
It doesn't protect a franchisee fran another 
manufacturer at all. That's good competition, Ford 
versus GM, BMW versus Porsche. But it does protect a 
BMW dealer who ' s franchised by BMW from another 
franchisee fran BMW caning into that relevant market. 
Again, none of that would have application to 
Tesla. Tesla is protecting its own subsidiary Eran 
termination. It makes no sense. So the Franchise Act 
by the terms and purposes just doesn't apply to the 
situation of Tesla. 
16 is enforced by the Department of Commerce. And the 
17 Franchise Act by its very terms, both its legislative 
18 purpose and its terms, is to protect franchisees from 
19 exploitation by their affiliated franchiso~s. 
16 Again, we can see this in the legislative 
20 The legislature found there was an imbalance 
21 of poi1er between a franchisor, large manufacturer, and 
22 a franchisee, independent business, which is under 
23 contract with that franchisor and could lead to unfair 
24 practices, unfair allocation, termination, refusal to 
25 provide inventory. None of that applies to a 
17 purpose. The legislative purpose said a substantial 
18 inequality of bargaining po,;er between motor vehicle 
19 franchisors and rotor vehicle franchisees enables these 
20 kinds of unfair practices, forcing a franchisee to sign 
21 an unfair agreement, terminating a franchise without 
22 good cause, etc. Again, this would not apply to a 
23 wholly-o,,med subsidiary. 
24 So we believe that all of the provisions of 
25 the Franchise Act have to be construed in light of that 
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1 purpose of protecting independent franchisees from 1 
2 misconduct by their affiliated franchisors, not to 2 
3 restrict a manufacturer who's selling directly from 3 
4 selling directly. 4 
5 You can see that in the definition of 5 
6 franchisor, is a person who in writing or practice 6 
7 agrees with or permits a franchisee to purchase, sell, 7 
8 offer new motor vehicles. A franchisee i's a person 8 
9 with whom a franchisor has agreed or permitted to 9 
10 purchase, sell, or offer new motor vehicles. 10 
11 Now, if you look at this as sort of a 11 
12 circular definition -- but this would include, for 12 
13 example, a distributor who sold to a customer-. That 13 
14 would -- a customer is someone who agreed to buy a car 14 
15 from a distributor. 15 
16 Well, a customer isn't a franchisee. That's 16 
17 not our concept of franchisee. So these ambiguities in 17 
18 the statute have to be resolved by looking at the 18 
19 legislative history and purpose of the statute, which 19 
20 was to protect independent franchisees from their 20 
21 affilfated franchisors. 21 
22 Again, you can see this in the terms. A 22 
23 franchisor, for example, may not force a franchisee to 23 
24 order new motor vehicles. 'That makes no sense when the 24 
25 dealer is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the 25 
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1 the dealer is wholly owned and -operated by the 1 
~ manufacturer . So the very definition of the franchise 2 
3 takes it out of the situation where the dealer is 3 
4 wholly owned and operated by the manufacturer . 4 
5 so we believe that when these statutes -- 5 
6 when this statute, the Franchise Act, ·is construed in 6 
7 light of the purpose of the law, it would have no 7 
8 applicability to Tesla. And it certainly should not 8 
9 form the basis for denying the license. 9 
10 That should be left to the Department of 10 
11 Commerce to interpret and construe and should not be a 11 
12 basis to deny a license to serve the people of Utah 12 
13 directly through an owned and operated store, just as 13 
14 Tesla does in 20 other states and the District of 14 
15 Columbia. 15 
16 Now, we believe that the proper construction 16 
17 of these statutes will result in a reversal of the 17 
l? denial of the applications. But we are also going to 18 
19 put on evidence today with regard to the 19 






believe that if the Division's construction of these 21 
statutes, their interpretation of these statutes, is 22 
upheld, it will be unconstitutional. 23 
Now, my understanding is this tribunal is not 24 
empowered to declare a statute unconstitutional, but it 25 
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manufacturer. There's no coercion there. They're 
Ql,med and operated by the same canpany. To issue a new 
franchise in a relevant market area without good cause, 
again, that just has no application where the dealer is 
wholly owned by the manufacturer. 
For example, requiring the franchisee to 
participate in ad campaigns, that just makes no sense 
when the dealer is owned by the manufacturer. It ' s 
part of an overall corporate advertising strategy. 
We don't think of a wholly-owned subsidiary 
being coerced by the parent. That terminology only 
applies where the independent franchisee is a separate 
business that could be subject to these kinds of unfair 
practices. 
And, finally, if you look at the term 
"franchise," which is defined differently in the 
Franchise. Act than it is in the Licensing Act, so we're 
looking at the definition in the Franchise Act, it 
talks about a written agreement or course of dealing 
where a person grants another to use a l i cense to use a 
trademark. ·And there is a. community of interest in the 
marketing of a new motor vehicle. 
You can see that language has applicability. 
We have ah independent dealer who has separate 
interests than the franchisor. It wouldn't apply where 
Page 25 
is a cardinal rule of statutory construction to avoid, 
if possible, a construction that renders a statute 
unconstitutional. And, hence, we believe if there ' s 
any doubt about the construction, certainly the 
Commission should adopt an interpretation that avoids _ 
these constitutional issues. 
In Utah -- and this is a very unique 
provision. I'm not aware of any other state that has a 
provision that effectively writes into the state 
constitution the·philosophy of a free market system. 
And this says it is the policy of Utah that a 
free market system shall govern trade and commerce in 
this state to promote the dispersion of economic and 
political power and the general welfare of the people. 
The construction of these two statutes 
advocated by the Division runs directly afoul of that 
provision because what it does is it constructs a 
monopoly over retail new mot;or vehicle sales in the 
hands of independent franchise dealers in the state of 
Utah. 
Now, that was not the intent of the statutes. 
But if that is the construction that they're given, it 
runs afoul of this constitutional provision, as well as 
the federal constitutional provisions. 
But, again, we don't believe that you need to 
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1 reach the constitutional issues because the proper 1 
2 construction of the statutes will result in the 2 
3 issuance of a license in this case. 3 
4 And the store which Tesla has invested in 4 
5 located on State Street should be open to the public to 5 
6 provide the same benefits that the citizens of other 6 
7 states have received from the direct sales and service 7 
8 model offered by Tesla. Thank you very much. 8 










































apologize for the heat. We did request the air 10 
conditioning be turned up . Unfortunately, we don't 11 
have a thennostat in this room to do it, and we had to 12 
request it, and I guess they' re working on it. 13 
MS. JOHNSON : They're working on it . 14 
MR. VALENTINE: Your Honor, I would be okay 15 
if everyone wanted to remove their coats if everyone 16 
would like to do that, including the Chair. 17 
JUIX,E PHAN: Rel!Dve your jackets, loosen your 18 
ties, that's okay. And I'll try shutting the blinds. 19 
All right, Mr. Francis. 
OPENING ARGUMENT 
BY MR. FRANCIS: 
Thank you,_Judge Phan, carmissioners, 
esteemed counsel. I'm Gale Francis, an Assistant 








new motor vehicle license. 1 
State licensing is the granting of the 2 
privilege of doing business in the state. The 3 
respondent and the Tax Commission are given the 4 
authority to grant licenses involving the motor vehicle 5 
industry. But statutory law dictates the scope and 6 
limitations of such licensing. 7 
This appeal is about statutory construction. 8 
The Division asserts that Tesla's dealership 9 
application does not comply with Utah's existing law. 10 
The Division understands that Tesla strongly disagrees, 11 
and this area of disagreement is the core of this 12 
proceeding. 13 
What the evidence will show is that in theory 14 
and in practice, the one thing that the petitioner 
refuses to do is to ·change to a model of a legal 
franchise . What the law will show is that without a 
franchise relationship, a company wholly owned by a 
manufacturer has no right to a new car dealership 
currently. 
Utah Code Annotated Title 41, the Motor 
Vehicle Act, requires the enforcer of that act, which 
in this case is the respondent, Motor Vehicle 
Enforcement Division, to deny the application of the 













Enforcement Division . 
There's no doubt that Tesla Motors 
Incorporated is an innovative and cutting-edge company. 
The petitioner, Tesla Motors Utah, Inc., was created to 
operate in this state. They steadfastly adhere to 
their structure and operational model . 
As a result, we believe and the Division has 
decided that they are not entitled to a new motor 
vehicle dealer license under current Utah law. The 
Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division therefore asks the 
Tax Commission to affirm the denial of the motor 
vehicle dealer license to Tesla. 
You will hear much about Tesla's mission, you 
have heard already, with lofty goals of reforming the 
world of personal transportation. You will hear much 
about their manufacturing, operational, and marketing 
models. They care about customers, sell through 
salaried employees and direct market through the 
Internet, allowing cus~om orders to build a car to the 
personal choice of the purchaser. And they've won 
awards in many industrial cat~ories. 
However, the simple conclusion that the 
COITTnission should make is that regardless of all of the 
innovation and technology and methodology, under 
current Utah law, this applicant is not entitled to a 
applicant in accordan7e with Chapter 3. 
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When we focus on a critical subsection of 
Section 41-3-210, which is subparagraph l(d), the clear 
language requires the Motor Vehicle Code to take into 
consideration .all laws and rules of the state of Utah 
with regard to licensing. 
The Motor Vehicle Business Regulation, which 
is Chapter 3, prohibits the violation of "any law or 
rule of the state respecting cairnerce and motor 
vehicles." 
By this language, the Conmerce Code or the 
Franchise Code as it's been referre.? to by opposing 
counsel, specifically the New Motor Vehicle Franchise 
Act, Title 13, Chapter 14, is relevant and necessary to 
the enforcement of the Motor Vehicle Act. 
Chapter 3 then prohibits engaging in business 
in selling new motor vehicles for which the licensee 
does not have a franchise. The petitioner directly 
denies having a franchise relationship with Tesla 
Motors, Inc., its owner. 
It does this in _its own dealer agreement, 
which is Exhibit 4, and in correspondence to the Motor 
Vehicle Enforcement Division, which obviously had an 
impact on the decision of the Division. 
The petitioner could, in other words, it is 
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1 feasible, but won't change its operation to canply with 1 
2 these sections of the Utah code . The respondent, the 2 
3 Division, argues that the testimony and evidence 3 
4 presented will establish that the petitioner could 4 
5 accomplish its mission or objectives under a franchise 5 
6 agreement, but it chooses not to . 6 
7 \'le 've heard that it is not viable , 7 
8 potentially I think the test imony will show that it may 8 
9 not be -- that it may increase the cost or fi nancial 9 
10 profit basis of Tesla Motors, but it certainly is not 10 
11 impossible to adopt a franchise agreement. 11 
12 Therefore, in simple terms of syllogism, the 12 
13 Utah code states that a company must be a franchisee to 13 
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jurisdiction. The same is true in regard to Tesla's 
constitutional clai ms. The Division asserts that the 
Licensing Act and the Franchise Act are constitutional 
as enacted and as interpreted by the Division. 
Tesla's argument i s essentially that these 
acts are unnecessary and counterproductive with regard 
to their canpany. However, the statute and Motor 
Vehicle Enforcement Division 's regulat ion govern an 
industry, not a single player within that industry. 
Although the accanplishments and model of the 
peti t ioner may be innovative and award winning, the 
regulatory body must use the law in equally evaluating 
every player . It has. 
14 have this l icense. Petitioner negates being a 14 Much l ike a single manufacturer of a 
15 franchising operat ion . The only logical conclusion, 
16 therefore, is petitioner cannot quali fy fo~ this 
17 license at this time . 
15 pharmaceuti cal who may claim that the safest and most 
16 effective drug exists within their purview, the FDA 
17 cannot ll)ake an except ion i n i t s regulatory legal 
18 To the ex~ent that Tesla argues that t he 
19 application of Utah's existing statutes does not make 
20 sense in regard to the intent of the statutes and 
18 mandate. FDA regulation may cause an increase in cost s 
19 of business and be unnecessary for one canpany, but it 
20 i s critical within the i ndustry to protect consumers 
21 Tesla's business model, those i ssues should be 21 and ensure fair canpetit ion. 
22 addressed not in this forum but by the l egisl ature 
23 itself. 
22 The applicable statutes and the Division's 
24 This forum, the Coomission, i s tasked -with 
23 application of them t reat: in-state and out-of-state 
24 interests equally. And current law ent itles all 
25 enforcement of the statutes of the state within its 25 applicants and licensees alike to due process. That is 
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1 one of the reasons why we are here. 1 
2 The Division as respond~nt asks the 2 
3 Conrnission to focus on the l aw as it applies to the 3 
4 evidence that it will hear, documentary and. 4 
5 testamentary, and rule in favor of the Division. Thank 5 
6 you . 6 
7 JUOOE PHAN : All right . Mr. Riley or 7 
8 Petrogeorge? 8 
9 MR. RILEY: Thank you. Thank you very much. 9 
10 JUOOE PHAN: Would you like to call your 10 
11 first witness? 11 
12 MR. RILEY: We would like to call our first 12 
13 witness, Diarmuid O'Connell. 13 
14 JUOOE PHAN: Mr. O'Connell , i f you stand and 14 
15 rai se your right hand. 15 
16 - -oOo- - 16 
17 DIARMUID O'CONNELL, 17 
18 having been first duly sworn to tell the 18 
19 truth, was examined and testified as follows: 19 
20 - -oOo- - 20 
21 JUOOE PHAN: Go ahead and have a seat up 21 
22 there. 22 
23 DIRECT &XAMINATION 23 
24 BY MR. RILEY: 24 
25 Q. Please state your full name and position for 25 
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t he record. 
A. My name is --
JUOOE PHAN: Is the green light on? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. My name is Diarmuid 
O'Connell. I 'm the vice president for business 
development for Tesla Motors. 
Q. . (By Mr. Riley) Could you briefly describe 
your duties for Tesla? 
A. Sure. I have a range of duties that can be 
characterized as sort of strategic affairs . I 'm 
i nvolved in market development of our products i n 
Europe and in China. 
I 'm responsible for our relationships with 
ot her car manufacturers and our emissions t rading 
business . I 'm i nvolved wi th or responsible for all of 
our relat ionships with governing bodies, whether local , 
state, federal , and increasingly foreign governments . 
And as a consequence of some of that have been very 
involved in the development of our retail network and 
t he model that we pursue. 
Q. When did you join Tesla? 
A. I joined Tesla almost 10 years ago in 2006 . 
Q. Please describe Tesla 's corporate mission. 
A. Yes . sci our mission is something that we 
hold very dear. And as someone who was with the 
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company when we were just barely 50 people, I feel it 1 
as deeply or nore deeply than nost. 2 
The company was founded not because the world 3 
needed another car company, but because the world 4 
needed a car c~y we felt t hat was wholly focused 5 
and devoted to the introduction of electric vehicle 6 
technology. 7 
So the mission of the company is to serve as 8 
a catalyst for sustainable transportation through the 9 
introduction of electric vehicles. Everything we do is 10 
truly measured against that standard. 11 
Q. And can you briefly descripe your background 12 
before you joined Tesla in 2006? 13 
A. Yes. I have a background i n international 14 
marketing, have done work in strategic consulting, have 15 
experience as a founder of a technology startup. I 16 
served for two and a half years in the most recent Bush 17 
administrat ion in the capacity of national securi ty . 
And t hen I joined Tesl a Motors. 




the Bush administration? 21 
A. Yes. I served as chief of st aff for 22 
polit ical military affairs in the State Department , i n 23 
which capacity I was partly responsible for operational 24 
and policy support to the military, particularly as i t 25 
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was involved in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
It was there that I formed a judgment about 
the effects, negative effects, of oil dependence on our 
.economy, on our national security profile, and 
determined to devot e my -- the next phase of my 
professional career to developing or working on 
technologies that woul d reduce oil in our economy. 
Oil in our economy is used primarily in 
transportation. So the generic idea was to work on a 
technology that would reduce oil in transportation. I 
was very fortunate in finding such a project in 
califomia . 
Q. Could you describe Tesla's current 
operations? 
A. Tesla at this point is a global ent erprise, 
in that we sell our products around the world, 
throughout Europe and China, Japan, Asia Pacific, 
around t he United States, and with plans to enter new 
markets this year. 
We develop t he vehicles in our engineering 
facility in Palo Alto, califomia. We manufacture 
those vehicl es in an old GM plant that we 
recorrrnissioned in Frenont, california, south of 
0akl and. And we sell and service those vehicles around 
t he country and around the world in our wholly-owned 
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1 facilit ies . 1 have not yet filled up. But we anticipate that with 
2 Q. How many employees do you have in the 
3 United States? 
4 A. I believe we ' re approaching 12,000 enployees 
5 right now. 
6 Q. And how are they allocated? 
7 A. Roughly 30/30/30 around -- in the first 
8 place, engineering and development , 30 percent there; 
9 about 30 percent of our headcount is in manufacturing 
10 of the products; and about 30 percent of our products 
11 i s in sal es and service organizat i on, with roughly 
12 10 percent in business over those operations . 
13 Q. What are your plans to expand operations in 
14 the Unit ed States? 
15 A. Well , we have very aggressive plans. I 
16 believe we'll be opening on the order of 20 new stores 
this year alone. We've been progressively opening up 
new markets in new states . This is also true of our 
2 grruth in the markets in Europe and in Asia t hat we 
3 will need additional manufacturing capacity. 
4 We have also this past year comnissioned an 
5 effort to build a batt ery facility. It will be the 
6 largest battery facility in the world, known as the 
7 Gigafactory. 
8 Q. Where will the Gigafactory be located? 
9 A. The first Gigafactory will be located outside 
10 Reno, Nevada. 
11 Q. What are the project ions for employment at 
12 the Nevada facility? 
13 A. So this will be about a 10 million square 
14 foot facili ty. At full capacity, it will have the 
15 ability to produce nore batteries than are produced by 












international markets. We have an extensive network in 19 
the world, which is primarily currently located in 
Japan, Korea, and increasingly in China. The planned 
full employment for the facility is something around 
6,500 employees . Europe and growing network i n China , J apan, 
international as well. 





A. Yeah. We were very fortunat e to acquire a 24 
manufacturing facility, 5 million square feet, which we 25 
Q. So thi s one plant can make more capacity in 
batteries than the enti re world does today? 
A. That is correct. \•le believe that it's 
necessary to increase the source of lithium ion battery 
technology in order to accarplish our greater mission 
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1 of a world dcminated by -- maybe perhaps ultimately 1 
2 exclusively by electric vehicles. 2 
3 Q. Let' s talk about the el ectri c vehi cl es that 3 
4 you ' ve made at Tesl a beginning wi th your first model . 4 
5 I think we have a photograph of that . 5 
6 A. Yeah. Hopefully that will come up here. So 6 
7 the first project at Tesla Motors was to develop the 7 
B full battery and powertrain system. That was largely 8 
9 an engineering project, uninq:iressive for the purpose of 9 




































We productized that technology with our first 11 
generation product, the Tesla Roadster. This is a 12 
product that we made from 2008 to 2011. We did roughly 13 
800 vehicles a year, for 2,500 vehicles in total, at a 14 
price point of $109,000, not atypical for first 15 
generation technology. I can speak to the business 16 
plan separately. 17 
But the product itself had three salient 18 
attributes. The first is long range. It had 245 miles 19 
of .range. This was to explode the myth that electric 20 
vehicles were necessarily short-range vehicles. 21 
It had all the performance characteristics of 22 
vehicles in its class, Porsches and so forth, in that 23 
its acceleration was Oto 60 in 3.7 seconds and had 




single charge. 1 
The highest end version of this car achieves 2 
o to 60 in t he 2.8 second range . And, again, I hope 3 
you agree , it's an attractive product. It has greater 4 
utility obvi ously than the Roadster, which was a small 5 
two-seat sports car. It can seat five adults, plus two 6 
children. 7 
Q. Let 's talk about the' future. Let ' s take a 8 
l ook at the Model X. This is also in the binders. 9 
JUOOE PHAN: It's the smaller binder. 10 
THE WITNFSS: Yes. · So ultimately the goal is 11 
to get to a !f0SS market of electric vehicle, what we 12 
call t he Model 3. That would be a $35;000 price point 13 
vehicle made in the hundreds of thousands of units . 14 
But in the meantime -- that will be in the 15 
market by 2017 . In the meantime, we've developed a 16 
variant, an SUV variant off of the Model S platform. 17 
Imagine a vehicle of the relative size of Model S. 18 
Just for reference, Model Sis in the category of 19 
vehicle such as t he Mercedes E and S class, the BMW 5 20 
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Finally, if you could see the visual, we 
wanted to introduce an attractive car. It's fair to 
say that most electric vehicles that have been in the 
market over the course of time have been explorations 
of the folll\ of a golf_ cart and haven't exactly 
attracted the kind of interest that asports car would. 
This was our first product, intended to set the terms 
for the conq:iany, the terms for its product, and to 
stimulate interest in the technology. 
Q. Tell us about t he Model S, which we looked at 
during the opening statement. 
A. A brief introduction to our business model . 
It 's very much the technology introduction model that's 
been -- that successfully led to laptops, cellphones, 
air travel, in fact, which is the first generation 
product is necessarily expensive because of the cost of 
development, because of low scale. 
But as you attract interest and capital, you 
can grow scale, your manufacturing scale, and thereby 
bring do,m cost and then also make technology 
introduction. 
Whereas the Roadster was a very low volume 
product, our second milestone was the development of a 
mid-volume, mid-price sedan. That is the Model S. It 
is a vehicle that achieves 265 miles of range on a 
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It will have innovation such as what we refer 
to as falcon wing doors, which allow for easy ingress 
and egress. And it opens up a new market for us in 
all-wheel drive markets and weather-challenged markets 
for other family appl ications. 
Q. (By Mr. Riley) Could you summarize the sales 
growth for these vehicles? 
A. Sure. So we introduced.the Model S, l aunched 
the Model Sin mid-2012 and in that hal f year produced 
3,000 vehicles . So you could extrapolate that we might 
have done 6,000 in a full year. To fast forward to 
this year where we'll be producing and delivering 
50,000, at least 50,000 vehicles to the market . 
Q. What was your first calendar quar ter resul t s 
like in 2015? 
A. 2015, I think we sold over 10,000 vehicles . 
Q. How does t hat COJit>are to fi rst quarter of 
2014? 
A. Quite inq:iressively. I can't quite remember 
the number, but it ' s almost a factor increase. 
21 and 7 series, so a large sedan. 21 Q. And have these vehicles received awards in 
22 The Model X will be a crossover SUV, both on 
23 the same platform, similar to SUVs that are built on 
24 large sedan platforms. It will have seating for seven 
25 passengers. It will have all-wheel drive capability. 
22 consumer ratings? 
23 A. They have . At the risk of repeating some of 
24 what you already said --
25 Q. Wel l, we have a slide, which is slide 5, that 
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1 we can bring up. 1 
2 A. So the most important -- the first and most 2 
3 important award that we received was the Motor Trend 3 
4 car of the year award. The Motor Trend car of the year 4 
5 award, you can think of it as the Oscars of the car 5 
6 category. It is a testament to design and engineering 6 
7 and performance standards rigorously tested. 7 
B The next most important that I would point to 8 
9 here is in the next year, following year, received 9 
10 Consumer Reports best overall _car award. In fact, the 10 
11 article said that this was the best car that they had 11 
12 ever tested. And that was a tremendous additional 12 
13 validation. 13 
14 But I think the most recent and most 14 
15 important award we've received, again, from Consumer 15 























experience, where we've received awards -- scores 
indicati ng that we have the best service and repair 
profile. 
And that's taking into account .the other --






operations, as well as independent service operations. 22 
Against all of that population, .w~ rate best. It also 23 
has received from the actual owners of the car the best 24 
overall ownership experience for two years in a rCM. 25 
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Q. How are those cars desi9°9-ed and engineered to 
accon-plish tlµs? 
A. Well, so our first car was -- just, again, a 
brief digression - - was a conversion of~ existing 
car. We look ·a Lotus Elise chassis alreaµy engineered 
and adapted it to an electric drive train technology. 
But with the capital and time and interest in 
developing a ground-up vehicle, we did so for the 
Model S. So essentially we redesigned the vehicle to 
exploit all the potential improvements that electric 
vehicle technology offers. 
By introducing electric drivetrain, you take 














14 breakdown, friction, heat loss, heat and energy loss. 14 
15 So you can package that in a very compact way, frankly, 15 
16 coaxial in the wheel well of the car . ' so it's 16 
17 independent of - - so it's almost invisible to the user. 17 
18 The battery, the biggest and most -- 18 
19 heaviest -- frankly, _most expensive component 9f the 19 






of this sort here, which extends out to the bat -- it ' s 21 
about this thick, extends out to the battery rails and 22 
out to the axles and provides an extraordinary low 23 
center of gravity and a balanced platform for the 24 
vehicle . 25 
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Q. What about safety, where does Tesla rank in 
safety? 
A. So from the beginning of the company, safety 
has been a hallmark . As the introducers of new 
technology, we have a heavy burden to introduce the 
safest possible technology, particularly if you're 
going to be successful in converting the mass market to 
the technology. With respect to the Model S, we set a 
standard for ourselves to produce the safest vehicle 
that's ever been produced. 
If I could digress again for a m::xnent, our 
goal has never been to produce the best electric 
vehicle in the world . It's actually been to produce 
the best vehicles in the world, because we felt by 
doing so, we would have the best possible chance of 
converting folks from .a kn01-m gasoline-driven 
technology to electric vehicles . 
But with respect to safety, we achieved our 
goal happily. We ·have been rated 5 star by NIITSA, 
which is the highest standard. If you· just aggregate 
the numbers in that score, you would find that we are 
the safest vehicl~ that ·has ever been tested by NfITSA 
or were at that time . As well under the -- some would 
argue slightly more rigorous European standards, we"ve 
already received the highest possi~le scores. 
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So the vehicle is extraordinarily safe. It 
handles weli. It doesn ' t pi tch .. It doesn't yaw_as you 
turn corners or brake hard. It's very well planted. 
And it's, frankly, almost -- well, not almost 
impossible, but it's very difficul t to rqll over this 
vehicle even for test purposes, so extraordinarily 
safe . 
And so with that platform, think of it as a 
skateboard -- if we had a picture of it, I think we do 
later - - we can then develop the vehicle on top of it. 
With the vehicle on top of it, we want to explore all 
of the opportunities we have with new space. 
So where the engine compartment would be in a 
gasoline-driven car, you have a void, which we've --
which we've created the storage area called "the 
front. " We also have opportunities in the rear of the 
car of a rear wheel well into which you can fold in or 
fold out a third rCM rear-facing. seat for children, 
similar to the one I grew up in in a Ford Country 
Squire some years ago. This allCMs for the 
seven-passenger opportunity I was talking about. 
It ' s a rear hatchback. So you can -- with 
the seats folded down, you can, frankly, carry as much 
or more capacity than most large SUVs. So, again, 
every effort was made to explore how to use this new 
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space. 1 
Indeed, we also introduced a new concept to 2 
the vehicle. We removed all the button switches and 3 
knobs in the user interface and replaced it with what's 4 
effectively a 17-inch touch screen, very much like an 5 
iPad, where all of the - - all of your interface with 6 
the vehicle is contained. 7 
So whether it's your navigation, your climate 8 
control, your entertainment, and other features that we 9 
introduced, such as Web surfing and so forth, all of 10 
this is made possible on this single screen, which 11 
vastly sinplifies the user experience in the vehicle, 12 
reduces complexity in the parts as well. 13 
Q. Turning to slide 6, this is the picture of 14 
the Tesla factory in Fremont . How has your 15 
manufacturing contributed to the success of the 16 
vehicle? 17 
A. So we were very fortunate to be able to 18 
acquire a l arge manufacturing facility in Fre·mont, 19 
Cali f~~ia, south of Oakl~d . . This is the last car 20 
plant on the West_ Coast. 21 
The good news was we were able to acquire it 22. 
relatively cheaply. The bad news is it was developed 23 
in 1960. We basically stripped it all out and within 24 
the shell have introduced the state-of-the-art 25 
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Q. What else has Tesla done to encourage the 1 
adoption of its electric vehicle technology? 2 
A. Among other things -- so as~ general 3 
proposition, with 265 miles of range, ~ven in geography 4 
such as Utah, most peopl e people ' s daily driving needs 5 
are satisfied. 6 
And they're satisfied by the fact that if the 7 
customer - - the customer plugs the car into a very 8 
sinple plug, very much like as here in the wall, 9 
overnight, they leave their garage every rrorning with 10 
265 miles of range. 11 
But in order to be a perfect substitute for 12 
the gasoline vehicles that·we 're selling against , we 13 
wanted to have a long range driving capability. We 14 
introduced what's called the Supercha.rger network. So 15 
this is -- 16 
Q. Let's refer to slide 7. 17 
18 
19 
A. Yes. This is -- this is portrayal of our 
Supercharging network as it exists right now in the 
U.S. We have developed a fast charging technology 20 
which allows you to recapture roughly 60 percent of the 21 
range of the vehicle, so almost 200 miles of range, 22 
within 30 minutes, so roughly approximating a rest stop 23 
on a long-distance trip. 




automation and robotics technology in order to ensure 
that we are producing the highest possible quality 
vehicle . 
As I said before, the vehicles we' re 
competing with are not other electric vehicles. It's 
the best-of-class vehicles in the luxury and 
performance segment, whether it ' s Cadillac or BMW or 
Audi and the other brands in that segment. We have to 
hit those -- that level of refinement. And so we've 
introduced start-of-the-art technology in order to do 
that . 
Q. And how are the cars built for each customer? 
A. Yes. Again, at risk of covering some old 
ground, our system is to deliver to customers the exact 
vehicle that they o'rder. So we don't -- we build very 
small amounts of inventory. More than 95 percent of 
our vehicles I believe are custom built. 
So the custan -- the prospect wi ll come into 
a Tesla store, interact with :is online or by phone, 
make a decision to purchase, an~ then go to our website 
and into a configurator, and identify the exact colors 
and 1 features that they want in their vehicle . And then 
at a reasonable .period later, generally speaking a 
month, at most two months, that car is delivered to 
them. · · 
Page 49 
They are -- they provide electricity free to our 
customers. And we've invested in t his network across 
the United States, making it possible to drive up and 
down ·tii/ coast, across the country in a couple of 
different fashions. We have 10 of these faci l ities 
around the ·state of Utah in order to make it possible 
to drive some of the long distances that are driven 
here. 
We also have an extensive network of these 
throughout Europe, as well as in China . This is a 
system that we're building using our own balance sheet. 
So t his is no~ a system that relies on any sort of 
public subsidy. 
This is something we're doi ng to encourage 
the imagery that an·electric vehicle is as capable as 
any other vehi cle that you would ever consider 
purchasing. 
Q. Let 's tum to Tesla's sales model . Could you 
please describe that for the Commission? 
A. Sure. Our sales model derives directly from 
the mission that I stated at the beginning. We want to 
do everything both with our products and with our 
operations to encourage the adoption and ownership and 
prepurchase of electric vehicles . 
So our analysis of the situation, our 
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1 experience in introducing -- some of us in introducing 1 
2 new technologies to the markets is that that is best 2 
3 done -- one, there's a huge education requirement. 3 
4 When you're asking someone to convert from a technology 4 
5 that they 're habituated -- that they 've been habituated 5 
6 to their full lifetime, it ' s a rather large leap, and 6 
7 made rrore difficult when the purchase itself is as 7 
8 consequential as a car, the second most expensive 8 
9 purchase that rrost people will make in their lifetime. 9 
10 So we have optimized a sales and service 10 
11 model for education. As you mentioned earlier, i t 11 
12 takes roughly 25 days from first -- first touch with a 12 
13 custqner to ultimate conversion to a purchase of one of 13 
14 our vehicles. 14 
15 The experience in our stores is one of hours, 15 
16 where people come in and they experience with our 16 
17 product specialists. First, they learn about electric 17 
18 vehicle technol ogy in general, our product 18 
19 specifically, and then ultimately if we' re -- if we are 19 
20 successful i n converting them to the idea, then 20 
21 ultimately making the purchase . 21 
22 And then in their ownership experience, we 22 
23 strive to serve them with a service network, which is, 23 
24 frankly, rrore persuasive than our stores, and which is 24 
25 notable for the fact that i t is not optimized for 25 
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1 across all markets . Side note here is that the Model S 1 
2 i s - - and i ts various options are the same price 2 
3 everywhere in the world. 3 
4 So a M:xlel Sin China is the same price as it 4 
5 is here in the U.S., though we do have to add on of 5 
6 course transportation and duty costs ·associated with 6 
7 doing business in China, same in Europe, same 7 
8 everywhere in t he world. 8 





fricti on in the process, and make sure that everybody's 10 
incentives are. aligned. We found tremendous reception 11 
to thi s approach. 12 
Q. Let ' s go to t he design studio on your 13 
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profit. Frankly, we don't want to make any rroney on 
our service infrastructure. That is not the business 
model. 
The business model is to keep people in their 
cars and on the road with the view that they will have 
such a good experience that they will return to the 
franchise when they want to buy a new car. 
Q. So what are the channels in the United States 
through which you sell Tesla vehicles? 
A. So there's only one physical channel, and 
t hat's our stores. But people can also access 
information and transact with the company either online 
or on the phone. We try to make that as easy as 
possible . 
Q. Let's take a qu~ck l ook at the website . 
Could you briefly describe that for the Commission? 
A. Sure. Our website, I think consistent with a 
lot of our brand presence in our stores and service 
centers, is simple and clean. We want to rerrove all of 
the complexity from the purchase considerat ion process. 
So we do a number of things . We make the 
choice set as sirnple as possible, _you know, the options 
or packages tliat the people might want to -- that 
prospects might want t9 purchase. 
The price is transparent and consistent 
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20 states, pl us the District of Columbia without --
without any sort of conflict or disruption as you 
suggest . There are o~her states where we could operate 
where the regulatory statutory envi ronment is 
permissi ve. They're small enough markets that we 
haven't yet invested. 
Q. I'd like to ask you to ~lk us through the 
process that's used in one of your stores to sell 
directly. Let ' s look at the interior of the store on 
Stat e St reet here in Salt Lake City, which is not 
opened. 
A. Right. So a couple of elements that I draw 
your attention to here. First of all, it's an 
14 website. Can you describe how a consumer would use 
15 this? 
14 educational environment . Our product specialists are 
15 trained to real ly focus on evangelizing for the 
16 A. Sure. This i s an exemplary of our 16 technology as much or perhaps more than they are in the 
17 actual sale of the vehicle. 17 custcrnization process where in a sirnple envirorllll"--11t , 
18 one can configure a vehicle and sort of test the look 
19 and feel of that vehicle by picking out paint color, 
18 But a couple things here . One, it's a 







roof choices, whether a solid roof or glass roof, wheel 20 
choices, interior fitness, and so forth . 21 
Q. You ment ioned you sel l through your stores, 22 
and I t hink you prepared this slide that list s the 23 
states in which you have your own stores? 24 
A. That's right. We are currently operating in 25 
what you might find in an Appl e store, emphasis on the 
technology, ernphasis on the product. 
We have to the left of the screen the chassis 
syst em. I mentioned a sort of skateboard architecture. 
You can see elements of it r ight there . First of all , 
it's an all-aluminum product, the first and I think 
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1 still only all aluminum vehicle produced in the 1 
2 United States. Even the Ford 150, which we ' re pleased 2 
3 to see is using aluminum, isn't as intense as t his 3 
4 vehicle. 4 
5 But it's essentially a skateboard chassi s 5 
6 with the battery in the middle, low slung under the 6 
7 passenger corrpartment. You can sort of see it there. 7 
8 The motor is not visible because it's' actually in that 8 
9 rear wheel well. 9 
10 If you can imagine a tubular construction 10 













the motor, the inver ter, which is the power electronics 12 
and the gear box, all technology that Tesla develops 13 
and manufactures. 
We have an all-wheel drive variant of the 




year. I 'm sorry. That has a motor in t h~ front wheel 17 
well as well. 18 
So that's the -- that's how we educate folks 19 
as to the t echnology itself. You se,e ' oh the right-hand 20 
side a touch screen, which is a little hard to see 21 
there, but is an interactive way for folks to configure 22 
t heir car, similar to .how they would do_ i t at home· on a 23 
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judge the color of the car, tlie wheels below, and sane 
of the i nterior fitness . Again, it ' s a very simple 
environment. 
Couple other notable things. You don't see a 
lot of cars in the parking lot because, as I said, we 
have a custan order, custan build system. So we don't 
have a parking lot full of vehicles. Typically we ~ill 
only have one vehi cle on the floor of the store and 
make maybe a couple vehicles available for test rides 
or test drives. 
Q. And are your sales people incentivized to t ry 
to up-sell customers wit h features? 
A. No. Huge contrast . I mean, consistent with 
our desire to ren10ve frict ion and any sort of barrier 
to adopt t his new technology, we wanted to eliminate 
all of the historical friction , di ssonance, conflict in 
the car buying experience. 
And so t hat's exemplified i n the fact that we 
are not incentivizing our employees to up-sel l folks 
into -- into options and features that they may or may 
not want or to confuse -- a process which oft en 
confuses and even rrore often frustrates folks. We 
wanted to avoid all of t hat. 
' 24 PC and t hen sane -- sane of t he features . 24 So our folks are trained and referred to as 
25 So the things on t he top or how you would _ 25 "product specialists," and they are not incent ivized to 
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1 up-sell in t he fashion that 's traditi onal in t he 1 
2 industry. 2 
3 Q. What about finance, ~o you offer fi~cing 3 
4 for your stores? 4 
5 A. We do make it possible, also consi s t ent wi t h 5 
6 our desire to help fol ks to get into the technol ogy. 6 
7 We do make financ'ing possibl e ourselves ~ t hrough our 7 
8 partners . 8 
9 Q. How is that structured? Is that a profit 9 
10 center for you? 10 
11 A. No, it's not a profit center. I believe 11 
12 there ' s a small fee , flat fee , associated wit h t he 12 
13 origination of any f i nancing_ : any particular customer 13 
14 financing. 14 
15 But t he pract ice in the industry i s a rather 15 
16 opaque one whereby sales agent s are rewarded for 16 
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colipany. 
Q. What about trading in used cars by other 
manufacturers, do you do that? 
A. We do - - well, we facilit ate that process, 
but we take no financial interest in i t . That is to 
say t hat· if a custaner comes into our store with a BMW 
or a Cadiilac of some sort, we make i t possibl e for 
them to connect with a third-party reseller of those 
vehicles, and there are many. But we do not 
participate in that transact ion. 
Q. Why is that? 
A. It' s just not -- fundamental ly, we want to 
help ~olks· to migrate to t he new technology, and we - -
we want to make that as efficient a process as 
possible. 
Q. Let' s talk about servi ce. You mentioned the 
17 directing customers to particular financing packages 
18 and have incremental conmissions that they can earn 
19 from that process. We have none of that, never will. 
17 awards _you've won in service. How can you accomplish 
18 that? What is your structure for that? 
19 A. So our service staff are either hourly or 
20 Q. Why i s that? 20 sal ary employees . There is a mode of -- the typical 
21 A. Because we want to make . t he process as 21 
22 transparent and trustworthy as we possibly can. We.-re 22 
23 trying to rerrove, as I said, all the barriers to 23 
24 introduction of the technology because the int roduction 24 
25 of the technology is, as I said, t he mission of the 25 
mode of operation in the car business i s, agai n, to 
up-sell or sell incremental service . The profit --
service is a huge profit center in the traditional car 
busi ness . 
And so t here are - - there's a systen1 in most 
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1 dealership models whereby service staff, service 
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1 co-op adver t ising programs and t hings that we 
2 advisors are trying to sell a customer incremental 2 tradi tionally associ ate with franchise dealers? 
3 service. If they come in for an oil change, what else 
4 can we do? 
3 A. No, we do not. Most of those things would be 
4 impossible to do in that we're representing ourselves 
5 We actually -- we judge our performance by 5 in those instances. So cooperative advertising 
6 what we call customer happiness. We do a survey, a 
7 very direct survey, which really measures how - - how 
8 happy customers were with the service experience. 
6 wouldn't be feasible. No, we don't do any of that. 
7 Q. With regard to the price, how does t he price 
8 at t he stores differ from the price that you offer 
9 As I said, we seek t o make no money. We want 9 consumers online? 
10 to have cars in and out as quickly as possible . And so 10 A. There is absolutely no difference in the 















either incremental or in worst case unnecessary. 
Q. What is your approach to advertising? 
A. As a practical matter, we don't do any 
advert ising, which i s to say we don' t pay anyone to 






marketing our products is t hrough our store and service 17 
venues, the products on the road, and to a degree our 
Superchargers. 




as earned media traditionally, public relations, where 21 
peopl e -- we engage wi th jot1I1:cllists so - - i n the hope 22 
that they will write good t hings about our products . 23 
But we don' t do tradit ional _adver_tisinQ. . 24 
Q. And do you offer manufacturer incentives and 25 
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1 Q. Now, returning to the stores that you own and 1 
2 operate in 20 states and the District of Columbia, has 2 
3 Tesla to your knowledge ever been cited by any 3 
4 govermnent agency for fraud or improper or unfair sales 4 
5 practices? 5 
6 A. No. To my knowledge, we've_ never been cited 6 
7 for anything of t hat sort. 7 


















stores in the 20 states and District of Columbia, has 
to your knowledge Tesla ever been cited for unfair 
business practices or fraud? 







Q. To your knowledge, has Tesla ever been cited 14 
for delivering an :iJllproper title to a car? 15 
A. No. I have no knowledge of us being cited in 16 
that fashi on. 
Q. So has Tesla in its 12 years of existence 






A. No, we have not. 21 
Q. Why? 22 
A. The primary purpose of our retail strategy is 23 
to educate a public which is largely unfamiliar with 24 
this new technology and to - - to invest in that 25 
or, as I said, across markets around the world. It's 
the same price for the same product or same features or 
options that the customer might select. 
Q. So there's no additional margin charged at 
the store level? 
A. There is zero additional margin. 
Q. Why do you do that? 
A. Well, ·it goes back to what I 've said before, 
which i s trying to create a set of -- an alignment of 
incentives and a system that is frictionl ess so that 
all of t he normal barriers to considerat ion of a new 
car are el iminated in the interest of advocati~ for 
t he technology i t self and focusi ng fol ks on adoption 
and hopeful ly the transaction . 
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relationship and that educat ional process. 
As a practical matter, we have no need for 
the kind of -- the narrow benefits that the dealer 
system might offer to Tesla, one being ability to 
expand into diverse world geography. 
We are primarily selling into urban and 
suburban markets right now. So where as the dealer 
system might all ow us to expand the number of stores , 
that's not -- those aren't market s we 're focused on 
right now. 
As a second and much more canpelling business 
issue, we are as I mentioned building custom vehicles. 
We are selling these vehicles on a one-off basi s. The 
traditional deal er-manufacturer system has the 
manufacturer offloading hundreds or t housands of 
products from its balance sheet to a dealer for markup 
and sale . 
We are not a high-volume manufacturer at this 
point i n our corporate development , and so we do not 
have the need or desire to resell or have products 
marked up. 
One could suggest that our vehicles are 
expensive, and, indeed, they are at this point until we 
produce a $35,000 vehicle. But we are trying to make 
that technology as cost efficiently as possible and as 
Litigat i on Servi ces I 800-330- 1112 
www . li t igationservices.com 


























inexpensively as possible in order to make -- deliver 1 
those products to the customer at the lowest cost 2 
possible. 3 
Q. But woul dn ' t, as counsel said, it be possible 4 
for you to sell consi stent with your business model 5 
t hrough an independent franchise dealer? 6 
A. So the problem - - the very specific problem 7 
that one would have there is that in a world where 8 
dealers make profit on markup of the initial sale and 9 
service of the vehicle in the post-sale environment, 10 
neither of those opportunities would exist for a dealer 11 
selling independently but in parallel to Tesla's own 12 
efforts . 13 
So they would not have the ability to mark up 14 
a vehicle when the customer can see for themselves on 15 
the Website that they could have the vehicle for the 16 
Tesla price at a cheaper rate. So that's -- that's a 17 
very -- that ' s a very specific issue there. 18 
The ~ame principle applies in service. 19 
Our -- why would a customer go to -- have their vehicle 20 
serviced wi th a third party, at a dealer, when they 21 
knCM they can have that vehicle les_s expensively in a 22 
Tesla servi ce facil i ty? 
Q. So you 've explored this but det eanined t hat 
23 
24 
25 it's not possibl e? 25 
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1 here in Utah for Tesla? 1 
2 A. Yes. So this is a plan that was initiated 2 
3 last year to id~nti fy a location in t he Great Salt Lake 3 
4 area to serve our grCMing customer .base here. As 4 
5 mentioned before, something on the order of 270 5 
6 Model S, so we wanted to be here to service, and 6 
7 consistent with our model to open a sales opportunity 7 
8 as well. 8 
9 As a practical matter, you see Superchargers 9 
10 there in the foreground. We also offer free charging 10 
11 at this facility as well. That effort initiated last 11 
year with the clear view toward opening the store in 12 
the first quarter of this year. 13 
Q. Were you involved i n that process of applying 14 
for a new motor vehicle deal er' s l i cense? 15 
A. At a high level. We have a legal and retail 16 
development team that is involved in the actual 17 
paperwork and planning of these exercises. 18 
Q. And did you r eceive a license from t he Motor 19 
Vehicl e Enforcement Divi sion? 20 
A. We did not. 21 
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A. Well, we've studied this. Exploration would 
suggest that we 've actually -- might suggest that we 
had actually discussed this with third parties. But 
our study, view, and experience with this suggests that 
this is unambiguously the case. 
Q. Let's turn to t he efforts --
JUWE PHAN: Maybe before we start a new 
section, it's aoout 10:30. This clock up there --
MR. VALENTINE: Is fast. 
JUWE PHAN: I think we'll take a break. 
MR. ·VALENTINE: Chairman needs to make a call 
to an elected official at a break at 10:30. Take aoout 
a 10-minute break at this time. 
MR. RILEY': Thank you very much. 
(Recess taken at 10:29, resuming at 10:44.) 
MR. VALENTINE: Thank you very much, Counsel. 
MR. RILEY: Thank you very much, 
Mr. Chairman . 
JUWE PHAN: Okay. We're back on the record. 
MR. RILEY: Thank you. 
Q. (By Mr. Ril ey) Mr . O'Connell, I 'd like to now 
turn to the plan to start operations here in Utah. And 
we have slide 12, which is a ·photograph of the store on 
Stat e Street here in Salt Lake City. 
Could you describe the plans to open a store 
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ability of all manufacturers to sell in a certain way 
online here in Utah. ·· We-saw the effort as unnecessary 
relative to our specific goals and aims, well meaning 
as it was, and dec1ined to participat e in that effort. 
With the rejection of the license, hCMever, 
we revisit ed conversations with Representative 
COleman's office, and, admittedly l ate in the 46th 
legislative session here, engaged in an effort to 
modify the language in a fashion that would permit the 
narrow activities that we sought, the narrow activity, 
specifically the licensing of this facility that we 
sought . 
Q. And did you make any effor t at that point t o 




A. It would not make sense. There is no profit 
opportunity for a licensed dealer, and it would not 
serve our customers. 
Q. Why would i t not serve your cust omers? 


















Q. And what r ecourse did you take at that point? 22 
A. So there -- we had been approached earlier in 23 
the year by Representative Coleman to participate in 
the legislative effort, well meaning, to clarify the 
24 
25 
model is to educate, not to up-sell, and to service i 
without up-selling or extracting additional monies from 
our customers. 
'---- ------- ----- - - - - --- - ---~--- ----------- - - --- ----- ..J 
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1 Q. And have you reviewed the l i terature on this 1 
2 process of selling through dealers? 2 
3 A. I have a lot of practical experience with 3 
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A. No. To my lmowledge , there is not. 
Q. How i s the st ore funded then? 
A. The is store is funded by -- on the corporate 
4 t his issue havi ng been drawn into disputes in something 
5 on the order of 30 other venues, so I have a general 
4 balance sheet as I understand it . There may be 
6 but well understood view of the practice of third-party 
5 financial transactions below that that I'm not aware 



















car sales. 7 
Q. And with respect to t he State Street store, 8 
what i s t he current status? 9 
A. My understanding is that the store is -- that 10 
t he service center is open, but the store itself is 11 
shuttered. 12 
MR. RILEY: Thank you. I have no more 13 
questions . 
JUIX,E PHAN: All right. Mr. Francis? 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. FRANCIS : 
Q. Mr. O'Connell , I have a couple of questions 
with regard to Tesla Motors, Inc.' s relationship with 








are salaried. 21 
Is there an agreement between TMI, I'll refer 22 
to it as that, the parent company or the manufacturer, 23 
and their stores with splitting the profits from the 24 
monies directly to build new stores and service 
facilities, as with the Supercharger network. 
Q. I s t here a manager of a store? 
A. There typically is a manager of a store. 
Q. So all of the profi t s from all of the sales 
go to the parent company, and the parent company on its 
bal ance sheet deducts the amounts of salari es of 
personnel in t he stores themselves? 
A. I'm unfamiliar with the exact m:xialities that 
you're describing. 
Q. Do you !mow what the margin of profi t is on 
the sale of a vehicle that would go to TMI? 
A. No, I •m not at this moment. I am generally 
aware of the corporate goals we set for ourselves that 
we comnunicate to the public markets, but that's as far 
as my lmowledge goes. 
Q. Do you lmow whether or not the margin of 
profit on a sale of a vehicle is higher than the margin 
25 sale of a single vehicle? 25 of profit that would go to a manuf?cturer in an 
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1 i ndependent franchise dealership? 
2 A. I do not. I have not done t hat analysis . 
3 Q. Couldn't Tesla create a franchise 
4 relationship where the franchise agreement would 
5 include all of the rest rictions that currently exist 
6 with the store's sales model and everything that Tesla 






1 MR. FRANCIS: No further questions. 
2 JUIX,E PHAN: Okay. Are there -- before we 
3 have redirect, let's see if comnissioners have 
4 questions. 
5 Comnissioner Pero? 
6 .- MR. PERO: Mr. O'Connell, I 've not heard 
7 anything about warranty on the vehicles. 
8 
9 
10 A. There are many reasons. The principal one, 10 
THE WITNESS: so we offer a full warranty 
consistent with every other vehicle in its -- in the 
category. 
11 which I indicated first off, is there's no profit 11 
12 opportunity for the third party. There are all of the 12 




mission, regarding the culture of education as opposed 
to transaction, and other i ssues I 've mentioned. 








same structure, that TMI, the parent company, would pay 18 
the expenses of the facility and salaried personnel? 19 
A. No. The introduct ion of a third party would 20 
MR. PERO: What is the warranty? 
THE WITNESS: I don ' t have the specifics in 
front of me, but we offer at least -- there ' s a 
vehicle-side warranty, which is -- I should Jma,; this, 
I apologize for t his . It ' s perhaps a 3- to 5-year 
warranty, but I don't want to stipulate to that. We 
can get you these details . We also offer an extended 
warranty on the battery, which is for most customers 
the perceived riskiest part of the transaction. 
MR. PERO: SO if I'm an owner of a Tesla, 
21 introduce a new set of diverse incentives that were not 21 could I go to any of the facilities across the 
22 consistent with our goals and our practice. 22 United States? 
23 Q. Unless they contracted otherwise? 23 THE WITNESS: Absolutely. Yes. 
24 A. Our study of this issue suggests that it 24 MR. PERO : Okay . If - - if I 'm an CMner of a 
25 could not be done and will not be done. 125 Tesla and I want to trade it in, let's say I ha~e an X 
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1 and I want an S, do you handle that? 1 
2 TI!E WITNESS: We have recently in the past 2 
3 month introduced a CPO, certified preowned system, that 3 
4 allow folks to bring their Models in and -- and trade 4 
5 i t in for a new version. We take those cars, we 5 
6 recondition them, and we offer a warranty and resell 6 
7 them. 7 
8 MR. PERO: Those would be sold through Tesla , 8 

















TI!E WITNESS: That is correct. I -- I would 10 
also mention here that I think it ·is true that other 
third parties can acquire Teslas and sell them 




can't control what a customer does with their car. But 14 
we do offer this 7- 15 
MR. PERO: That probably gets into my last 16 
question. I O\'m an X, and I don' t like it. So I go to 17 
Larry Miller, one of the dealers in town, and I want to 18 
get a Chevrolet. If I am successful in getting that 19 
trade done, can they do anything with my Tesla or -- 20 
THE WI1NESS: It's a -- it's a free market to 21 
resell a product t hat one acquires legally. So I don ' t 22 
know of the specific rules in Utah with respect to this 23 
issue, but I know t hat this is done in most other 24 
venues where it's been explored. 25 
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1 THE WITNESS: Yes , t hat is correct. 1 
2 MR. VALENTINE: Do you have other vendors 2 
3 that you use as wel l, or is AutoNation your exclusive? 3 
4 THE WI1NESS: I believe we do, but I 'm 4 
5 unaware of the specific names . I wouldn ' t want to 5 
6 stipulate to that . 6 
7 MR. VALENTINE: Thank you. That ' s all I 7 
8 have. 8 
9 JUDGE PHAN: Corrrnissioner Cragun? No? 9 
10 Ccmnissi oner Rockwell? No? 10 
11 Okay. Your redirect? 11 
12 MR. RILEY: Thank you. 12 
13 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 13 
14 BY MR . RILEY: 14 
15 Q. Question on the states, line of questioning 15 
·16 about handling all of these issues through a contract 16 
17 with an independent franchise . 17 
18 Now, is it your understanding that 18 
19 tenninating that independent" franchisee, for exanple, 19 
20 for not following your contract is governed by state 20 
21 law? 21 
22 A. Unfor tunately, I 'm not a lawyer, and I'm not 22 
23 practiced in these issues. So I, frankly, can't speak 23 
24 to how these things might be handled under contract 24 
25 law. 25 
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So the answer is yes, they can acquire it, 
and they can resell it themselves. Our CPO program, 
just to be clear, is it to make it easy for customers 
to stay within the franchise , so that's why we offer 
it. 
JUDGE PHAN: Any other questions? 
MR. VALENTINE: I have some. Similar 
questions to Commissioner Pero, and that is talk a 
little bit more about this trade-in policy with those 
outside of the Tesla market . I come in with my Chevy 
to use his example, and I want to buy a Tesla. You 
don't have a trade-in for my Tesla, but you do what? 
Explain again what happens. 
TI!E WITNESS : We have - - we have general 
agreements with a couple of resellers, used car sales , 
AutoNation being one of t hem, AutoNati on being a pretty 
well-knOl'm brand in the business. We simply make the 
connection for the customer with AutoNation, so it's a 
relatively frictionless transaction . 
MR. VALENTINE: You make the connecti on with 
AutoNation, and they negoti ate with AutoNation for the 
sale of their vehicle? 
THE WITNESS: If -- if by "they" you mean the 
customer? 
MR. VALENTINE: The customer. I'm sorry. 
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Q. Let ' s talk about the incentive structure that 
you did mention. A Tesla store in New Jersey, a 
customer is visiting from Wyomihg. Does the employee 
in that New Jersey store have an incentive to help that 
customer even though they may likely not buy the car? 
A. Absolutely. They are a salaried empl oyee of 
Tesla Motors, so they would have as much incenti ve as 
the local salesperson. 
Q. How does that COl!q)are with, for exanple, an 
independent franchisee? 
A. It's qui te different in that each sales - -
well, each dealership as I understand it and t he sal es 
people within those dealerships have very diverse 
incentives to -- to both move a customer into a 
product, as well as into a set of features inclusive of 
options, as well as f inancing schemes. 
And as I 've discussed, some of those are 
cornni ssioned in a way to direct certain behavior. So 
the bottom line is that the price would be -- price 
would be quite diverse across different venues, even 
within the same geography. 
Q. You testified I believe about the additional 
margin would not be available to the independent 
middleman. What did you mean by that? 
A. Well, very simply that if Tesla on its 
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1 website is suggesting that the car -- is stipulating 1 
2 the car sells for this, and that is also the price 2 
3 through which we sold to a third party, then t hat third 3 
4 party, whoever it is, has very little ability to earn 4 
5 incremental profi t on t hat sale of that same product 5 
6 because the customer can quite easily see that they can 6 
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state your full name and occupation for the record? 
A. Fiona Scott Morton. I'm a professor of 
economics at the Yale School of Management. 
Q. Could you describe your educational 
background? 
A. Yes. I have an undergraduate degree from 
7 get a better price fro.~ Tesl a . 7 Yale and a Ph.D. in economics from MIT. 
8 MR. RILEY: Thank you . No further questions. 
9 JUD8E PHAN: All right . Mr. o' Connell, you 
10 can take a seat . 
11 Mr. Riley, go ahead and call your next 
12 wit ness . 
13 MR. RILEY: Thank you, Your Honor. Our next 
14 wit ness is Fiona Scott Morton. 
15 JUD8E PHAN: Will you stand and raise your 
16 right hand. 
17 --ct>o--
18 FIONA SCOTT MORTON, 
19 having been first duly sworn to tell the 
20 truth, was examined and testified as follows: 
21 --ct>o--
22 JUD8E PHAN : Have a seat. 
23 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
24 BY MR. RILEY : 
25 Q. Good 111::>rning, Professor. Could you please 
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8 Q. If you could, refer to your exhibit book. 
9 There is your curriculum vitae as Exhibit 10 .1. Is 
10 this a current curriculum vitae? 
11 A. Yes, it is. 
12 Q. Now, it lists you as a Theodore Nierenberg 
13 Professor of Economics. What is that? 
14 A. That's an endowed chair. Mr. Nierenberg gave 
15 money in honor of his father, and I was selected to 
16 occupy that chair. 
17 Q. And what courses do you teach at Yale? 
18 A. I teach courses on competition, competitive 
19 trajectory for MBA!,, and then a competition economics 
20 class. 
21 Q. Have you held other t eaching positions at 
22 universiti es? 
23 A. Yes. Before I came to Yale, I was a 
24 professor -- an assi stant professor at the University 
25 of Chicago Business School and before. that at Stanford 
1 Business School . 1 
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a t eam, and yo~ •re looking at the data. You're 
weighing the pros and cons of certain behavior, looking 
at whether it has anticompetitive effect, trying to 
quantify that anticompeti tive effect, determining if 
there's a l ess anticompetitive way to achiev~. the 
firm's business objectives, you kn01,, that kind of 
analysis that goes into determining whether the 
Division would bring a case, for example. 
2 Q. How long have you been a professor at Yale? 2 
3 A. About 15 years, a+most 16. 3 
4 Q. And have you held other positions at Yale 4 
5 besides professor? 5 
6 A. I was Associate Dean for a few years, which 6 
7 i s an administrative function helping to organize the 7 
8 faculty. 8 
9 Q. And have you had held any positions in 9 
10 government, Professor? 10 
11 A. Yes. For a year and a half, I was the chief 11 
12 economist at the Department of Justice Antitrust 12 
13 Division. 13 
14 Q. What were your duties as a Deputy Assistant 14 
15 Attorney General? 15 







supervising and guiding about 45 or 50 Ph.D. economists 17 
who work as civil service staff at the DOJ. They 18 
evaluate antitrust and merger cases and competition 19 
advocacy. And the chief economist who comes in from 





Q. Could you please describe your areas of 
research focus? 
A. Yes . My area i s called industrial 
organization. And that' s the study of competition 
among firms. I've worked -- I"ve done research in a 
vari ety of industries, pharmaceuticals, auto retailing, 
caskets, magazines, a number of different industries. 
Q. Have you been qualified as an expert in 
economics by a court or administrative forum? 
A. Yes, I have . 
Q. Could you describe those occasions? 
A. I've done a number of -- I've testified in a 
number of trials in the pharmaceutical industry. I 
have testified for Chrysler in the matter of dealer 
23 Q. And what were your specific duties at the 
24 Department of Justice with regard t o antitrust cases? 
23 terminations. I've testified for Tesla in Georgia. 
24 Those would be the most recent. 
25 A. Well, you do the economic analysis. There's 25 Q. And what is your expertise in the automotive 
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1 industry? 1 
2 A. I have written a series of papers with a 2 
3 friend and colleague at Northwestern looking at auto 3 
4 retailing and the way in which prices are negotiated, 4 
5 how consumers search, how consumers bargain, the way 5 
6 prices are set in that context. 6 
7 Q. And have you published any peer-reviewed 7 
8 arti cl es on that subject? 8 
9 A. Yes, I have . Several looking at the 9 
10 automotive retailing market and then the introduction 10 
11 of the Internet and its impact on the way consumers 11 
12 search and the way they bargain . 12 
13 Q. Have you been previously engaged by Tesla? 13 
M A. Iraw. U 
15 Q. Could you describe those engagements? 15 
16 A. Yes . I worked a little bit on the case in 16 
17 New Jersey. I worked on the case in Georgia and 17 
18 testified in that instance. And I wrote a small piece 18 
19 for the case in Connecticut, my home state . 19 
20 Q. Are you being compensated here for your time 20 
21 and preparation? 21 
22 A. Yes, I am. 22 
23 Q. What are you being compensated at? 23 
24 A. $1, 000 an hour. 24 
25 Q. Approximately how many hours have you devoted 25 
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1 at the 10-K, you know, a number of other things like 1 
2 that . 2 
3 Q. So I would like to ask 'you at this point if 3 
4 you could swmnarize your opinion based on the work you 4 
5 have done to analyze the economic i.Irpli cations of 5 
6 prohibiting Tesla from selling vehicles directly to 6 
7 Utah customers . What is the summary ·of your opinion? 7 
8 A. It's a very clear surrrnary. Preventing Tesla 8 
9 from selling direct to Utah customers is 9 
10 anticompetitive. It's going to cause higher prices, 10 
11 going to cause consumers to have less choi ce. There's 11 
12 going to be less innovation. 12 
13 It ' s also inefficient. Consumers in Utah 13 
14 will have to drive to Nevada if they want to test drive 14 
15 a car. There won't be the environmental benefits in 15 
16 Utah because there won't be as many cars . There won ' t 16 
17 be jobs in Utah. And there is no benefit to the publ ic 17 
18 from restricting the way an auto manufacturer sells its 18 
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to the Utah-specific issues? 
A. Well, the Utah specific issues are related, 
of course, to the broader issues that I had to learn 
about for the Nei1 Jersey and the Georgia cases, in 
particular. For example, I visited a Tesla store and 
test drove the car. So it 's been about SO hours all 
told for al l these matters put together. 
MR. RILEY: Your Honor, I'd like to offer 
Professor Scott Morton as an expert in ccmpetition and 
regulation in the automotive industry. 
MR. FRANCIS: We have no objection. 
MR. RILEY: Thank you. 
Q. (By Mr. Riley) Professor, what were you asked 
to do in this matter? 
A. I was asked to evaluate t he Tesla business 
model and determine whether there was any 
procCXJ4)etitive justification for restricting the way 
that Tesla sells cars in the state of Utah. 
Q. And what did you examine in your preparation? 
A. I examined -- you know, I l earned about the 
technology of the car. I visited a retail store and 
acted like a .customer and received the tour of the 
technology, did a test drive, read a number of articles 
about -- sort of Consumer Reports kinds of studies and 
other studies about purcrasing these·vehicles, looked 
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ca!s and is looking across the variety of model s that 
are out there and is interested in the Tesla, then 
obviously the easiest thing for that consumer is i f 
there's a Tesla store within range of, perhaps, so trat 
she can go learn about the vehicle, test drive the 
vehicle, get educated, maybe go back several times 
easily. 
If she had to drive to Colorado or some kind 
of neighboring state to get this information, then that 
makes the whole process of searching more difficult. 
It reduces her choice in vehicles . 
And it doesn't -- it ' s going to reduce the 
number of -- because it reduces her choice and it's 
mcire difficult, there aren 't going to be as many Teslas 
sold in Utah. 
· That ' s going to reduce the environmental 
benefits, more pollution on t he roads and so forth, and 
also denies Utah citizens the ability to have a job 
19 cars . 19 working for Tesla in this store. 
20 Q. Let ' s turn t o one of the bases for your 
21 opinion, which is t hat it would be inefficient to 
22 prohibit Tesla from selling directly to cons~ers 
23 through a Tesla-owned and operated store. What ' s the 
24 basis for that opinion? 
25 A. Well, if a consumer i s trying to shop for 
20 Q. But why not, as counsel suggested, just force 
21 Tesl a to contract with an independent franchise dealer? 
22 A. Well, you know, of course a state has the 
23 abil ity to write l aws of that form. But the question 
24 from -- for an economist is why would you do that? 
25 There is no reason to do that. 
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1 Normally we think if a clothing brand would 1 
2 like t o franchise its stores, it's welcome to do that. 2 
3 If it wants to own the stores, it's welcome to do that. 3 
4 It's going to pick the retailing structure it thinks 4 
5 that consumers like best and that's going to work best 5 
6 for its clothing brand. 6 
7 That ' s what we let manufacturers do because 7 
8 it's efficient. And we let the free market decide 8 
9 whether the 01med store really works. If consumers 9 
-10 don ' t like the owned store, they wouldn ' t buy the 10 
11 prcx:luct there . And the free market would l et us kn01, 11 
12 that that wasn't a gocx:l choice. But we don ' t have the 12 
13 government deciding hO\Y manufacturers should retail 13 
14 their prcx:lucts. 14 
15 Q. Is Tesla 's direct sales model cost efficient 15 
16 in your opinion? 16 
17 A. Yes, I think. it i s because this i s a small 17 
18 finn, so they don't have a lot of volume to spread 18 
19 around. And it is a brand new technology. So t his -- 19 
20 the salesperson job i s not really sales in t he 20 
21 traditional sense. It's a lot of education, and it's 21 
22 brand building. You're trying t o bui l d a global brand. 22 
23 And so trying to get that right requires a lot of 23 
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Mr. O'Connell's question earlier, why can't -- on the 
cross-examination, why can't you just set up a contract 
that makes exactly what you want to have happen in the 
store happen but with a third party? 
The answer is there's a long literature in 
economics that says it's really hard to write those 
contracts. There's always things that occur that you 
didn't realize would occur at the time you're writing 
that contact. 
And then that third party is a free agent and 
can do what they want because it isn ' t written down in 
the contract that they should smile at a certain moment 
or open the door at a certain moment or change the air 
conditioning at a certain moment. 
And so the finn doesn't have control. And 
the way it would is if it was its own store and its Cl'lm 
employees. That control when you're a young firm 
building a brand, when you don't do any advertising, 
the consumer's experience in the store is the 
advertising. It is the brand building. They have 
to - - Tesla has to be able to do that exactly the way 
t hey want it done. 
Q. What about just simply write it i nto a 
24 control. 
25 I thi nk part of the answer to your -- to 
24 contract, and if the independent franchisee doesn't 



























A. Well , t enninating anybody is costly and t akes 1 
a long time, and it is probably protected by the state 2 
franchise l aws. Anyway, that ' s not t he rel ationship 3 
you want to have. You want to get i t r i ght. 4 
The object is not to be terminating people . 5 
The object is to get it right and with employees whom 6 
ybu train yourself and promote and let go and have 7 
store managers and so on yoursel f. 
You can make that cust omer experi ence exactly 
what you want it to be . It's a litt le like the Apple 





the Best Buy retailing experience of 10 years ago. And 12 
that's a conscious choice by that manufacturer to 
create that retailing experience as part of their 
brand. 
Q. Have you studied the incentive structures 








A. Yes, I have. 19 
Q. And what is your opinion with regard to t hose 20 
incent ive structures? 
A. They're completely different. The 
traditional franchise dealer compensates salesmen on 





can negotiate with that customer. They're compensated 25 
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for selling additional extras, add-ons, additional 
insurance, fi nancing. 
They're compensated on t he margin they can 
earn on the trade-in, all these different business 
lines that Tesla does not have for one thing, and then 
also is trying to avoid with a fixed price that we're 
going to put our sal es people on salary. 
We're going to have a fixed price system 
where depending on the options and configuration of the 
car you select, there's just one price visible on the 
Internet to everybcx:ly . There's no bargaining at al l. 
There's no kind of extraction of -- of the 
customer ' s money. Let's try to figure out how much 
you're willing to pay, and I'll take that. That's the 
traditional mcx:lel , and that ' s what those sales people 
are trained and incentivized to do. 
Q. Have you studied Tesl a ' s service model? 
A. I have. 
Q. And how does that differ from a traditional 
model ? 
A. Well, that's also different partially 
because, of course, the technology is so different, 
some servicing can be done remotely with software 
updates. 
Q. Could you explai n t hat , remotely? 
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1 A. Yes. This car has an operating system. If 1 
2 Tesla wants to change something about the functionality 2 
3 of the car, Tesla can, using a mobile conrnunications, 3 
4 do a software update in the car, just like you would do 4 
5 a software update of your laptop with a wifi 5 
6 connection. And so that kind of service happens 6 
7 without the consumer needing to do anything or bring 7 
8 the car anywhere . 8 
9 There's also the kinds of service that 9 
10 requires mechanics. And those mechanics are, again, 10 
11 not paid per job, rush, rush and finish this as quickly 11 
12 as possible, but t hey're paid to make the brand strong. 12 
13 They' re paid to get the repair done correctly the first 13 
14 time so that t here ' s a happy customer. We see that in 14 
15 Consumer Reports readings, for example . 15 
16 Q. And in your study of t his industry, how does 16 
17 that differ from t he traditional franchise model ? 17 








money on repairs. They're incenti vized to get you in 19 
the door. But then the brand is not their concern. 20 
They're a Ford dealer. They'd l ike you to come back to 21 
them. 22 
But in terms of building the Ford brand and 23 
if you move to another· state wanting you to buy the 




1 same way Tesla has. 1 
2 Q. That focus on brand building, how does that 2 
3 translate to the customer's experience in a store in a 3 
4 part icular geography, for example? . 4 
·5 A. It ' s very much related to that. As we heard 5 
6 from everylxx:ly this norning, the Tesla idea of sales is 6 
7 to .make . the process fr ict ionless, by which I think they 7 
8 mean you don't have to argue with the salesperson about 8 
9 how much you' re going to pay for the car. 9 
















models are sitting on the lot. You can choose your a,,m 11 
model. Your financing isn't going to be marked up. So 12 
the whole shopping experience becomes very transparent 13 
and very easy. 
I can choose the battery I want. I can 
choose the wheels I want. If I wonder about the 
characteristics of wheels, I can ask the salesman in 
the store, and I kno~ t hat he 's not being paid to get 
me to buy expensive wheels. 
He 's there as an educator. He wants me to 









He's going to help me figure out which wheels I want . 22 
I choose them, and they have a t ransparent price on the 23 
website. They cost whatever they cost. And I can see 24 
that . 25 
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concern, unlike an integrated model where the store is 
part of the mother ship and wants the brand to be 
built. So the franchise dealer doesn't have the same 
incentives for quality of repairs and for repeat 
business. 
Q. We had some ques t ions from the Commissi on 
about warranty repai rs. Have you l ooked at that with 
regard to Tesla and a traditi onal independent franchise 
model? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. 
A. 
What opinions have you reached on that? 
Well, this goes back to what I was saying 
about incentives. The warranty is designed to give 
people comfort in the product and the brand and 
guarantee that product. 
And Tesla, because they're brand building on 
a global basis, is very interested in having this work 
out beautifully and have the customer like the car and 
recomnend the car to all their friends and relations 
because, remember, they don ' t do any advertising. So 
the word of mouth is really critical. 
For a franchise dealer, the warranty is a 
source of profits. If t he car breaks down, they do the 
warranty work, but there isn't a long-run concern t here 
for making the customer happy wi th the brand i n the 
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The whole thing can be very relaxed and 
non-confrontational and positive. And then I can - -
I'm going to go home and tell all my friends that this 
was a marvelous shopping experience . 
Q. What does i t mean in t erms of efficiency that 
Tesl a spends no ItPney on paid advertising? 
A. Well, that's a tremendous cost savings. 
Anybody who watches the Super Bowl or drives do,m the 
highway kna.~s that car manufacturers and their 
associated dealers spend a great deal of money on 
advertising. 
Q. Have you l ooked at inventory and compared 
inventory management between the t raditional franchi se 
dealer model and Tesla? 
A. Yes. The inventory -- not holding inventory 
i s an i ncredible cost savings . When you build the 
inventory, you' re trying to guess what consumers want. 
So you put 100 cars on the dealer's lot, and you're 
hoping those are the 100 cars that t he consumers who 
walk in would like to buy. 
When you build to order, there ' s no waste. 
You' re building exact! y t he car the consumer wants . If 
you're Tesl a , the cash flow is better because you 
collect the money as you deliver the car . So it's not 
the case that I build a car, incur al l those costs, I 
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1 have it sit on the lot for a rronth, then the dealer 1 
2 sells it, then maybe I make my money. 2 
3 So the cash flow is quicker, and there's not 3 
4 waste for building the wrong car for scmetxxly who 4 
5 doesn't want it. And because the production process is 5 
6 quite quick, this is a four-week, eight -week at most 6 
7 delay for the consumer. 7 
8 Q. Let's talk about the traditi onal franchise 8 
9 dealer and the experience of selling electric vehicles. 9 
10 Are you aware of any literature that supports your 10 
11 opinion in that respect? 11 
12 A. Yes. There have been several studies. 12 













alternative fuel vehicles and found that the experience 14 
was really not very good outside of the Tesla store. 15 
Q. Let ' s look at the slide that you prepared, 16 
slide number 2, Consumer Reports. It says, "When asked 17 
about a Prius plug-in, a salesperson in Star ~oyota 18 
Sci on of Bayside New York would not even show our 19 
shopper the car despite having one in stock. " 
A. Yes. And maybe that sales person thought 
that they could persuade the shopper to buy a more 
expensive gasoline car, and they wanted th~ margin on 
that gasoline car. 








1 the car. They learn a little bit. They go away, t hink 1 
2 about it. It ' s a l ong sales process because the 2 
3 technology is so different. 3 
4 Q. Then you mentioned this study in your direct 4 
5 testimony by the University of California at Davis. 5 
6 And perhaps you could explain that to us. 6 
7 A. Yes. I mean, it ' s well known that people do 7 
8 not enjoy shopping for a new car. And what _ this study 8 
9 does is it canpares different buyers, plug-in vehicle 9 
10 buyers, non-premium, so t hat's the Volt and so on, and 10 
11 then compares that t o conventional vehicle non-premium, 11 
12 conventional vehicle premium, and then Tesla . 12 
13 What you can see is that the ratings for the 13 
14 shopping process gets consecutively better as you go up 14 
15 that list. And this is because the plug-in is t his odd 15 
16 duck in the regular conventional lot. And the dealers 16 
17 are not training -- don't have_ the incentives to train 17 
18 the salesmen to do a good job with that. 18 
19 And then you see as the cars get rrore 19 
20 expensive, people enjoy the shopping process a little 20 
21 bit more. But Tesla beats all of them I t hink because 21 
22 of this no haggling and this kind of transparent 22 
23 friendly process where, you know, the consumer doesn't 23 
24 feel stressed about visiting t he dealership. 24 
25 Q. So on the chart, Tesla is the dark blue line? 25 
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time to explain the Prius plug-in. That would waste 
two hours of their day that they coul9 be spending on 
selling-cars to sometxxly else. 
Q. And then Green Car Report says, "The salesman 
who showed BMW's first ever electric car on sale had 
never driven it, nor had received any training." 
A. This is a t ypical problem where you have 
sales people who are compensated on selling cars and on 
the margin of selling cars. They' re not going to want 
to take two days out of selling cars to get trained on 
electric vehicle technology. 
That is just very costly to them because 
they're not getting paid for that day. And then every 
customer who comes in takes a really long t ime to 
educate and convince about the electric car. So it ' s 
really not in the interest of the salesperson at a 
traditional dealership to invest in learning how to 
sell these cars. 
Q. And then Green Car goes on to say, "Selling a 
plug-in car takes three to five times as long for a 
dealer as does selling a gasoline car." 
A. Yeah. It's real ly an education process 
because people are unfamiliar with the technology. So 
you would expect them to come in. They're curious. 
They see the store in the mall. They want to look at 
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A. Line at the bottcm doing better than 
everytxxly, yeah. 
Q. In the categories of facility, salesperson, 
working out the deal, delivery, and overall 
satisfaction? 
A. Correct. 
Q. So I'd like to turn to the question that 
counsel for the state posed, which is wouldn't it just 
be possible given Tesla's model in the rest of the 
country to come here in Utah and contract with an 
independent franchisee? Doesn' t that make sense? 
A. It doesn ' t make sense. 
Q. Why? 
A. It's completely inconsistent with Tesla's 
strategy. They want the store under their control. 
They want to brand build in this way. There i s 
nothing -- there's no profit built if for a third 
party. There's no markup they can do on the.vehicle. 
They' re not selling used cars. They're not 
sell ing marked-up financing. They 're not selling 
additional add-ons . So there would be no place for 
that third-party franchisee t o earn any money doing --
selling a Tesla car. 
Q. But have you identified any harm to customers 
from prohibiting Tesla from selling directly to 
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customers through a store in Utah? 
A. No. This is a question of retailing form. 
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J ~ 
manufacturer -- I mean, the car is the same . We're not 
talking about a safety issue about the car. We're 
talking about the method by which the manufacturer 
chooses to retail that car. 
And that's a business choice, which a 
business should select according to what's most 
convenient and is going to enhance their strategy in 
the product market, which typic'.3lly is going to be a 
choice that they think makes co:1sumers happy. 











economy with happy consumers, you want manufacturers to 13 
be able to decide for themselyes how they're going to 14 
retail their product. . 15 
Q. Let me ask the question in reverse. Is there 16 
any harm to customers from prohibiting Tesla from 
selling directly through its own store in Utah? 





pressure on the incumbent vehicle sellers in the state 
of Utah, which is really good for consumers. So it's 
going to put pricing pressure on luxury cars because 
they're going to have another competitor that they have 
to try to convince consumers to come to them. 
So if I'm Mercedes, I may have to try harder. 
I may have to lo~,er my price. I might have to have 
nicer sales people. I might have to do something to 
compete with Tesla. 
If I'm the fully-loaded Ford beneath the 
Mercedes, I'm going to ·respond to the Mercedes. 
Dealers may decide that they need to have different 
kinds of facilities or different kinds of workers to 
help with buyer satisfaction. The entry of Tesla is 
going to up the competitive landscape in Utah, which is 
great for Utah consumers. ' 
Q. Is there any economic literature that 
supports your opinion about the harm to consumers of 
restricting Tesla from selling directly through its own 
20 entry. That entry is valuable .for several reasons. 
21 First of all, i~•s really a different and innovative 
22 entry. It's not just another car similar to ones we 
23 already have. It's really unique. 
20 stores? 
21 A. It's not economic literature, but it's --
24 That's going to give consumers a lot of 
22 it's the federal -- I mean -- well, so there's plen~y 
23 of economic literatur~ that say; that firms profit 
25 choice. And then it's going to put competitive 
24 maximize, and the thing that they do is try to please 
25 consumers. And you're best off if you leave firms to 
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1 their own decision making. 1 
2 There's -- in other settings besides auto 2 
3 retailing, . there's a number of different papers ~hat 3 
4 look at gasoline stations, for example, and whether 4 
5 they're restricted from having a repair store or 5 
6 self-serve versus full serve, so on. 6 
7 There's also explicit advice on this topic 7 
8 from the Federal Trade Commission which cites a number 8 
9 of these pap_ers in its letter to d~fferent states who 9 
10 have encoun~er~d this same problem with ·d~alers trying 10 













Conmission says -- and this is one of our two antitrust 12 
agencies -- says there is no reason to protect 13 
consumers in this way. 14 
It's not protecting consumers to restrict t he 15 
manufacturer's choice of retailing strategy, that the 16 
free market is quite capable of letting -- of 17 
determining which retailing strategy is going to win. 18 
Consumers will choose the one they like . And 19 
there isn't any - - any public interest reason for 20 
re_stricting the way a consumer -- a manufacturer 21 
chooses to sell its cars . 22 





Q. Yes, consumer surveys. 
A. Yes. I reference a number of surveys in my 
statement, and these have been carried out by Consumer 
Reports in particula;, by th~-Davis people, by a nuinber 
of different organization~ that have looked at the 
benefits of Tesla and how consumers have -- are highly 
rated, both the car and the service that comes with the 
car. 
Q. As an economist, what is the significance of 
those surveys to you? 
A. Well, we're in the business I think here of 
trying to set _up a market economy that serves the 
consumer. So if the consumer is very happy with a 
particular product or a particular retailing method or 
particular kind of service, then the economy is serving 
the consumer well. We don't want to restrict the 
choice that is creating so much ·consumer benefit. 
Q. How do you respond to the argument that 
having local independent franchisees supports 
competition in the market? 
A. The many franchisees of -- let ' s take Ford as 
24 literature that supports your opinion about the 
25 consumer benefits provided by Tesla's direct sale 
24 an example - - compete with each other over selling --
25 over the -- they all buy the car from Ford at the same 
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price. That's in the franchise law. 1 
Then the question is how much do they mark it 2 
up? So they' re competing with each other over that 3 
markup. That's intrabrand competition. They're all 4 
Ford dealers . They're selling the same car. They 5 
bought it at the same price. 6 
7 And the question is -- I can drive from one 7 
8 to the other and say, What's the best price you' re 8 
9 offering me for this truck? And I can get different 9 
10 offers from those different Ford deale~ships and pick 10 
11 the lowest one. So this derronstrative, the slide here 11 
12 illustrates that . 12 
13 Q. We ' re referring to slide 6 for the record. 13 
14 A. Yes. F.ach make of car, each manufacturer has 14 
15 mul tiple dealers, and they compete wit h each other to 15 
16 reduce the retailing price, okay, not the wholesale 16 
17 price, but the retailing price. The markup the 17 
18 consumer faces is reduced by intrabrand competition . 18 
19 Q. What about Tesla's model, which i s not to 19 
20 have these independent dealers? 20 
21 A. . Well , if we go to the next slide, you can 21 
22 visually see how Tesla fits in. Tesl a is going to own 22 
23 i ts own store, and its store is competing with all 23 
24 t hose deal ers. 24 
25 Tesla when i t competes with Ford and BMW and 25 
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Toyota is engaging in interbrand competition. It's 
thinking about I want that BMW buyer to come to me 
instead . I'm going to set a price to convince that 
buyer that they should switch brands. That's 
interbrand competition. Tesla doesn't have to worry 
about the dealer marking up its car because it's a 
store, it's itself, just sets that final retail price. 
Q. Are t here benefits to consumer s of this 
ver t ical i nt egration from manufacturer to dealer? 
A. Yes, there are. It's something called double 
marginalization. It's the main reason that we give --
when we ' ;e looking at mergers that are a vertical 
merger from -- that integrate two pieces of the supply 
chain, and the basic intuition is when you look at BMW, 
you see there's two places to put a markup. BMW itself 
can put a markup, and the dealer can put a markup. 
That ends up flowing through to the consumer as a high 
price. 
When the two enti ties are combined into one, 
there's only one markup. And the result of that is a 
net lower price. And I have an arithmetic ~le on 
the next slide. 
Q. So this is slide number 8 entitled "Double 
Marginalization Increases Price." Could you walk us 











A. Cer tainly. So let ' s take the first column 
and imagi ne t hat we i:iave a dealer that's just one 
dealer of a manufacturer. And that the dealer buys 
t hat car for $1,000. Now, where does that $1,000 come 
from? 
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1 cost of goods sold here, $950. The manufacturer retail 
2 costs are going to be borne by Tesl a . They're going - -

















4 ' Tesl a is not carrying inventory, okay, and Tesla is 
5 not -- doesn't have the same l arge staff costs. So 
Let's assume the manufacturer ' s cost is 950. 6 that's going to be a lower cost for Tesl a . 
Then the manufacturer is going to have a markup. 7 And t hen the sum of that is going to be 
That's about a 5 percent markup. So the dealer's going 8 marked up because the manufacturer gets to mark up the 
to sell the car -- the manufacturer is going to sell 9 
t he car for $1,000 to the dealer, and then the dealer 10 
is going to have sane cost of sales, rent, advertising, 11 
floor pl an. Then the dealer is going to apply his own 12 
markup. So we get at the bottom there $1,150. 13 
Now let ' s imagine that that dealer is facing 14 
intrabrand competition. There are three dealerships 15 
nearby, three dealerships in the local area that 16 
compete to sell to the consumer. That $100 markup is 17 
going to shrink. 18 
Remember that the dealer's costs here are 19 
really 50 they ' re selling on the car, the 1,000 they're 20 
getting back when they sell the car. Dealer's costs 21 
are 50. And their markup just went fran twice their 22 
cost to 1/5th their cost because they're competing. We 23 
got a net price of $1,060. 24 
Now let's think about the Tesla model. Same 25 
product . But you can see because there ' s only one 
markup, we end up with a net l ower pr ice. Okay. 
That ' s t he - - what we call the el imination of 
double marginalizat ion. And it's a benefit to not 
having a chain of independent enti ties, each of which 
needs a profit margin. 
Q. So what are the benefits to consumers of 
elilllinating the double marginalization? 
A. A lower price. 
Q. And how does that affect competition? 
A. That, of course, enhances competition because 
that lower price, that efficient way of organizing, 
puts competitive pressure on all of t he competing car 
sellers in the region. 
Q. Now, Professor, I'd like to ask you given 
that Tesla is directl y i n t he marketplace i n many 
markets in this country and sells nationally over i ts 
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1 website, I want you to assume t hat 's the case, wouldn't 1 
2 it still be possible for Tesla to sell through an 2 
3 independent franchise dealer in Utah under those 3 
4 constraints? 4 
5 A. I don't really see haw because you 've got 5 
6 this price, let's call it $1,026, that people can 6 
7 freely see on the Internet. That independent dealer is 7 
8 going to quy the car for $1, 026 or else Tesla has to 8 
9 sell it to them for a lot less. 9 
10 And then Tesla is paying that dealer to 10 
11 engage in activities that they can't control properly. 11 
12 If they're selling it to them for $1,026, there ' s no 12 
13 basis of econcmic support fo~ that independent entity 13 
14 because they can't mark up the car any more. No one 14 
15 would buy it fran them. They would just go on the 15 
16 website and buy' i t. 16 
17 And you don't in general want to have a third 17 
18 party you can't control very well building your brand 18 
19 when you ' re so young and when the brand · - - when the 19 
20 brand building is the way that you're essentiaily doing 20 
21 ~dvertising and stimulating growth. 21 
22 Q. What about the traditional profit centers 22 
23 such as used car sales, service, finance, and so forth? 23 
24 A. Those don't exist for Tesla. So the 24 
25 traditional dealer today doesn't make very much money 25 
Page 104 
1 So if the firm wants to do sanething 1 
2 innovative like have a store with a staff that are 2 
3 corrpensated by salary and selling a fixed priced item, 3 
4 that might be an innovation that consumers really love. 4 
5 So I don ' t see why -- there just isn ' t a state interest 5 
6 in stopping that kind of innovati on. 6 
7 MR. RILEY: I have no further questions. 7 
8 Pass the witness . 8 
9 JUCGE PHAN: All right, Mr. Lind? 9 
10 CROSS-EXAMINATION 10 
11 BY MR. LIND: 11 
12 Q. Good oorning, Ms. Morton. 12 
13 A. Good morning. 13 
14 Q. I have some questions, primarily deals with 14 
15 your Apple example. I want to start with that one. 15 
16 Apple's oodel has direct Apple stores, but 16 
17 doesn't it also sell through retailers? 17 
18 A. I only know about Apple as a consumer, but I 18 
19 believe that's correct. Yes . 19 
20 Q. The prices for the Apple products are 20 
21 consistent in the Appl e store and at the retail 21 
22 locations? 22 
23 A. That's correct. 23 
24 Q. Is it your understanding and belief that 24 
25 Apple makes the product available to the retailers for 25 
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off of new cars. They mostly make their money off of 
used car and parts and service and, you know, extended 
warranties and things l i ke that . 
And Tesla does not sell those things. So 
those are not sources of profit for a third party. 
They would have to make their money off of the new car. 
And there just isn't a way to do it in this setup. 
Q. So forcing Tesla to sell to an independent 
franchise dealer .is tantamount to 'forcing Tesla out of 
the state. Is that your opinion? 
A. That is 'my opinion, yeah. 
Q. Now, in examining the :ill'lpact of this as an 
economist,· do you find any legitimate interest that is 
served by the state by prohibiting Tesl a from selling 
through its own operated store in Utah? 
A. 'No, I don't see one. I t hink the consumer 
safety issue is a very important issue, but that's 
dealt with through, you know, the NJITSA and through the 
licensing procedure to make sure t hat the vehicle is 
authentic and has passed all its safety tests. 
once you-have finished that kind of consumer 
protection, then the method by which, you know, the car 
is retailed does not i rrpact consumer welfare, except 
insofar as you stop finns from doing innovative things 
that consumers like. 
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a lower price than it does to the consumers at its 
Apple store so that the retailers can make a profit ? 
A. I haven't studied the_Apple retailing 
setting. I ·mean, I would return to the general 
principle· that Apple should be allowed to do what it 
thinks is in i ts best interests in tenns of retailing. 
If it wants a hybrid roodel, some awned 
stores, some third-part y stores, it should be free to 
try that and see if it works. I don't see any reason 
why the state should cane in and say, Oh, I'm sorry, 
you can't sell through Best Buy, you may only sell 
t hrough your stores. 
Q. That really wasn't my question. You referred 
to this as a hybrid model. Economically, how does a 
hybrid model work when the ultimate sales price is the 
same in the manufacturer's store and at the retail 
outlets? 
A. I don't know enough about Apple. I mean, as 
I said, I've consumed Apple products, so I know that 
the prices are comparable in the different kinds of 
outlets, but I have no idea how they incentivize or 
price or contract to sell those products. 
Q. As an economist dealing with marketplaces, 
including retail marketplaces, do you have any 
knowledge how that model works with that background? 
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1 A. It would be voluntary on lx>th sides because 1 
2 there's no state regulation telling Appl e what to do. 2 
3 So that means it must be in the interest of Apple to 3 
4 sell through Best Buy if that ' s what they're doing and 4 
5 in the interest of Best Buy. 5 
6 Now, there are many reasons why Best Buy 6 
7 might want Apple conswners to walk in the door. They 7 
8 may be trying to sell other things. ll.pple may have 8 
9 some special arrangement with Best Buy to do some 9 
10 special service . I have no idea. But lx>th parties 10 
11 have to be happy with it . It' s not forced on either 11 
12 side. 12 
13 Q. But if there's some reason to enter that 13 
14 arrangement, is it your understanding in the hybrid 14 
15 model with a fixed sales pri ce, which presumably is 15 
16 done pursuant to an agreement because it ' s voluntary, 16 
17 that the product is made available to the retail ers at 17 
18 a lower price than it is from the Apple store directly 18 
19 to the consumers? 19 
20 A. I have no i dea ." Firms can get very creative 20 
21 in t his -- in this way as I said . There are many 21 
22 benefits that might flow to a firm from having Apple 22 
23 customers walk through the door . So I real ly don' t 23 
24 know how they set it up. I don't want ~o speculate. 24 
25 Q. The benefit to the manufacturer could be 25 
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1 A. It's plausible, but we don't real ly -- as 1 
2 economists, we don't really think that we know better 2 
3 than the firm itself how it wants to execute its · 3 
4 s"trategy. 4 
5 If Tesla wanted to do something like that, 5 
6 i t - - it could. The fact t hat it's choosing not to and 6 
7 that we're here explaining why it really wants to sell 7 
8 through its own stores suggests to me that there are 8 









We could get all micromanaging and say the 11 
state is going to charge this much, and we ' re going to 12 
save that much, and we're going to authorize -- force 13 
you to sell at a particular price to a parti cular third 14 
party. But how does that help t he consumer? The firm 15 
knows best hc,.1 to get its product into the hands of the 16 
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making sal es that it wouldn' t otherwise make, for 
whatever reason it may be sales that it wouldn't 
otherwise make, whether it's state regulation or sin-ply 
volume increases? 
A. You're saying the benefit to Apple through 
selling t hrough third parties would be incremental 
sales? That's a perfectly sensible hypothesis . I 
don't know, but i t makes sense . 
Q. So returning to your slide -- could you go to 
page 8, please. To make that 100del work and illustrate 
my example, assuming that Tesla mandates that the sales 
price of a Tesla vehicle or it could be an iPad, 
$1,026, this is at the Apple store. 
But to make that possible, Tesla would have 
to -- wel l, it would avoid the manufacturer's rent and 
staff costs because it would - - over here, so that's 
$25 off. 
But it could allow some of its manufacturers ' 
markup to reduce the cost to the independent dealers. 
So that the sales price would be the same, $1,026, at 
each location. 
Tesla would be already less on the sale 
through t he deal erships than it is from direct sales, 
but it would be making the sales that perhaps it 
wouldn't otherwise make. Is that a plausible scenario? 
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suggest that. I believe it's a unitary system with the 
store paying the employees a salary. Because you would 
imagine that different kinds of neighlx>rhoods are 
interested in different kinds of features . 
They might love the wheels in califomia and 
not care alx>ut them in New England. So I would think 
there would be different kinds of patterns of what 
people would buy across different geographies . But 
sales people are not compensated based on the type of 
car t hat the consumers --
MS. ROCKWELL: I guess my question didn't go 
to sales people but, rather, to the store itself. 
TilE WI'INESS: Because the store isn't -- the 
store I don't think has a sort of profi t and loss 
statement that goes to compensate anybody because it's 
not an independent business. It's a store. 
17 conswner. 17 I mean, someone ' s keeping track of hc,.1 many 
18 MR. LIND : I don ' t have any further 18 cars they "re selling, of course. But it 's not as if 
19 the manager of the store at the end of the month gets 
20 to keep whatever's left over at the lx>ttom in terms of 
19 questions. 






MS. ROCKWELL: Yes. Again, I'm referring to 21 
slide 8. And in studying Tesla's business model, have 22 
you found anything to suggest t hat Tesl a ' s manufacturer I 23 
markup on a vehicle is shared with the local store? 24 
TIJE WI'INESS : I have not found anything to j 25 
his cost s and his sales. 
MS. ROCKWELl..: Thank you. 
JUD3E PHAN: Ccrnmissioner Valentine, 
Conmission Chair? 
MR. VALENTINE: Thank you. I'd like to 
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explore more about the state interest that you've 1 
testified about earlier. I think you concluded the 2 
state had no state interest in trying to require a 3 
franchise agreement methodology for the manufacturer. 4 
Have I got your testimony correct? 5 
TIIE WITNESS: That ' s pretty much right, yes. 6 
MR. VALENTINE: If you'd tum to slide 7, the 7 
sl ide just before this one . 8 
Does the state have an interest to protect 9 
10 the dealers who are right now in the present dealership 10 
11 format with franchises from t he manufacturer engaged in 11 
12 predatory actions? I tum your attention to -- 12 
13 THE WITNESS: From their own manufacturer? 13 
14 MR. VALENTINE: From their own manufacturer. 14 
15 THE WIWJ¥iS: Yes. I think that is something 15 
16 that has been of concern i n a number of states and why 16 
17 there are franchise l aws i n a number of states where 17 
18 legislators have been worried that there's an imbalance 18 
19 of pa,ier, that BMW is much strong~r than the franchise 19 
20 dealers ; therefore, it ' s i n the state ' s interests to 20 
21 protect t hose smaller independent dealers because 21 
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needs to be protected. In contrast, I would say to 
Tesla where it's just one unitary thing, there isn ' t 
anyone to protect. 
MR. VALENTINE: Doesn't .the state have an 
interest in trying to protect t he market from -- from 
abusive-type actions of having a very large 
manufacturer, say a BMW, Toyota, or Ford, from engaging 
in practices that then becomes anticompetit ive by 
virtue of the actions they do on the dealer? Doesn't 
the state have a state interest in that regard? 
TiiE WI'INESS : I think I don't ful ly 
understand your question. IX> you mean BMW entering as 
a vertically integrated whole to compete against 
i t self? 
MR. VALENTINE: Yes, against its dealers. 
THE WITNESS: Yes . So I think that that's 
the purpose of the curren~ franchise law is to restrict 
actions like that because BMW is selling exactly the 
same thing, of course, as its own franchise dealers . 
I think the distinction wi th Tesla is it ' s 
l ike saying suppose there was XYZ Corporation that 
22 they're in a l ong-term relationship really. 
23 They' re a BMW dealer, and they can '.t sort of 
24 snap their fi ngers and become Toyota. They ' re kind of 
25 st uck with BMW. Therefore, that long-run relationship 
22 invented some car and came in with a bunch of dealer 
23 franchises . 
24 We wouldn't think that the state had an 
25 · interest in protecting Toyota and Ford against XYZ 
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1 Corporation selling their new cars t hrough their 1 
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bargaining power, then there's a set of laws already in 
place to -- to deal with that. 2 franchi se dealers. That's just intrabrand competition 2 























Here Tesla is doing that very same thing. We 
don't have to protect BMW against Tesla. We might have 
to protect a BMW dealer against the manufacturer BMW if 
4 prohibiting the manufacturer from going out and 
5 . operating that ~ealer so they can compete against their 
own dealers? 6 
we t hink there ' s some. imbalance of power . 7 
There ' s some controversy among economists 8 
9 about whether there i s an imbalance of pa,ier anymore 
because a lot of d~alers are part of very large groups 10 
now, · and they're quite pa,ier ful themselves. But if you 11 
were worried about that , t hen that' s the relationship 12 
you would regulate. 13 
MR. VALENTINE: So the state does have a 14 
i nterest i n regulating that particular aspect of the 15 
relationship between dealers and the manufacturers? 16 
TIIE WITNESS: Yes. I'm sorry. When you 17 
summarized my testimony before, what I thought you were 18 
saying was t he state doesn't have an interest in 19 
telling a manufacturer whether to ~se the business 20 
model on the left or the business model on the right . 21 
I don't think there ' s any consumer benefit gained by 22 
the state instructing manufacturers about that. 23 
once a manufacturer has chosen the business 
model on the left and there i s this concern about the 
24 
25 
THE WITNESS: Right. Because the issue there 
is if I'm a BMW dealer, I ·have invested in a plant. I 
have a lease. I 've advertised on t he radio. I have 
billboards . I've really sunk a lot of assets into my 
small business. 
And if BMW, the corporation, were to come and 
put a faci l ity a block away and could undercut me 
because of double marginalization or because they 
decided to, my whole business that I have -- I had 
relied on that not happening to build my business, I 
might never really, frankly, have done -- built that 
business if I knew that they were going to come in a 
block away. 
But once I built that business, then the 
state has an interest in making sure franchise 
agreements protect everyl:xxiy's investments. Because if 
people aren't willing to invest, obviously we don't 
have auto retailing. That's a problem. 
So there is a whole set of issues around the 
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1 relationship between those investments that the local 1 
2 business makes and the brand name sitting in the 2 
3 background. 3 
4 But that's not a relevant issue when it's a 4 
5 company-01-med store because the company i tself, if it 5 
6 puts another Tesla store a block away, it's hurting 6 
7 itself, or it's putting another Tesla store a block 7 
8 away because there's so much demand for Teslas that it 8 
9 needs that additional store. And it's quite capable of 9 
10 working that out because it's all its own dollars. 10 
11 MR. VALENTINE: So it ' s your testimony then 11 
12 that there is a state interest in protecting dealers 12 
13 once you have a dealer and franchise arrangement. But 13 
14 if you always stay as a coopany store and never go to 14 
15 the franchise model, that' s where you then say it ' s 15 
16 your opinion that there is a lack of state interest in 16 
17 protecting that particular model? 17 
18 THE WITNESS : I think there's a state 18 
19 interest in protecting that model , in allowing it to 19 
20 enter, but I don't think there's any entity within that 20 
21 Tesla column that needs protecting. 21 
22 It ' s a manufacturer . I t 's gro1-m up. It can 22 
23 look after itself. It can choose i ts store locations 23 
24 itself. There i sn't a state interest in protecting the 24 



























do, that's terrific: 
MR. VALENTINE: But the i ssue i s does the 
state have an interest in regulating this area. I 
think if I understand your testimony correctly, you 're 








THE WITNESS: Well, it depends what you mean 7 
by "this area. " IE you mean all of automobile 8 
retailing, t hen -- 9 
MR. VALENTINE: Let 's· define it as automobile 10 
retailing. 11 
THE WITNESS : Okay. I think some people 12 
would argue, and I 'm not going to push back against 13 
them too hard, that there is a role for the state to be 14 
worried about the relationship between a franchisor and 15 
an independent dealer in a world where those 16 
independent dealers have invested in developing the 17 
brand in a particular place, that that i s something 18 
worth paying attention to. 19 
I don't think the state has any reason to 
worry about competition between BMW and Tesla where 
20 
21 
Tesla chooses to have a store instead because that kind 22 
of coopetition is just good for free markets, 23 
efficiency, consumer choice, and so on. And there 24 
isn't an independent dealer to protect in the Tesla 25 
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thing. 
MR. VALENTINE: But if Tesla then decided as 
its business model grew out, because I think your 
testimony was because it's small, it's got efficiency 
to be coopany owned, if they grew out to the point 
where franchising became important, then it would be 
really important to prohibit them from 01-ming 
coopany-01-med stores per the testimony you just gave? 
THE WITNESS: As I said, there 's some 
controversy about how much these dealers need to be 
protected because, as I said, some of them are quite 
large. And there are quite a few laws already in 
place, just normal contract laws, that would protect 
those dealers. 
But if Tesla were to grow and decide it 
wanted this traditional franchise model, then I think 
under Utah law; the franchise laws would apply to 
that -- that - - if Tesla created third-party 
independent stores that were dealers that were selling 
its product, then you already have a law in place for 
regulating that. 
But t hey' re not at the present rroment . And I 
think it ' s interesting that a company is experimenting 
with this 0\-med-store approach. I think i t ' s an 
exciting developnent. Conslllll"'...rs may love it. If they 
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world. They're just selling cars . 
MR. VALENTINE : That's been very helpful. 
Thank you.· 
JUIX,E PHAN: Any other questions? Mr. Riley, 
redirect? 
MR. RILEY: Thank you . 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. RILEY: 
Q. Professor Scott Morton, to clarify in 
response to -- in response to COimllissi oner Rockwell's 
question, you ment ioned a unitary accounting. 
What did you mean by that with regard to not 
having separate profit and loss statements for the 
s tores? 
A. When a store i s company owned, what that 
means is the decision about how that store is run is 
taken ultimately at headquarters or some kind of 
regional place where the cost of the store, the 
building of the store, the payroll of the store, all of 
that -- all of those decisions are made . 
And for instance, if you were opening a store 
in Utah, you might not expect that store to have a lot 
of sales in the first year because it ' s a brand new 
product. You ' re teaching people about it. And maybe 
there ' 11 be 250 sales. And maybe if you were to look 
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1 at the cost of the running the store and the sales out 1 
2 of the store, there might be a big loss on that store 2 
3 that year . 3 
4 I think that doesn't mean that the employees 4 
5 or the manager of that store don't get paid because 5 
6 this is a corporate decision. The corporation has 6 
7 decided we ' re investing in Utah, we' re building the 7 
8 store over the long haul. This is going to be 8 

















And, meanwhile, we pay everybody at the store 10 
for following all the procedures, doing the training, 11 
having good r_atings from their customers and so forth . 12 
So it's a unitary financial model. 
Q. In studying this and in your personal 
experience in the stores, how does that affect the 





from someplace else? 17 
A. I t 's interesting. When I went to the store 18 
in New York, there was a couple there ahead of me who 19 
were from Egypt. And the -- they had a long layover or 20 
something. They had come to the Tesla store from JFK. 21 
And the salesman was taking a long time with 22 
them, answering all their questions, telling them about 23 
the technology. And I just don't think that would 24 
happen in a world where the salesperson was compensated 25 
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1 We do want to protect potentially -- as I 1 
2 said, there's some disagreement, but you might want to 2 
3 protect a .dealer's relationship with .an existing dealer 3 
4 who's invested in the state its relationship with its 4 
5 own manufacturer. 5 
6 That I would set to one side as a special 6 
7 area. There's franchise law to deal with that. But 7 
8 t here is no reason to prqte~t the ,existing incumbent 8 
9 sellers of cars in Utah frqn more competition. 9 
10 MR. RILEY:· Thank you very rrruch. 10 
11 JUOOE PHAN: _You may have a se_at . 11 














JUOOE PHAN : Mr. Riley, before we move on, 13 
let's talk about exhibits. Were you intending to offer 14 
Exhibits 10.1 through 10.15 at this time or some other 15 
time? 16 
MR. RILEY: At this time, Your Honor. In 17 
fact, I would like to offer -- we 've exchanged with the 18 
State Exhibits 10.1 through 10.15 to Professor Scott · 19 
Morton's pre-filed testimony., as well as the exhibits 20 
and the pre-filed testimony of Herb Walter, which we 21 
filed with the COrrrnission and exchanged with the State. 22 
JUOOE PHAN: Okay. Does the Division have 23 
any objections to, first of all, Exhibits 10.1 through 24 
10.15? 25 
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on the margin of the car and kind of was trying to push 
through lots of cars every day. 
This is a brand-building, long-term vision of 
a global brand. Tesla .doesn't sell in Egypt tcxlay, but 
maybe some day they will, and then there will be a 
custaner there who knows about Tesla cars or who will 
enable that entry somehow or, perhaps, drive over the 
border and buy a car and be an evangelist in Egypt for 
the brand. So that's the kind of sales effort you can 
get when you're compensating your employees this way. 
Q. And then, finally, with regard to the 
Chairman ' s questions about Tesla, i s i t your 
understanding Tes.la has never sold through an 
independent franchi se dealer? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Is there any state interest in forcing Tesla 
to sell through an independent franchi se dealer? 
A. No. There is no state interest. 
Q. Well, is protecting independent franchise 
dealers an interest in that situation? 
A. Well, we don't want to protect independent 
franchise dealers from entry of a new brand . That's 
interbrand competition. That -- if we protected them 
from entry of a new brand, that would be creating 
ironopolies and would be very anticompetitive. 
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MR. LIND: Well , we want a limitation. A lot 
of these exhibits are stand-alone exhibits, substantive 
evidence, and would be objectionable, lack of 
foundation, hearsay, etc. To the extent they form the 
basis of Professor Morton's expert opinion, we have no 
objection and are illustrative of her testimony. 
MR. RILEY: Your Honor, we would accept that 
these were the -- form part of the basis for her 
opinion and were illustrative of her opinion as an 
expert. 
JUOOE PHAN: Okay. All right. Then 
Exhibits 10.1 through 10.15 are received with that 
limitation. 
MR. RILEY: And. then wit h regard to Herbert 
Walter, whose testimony has been filed with the 
Conrnission, we would offer on the same basis 
Eliliibits 11.1 thrqugh 11.20. 
JUOOE PHAN: I'm not sure I have a copy. Do 
we have another binder? 
MR. CRAGUN: We figured out that we're 
shar~ng this binder. 
JUOOE P~: So you said 11 --
MR. RILEY: .1 through 11.20 to the previous 
filed testimony of Herbert Walter, an expert on retail 
findings. 
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1 JUDGE PHAN: Is his previous filed testimony 1 
Page 123 
t hem are up there on the bench, but we delivered those 
2 in here? 2 yesterday. 
3 MR . RILEY: Yes . 
4 JUDGE PHAN: It's one of the exhibits? 
5 MR . RILEY: It's in the exhibit binder with 
6 the stipulated facts and exhibits. 
7 JUDGE PHAN: Okay. 
8 MR. PETROOEORGE: Exhibit 11. 
9 MR. RILEY: Exhibit 11. Excuse me. 
10 MR. CRAGUN: That's at the end of this one. 
11 MR. FRANCIS: It's in volume 1, number 11, I 
12 believe. 
13 MR. PETRCX,EORGE: Yes . 
14 MR. CRAGUN: Volume 1, Exhibit 11. I think 
15 you ' re supposed to have all the big binders, and we 
16 just got the little binders. 
17 JUDGE PHAN: Okay. So for Exhibits 11.1 
18 through 11.20, the same --
19 MR. LIND: We just want them to be treated 
20 the same way as they were with Professor Morton. 
21 MR. RILEY: We accept that, yes. Thank you. 
22 MR. PETROOEORGE: Your Honor, on the exhibit 
3 MR. CRAGUN: We ' 11 track them d01-m. 
4 MR. VALENTINE: Thank you. 
5 JUDGE PHAN: We seem to have maybe one set. 
6 MR. CR/I.GUN: There should be four volumes. 
7 MR. PETRCX,EORGE: There's actually five - -
8 there 's four volumes of exhibits, and every one of 
9 you -- each of you should have a copy of all four. 
10 MR. VALENTINE: And then there's one 
11 illustrative of demonstrative exhibits. 
12 MR. PETROOEORGE: That's one of the four I'm 
13 referring to . 
14 MR. VALENTINE: That's the fourth volume. 
15 What we're lacking up here is 1, 2, 3, and 5. 
16 MR. PETROOEORGE: There's only four, so 1, 2, 
17 and 3. 
18 MR. VALENTINE: I'm sorry. I thought you 
19 said there's five. 
20 MS. ROCKWELL: I have volume 1. 
21 JUDGE PHAN: You have a volume l? 
22 MR . VALENTINE: We found them. 
23 binders, if I may, we did deliver a full set of all the 23 
24 exhibits, including the big volumes, five sets so that 24 
25 each of you would have a copy. I don't know if all of 25 
MR . FRANCIS: We'll give you the lunch break 
to read them all. 
MR . VALENTINE: Oh, you' re so kind. 
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1 JUDGE PHAN: So we will receive the 1 
2 Exhib~ts 11.1 through 11.20 based on a stipulation that 2 
3 ' they represent the testimony of Mr. Herbert Walter, 3 
4 that they don't represent testimony, but they are the 4 
5 basis of his expert opinion. Okay. We have another 5 
6 box full . Okay. 6 
7 All right. And then the pre-filed testimony 7 
8 of Mr. Herbert Walter, what exhibit is that one? 8 
9 MR. PETROOEORGE: Exhibit 11. 9 
10 JUDGE PHAN: Any objection from the Division 10 
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JUDGE PHAN: Okay. The stipulation of facts 
is also received into the record. Okay. Any other 
exhibits that we need to deal with at this time? 
MR . RILEY: No, Your Honor. Thank you. 
JUDGE PHAN: Okay. All right. Do we want to 
have the lunch break now? 
MR. VALENTINE: It ' s up to the parties. I 'm 
okay to go for a little while longer, or we can break 
now. 
JUDGE PHAN: Okay. I don' t knCM if she came 
11 on Exhibit 11? 11 back with your lunch. 
12 MR. FRANCIS: No. 12 MR . RILEY: Your Honor, that concludes the 
13 JUDGE PHAN: Okay. That is received. Were 
14 there exhibits that the parties had stipulated to 
13 presentation of our evidence with the admission of 
14 those exhibits and stipulations . So it's nCM the 
15 that -- which exhibits are those? 15 State's case . 
16 MR. PETRCX,EORGE: Exhibits 1 through 8 are 16 JUDGE PHAN: All right. 
17 stipulated exhibits. 17 
18 JUDGE PHAN: Okay. And those are received at 18 
19 this time. Did that -- there was a stipulation of 19 
20 facts that was submitted with the pre-hearing briefs. 20 
21 Are those included 1n Exhibits 1 through 8? 21 
22 MR. PETROOEORGE: Exhibits 1 through 8 were 22 
23 the attachments to that stipulation of facts. The 23 
24 stipulation of facts was the stipulation regarding the 24 
25 authentication of those exhibits. 25 
MR. CRAGUN: I 'd like to ask Mr. Riley a 
question before we break. In your opening statement, I 
thought I understood you to say that at one time there 
was the same linkage in the dealer definition in 
Title 41 as there is in the distributor definition 
where there was a "franchise" referenced in the dealer 
definition, and that that was removed. Can you give us 
any more detail about that? 
MR. RILEY: Yes. The legislative history 
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1 doesn't indicate why that was changed . 1 
2 MR. CRAGUN: I want to know when . 2 
3 MR. RILEY: It was in 1992 - - 3 
4 MR. CRAGUN: Okay. 4 
5 MR . RILEY : - - when a number of changes were 5 
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MR. RILEY: Yes', Your Honor. However, during 
the break, we were able to obtain the information about 
warranties that Commissioner Pero requested. So I 
woul d request permission t o recall Mr. O'Connell just 
to answer that question "for you so tha~ the record is 
6 made to the statute . The tenn "franchise" was 6 accurate. 
7 eliminated from the definition of dealer. It's still 
8 in the definition of distributor. 
9 MR. CRAGUN: I can track that down. Thank 
10 you. 
11 MR. RILEY: Thank you. 
12 JUD3E PHJI.N: Okay. All right. Then at this 
13 point we will break for lunch. Are we all okay with a 
14 half-hour lunch? 
15 MR. RILEY: Yes . That ' s fine for Tesla . 
16 Thank you. 
17 JUD3E PHAN : Okay. 
18 MR. FRANCIS: That ' s acceptable . 
19 JUD3E PHAN : So 12:30. 
20 (Recess taken at 12:00, resuming at 12 :41.) 
21 JUD3E PHAN : All right. Thanks, everyone. 
22 Have a seat. We are now back on the record. 
23 Mr. Riley, I believe before the break, you 
24 indicated you had called your final witness; is that 
25 correct? 
7 JUOOE PHAN: Okay. 
8 MR. RILEY : Thank you. 
9 (Mr. o' Connell was recalled as a witness. ) 
10 JUOOE PHAN: Mr. O'Connel l , you're sti ll 
11 under oath from prior. 
12 TI!E WI1NESS : Thank you. 
13 MR. RILEY: Thank you, Your Honor. 
14 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
15 BY MR. RILEY: 
16 Q. Would you please explain the warranties that 
17 are offered by Tesla? 
18 A. Certainly. There are at least four 
19 categories. The first i s a conventional 
20 four-year, 50 ,000-mile guarantee . And t his is a 
21 warranty. This is consistent with, as I said, other 
22 models in this segment. 
23 The second is related to the battery, which 
24 is an 8-year unlimited mileage guarantee where 
25 essentially we will replace t he battery at any time as 
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1 long as there isn' t an i ntentional effort to damage by 1 Mr. Francis? 






















The t hird is a happiness guaranty, if you 3 
will, whereby a customer who is unhappy with their 4 
vehicle can bring it back at any time. And t he final 5 
is a residual value guaranty, and this relates to the 6 
trade-in of a vehicle where \'le have pegged -- electric 7 
vehicles being relatively new technology and not having 8 
a body o_f data to support what projected residual value 9 
guarantees would be in the out years. 10 
What we 've done is we've pegged the residual 11 
value to a typical residual value in the class of 12 
vehicles we sell. We provide t hat as a guaranty for 13 
the purpose of trade . 14 
Q. Are those warranties and guarantees honored 15 
at any time? 16 
A. They're honored at any :esla store . That's 17 
correct. 18 
MR. RILEY : Commissioner, I hope that answers 19 
your question. 
MR. PERO: It does. Thanks. 
JUD3E PHAN: Commissioners? 





Stoddard as a witness. 
--cOo--
aJRTIS S'IDDDARD, 
having been first duly sworn to tell the 
truth, was examined and testified as follows: 
--c0o--
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. FRANCIS: 
Q. Please state your name and position with the 
Division. 
A. Curtis Stoddard, the Assistant Director of 
the Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division. 
Q. How l ong have you held that position? 
A. Approximately five years. 
Q. How l ong have you been employed with the 
Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division: 
A. All together about 15 years. 
Q. Are you familiar with the application 
submitted by Tesla Motors Utah, Inc.? 
A. I am. 
Q. What responsibility does the Division have 
24 Your Honor. 24 with regard to the motor vehicle licensing? 
25 JUD3E PHAN : Okay. Then for the Division? 25 A. So the Division is required by statute to 
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look at motor vehicle dealers . We also license sales 1 
people, manufacturers, distributors, remanufacturers, 2 
body shops, dismantlers, crushers. And I 'm sure I 3 
forgot some . But basically we regulate the automotive 4 
industry. 5 
Q. What ' s the process in evaluating an 6 
applicat i on for a new motor vehicle dealer ' s license? 7 
A. So an application will be suhni tted to the 8 
Division. The support staff will take that 9 
application, and they will check to make sure that 10 
everything is complet e; that al l the requirements of 11 
the Division are in that appl ication. 12 
With that, if they ' re all complet e and t here 13 
are no criminal viol ations or anything that would cause 14 
a review to happen, then the license would be 15 
processed . 16 
Q. With regard to the first application of 17 
Tesla, approximately when did that come int o the 
Division? 
A. I believe it was i n February. 






A. The appli cation - - I believe t here was some 23 
things that were missing that our staff had some 24 
correspondence with Tesla. One of the t hings that was 25 
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1 JUJ:GE PHAN: Before you move on, we' re 1 
2 thumbing through our exhibit binders , and we don' t seem 2 
3 to have ·the exhibit over there. 3 
4 MR . PERO: Volume 1. 4 
5 MR. FRANCIS : Volume 1, Exhibit 1. 5 
6 JUJ:GE PHAN : Exhibit 1. Okay. 6 
7 MR. FRANCIS : That' s the problem. It's quite 7 
8 a thick packet . 8 

















11t h down. 
MR. FRANCIS: I had a hard t ime thumbing 
t hrough and fi nding i t, too. Corrmissioner Valentine, 
you're too far . We're looking for this. 
MR. VALENI'INE: I' ve got it. Thank you. 
Q. (By Mr. Francis ) Once you received that 








A. With t he - - I consulted with the director. 17 
It appeared that by - - through statute -- t he code t hat 18 
the Division was unable to issue a new motor vehicle 19 
dealer's license to Tesla . 20 
Q. What st atute are you referring t o? 21 
A. It i s -- if I can look in the code book under 22 
41-3-210, and t hen it would be l(g) which states, 
"Engaged in a business respecting the selling or 





missing at the time was a franchise agreement . So a 
franchise agreement was mailed in. We received that. 
Because of what it said on the letter, the franchise 
letter, the staff came to myself. 
Q. Was it a franchise agreement, or was it a 
let t er regarding franchising at all? 
A. It was a letter regarding what Tesla does 
with franchising. 
Q. Would you find t hat exhibit? I believe it ' s 
an exhibit in the first volume, Exhibit 1, and the 11th 
divider down. 
MR. FRANCIS : Exhibit 1. Then there are a 
ser ies of orange dividers. It's actually after the 
11th divider. 
Q. (By Mr. Francis) What is the dat e of that 
letter? 
A. The date appears to be February 10th, 2015. 
Q. And who is it from? 
A. It i s from -- signed, "Sincerely, Jonathan 
Chang, Deputy General Counsel . " 
Q. And once you got that , what was -- well, what 
is the nature of the correspondence? 
A. The letter basically states that there is no 
franchise agreement between a dealer and a -- Tesla 
i t sel f, that they sell directly to t he public. 
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which he is not licensed, including selling or 
exchanging new motor vehicles for which the licensee 
does not have a franchise. 
. "But this Section l(g) does not apply to 
special equipment dealer who sells a new special 
equiprrent motor vehicle with a gross vehicle weight of 
12,000 or more pounds after installing special 
equipment on the motor vehicle . " 
Q. And paragraph 1, which precedes all of those 
subparagraphs, says that these are prohibited actions 
by a licensee? 
A. Correct. In order to hold a new motor 
vehicl e deal er ' s license, the dealer must have a 
franchise to sell that particular make. 
Q. Upon that initial finding under the statute 
Secti on 209, what is the administrator supposed to do? 
A. Under 41-3-209(1) states, "If the 
administrator f i~ds t hat t he applicant i s not qualified 
to receive a license, a license may not be granted." 
Q. In consultation wi th t he Divi sion, did you 
seek addit i onal information before making the Division 
decision as to Tesl a ' s application? 
A. We did. We referred it to our legal counsel 
and took it to the Attorney General 's office. 
Q. And after you recei ved input , what was the 
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1 decision of the Division? 1 
2 
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A. I bel ieve it was in mid-April, yes. 
Q. What was different in the April application 2 A. That without a franchise agreement, that we 
3 could not i ssue a new motor vehicle dealer ' s license . 3 than from the February application? 
4 Q. How was that decision delivered to the 4 A. In that applicat ion, t here was an agreement, 
5 applicant? 5 which I'm not sure - - a dealer agreement -- exactly 
6 A. In this particular case, a letter was. 6 where that is in the exhibits. 
7 generated by the Attorney General's offi ce and was 
8 mailed to Tesla . 
7 Q. Turn to -- in volume 1, Exhibit 4, and tell 
8 me if that appears to be it. 
9 Q. In your discussions with Tesla, did you 9 A. That does appear to be the dealer agreement 
10 discuss any other options other than a new ootor 10 that was sent . 
11 vehicle dealer's license? 11 
12 A. I did. I had t he opportunity to talk with I 12 
13 believe a ·representative of Tesla. The name was 13 
Q. And did you review that dealer agreement? 
A. Yes . 
Q. What in that dealer agreement caused you 
14 Ingrid, I want to say Robinson, but I'm not positive on 14 concern with regard to franchising? 
15 her last name , and discussed that we cou'ld license 15 A. It still appears that in that dealer 
16 Tesla as a used motor vehicle dealer without having the 16 agreement, i t states that they do_not franchise 
17 franchise, and we would be happy to do that. 17 dealers, and that under Subsection 16, I believe 
18 Q. Was there any response to that? 18 it's 1, in that on page 6, it states, "Dealer is an 
19 A. She responded that at the current time that 19 · independent contractor and is not an agent, servant, 
20 that was not something tbat they were ,looking at doing, 20 
21 but they may in the future. 21 
22 Q. Did you later receive another application? 22 
23 A. The Division did, yes . 23 
24 Q. Was that the April application that's been 24 
25 previously referred to in testimony? 25 
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1 A. That there still was not a franchise 1 
2 agreement that we could i ssue a ~ew dealer ' s license. 2 
3 Q. Did you c~nsult additional ~ections of Code 3 
4 Section 210, 41-3-210, with regard to franchises? 4 
5 A. We did. With f~anchise law which is_ covered 5 
6 under the 13 section, there are additional requirements . 6 
7 for a franchise agreement. In that, it also -- which 7 
8 210 -- I'm sorry -- 41-3 -210, Section l(d) s tates that, 8 
9 "T~e holder of a license may not violate any law of the 9 
10 state respecting customers in motor vehicles or any 10 
11 rule respecting comnerce in motor vehicles made by any 11 
12 licensing or regulatory authority of the state. 11 12 
13 Q. Did you seek further consultation from other 13 
14 areas or agencies in the state? 14 
15 A. We did. We actually contacted the Attorney 15 
16 General's office and asked to help interpret this 13 16 
17 section because we knew that there was other sections 17 
18 that regul ate the franchise agreement. 18 
19 With that, we were able to determine under -- 19 
20 it is -- this one's a big one. Sorry. 13-14-201, and 20 
21 then it is 6(d) and then (ii) which states t hat, "A 21 
22 f ranchisor does own directly or indirectly more than 22 
23 45-percent i nterest in t_he dealership. 11 And that's -- 23 
24 they could have a dealership i f they did not own 45 24 
25 percent of it . 25 
employee, legal representative, pan;ner, or joint 
venture of 1MI. Iri addition, dealer hereby agrees that 
thi s agreement does not form a franchise relationship 
between dealer and 'IN!. " 
Q. And with regard to that statement, what did 
you conclude about the dealer agreement? 
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Q. Was that an alternative to paragraph l(u) 
previously in that same sec~ion? 
A. I believe l(u) states, 11 Except as provided in 
Subsection 6, 11 which that 's where we went t o, 11directly 
or indirectly own an interest in a motor vehicle dealer 
or dealership, operate or control a new motor vehicle 
dealer or dealership, act in the capacity of a new 
motor vehicle dealer as defined in Secti on 13-14-102, 
or _operate a motor vehicle service facility. 11 
Q. And, again, those are a list of prohibited 
actions by a franchisor? 
A. Correct . 
Q. What was the conclusion of the Division 
regarding licensure in the April application? 
A. Again, that we would be unable to issue a new 
motor vehi cle dealer ' s license . 
Q. And how was that corrmunicated to the 
applicant? 
A. That was a letter that was generated by t he 
Division. And, again, apologize, I don't know where 
t hat is in t he novel that we have in front of us. 
Q. It might be Exhibit No . 7 in the same book 
that you ' re i n. 
A. That does appear t o be the letter that was 
sent. And that was dated May 21st. 
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Q. Did you draft that? 1 
A. I did not, but it was drafted by my 2 
authority. 3 
Q. If the dealer agreement ~uuld have 4 
aclcnowledged that a true franchise relationship existed 5 
between Tesla Utah and its manufacturer, would the 6 
license have been granted? 7 
A. Yes . 8 
Q. In February as well? 9 
A. It would have. 10 
Q. Do you believe that there are owners of 11 
dealerships, either individual entities for dealerships 12 
within the state of Utah, where those owners actually 13 
live outside the state of Utah? 14 
A. I'm sure there is. I couldn't state who, but 15 
that would be nothing that would prohibit t hem if they 16 
did live outside of the state. 17 
Q. Thank you. Is the Division in any way 18 
intentionally trying to block entry into Utah's market 19 
of any business or individual or entity. from being a 20 
dealer within the state of Utah? 21 
A. Is our Division doing that? 22 
Q. Yes. 23 
A. I do not believe so, no. 24 
Q. Is the Division in evaluating these . 25 
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1 correct? 1 
2 A. Not if it comes from the Attorney General's 2 
3 office, no. 3 
4 Q. Okay. But you worked -- you reviewed this 4 
5 letter before it was issued, correct? 5 
6 A. I believe I dil 6 
7 Q. Yes. And in this letter, if we could, this 7 
8 is the letter t~at declined the first application that 8 
9 was submitted by Tesla, correct? 9 
10 A. Correct. 10 
11 Q. And the first application, which was made in 11 
12 February, did not include the dealer agreement, 12 
13 correct? 13 
14 A. It had the letter that we di scussed that was, 14 
15 I believe, Exhibit -- I think it was 4. And then in 15 
16 4 -- so it did include the l etter dated February 10th. 16 
17 Q. February 10th. Okay. The application was 17 
18 dated February· 12th, the ·letter was dated 18 
19 February 10th, correct? 19 
20 A. I believe so. If we could go to the 20 
21 application, I could tell you. 21 
22 Q. And then that letter that was submitted with 22 
Page 139 
applications for now motor vehicle licensing responding 
to pressure of any external group in making its 
decision? 
A. The sole decision of the Division is based on 
current statute. 
MR. FRANCIS: I have no further questions at 
this time of Mr. Stoddard. 
JUCGE PHAN : Okay. All right. Mr. Riley? 
MR. RILEY: Thank you. 
CROSS-EX.A.MINATION 
BY MR. RILEY: 
Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Stoddard. 
A. Good afternoon. 
Q. I'd like you to turn to Exhibit No. 2 in your 
book, please. Now, Exhibit No. 2 is a letter dated 
February 26, 2015, on the stationery of the Attorney 
General directed to Ingrid Robertson at Tesla ~rotors, 
correct? 
A. That's what it appears, yes. 
Q. This letter was drafted under your authority, 
correct? 
A. We requested' that the Attorney General 
respond to t he application . 
Q. But in your direct, you said these kinds of 
letters were done •under your authority"; is that 
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A. Correct. 
Q. So that was submitted, and then your 
deparbnent rejected the application _and notified Tesla 
in what is Exhibit No. 2, ·correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Now, if we could turn to the page 2 of 
Exhibit No. 2, the letter rejecting Tesla's 
application, it says, in the second paragraph, "Since 
Tesla Motors Utah, Inc. is not· a franchisee, MVED 
cannot issue a license as a new car dealer." Do you 
see that? 
A. I agreed that Tesla did not hold a franchise 
for selling Tesla. 
Q. But th: term "franchisee" doesn't appear in 
the statute, does it? 
A. Under 41-3? Because it does appear in many 
places. So where are we --
Q. Okay. Let me be precise. The Licensing Act 
is what authorized your Division to issue new rotor 
vehicle dealer licenses, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. The term "franchisee" does not appear in the 
23 the first application, the first application in 23 Licensing Act? 
24 February, that letter said Tesla does not engage with 
25 independent franchise dealers, correct? 
24 A. I don't !mow. I would have to look at 
25 definitions to make sure that it doesn't. But --
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1 Q. Flip to the definitions. You did this 1 
2 before. If we could go -- 2 
3 MR. RILEY: For the c011111iss ioners, we have 3 
4 included in the booklet of exhibit s the Licensing Act 4 
5 and then the Franchise Act . So we can all turn in 5 
6 Exhibit No. 1. 6 
7 MR. PETROOEDRGE: Volume 1. 7 
8 MR. RILEY: In volume 1 to 41-3-101. 8 
9 MR. VALENI'INE: Where's the tab at, Counsel? 9 
10 MR. PETROOEDRGE : It's at the back of 10 
11 volume 1. There's a tab for licensing and one for the 11 
12 MVDRA. 12 
13 Q. (By Mr. Riley) So it has as listed in 13 
14 alphabetical order the various definitions, and it has 14 
15 a definition for "franchise" but not "franchisee," 15 
16 correct? 16 
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A. I do. 
Q. Now, i t doesn't require that contract or 
agreement to be in writing, does it? 
A. The definition does not, no. 




the rnake or model , correct? 
It does. 
And other t han that authorization, there is 
no other requirement to satisfy the definition of a 
franchise? 
A. In thi s particular section? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Correct . 
Q. But rou declined the first application even 
though Tesla Motors Utah was a wholly-owned subsidiary 
of Tesla, and Tesla has the authority to sell i ts own 
17 A. That ' s what it appears, correct. 17 cars, doesn ' t it? 
18 Q. So the definition of "franchise," and I want 18 A. It does, yes, t hrough --
19 to focus on that for one moment, which is the 16th 19 Q. Thank.you. 
20 definition there on - - in the Licensing Act, "Franchise 20 
21 means a contract or agreement between a dealer and a 21 
22 manufacturer of new motor vehicles or its distributor 22 
23 or factory branch by which the dealer is ~uthorized to 23 
24 sell any specified make or makes of new motor 24 
25 vehicl es. " Do you see that? 25 
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1 avoid any sort of franchise requirement if it became a 1 
2 used car dealer? 2 
3 A. No. What I said is t hat they could sell used 3 
4 vehicles at that dealership. Correct . 4 
5 Q. At that dealership. They could sell used 5 
6 vehicles? 6 
7 A. Correct . 7 
8 . Q. And I think you said a little bit more. You 8 
9 told them how they could do that, correct? 9 
10 A. I did. 10 
11 Q. All right. Let's take a look at the 11 
12 provisions of the Utah statute that relate to used car 12 
13 dealers. So this is your witness statement -- if we 13 
14 could just take one moment -- that was filed here. 14 
15 You said, "In discussion with representatives 15 
16 of Tesla Motors Utah, I suggested other license options 16 
17 were a~ailable, which did not include or require 17 
18 franchise. relationship." That was your testimony? 18 
19 A. There are many types of licenses that we 19 
20 issue that do not require a franchise, correct. 20 
21 Q. And one of them is a used motor vehicle 21 
22 license dealer? 22 
23 A. Correct. 23 
24 Q. What you suggested to Tesla was that it take 24 
25 its cars that came off the factory, put a couple miles 25 
A. -- the correct form, yes . 
Q. Now, you stated in your -- in your direct 
that after you declined it, that you talked to Tesla 
about Tesla selling its vehicles as used cars? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And what you were suggesting was it could 
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on t hem, and then transfer the title to someone, and 
then sell i t as a used car. Is that what you 
suggested? 
A. Kind of, yes. 
Q. All right. So what you were suggesting is 
that they skirt the requirement of a franchise 
relationship by engaging in these kind of transactions? 
A. No. I was not suggesting that. 
Q. Let's look at the law. I assume you're 
familiar with 41-3-102-33, right? 
A. I am, yes. 
Q. It says, "A used motor vehicle means a 
vehicle that has been titled and registered t o a 
purchaser other than a dealer or has been driven 7,500 
or more miles, unless the vehicle is a trailer. " 
So I believe what you told Tesla was, Look, 
you can title and register it to someone else and tqen 
transfer it to the store, put a couple miles on it, and 
sell it as a used car? 
A. D::>esn't say anything about miles. I said 
that a ve~icle is used. if it has been titled and 
registered. So if the vehicl e is tit led and 
registered, then they could legally by the statute sell 
them as a used.vehicle . Didn' t say anything about 
miles. That was not part of the conversation. 
Litigation Services t 800-330-1112 
www.li tigationservices . com 
HEARING TRANSCRIPT - 08/14/2015 
Page 146 I 
1 Q. You didn't mention the 7,500 miles? 1 
2 A. I would have told them that is the other 2 
















































Q. So what this would result in then is Tesla 
would have to absorb the additional expense of titling 
and registering, for example, in another state, 
correct? 
A. Not in another state, no. They could have 
done it in our state. All I was trying to do is said 
if they did not have a franchise agreement, that there 
were other options that they could open a dealership in 
our state. 
Q. But it would have to be in another state 
because you're saying they don't have a license to sell 
it in Utah? 
.. 
A. That doesn't mean that you cannot title and 
register a vehicle in our state. 
Q. And then they would sell that vehicle -- they 
would have to advertise it as a used vehicle, right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. $0 they would have to be telling customers 
that this car, which might have ·no mileage on it, is a 
used car and sell it as such? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And that would be a competitive disadvantage 
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Q. . -- California? 
MR. RILEY: No more questions, Your Honor. 
Thank you. 
JUOOE PHAN: All right. Questions from the 
comnissioners? Ccmnissioner Cragun? 
MR. CRAGUN: I just want to look at this 
theory that Tesla is advocating through their counsel 
this idea that if you just iook at the definition of 
"franchise" in 41-3-102, their dealer agreement seems 
to ccxnply with the requirement of 41-3-210. So I need 
to understand from you why it is that you have to go 
and look at Title 13? 
THE WI'INESS: In -- under 41-3-210 and then 
~tis l(d), it states that they can't violate any law 
of the state respecting conrnerce in motor vehicles, 
which 13-14 obviously does do that. So they would be 
required to also do what 13-14 states they must do. 
MR. CRAGUN: Okay. So how does their 
argument that Title 13 doesn't even apply to them 
because they don't have a franchise agreement --
THE WITNESS: Under --
MR. CRJI.GUN: If they don't have a franchise 
agreement, why would we even look at Title 13? 
THE WI'INESS: Because under Title 13, it 

















































to Tesla selling against other new car dealers, right? 
A. I don't know if that would have been a 
competitive disadvantage . I was trying to give them a 
way that we could license them in our state. 
Q. And you also understood that by selling it as 
a used car, customers would be denied the tax benefits 
that are given to purchasers of new electric vehicles, 
right? 
A. I had no -- I did not consider that at all. 
Q. And this would require for a sale to a 
particular member of the public two stages of title and 
registration, .first by Tesla in order to sell it as a 
used car and then, second, by the customer when they 
bought it, right? . 
A. In order to make it a used vehicle, it ~ould 
have to be titled and regis tered. If they sold it to a 
customer, then yes, that additional title and 
registration would have . to occur. 
Q. So that would impose an additional 
transaction cost to sell the very same vehicle, right? 
A. That -- that happens all the time by law. 
Used vehicles are sold throughout our state every day. 
Q. Right. But used vehicles straight off the 
assembly line in Fremont --
A. Yep. 
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the dealership itself. In order for us to license a 
new rrotor vehicle dealer in our state, they have to 
have a franchise. 
MR. CRAGUN: I l!flderstand what you're reading 
in the statute. What I 'm not understanding is how you 
reached your conclusion. I understand tliat if a 
manufacturer has a franchise relationship with a dealer 
that the manufacturer cannot own the dealer. But if 
the manufacturer has no franchise under Title 13, why 
do we care how much they own? 
THE WI'INESS : And because of the statute 
stating that they must have a franchise in order for us 
to give them a new dealer ' s license. 
MR. CRAGUN: Is that 41 -- 41-3-210? 
THE WI'INESS: 41-3-210, correct. And then 
it's l(g), "Engage in a business respecting the selling 
or exchanging of new or new and used motor vehicles for 
which he is not licensed, including selling or 
exchanging a new motor vehicle for which the licensee 
does not have a franchise." 
MR. CRAGUN: That's where I want to focus. 
That word "franchise" is defined in 41-3-102. Have 
they not met the definition of 43 - - what is it, 
41-3-102(16)? D:Jes their dealer agreement not meet 
that definition of "franchise"? 
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1 THE WITNESS: It appears that it could, yes, 1 
2 but that there are additional statutes. And that's why 2 
3 the Division considered referring this or consulting 3 
4, t he Attorney General ' s off ice and involving t he 4 
5 Department of C=:rce, whic~ inclu~es t~e 13-14, which 5 
6 has other definitions, including a franchisee. And 6 
7 that i s the title of that act, 14 -- 13-14-101 states, 7 
8 "This chapter shall be cited as the new Automobile 8 
9 Franchise Act. " 9 
















between Title 41, Chapter 3 to Title 13, Chapter 14 is 11 
41-3-210 (1) {d)? 12 
THE WITNESS : Correct. 13 
MR. CRAGUN: That's the only linkage that 14 
you' re aware of? 15 
THE WITNESS: That I'm aware of. 16 
MR. CRAGUN: All right. So if we accept 17 
Tesla's theory, their argument, t heir premise, whatever 18 
it is they're dqing, what ef_fect will that have on ~ew ~9 
car dealers that are currently located -- that are 20 
currently selling cars in the state? 
THE WITNESS: It may have no effect unless 




Because of this, we want to open our own and not have a 24 
franchise , which then could basically state that they 25 
Page 152 
1 application? 1 
2 THE WITNESS: Correct. 2 
3 MR. CRAGUN: Okay. Talk to me about the 3 
4 difference between a definition of "dealer " and a 4 
5 definition of "dismantler" in 41-3 -102, where 5 
















distributor -- where i t talks specifically about a 
person who has a franchise. 
7 
8 
But in t he definition of "deal er, " it doesn't 9 
even mention the word "franchise. " The only place that 10 
"franchise" and "dealers" come into play is in 





THE WITNESS: I wasn't he.re when these laws 14 
were written, and I don't know if I can say why certain 15 
things weren't there or were included. The Division's 16 
trying to equitably enforce these statutes and these 17 
l aws the best that they can with respect to motor 18 
vehicle conrnerce. 19 
MR. CRAGUN: I.et me ask the question this 20 
way. Were you aware that t he definition of "dealer" 21 
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could put a dealership across the street from one that 
i s in existence and put them out of business. 
MR. CRAGUN: How could they do that and still 
comply with the new Automobile Dealer •s'·Franchise Act? 
THE WI1NESS: And I don't think that they 
could. However, that ' s V1hy we are also including that 
in the reasoning behind it that states that a 
manufacturer cannot own more than 45 percent of the 
dealership. 
In order to sell a vehicle in the state of 
Utah, you have to have a dealer's license. That 
dealer's license allows t hem to do cer tain things. 
It's a level, a step. So a new motor vehicle dealer 
can sell new franchise dealers to whatever make or 
model that they have. 
A used dealer is a step down from that. They 
could sell anything that basically is licensed and 
titled in the state of Utah. Then there's other 
dealerships below that. There's small trailer and ATV 
dealers . They can only sell those types . 
So the l inkage of that t hat -- the separation 
is what's difficult because if we say that it acts for 
all of the current dealers in the state, t hat we feel 
that i t needs to also be the same for Tesla. 
MR. CRAGUN: So you see it· as a uniform 
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today really noticed that. That would have not been 
something that would have been apparent. 
MR. CRAGUN: Didn't consider that at all in 
making your decision to deny the license? 
THE WITNESS: No. 
MR. CRAGUN: Okay. I think that's all the 
questions I have for Mr. Stoddard. But Mr. Riley and 
Mr. Franci s, we 're going to need to explore thi s a 
little bit more before the Conrnission is ready to make 
a decision. I think it' s probably legal argument 
rather than testimony. 
JUDGE PHAN: Are there any other questions 
from the c=issioners? 
MR. VALENTINE: I have a few. 
JUDGE PHAN: Commissioner ehair? 
MR. VALENTINE: This is a carry-on to the 
discussion that my col league, Commissioner Cragun, has 
asked. I'd like to go back to Title 13 and 
specifical l y in the def inition sections under 13-14-102 
focus on paragraph 8 for a minute, which is the 
definition of "franchise ." 
22 did not include the word "franchise" in it, but the 
23 definition of "distributor" did include the 
22 For franchise agreement, can you just walk 
23 through the definition and ask each one of those 
24 "franchise"? 
25 THE WITNESS: Honestly, I have not until 
24 elements where this particular application failed? I'm 
25 talking specifi cal ly about the second one because they 
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have a written agreement i n the second one. 1 
Franchise means a written agreement or, in 2 
the absence of a written agreement, of course, a 3 
dealer. Did they have a written agreement in that 4 
second application? 5 
. TilE WI'INESS: I would say yes. 6 
MR. VALENTINE : The next element was a person 7 
grants to another person. Were two people involved, 8 
even though they are wholly-owned subsidiaries, they 9 
were two separate corporations? 10 
TilE WI'INESS: It appears to be that way, yes. 11 
MR. VALENTINE: Is there also a license to 12 
use the trade name, trademark, service mark, or related 13 
characteristics? 14 
TilE WI'INESS: I would say yes. 15 
MR. VALENTINE: Then the next element was, "A 16 
cornnunity of interest exists in the marketing of new 17 
18 motor vehicles." 18 
19 What is your understanding -- as you have to 19 
20 enforce this, what's your understanding of t hat 20 
21 cornnunity of interest? 21 
22 TilE WI'INESS: And normally with 13-14, that 22 
23 is enforced by Ccmnerce, the Department of Ccmnerce. 23 
24 So i t would be better to have somebody from Ccmnerce 24 
25 answer those questions. 25 
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1 TilE WI'INESS: It doesn't appear to be, no. 1 
2 MR. VALENTINE: Okay. We are going to have 2 
3 to explore this with counsel when we get to l egal 3 
4 argument. Thank you. 4 
5 JUOOE PHAN: Any other questions? Okay. Do 5 
6 you have redirect, Mr. Francis? 6 
7 MR. FRANCIS : Well, just one quest ion. 7 
8 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 8 
9 BY MR. FRANCIS: 9 
10 Q. If you 'll tum t o the dealer agreement . 10 
11 A. can you help rre where that i s? 11 
12 MR. FRANCIS: That is 7. And read again 12 
13 paragraph 16.1. 13 
14 MR. PETR(X;EORGE: Exhibit 4. 14 
15 MR. FRANCIS: Exhibit 4. Excuse me. Thanks. 15 
16 TilE WITNESS: It ' s 16.1? 16 
17 Q. (By Mr. Francis) Yes. 17 
18 A. "Dealer is an independent contractor and is 18 
19 not an agent, servant, employee, legal representative, 19 
20 partner, or joi nt venture of TMI. In addition, dealer 20 
21 hereby agrees that this agreement does not form a 21 
22 franchise relationship between dealer and ™I- 22 
23 "And dealer further agrees that ~his is not a 23 
24 franchisee as term defined under Utah Code Annotated 24 
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MR. VALENTINE: But you had to make a 
determination for this rejection because you were 
relying upon this sec.tion. So what was the basis for 
your denial under this part of the test? 
THE WITNESS: Just the definition itself, it 
wasn ' t. It was going into 13-14, and then it appears 
to be --
MR. VALENTINE: 13-14, what section? I need 
a title and chapter. 
THE WITNESS: I don't see the exact --
MR. FRANCIS: 201. 
MR. VALENTINE: 201? 
, TilE WITNESS : sorry, 13-14 -201. 
MR. VALENI'INE: l(u)? 
THE WI'INESS: And then 1 (u) . 
MR. VALENTINE: Let rre get there. So this is 
prohibited acts by franchisors, is that correct, this 
Section 201? 
THE WITNESS : Correct. 
MR. VALENTINE: so let ' s go back and find 
what a franchisor is. Subpart 10, "A franchisor means 
a person who has in writing" -- drop out a couple words 
here -- "agrees with or permits a franchisee to 
purchase," but the franchisee is not defined in 
Title 41", is it? 
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this agreement does not form a franchise between dealer 
and ™I . And TMI -further agrees that this is not a 
franchisor as such term defined under Utility Code 
19-15, same Subsection 102." 
Q. And when you reviewed the dealer agreement 
since it by its own l anguage deni ed being a franchisee 
and franchise agreement under Ti t le 13 - - excuse 
me -- 'yes, Chapter 14, did that wei gh into your 
consideration of denying the l icense because a 
franchise agreement didn ' t exi st ? 
A. Yes. 
JUOOE PHAN : All right. Mr. Stoddard, you 
may be seated. 
THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
MR. FRANCIS: We have no further witnesses. 
JUOOE PHAN : Okay. All right. Is there 
rebuttal from Tesla? 
MR. RILEY: No, Your Honor. We're prepared 
to make closing arguments. 
JUOOE PHAN: Okay. 
MR. CRAGUN: Is there an opportunity here to 
engage in a dialogue, or do you have something you want 
to say first? 
MR. RILEY: Your Honor, I would like to do 
25 19-15, Subsection 13-14-102 . ™I hereby agrees that I 25 whatever's most helpful to you. I can discuss the 
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1 prov1s10ns that you were questioning the witness about, 1 
2 ., as well as describe some of the more general points. I 2 
3 would like to reserve 10 minutes for rebuttal following 3 
4 the State 's closing. 4 
5 MR. CRAGUN: Is there anything that you still 5 
6 need to do to create a record for constitutional 6 
7 challenges? 7 
8 MR. RILEY: I believe we've made our 8 
9 evidentiary showing in that respect. I will address 9 
10 some of the constitutional issues in my closing. 10 
11 MR. VALENTINE: Why don't you go ahead then, 11 
12 and let's have you go ahead and make that. If you 12 
13 don ' t mind, we'll handle this like we would in an 13 
14 appellate court that we can ask questions. Then if you 14 
15 haven't covered some of the issues, then we'll ask 15 
16 questions. 16 
17 MR. RILEY: Thank you, Your Honor. 17 
18 CIJJSING ARGUMENT 18 
19 BY MR. RILEY: 19 
20 I'd like to tum, first, to an issue that 20 
21 Carmissioner Cragun raised, and that goes to the 21 
22 definition of "franchise" for the Licensing Act. I 22 
23 think we all agree that the definition of "franchise" 23 
24 in the Licensing Act is different than the definitions 24 
25 in the Franchise Act. 25 
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1 first. In fact, they cross-reference . 1 
2 MR. CRAGUN: What I'm thinking is if we 2 
3 overturn the Division, and you went out and nullified 3 
4 the authorization agreement that's Cl:_lfren~ly in place, 4 
5 the Divisi.on might be able to c~) n. and say, Hey, now 5 
6 you' re in violation of the law.. We' re revoking your 6 
7 license. Then it would be the time to .make that 7 
8 discussion. 8 
9 MR. RILEY: I believe that gi yen the s_equence 9 
10 of events where in response to an invitation to make a 10 
11 subsequent application, the den~al for the first 11 











If this Corrmission found as a matter of law 13 
that the statute should be interpreted as authorization 14 
is inherent in the parent-child relationship, the 15 
subsidiary and the parent, then we comply with the 16 
statute, and we don ' t even get into franchise 17 
agreements. 18 
MR. CRAGUN: I appreciate that because what 19 
I'm worried about is a jurisdictional i ssue here. You 20 
didn ' t appeal the first denial, so we can't deal with 21 
that. But I think I see where we could make a finding 22 
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Let me put that differently. The definition 
in the Licensing Act, which is sho~m here on the 
screen, is different from that in the Franchise Act in 
some important respects. 
It is our contention that "franchise" in the 
Licensing Act, which is a term of art i n the act 
itself, requires only the conveyance of authority to 
sell. It doesn't have to be between independent 
parties. It doesn't have to involve trademarks. 
It doesn't have to involve trade names. It 
doesn't involve applications, inventories, community of 
interest, none· of the things that you all can see with 
definitions of "franchise." It simply says that the 
manufacturer of new motor vehicles or its distributor 
is authorized to sell any specified make or makes of 
new motor vehicles. 
Now, it ' s our contention that that is 
satisfied simply by the relationship between a parent 
and a wholly-owned subsidiary. And the license should 
have been issued the first -- on the first application 
where there was no discussion of a franchise. 
MR. CRAGUN: But that issue is not really 
before us because you didn't appeal that denial. 
MR. RILEY: I believe it is still before us 
because the second denial is based in part on the 
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final denial references the first denial. But it is 
our argument that the dealer's agreement satisfies this 
requirement, clearly satisfies this requirement because 
it is an authorization by Tesla, Inc . . to Tesla Utah to 
sell its cars. That ' s all that's needed to satisfy the 
licensing agreement. 
MR. VALENTINE: But then once you're 
licensed, don't you get to the second part of the 
dilemma as you called it, which is that you ' re now 
having direct sales in violation of the Franchise Act, 
which has specific provisions in it dealing with direct 
sales? 
MR. RILEY: And the answer to that is no, 
we 're not in violation of the Fr<!f!chise Act . The 
reason is we are not a franchisor under that act. 
Mr. Stoddard misspoke when he said this act prohibits 
manufacturers from 01•ming and operating dealers. That 
is not what the provision says . 
That provision of Chapter 13, it says, 
"Franchisor may not sell, may not own and operate a 
dealer. " Again, for the record, s~ that we're 
completely cl ear about this, if you tum to Title 13, 
23 as a matter of law that you don't need to have the 
24 agreement that you do, in fact, have now. 
23 Chapter 14-201, it says, "Prohibited acts by 
24 franchisors. " Again, this is the Franchise Act, 
25 MR. RILEY: Yes . Thank you. Of course, the 25 part 2, franchises in general. "Prohibited acts by 
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1 franchisors. " 1 
2 MR. CRAGUN: Can you also tum back to the 2 
3 definition of "franchisor" and look at Subsection A, 3 
4 which references a manufacturer of new motor vehicles 4 
5 and talk about how that applies . 5 
6 MR. RILEY: Yes. That is one example of a 6 
7 franchisor. It doesn't say all manufacturers are 7 
8 franchisors . You have to look at the rest of the 8 
9 definition. 9 
10 It says, "Means a person who has in writing 10 
11 or practice agreed with or permits a franchisee," so 11 
12 you have to identify the franchisee, "to purchase, 12 
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Act have to be read in light of the express legislative 
purpose of this statute, which is to protect 
independent franchisees fr'?l' being exploited by their 
franchisors. It has no application to a direct sales 
model. That ' s why the term "franchise" is defined the 
way it is. 
Now, if you look at the dealer's agreement, 
and it was read into the record, the provisions · that 
expressly disclaim the creation of a franchise 
relationship within the meaning of the franchise 
agreement. 
Again, this was in 16.1 of Exhibit 4, which 




manufactured," etc. 14 
So a franchisor only exists if the franchisor 15 
has a franchise. Here Tesla Utah is not a franchisee 16 
17 because there is not an existence of a f ranchise 17 
18 agreement under the Franchise Act_. 18 
19 Because the definition of a franchise 19 
20 agreement under the Franchise Act i s fundamentally 20 
21 different than the definition of a franchise under the 21 
22 licensing agreement. So I believe Corrrni ssioner Cragun 22 
23 anti cipated this in his questions because it is our 23 
24 contention that these terms, "franchise, franchise 24 
25 agreement, franchisee, franchisor," in the ,Franchise 25 
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1 Ford' s dealers have to be given a license to 1 
2 use the Ford trademark on the store·. The l egislature 2 
3 wrote that requirement into the Franchise Act because 3 
4 that ' s the nature of doing business with an i ndependent 4 
5 franchisee. You have to have a separate contract. 5 
6 Here you can use the Ford logo on the store. 6 
7 Tesla doesn't need that because it owns and 7 
8 operates Tesla Utah. So the de~ler agreement expressly 8 
9 says this is not a trademark agreement, which is 9 
10 required to be a franchise in the Franchise Act. So 10 
11 that ' s how the dilerma is avoided. 11 
12 MR. VALENI'INE: Let me ask you this question 12 
13 t hen because no one's really addressed this issue. 13 
14 That is when you go over back to -- again, t he sect ion 14 
15 we're dealing with, the definitions in 13-14-102, go to 15 
16 definition 17, which nobody-has really made any kind of 16 
contractor. They are not a franchisee as that term is 
used in Title 13. There's not a franchise as that term 
is used in Title 13. In addition, this contract 
specifically says no t rademark license in Section 10. 
No trademarks. 
The extension of a trademark license is one 
of the characteristics, essential characteristics of a 
franchise and franchise agreement under the Franchise 
Act . And it makes sense because if you' re dealing with 
independent ccxnpanies, an independent franchisor, an 
independent franchisee, you want to expressly convey 
the rights to a trademark . 
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owning and operat i ng that l icensed dealer. So there 
are those cross-references from a Franchise Act 
because, again, they' re trying to protect the 
independent franchise dealers who are licensed to sell 
from their franchisors. 
But the key is not the definition of 
"dealer," it's the definition of "franchisor." And in 
response to Commissioner Cragun's question, a 
franchisor requires a franchisee and_a franchise 
agreement under the definition of the Franchise Act. 
We do not meet t hat defini tion. 
If you acquire a franchise under the 
Licensing Act, we meet that because we have the express 
authorization. But more is required to be a franchise 
under the Franchise Act, including a trademark license, 
which we don't have because we don't need it because 
17 statements on a new motor vehicle dealer is a person 
18 who's licensed under 41-202-1-A to sell new motor 
17 it's a Tesla-owned and operated store. 
19 vehicles. Isn't that the t ie between the two acts? 
20 MR. RILEY: That is one tie because what the 
21 statute says, Your Honor, i s it says, for example, a 
22 franchisor shall not own or operate, subject to these 
23 other limitations, a new motor vehicle dealer . 
24 But it doesn't say any manufacturer is 
25 prohibited. It says a franchisor is prohibited from 
18 And that ' s -- that is the way through this 
19 very clear statutory course through these 
20 constructions. And, again, it makes sense because of 
21 the purposes of these statutes. The Licensing Act is 
22 to protect consumers from unfair practices, background 
23 checks, bond requirements, and so forth. 
24 The Franchise Act, which defines franchise 
25 differently and defines franchisor and franchis~e, is 
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1 to protect independent franchise dealers from their 1 
~ franchisors. That's why you have a specific definition 2 
3 of a franchise agreement that includes what you would 3 
4 require to nm an independent franchise business, such 4 
5 as a trademark license. 5 
6 We do not have that here. So the Division 6 
7 should have issued the license either because we don' t 7 
8 require franchise, or we satisfy the requirement of 8 
9 franchise with a dealer agreement. 9 
10 The dealer agreement by its term is not a 10 
11 franchise agreement under the Franchise Act because 11 
12 that's regulating specific contracts between 12 
13 independent franchisors and their licensed dealers. 13 
14 And this, again, harmonizes with the purposes 14 
15 of the Franchise Act. It doesn't talk about protecting 15 
16 dealers from dealers selling other kinds of cars. It's 16 



































A substantial inequality of bargaining power 19 
between motor vehicle franchisors and rrotor vehicle 20 
franchisees enables a franchisor to do t hese things. 21 
Then the statute has specific prohibitions such as 22 
termination, such as forcing inventory, such as 23 
withholding cars. 24 
None of that applies where the manufacturer 25 
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became now a larger and larger segment of the market 1 
and chose to go with franchise dealers, you would not 2 
have any objection to having all the provisions of both 3 
acts apply then? 4 
MR. RILEY: That is correct, Your Honor. At 5 
that point we would be a franchisor under the 6 
definition. And those independent companies would come 7 
to us and say, Okay, I want to open a store in Provo. 8 
We understand you have a comp~y-a,med store 9 
in Salt Lake City, but we ' re gofng to have the Provo 10 
market, and we ' re going to enter into a franchise for 11 
that. And you can't put anot~er Tesla store in the 12 
Provo market. But that's where this act would kick ·in. 13 
MR. VALENTINE: At that point would you not 14 
be in violation because you have a company-owned store 15 
as well? 16 
MR. RILEY: No, because when we ent!'!red into 17 
that relationship, we were not a franchisor. We were 18 
only a franchisor once we entered into a relationship 19· 
with a f!'."anchisee. 20 
MR. VALENTINE: So you could abrogate the 21 
statute by starting out as a cCXTipany-owned store and 22 
then have franchises and company-owned stores at t he 23 
same time in contravention of the act? 24 
MR. RILEY: No, we would not be abrogating 25 
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is selling through its own wholly-01•med subsidiary. 
It's not a franchisor-franchisee relationship. The 
statute makes that very clear in the definition of 
"franchise" and "franchise _agreement . " 
And I appreciate that this is confusing, but 
we're dealing with two statutes that have different 
definitions for similar terms. But if we keep in mind 
the broader purposes of these statutes, then I think it 
becomes clear. 
And -- and I think we had compelling 
testirrony here today that what the Franchise Act is 
intended to do is to protect, as we show here on 
slide 6, the relationship between these dealers, these 
are licensed dealers, and their franchisor, Ford 
dealers with Ford as their manufacturing franchisor. 
There is nothing in the statute to suggest 
that it is to protect these dealers selling Fords 
from -- from Tesla at all, nothing. If the Comnission 
were to.hold that, you would be creating a monopoly 
among independent franchise dealers. That would be the 
only way you could enter the retail market in Utah, and 
that's not ~hat these statutes say. 
MR. VALENTINE: · I asked the question earlier 
maybe of your witness, and I ' ll ask·you n<M to respond 
to the same. If Tesla chose ·to as they' ve expanded and 
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the statute because the statute is to protect a 
franchisor and a franchisee who have an existing 
relationship from the franchisor interfering with that 
relationship. 
If the company-owned store were already in 
place, you're not interfering with an existing 
contractual relationship with a_ franchisee. Tesla has 
no franchisees. It doesn't become a franchisor under 
the statute until it eng_ages with a franchisee . At 
t hat point it ' s not abrogating the ·statute. It' s 
complying with the statute with regard to that 
franchisee. 
MR. VALENTINE: But, nonetheless, would still 
have coopany-owned stores within the state? 
MR. RILEY: As it was permitted and licensed 
appropriately when it first entered the state. The 
point of the protections of the statute only kick in 
when you're dealing with another independent 
franchisee. 
And that is assuming that the scenario ever 
took 'place. As the record shows, we've never sold a 
car through an independent franchisee anywhere in the 
world. And we coexist with other cCXTipanies that have 
chosen that model. 
I think that one of the telling pieces of 
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1 evidence here is the absence of any evidence at all 
2 suggesting that this preventing Tesla from entering the 
3 market has any negative impact on consumers at all, or 
4 that it interferes with the purposes of the Franchise 
5 Act. 
6 It doesn't. The state hasn't presented one 
7 iota of evidence that the public interest is served by 
8 prohibiting Tesla from entering the market, not at all 
9 none whatsoever. So I'd like to, if I could, if there 
10 aren't any other questions, reserve the balance of my 
11 time for rebuttal. 
12 MS. ROCKWELL: I do have questions. 
13 MR. CRAGUN: I have questions , too. 
14 MR. RILEY: Sure. 
15 MS. ROCKWELL: The term "franchise agreement" 
16 is not actuall y used in Subsection 13-14-201-l(u), and 
17 your briefs rely on the term "franchise agreement" with 
18 respect to legislative intent. 
19 can you tell me how the term "franchise 
20 agreement" is actually used in the body of the act 
21 aside from the legislative intent? 
22 MR. RILEY: It's used in connection with, for 
23 example, with prohibitions, limitations. I'm not sure 
24 I can turn irrmediately to -- with regard to what the 

























1 "dealer" change anything? Because I'm presuming that 1 
2 there were already franchise dealers in the state. 2 
3 MR. RILEY: I believe the definition -- I 3 
4 believe we covered this in the opening, and -- is that 4 
5 there was a definition of "new motor vehicle dealer" in 5 
6 the prior version, which did reference a franchise. 6 
7 That's - - 7 
8 MR. CRAGUN: Okay. I need to find that. 8 
9 MR. RILEY: That section was taken out, and 9 
10 · then they added the definition of "dealer." 10 
11 MR. CRAGUN: Of "dealer." 11 
12 MR. RILEY: It's our contention that by 12 













a franchise, unlike the definition of "distributors" as 
Conmissioner Cragun has pointed out , that this suggests 
a legislative intent that not all dealers have to hold 
14 
a franchise. 
MR. CRAGUN: Okay. I found that . 
I 15 I 16 
I 17 
Where they 18 
struck the definition of "new motor vehicle dealer"? 
MR. RILEY: That's correct. 
MR. CRAGUN: It did have a requirement that 
they be -- that they have a franchise, but the new 
definition of "dealer" dici not. Okay. So presumably 










If you turn to, for example, 
Section 13-14 -202 , this relates to protections accorded 
in connection with the sale or transfer or 01-mership of 
a franchise. And it says, for example, "The franchisor 
shall give effect to the change in a franchise 
agreement pursuant to subsection whatever." 
So this is an example of where the franchisor 
is -- for exarrple, there's going to be a change in 
ownership of the franchisee. And the state law imposes 
certain restrictions on what can be done pursuant to 
the franchise agreement. This is an example of how the 
term "franchise agreement" is used, which is consistent 
with the l egislative purposes. 
MS . ROCKWELL: Thank you. 
MR. CRAGUN: I'd like to look a little bit at 
the definition of "dealer" and "distributor" in 
Title 41, Chapter 3. Actually, I went and got the 
section laws from 1992 since it's not online. 
And as I'm looking through it, it l<X?ks like 
what the legislature did was actually add the 
definition of "dealer." Prior to this, there was no 
definition of "dealer" in the code. So "distributors" 
were there, and they already had the franchise 
agreement. 
Does the mere addition of a definition for 
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MR. RILEY: That is correct, Your Honor. 
MR. CRAGUN: Thank you. 
MR. RILEY: Thank you. Other questions? 
JUCGE PHAN: No other questions? 
MR. CRAGUN_: I don't. 
MR. VALENTINE: I don't. 
JUCGE PHAN: Okay. 
MR. RILEY: Thank you very much. I will 
reserve for rebuttal. 
JUOOE PHAN: All right. Mr. Francis? 
MR. FRANCIS: I don't know that I dare 
venture into the pit. 
MR. VALENTINE: Just warming up for the 
Supreme Court. 
CLOSING ARGUMENI' 
BY MR. FRANCIS: 
We have talked of statutory gymnastics I 
think and ping-ponging between the definitions or among 
the definitions that are involved in the two different 
acts. The Division, of course, made their decision 
based on the link, which they believe exists between 
the Motor Vehicle Act and the Franchise Act. 
That was centered around 41-3-210-l(d). And 
the Division continues to argue that the licensing 
statute and the franchise statute cannot be isolated 
~---------- - --------- - - --~-- - --- ------ --- --- ------~ 
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1 fran one another. And a lot of that, I guess, _has to 1 
2 do with some of the confusing definitional implications 2 
3 of the clear language of the statutes themselves, which 3 
4 further muddy the water. 4 
5 I don't envy the Conmission in trying to work 5 
6 between these acts and then settle the issues as to 6 
7 whether or not the facts and the testi11Dny are going to 7 
8 allow this license to be granted. The Di vision does 8 
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So here is another link between these two 
acts. And, of course, I'm not counsel for the 
Department of Cournerce. And I sure wish he were here 
rather than me. But I can't get past at least arguing 
that "franchisor" as defined in the Franchise Act 
specifi cally includes the manufacturer. Now, 
"manufacturer" is not defined in that act. 
MR. VALENTINE: Actually, Subpart 10 says 
9 not think that it could be, and we"ve given the 
10 statutory reasoning for it. As I mentioned in my 
11 opening, it's going to come down to statutory 
9 "manufacturer -- vehicles manufactured." Doesn't talk 
10 about the term "manufacturer. " 
11 MR. CRAGUN: lO(a). 
12 interpretation. 12 MR. VALENTINE: lO(a), manufactured. It 
13 We came across another definition in Title 13 13 
14 that may even further confuse all of us a little more. 14 
15 If you look at 13-14-102(4), we have a new term to put 15 
16 in the mix here, and that is "dealership . " I'll wait 16 
17 until you get there. 17 
18 MR. VALENTINE: I actual ly had t hat 18 
19 underlined to talk about it, so go ahead. 19 
20 MR. FRANCIS: "Dealership lll(!ans a site or 20 
21 location in this state, A, at which· a franchisee 21 
22 conducts the business of a new motor vehicle dealer; 22 
23 and, B, that is identified as a new motor vehicle 23 
24 dealer's pri~cipal place of business for licensing 24 
25 purposes under Section 41-3-204." 25 
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1 or do you want to wait until -- 1 
2 MR . FRANCIS: No. Sure. ~o, hit me with the 2 
3 questions. 3 
4 MR. CRAGUN: So let' s tal k about Tesla's 4 
5 assertion that they're canplying wi t h that section 5 




















don't have a franchise in this state. 7 
MR. FRANCIS: All I can say is we di~agree 8 
with that conclusion. We believe that because it says 9 
any law of the state respecting conrnerce in motor 10 
vehicles, that we would have to look at any l aw in the 11 
state respecting motor vehicles. It' s extremely broad. 12 
MR . CRAGUN: Okay. 13 
MR. FRANCIS: So if we were looking at a Venn 14 
diagram, we would have to include 11Dtor vehicle law, 15 
and both statutes would be included within that circle. 16 
I would like to address one other issue - 17 
statutory construction. As I mentioned, the Ccxrmission 18 
is going to have to cane to a conclusion as to whether 19 
or not some of these definitions are included or linked 20 
to each other. We argue that they are. Obvious! y t he 21 
petitioner argues that they're not. 22 
And the Division felt under the restrictions, 23 
it was an elimination type of reasoning. If t hey did 24 
not have a franchise under both acts , then they could 25 
starts using --
MR. FRANCIS : lO(a) in 13-14-102? 
MR. VALENTINE: "Or includes the 
manufacture." I understand now. Okay. 
MR. FRANCIS: Yes. I believe that was --
now, the links between these two statutes, of course, 
does create the crux of t he denial of the license by 
the Division. Mr. Stoddard testified that the Division 
believes that because of 41-3-210-l(d) , which has that 
requirement that any law or any rule respecting 
conmerce in motor vehicles would have to include a 
review of the New Motor Vehicle Franchise Act --
MR. CRAGUN·:· Are you open to discussion now, 
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n_ot receive a ' license . The Comnission very well may 
come to a different conclusion. 
But let me address the concept of the 
franchise model and what some of our testimony -- if 
you ' ll remember in my ope_ning argument, I said that 
feasibility1 might be an issue because i t costs -- would 
cost the peti t i oner more money to canply with Utah's 
act, .that it.goes against t heir grain to do t hat. 
But in the_ testi~ny that .wis given, for 
inst ance, in Mr: 0 1Connell 1s testimony, he studied the 
concept of having independent dealer ownership and came 
to the conclusion, We wouldn't do it, if I 'm quoting 
him correctly. There 's no profit incentive in order to 
do that for the conpany. 
And then there was ·a dismissal of the concept 
that -- but if saneone as an independent contractor 
actually agreed to be paid by the parent conpany or 
what would be the parent conpany and to do things 
exactl y in the manner in which Tesla wants to operate 
their franchise, testi11Dny of Ms. Scott Morton was it's 
difficult to contract for that, but it ' s still 
possible. 
And she answered, Why would they do it? 
Again, they wouldn ' t make the choice to do it, but it 
doesn't eliminate the possibility. She testified i n 
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relation to incremental sales that franchise dealers 1 
were plausible in cross-examination to Mr. Lind, but 2 
the fact that Tesla, she said, chooses not to means 3 
there are good reasons not to. And she said later, 4 
"The firm !mows best." 5 
Again, we think that profit motive and 6 
economics probably does run that gamut and makes that 7 
decision for Tesla. But it doesn't mean that they 8 
couldn't comply with what we consider to be the 9 
statutory requirements of franchise relationships. We 10 
would submit it on that basis. 11 
Any further questions? 12 
MR. VALENTINE: I have one. You heard the 13 
exchange between me and counsel that followed the 14 
exchange we had with their expert witness. The 15 
troublesome part that I'm still troubled with is the 16 
ability of a company to come in with nothing but 17 
company-owned motor vehicle stores, assuming their 18 
reading of the statute is correct, and then within a 19 
relatively short time start franchising. 20 
I think counsel argued that Tesla could 21 
continue to have company-owned stores and franchise 22 
stores. I think it shows the wealmess for me of -- of 23 
either the way the statute's written or the position 24 
that is being articulated to us. Would you care to 25 
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Mr. Riley? 1 
MR. RILEY: Your Honor, may I have a couple 2 
of moments to consult with my client? 3 
JUOOE PHAN: Sure. Why don' t .we take a 4 
10-minute break. 5 
MR. VALOOINE: 10-minute break and let you 6 
have your final rebuttal. 10 minutes. 7 
MR. RILEY: Thank you, ·Your Honor. 8 
(Recess taken at ·1: 57, resuming at 2: 09. ) 9 
JUOOE PHAN: Okay. We're ready to get 10 
started. Back on the record. 11 
MR. RILEY: Thank you. 12 
JUOOE PHAN: Mr. Riley, go ahead. 13 
REBU'ITAL ARGUMENT 14 
BY MR. RILEY: 15 
Thank you very much. I'd like to return to 16 
the issues that Comnissioner Valentine raised about 17 
sort of a hypothetical, what happens in the future if 18 
Tesla started to franchise independent dealers, 19 
something we haven't done, something that's not on the 20 
road map, something that is I think in large.measure 21 
hypothetical. But let's consider that. 22 
MR. VALENTINE: One of the reasons I'm doing 23 
that is not just focused on Tesla, but it's the next I 24 
company, XYZ Company says, we ' re going to follow the 25 
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expand on that? 
MR. FRANCIS: I would like to ccmnent on 
that. As I recall, the counterargument was that it 
would facilitate the potentiality of having a monopoly 
agreement airong dealers of a certain line make. 
What wasn't said, and yet what is as likely a 
possibility, is what if Tesla at the current time is 
the infant gorilla and doesn't threaten the structure 
of the other companies right now, but if they get their 
wish and complete their mission, they become the 
nonopoly that affects not only intra but intermake 
competition? 
I would agree that under the current law, 
Comnissioner Valentine, there is a problem in trying to 
coexist with both models. And I don't know what the 
legislative history is as to why the codes in both 
cases read the way they do. But there are potential 
problems with both. 
And in that regard, if it were allowed to be 
this way and have two different sets of possibilities 
here, I wouldn't want to be in the Motor Vehicle 
Enforcement Division's shoes in trying to enforce both. 
But that ' s all I can do is surmise what might happen. 
MR. VALENTINE : Thank you. 
JUOOE PHAN: Any other questions? No? Okay. 
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Tesla model, but we're bad actors. We're not Tesla. 
We ' re goi ng to come in and start with a single company 
store, and then we'll cherrypick and pick out some of 
the best companies, and some we're going to franchise. 
I'm worried about not only facts as it 
applies to this case, but then the next case that we 
have to consider. That's one of the reasons why I 
questioned you so hard on this. 
MR. RILEY: I appreciate that. I think 
that's an excellent way to sunmarize the hypothetical. 
Let's use XYZ Company. Because Tesla has no intent to 
do this, and I think it would be unfair to deny us a 
license because of some speculative hypothetical. 
I think your point is well taken. XYZ comes 
in, establishes an independent -- establishes a 
company-01med store in Salt Lake City. It ' s not a 
franchisor under the Franchise Act because it doesn't 
have any independent franchisees. I t doesn't have --
doesn't meet of the definition of a franchise agreement 
under the Franchise Act because it Olms and operates 
its Olo/11 store . 
So it is licensed under the Licensing Act to 
run that company-owned store. XYZ Company can run the 
store. A few years later, it decides it's going to 
establish independent franchisees in the state of Utah. 
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Now, of course, the dynamics are different. 1 
Those independent franchisees would know there ' s a 2 
company-o,med store, and they could bargain 3 
accordingly. It's not the same equities as I'm already 4 
in an independent franchise relationship, and I'm being 5 
extorted. These are very sophisticated companies, and 6 
they can make their own agreement. 7 
Let's say they do that. The opportunity for 8 
regulation, Mr. Chairman, that exists in that case is 9 
very clear under the statute, which is every year, 'f:i.Z 10 
Company has to come and gets its license renewed. 11 
At that point the Division could say, Back in 12 
2015, you weren't a franchisor because you only had one 13 
store, and you owned it. You didn't have a franchisee 14 
under the Franchise Act. But we now think you are a 15 
franchisor because you 've opened up an independent 16 
franchisee in Provo. You now run afoul of the 17 
Franchise Act . We're going to deny your license on 18 
that basis. 19 
Now, that's assuming that this Comnission 20 
21 decides that it's appropriate for the Division to 21 
22 interpret and enforce the Franchise Act. But let 's 22 
23 assume the Comnission ~es that decision on the 23 
24 rationale that was given earlier. 24 
25 At that point you believe that they were 25 
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1 because we're not required to franchise under the 1 
2 Licensing Act, or we satisfied 'the franchise provisions 2 
3 by the dealer agreement . 3 
4 We are not a franchisor under the Franchise 4 
5 Act because we don't have a franchisee or a franchise 5 
6 agreement that defines that relationship because t hose · 6 
7 relationships exist between independent companies. 7 
8 That's the way through this alleged dilernna. 8 
9 Finally, I would. suggest that the law says to 9 
10 us how we should interpret that dilernna, which is -in a 10 
11 way that avoids constitutional infirmity. If counsel 11 
12 believes that these are confusing and difficult to 12 







speak, to negotiate that dilernna by adopting a 





And Utah is alone in its advocacy of 17 
enactments that preserve the free market. This pattern 18 
where Tesla is eliminated from the free market from 19 
Pag e 183 
violating the Franchise Act, and this represented some 
threat, you could deny the license to the company-ovmed 
store, which has to be renewed on an annual basis. 
And, again, that serves the consumer protection 
function of ensuring that licensees are complying with 
the licensing statute . So you would have ··an 
opportunity at that point to regulate that conduct if 
you felt it was appropriate to regulate that conduct. 
What I believe would be, frankly, wrong would 
be on the basis of that sort of hypothetical, which you 
can address under the statutes, to deny the issuance of 
a license to a company which is not a franchisor under 
the franchise agreement. 
MR. VALEITTINE: Thank you. That helps. 
MR. RILEY: The company that meets all of its 
obligations under the Licensing Act because all it 
needs is authority to satisfy the franchise provisions. 
No\1, I appreciate counsel's concession that 
some of these provisions are confusing, and there are 
some interlinkage. But obviously we have to look at 
the actual definitions. And where the statutes use 
different definitions, we have to honor those different 
definitions. 
And the construction, which we have argued 
today, does that. We're entitled:to a license, either 
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offer a franchisee's margin. We can't offer the 
middleman the margin to operate. 
The reason for that is we're not going to 
abandon our direct sales mcxlel nationally or in other 
states . We're going to maintain a single transparent 
price because it's good for consumers. And no 
independent franchisee could cover its costs, its 
traditional costs, and sell higher than that price. 
We're not offering discounts. to dealers 
because we· don't have the inventory to offer volume 
discounts to dealers so that they can make their 
margin. We've eliminated areas that have, frankly, 
been abused, service contracts, service that's not 
needed, repairs that aren't needed, undercoats, 
haggling over -- we 've eliminated all of that, which 
has been a source of profits and friction and the 
source of consumer complaints. 
And I question Mr. Stoddard -- and I 
appreciate what he was trying to do by suggesting, Why 
20 competing with dealers from other companies would run 
21 afoul of that provision in Utah's Constitution. 
20 don't you become a used car dealer? Sell your new 
22 And there really shouldn't be any dispute . 
21 Teslas as used cars. Have we sunk to that point that 
22 we have to sort of engage in that sort of circumvention 
23 There's no evidence, no economic evidence, on the other 23 of the statute selling new cars as used cars? That's 
24 side of this issue at all. Tesla cannot viably operate 24 wrong. 
25 in Utah through an independent franchisee. We cannot 25 We can give vitality and life to these 
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statutes by finding that Tesla is an appropriate 
candidate for a license, but it is not subject to the 
Franchise Act's requirements or prohibition of 
ownership. 
We 've given a clear analysis of the statutes 
that result in that conclusion. We should be informed 
by the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation, which 
is not to interpret these statutes that give rise to 
constitutional dilemmas and problems . 
I believe that is a very, very clear course 
to resolving this and giving consumers the great 
benefits t hat Tesla offers and introducing competition 
to the market . Because ultimately, all of these 
statutes can on~y be justified if they serve the publ i c 
interest. This is a result that is contrary to t he 
public interest. 
In fact, it would be wrong - -·the fact that 
the Division has no problem if we sell the same cars as 
used cars, that shpws that there's no state i nterest in 
stopping us from selling the car . They just want us ' to 
engage in a cir~wnvention of the statute. That's just 
wrong . 
Not when these statutes offer a way through, 
a way that allows us to be licensed as we should be as 
new· motor vehicle dealers who are not running afoul of 
Commiss i on . 
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We sent it back, this one: because we 
wanted to be able to try toge~ it resolved as quickly 
as possible . 
So whoever is the non- pre vailing party can 
make some kind of choice where they want to _go after 
this. You have both done a very credible job i n your 
presentations . And I salute both of you f or how well 
you 've presented and the nature of the a rgurents. It ' s 
a c l ose call , but we really apprecia~e the ~erk of both 
counsel, both sides ' counsel. Thank you very much. 
MR . RILEY: Thank you , Your Honor. 
JUDGE PHAN: Okay. As far as the . decision, 
these are the types of cases we try to expedite the 
decision, but bec ause of the complexity, we don't ~now. 
MR . VALENTINE: No . 
JUDGE PHAN: The decision will be issued as 
soon as possibl e . It could be 30 days, it .could be 
longer, maybe possibly s horte r, but t hat ' s how i t goes . 
At t hi s point then I'll just close the record and end 
the hearing . Thci~ks , e ve ryone. 






































the Franchise Act because we do not engage in 
indepe nde nt franchising. That ' s the constitutional 
breakthrough with this dilemma. Thank you very much. 
MR. VALENTINE: Thank you . Counsel. 
JUDGE PHAN: Thanks. Al l right. At this 
point - -
MR . PETROGEORGE : I ha ve one housekeeping 
matter , Your Honor. We just want to make sure the 
demonstratives do not come in as affirmative evidence. 
t-Je wo uld like them recognize d as something as part of 
the record for any future appeal so that they 're 
reviewable by the appellate court or at least saved by 
t he appellate court . 
JUDGE PHAN: Okay . 
MR . LIND: ~le don't have an objection. · I 
know in other cases, we "ve treated them akin to briefs, 
PowerPoint presentations . 
MR. PETROGEORGE: If we can submit that 
binder of -- volume 4 i n that vein. 
MR. VALENTINE : Similar to a bri ef , yes . 
JUDGE PHAN: So volume 4 is received. 
Anything else before we end? 
MR. VALENTINE : I .might make just one quick 
statement. This was a very, very engaging presentation 
today . We hear a lot of very interesting cases at the 
STATE, OF UTAH) 
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